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THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK 
TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY 

HUMPHREY MILFORD 

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY 



1736 



THE FOUNDATION 

or 

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

A HISTORY OF THE OSMANLIS UP TO 
THE DEATH OF BAYEZID I 
(1300 1403) 

BY 

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, Ph.D. 

SOMETIME FELLOW OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 

\ 



OXFORD 
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
1916 



A DISSERTATION 

PRESENTED TO THE 
FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY. 
ACCEPTED BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, POLITICS 
AND ECONOMICS, MAY 1914. 



PREFACE 



Four years of residence in the Ottoman Empire, 
chiefly in Constantinople, during the most disastrous 
period of its decline, have led me to investigate its 
origin. This book is written because I feel that the 
result of my research brings a new point of view to the 
student of the twentieth-century problems of the Near 
East, as well as to those who are interested in fourteenth- 
century Europe. If we study the past, it is to under- 
stand the present and to prepare for the future. 

I plead guilty to many footnotes. Much of my text 
is controversial in character, and the subject-matter is 
so little known that the general reader would hardly be 
able to form judgements without a constant — but I trust 
not wearisome — reference to authorities. 

The risk that I run of incurring criticism from Oriental 
philologists on the ground of nomenclature is very great. 
I ask their indulgence. Will they not take into con- 
sideration the fact that there is no accepted standard 
among English-speaking scholars for the transliteration 
of Turkish and Slavic names ? Wherever possible, 
I have adopted the spelling in general usage in the 
Near East, and in English standard lexicons and encyclo- 
paedias. When a general usage cannot be determined, 
I have frequently been at a loss. 

There was the effort to be as consistent in spelling 
as sources and authorities would permit. But where 



6 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



consistency was lacking in originals, a consistent trans- 
literation sometimes presented difficulties with which 
I was incompetent to cope. Even a philologist, with 
a system, would be puzzled when he found his sources 
conflicting with each other in spelling, and — as is often 
the case — with themselves. And if a philologist thinks 
that he can establish his system by transliterating the 
spoken word, let him travel from Constantinople to 
Cairo overland, and he will have a bewildering collection 
of variants before he reaches his journey's end. I was 
not long in Turkey before I learned that Osman and 
Othman were both correct. It depended merely upon 
whether you were in Constantinople or Konia ! After 
you had decided to accept the pronunciation of the 
capital, you were told that Konia is the Tours of Turkey. 

My acknowledgements to kind friends are many. I 
am grateful for the year-in and year-out patience and 
willingness of the officials of the Bibliotheque Nationale 
during long periods of constant demand upon their 
time and attention. Professors John De Witt, D.D., 
LL.D., of Princeton Theological Seminary, Duncan B. 
Macdonald, Ph.D., of Hartford Theological Seminary, 
and Edward P. Cheyney, Ph.D., LL.D., of the Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvania, have read portions of the manu- 
script, and have made important and helpful suggestions. 
The whole manuscript has been read by Professors 
Talcott Williams, LL.D., of Columbia University, and 
R. M. McElroy, Ph.D., of Princeton University, who 
have not hesitated to give many hours to discussion 
and criticism of the theory that the book presents. 

Above all, I am indebted for practical aid and 



PREFACE 



7 



encouragement in research and in writing, from the 
inception of the idea of the book until the manuscript 
went to press, to my wife, with her Bryn Mawr insistence 
upon accuracy of detail and care for form of narrative, 
and to Alexander Souter, D.Litt., Regius Professor of 
Humanity in Aberdeen University, my two comrades 
in research through a succession of happy years in 
the rue de Richelieu, rue Servandoni, and rue du 
Montparnasse of the queen city of the world. 

H. A. G. 

Pabis, 
September 1, 1915. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

OSMAN : A New Race appears in History . . 11 

CHAPTER II 

ORKHAN : A New Nation is Formed and comes into 

Contact with the Western World ... 54 

CHAPTER III 

MURAD : The Osmanlis lay the Foundations of an 

Empire in Europe . . . . .110 

CHAPTER IV 

BAYEZID : The Osmanlis Inherit the Byzantine 

Empire 180 

APPENDIX A 

Traditional Misconceptions of the Origin of the 

Osmanlis and their Empire . . . 263 

APPENDIX B 

The Emirates of Asia Minor during the Fourteenth 

Century ........ 277 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES ..... 303 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....... 319 

INDEX . . 369 



MAPS 

PAGE 

1. Conquests op Murad and Bayezid in the Balkan 

Peninsula and of Bayezid in Asia Minor Frontispiece 

2. The Emirate op Osman ...... 31 

3. The Emirates op Osman and Orkhan ... 67 

4. The Emirate of Murad . . . . .113 

5. Timur's Invasion of Asia Minor . . . 247 

6. The Emirates of Asia Minor in the Fourteenth 

Century 278 



CHAPTER I 



OSMAN 

A NEW RACE APPEARS IN HISTORY 
I 

The traveller who desires to penetrate Asia Minor by 
railway may start either from Smyrna or from Constanti- 
nople. The Constantinople terminus of the Anatolian Rail- 
way is at Hai'dar Pasha, on the Asiatic shore, where the 
Bosphorus opens into the Sea of Marmora. Three hours 
along the Gulf of Ismidt, past the Princes' Islands, brings 
one to Ismidt, the ancient Nicomedia, eastern capital of 
the Roman Empire under Diocletian. It is at the very end 
of the gulf. From Ismidt, the railway crosses a fertile plain, 
coasts the western shore of Lake Sabandja, and enters the 
valley of the Sangarius as far as Lefke. Here it turns 
southward, and mounts rapidly the course of the Kara Su, 
a tributary of the Sangarius, through the picturesque town 
of Biledjik, to a plateau, at the north-western end of which 
is Eski Sheir, seven hours distant from Ismidt. Eski Sheir 
is the ancient Dorylaeum. It was here that Godfrey de 
Bouillon in 1097 won from the Turks the victory that 
opened for his Crusaders the way through Asia Minor. 

From Eski Shei'r there are two railway lines. One, running 
eastward, has its terminus at Angora, the ancient Ancyra, 
after thirteen hours of rather slow running. The other, the 
main line, runs south to Anon Kara Hissar, where the line 
from Smyrna joins it, and then south-west to Konia, the 
ancient Iconium, which is the western terminus of the new 
Bagdad Railway. The time from Eski Sheir to Konia is 
fifteen hours. 



12 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



From Lefke or from Mekedje, near the junction of the 
Kara Su and the Sangarius, one can drive in four hours 
west to Isnik (ancient Nicaea), or in twelve hours to Brusa, 
which lies at the foot of Keshish Dagh (Mount Olympus). 
Between Lefke and Eski Sheir, where the railway begins 
to mount above the river-bed of the Kara Su, is Biledjik. 
Between Eski Sheir and Biledjik is Sugut. West from Eski 
Sheir, six hours on horse across one low mountain range, 
lies Inoenu. South from Eski Sheir, a day by carriage, is 
Kutayia. There is a short branch line of the Anatolian 
Railway to Kutayia from Alayund, two and a half hours 
beyond Eski Sheir on the way to Konia. 

If one will read the above paragraphs with a map before 
him, he will readily see that this country, the extreme 
north-western corner of Asia Minor, corresponds roughly to 
the borderland between the Roman provinces of Phrygia 
Epictetus and Bithynia, and is near to Constantinople. 
Eski Sheir, Sugut, and Biledjik are close to Brusa, Nicaea, 
and Nicomedia. Owing to the convenient waterways 
furnished by the Gulfs of Mudania and Ismidt, Brusa, 
Nicaea, and Nicomedia have always been within a day's 
sail of Constantinople, even in the periods of primitive 
navigation. From the hills behind Eski Sheir, Mount 
Olympus is the commanding landmark of the western 
horizon. From Constantinople, Mount Olympus is easily 
distinguishable even in dull weather. 

It was this country, adjacent to Constantinople, and 
separated from the rest of Asia Minor by rugged mountain 
ranges and the dreary, treeless plateau stretching eastward 
towards the Salt Desert, which gave birth to the people 
who, a century after their appearance, were to inherit the 
Byzantine Empire and to place their sovereigns upon the 
throne of the Caesars. 



OSMAN 



13 



II 

At the end of the thirteenth century, Asia Minor, so long 
the battleground between the Khalifs and the Byzantines, 
almost entirely abandoned by the latter for a brief time to 
the Seljuk emperors of Rum, who had their seat at Konia, 
then again disturbed by the invasion of the Crusaders from 
the west and the Mongols from the east, was left to itself. 
The Byzantines, despite (or perhaps because of !) their 
re-establishment at Constantinople, were too weak to make 
any serious attempt to recover what they had lost to the 
Seljuk Turks. The Mongols of the horde of Djenghiz Khan 
had destroyed the independence of the Sultanate of Konia, 
and had established their authority in that city. But they 
made no real effort to bring under their dominion the 
districts north-west and west of Konia to which they had 
logically fallen heir. 

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, we find two 
Christian kingdoms, Trebizond and Little Armenia, or Cilicia, 
at the north-eastern and south-eastern extremities of the 
peninsula. In the north-western corner, the Byzantines 
retained Philadelphia, Brusa, Nicaea, Nicomedia, and the 
districts in which these cities were located — a narrow strip 
along the Hellespont, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bos- 
phorus. Asia Minor, without even a semblance of centralized 
authority, was to him who could gain and who could hold. 

Had there been in Asia Minor in the latter half of the 
thirteenth century a predominant element, with an historical 
past and with a strong leader, we might have seen a revival 
of the sultanate of Konia. Or we might have seen a revival 
of Hellenism, a grafting, perhaps, on fresh stock, which 
would have put new foundations under the Byzantine 
Empire by a reconquest of the Asiatic themes. But the 
Mongols and the Crusaders had done their work too well. 
The Latins at Constantinople, and the Mongols in Persia 



14 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and Mesopotamia, had removed any possibility of a revival 
of either Arab Moslem or Greek Christian traditions. 

Sixty years of Latin rule at Constantinople, and in the 
lower portion of the Balkan peninsula, had demonstrated 
the futility of any further effort on the part of western 
Europe to inherit the Eastern Roman Empire. The Mongols, 
the strongest cohesive military power at that time in the 
world, had not been won to Christianity, and thus inspired 
with a desire to re-establish for themselves the succession 
of the Caesars in the Levant. 1 The Italians, imbued with 
the city ideal which had been so fatal to the ancient Greeks, 
and divided into factions in their cities, were beginning 
a bitter struggle for commercial supremacy in the East that 
was to lose its vital importance from the discoveries of 
Vasco da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan, and to render 
them impotent before the Osmanlis after centuries of mis- 
directed energy and useless sacrifice. The last great crusade 
had passed by Asia Minor to spend itself in a losing fight 
against the one remaining Moslem power. 

As in other critical periods of history, then, an entirely 
new people, with an entirely new line of sovereigns, must 
work out its destiny in this abandoned country, or — 
to state what actually did happen — must come, with a 
strength and prestige gained in Europe, to subdue it and 
to possess it. 

From the eighth to the thirteenth centuries a number 
of new ethnic elements had entered Asia Minor. Except 
along the range of the Taurus and in the valleys of rivers 
which emptied into the Aegaean Sea, the Greek element, 

1 The Keraites, a tribe of large numbers, established on the frontier of 
China, were Christians in the early times : Resheddin, Quatremere edition, 
i. 93. The Council of Lyons sent missionaries to Mongols in the reign of 
Innocent IV, 1245. For account of missions to Mongols in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries see Howorth, i. 68 f., 189-92 ; ii. 183 n. ; iii. 72-5, 
278-81, 348-55, 576-80: also documents of the Ming period, trans, by 
Hirth, p. 65. 



OSMAN 



15 



or more specifically, the Hellenic organization of imperial 
institutions, had gone back to the coast cities from which 
it had originally come. The progress of Moslem conquest, 
after driving before it into Asia Minor the more zealous 
and militant Armenian and Syrian Christians, had brought 
a considerable immigration, partly Syrian, partly Arab, and 
varying in faith. The earlier Turks, who came largely by 
way of Persia, with a period of settlement in that country, 
belonged to the great Seljuk movement. They were 
nominally Moslems, and very quickly became an indigenous 
element, because they had settled themselves permanently 
in every place that had been opened up to Turkish immigra- 
tion by the Seljuk armies. So firmly rooted did they become 
that, when the fortunes of war allotted again temporarily 
some of the places which they inhabited to the Crusaders 
and to the Nicaean Byzantines, they did not dream of 
moving out. This was the best country they had ever seen 
and they had no intention of leaving it. When the Osmanlis 
captured Brusa and Nicaea, they found many Moslems who 
had been there for three generations. Simple-minded, 
tolerant of others, totally unconscious of the privileges as 
well as of the obligations of an organized society, the Turks 
of the earlier immigration neither opposed nor aided in the 
political changes which have so frequently been the lot of 
Asia Minor since their coming. This holds true of the 
Anatolian Turks of the present day, and will be so as long 
as they remain illiterate and uninstructed. 

In the first quarter of the thirteenth century there was 
another great migration towards Asia Minor, towards rather 
than into the peninsula, because it partly scattered itself 
in the mountains of Armenia and partly turned southward, 
going over the Taurus and Amanus ranges into Cilicia and 
Syria. Some got as far as Egypt. The earlier Seljuk 
invasion had been that of settlers following a victorious 
army. This invasion was that of refugees fleeing before 



16 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



a terrible foe. For Djenghiz Khan and his Mongol horde 
had come out of central Asia, and all who could, even the 
bravest, fled before him. The lesson had been quickly 
learned that to resist him meant certain death. Because 
it was a migration of families, with all their worldly posses- 
sions, and because they had to hurry and did not know 
where they were going, the great bulk of them did not 
advance far. 1 

Most of the bands, after settling for some years in the 
mountains of Armenia and in the upper valley of the 
Euphrates, were tempted by the death of Djenghiz Khan 
to return home. The steep mountains and narrow valleys 
of Rum had dissuaded them from trying for better luck 
farther west. It was too much up hill and down dale for 
their cattle. 2 The resolute and adventurous pushed on into 
Asia Minor, although in doing so they must have lost or 
have left behind most of their women and children and 
flocks. For they were small warrior bands, bent upon 
enlisting in the army of Alaeddin Kai Kobad, the last 
illustrious sultan of the Konia Seljuk line — illustrious because 
he had not yet met the Mongols and was looked upon by 
the fugitives as a possible saviour and avenger. Even if 
they had not the intention of putting themselves under the 
protection of Alaeddin when they set their faces westward, 
they must needs have come into contact with him. For 
of the two roads into Asia Minor from Armenia, the upper 
one lay through Sivas and Angora, and the lower through 
Caesarea, Akserai, and Konia. Whichever route they took 
would lead them through the Seljuk dominions. 

It is doubtful if Alaeddin viewed the appearance of these 

1 I have witnessed a similar migration, when the Bulgarians broke into 
Thrace in October 1912. The progress of the fleeing Turks, even on the 
plains, was painfully slow, and the mortality was frightful. 

2 Neshri (Noldeke's translation), in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgen- 
Uindischen Gesellschaft, xiii. 190. 



OSMAN 



17 



fighting bands with any other emotion than that of alarm. 
In spite of their undoubted skill as fighters, the Seljuk 
Sultan did not dare to enroll many of them in his army. 
If he were defeated in battle, or if he should die, he knew 
well that such vigorous mercenaries might upset his line. 
He could rely upon their fidelity neither against the Kha- 
resmians with whom he was at that time fighting (many of 
them were from that Sultan's country), nor against the 
Mongols with whom he must soon measure his strength. 
So he followed the policy dictated by prudence. Resist- 
ing the temptation of using them in his own army, he 
granted to their leaders as. fiefs districts on the frontiers of 
his rapidly diminishing empire which were hardly his own 
to give, where they would have to work out their own 
salvation by mastering local anarchy in their respective 
1 grants or, like the Israelites of Canaan, fight for what 
had been allotted to them, against the Byzantine Emperors 
of Nicaea. 

Under these circumstances, the tribe of destiny would be 
that which occupied the grant nearest Constantinople and 
the remnant of the Byzantine Empire. The Turkish tribe 
which settled on the borders of Bithynia, either by the 
direction and with the permission of Alaeddin Kai Kobad, 1 
or independently of the Seljuks of Konia, 2 was that whose 
first historic chief was Osman, the father of the Osmanlis. 

With the other Turkish tribes, which succeeded in estab- 
lishing independent emirates, the Osmanlis did not come 
into contact until the reign of Orkhan. So it is unnecessary 
I to trace their fortunes here. 3 

Ill 

There are no Ottoman sources to which the historian may 
go for the origin of the Ottoman people and royal house, 

1 Seadeddin, Casa Ottomana (Bratutti trans.), i. 6. 

2 Neshri, xiii. 190. 3 See Appendix B for these emirates. 
1736 B 



is 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



or for their history during the fourteenth century. They 
have no written records of the period before the capture of 
Constantinople. 1 Their earliest historians date from the end 
of the fifteenth century, and the two writers to whom they 
give greatest weight wrote at the end of the sixteenth and 
the early part of the seventeenth century. 2 From the point 
of view, then, of recording historical facts, one hesitates in 
our day to follow the example of von Hammer, by setting 
forth at length, after a scientific collation, the legends which 
the simple-minded Osmanlis have always accepted without 
question. The Byzantines give us nothing worthy of cre- 
dence about the origin of the Osmanlis, for the reason that 
they had no means of getting authoritative information. 
As for the early European writers, their testimony is valuable 
only as a reflection of the idea which Christendom had of 
the Osmanlis when they were becoming a menace to Euro* 
pean civilization. 3 

On the other hand, these legends are not to be ignored, as 
they have been by the latest authoritative writer on Ottoman 
history. 4 Where authenticated facts are lacking, traditions 
must be examined and carefully weighed. This is essential 
when we are considering the origins of a people. For no 
race has ever recorded its birth. The beginnings of a people 
are so insignificant that they remain unnoticed in general 
history until the attention of others is attracted to them 
by their own achievements. 

1 There is a collection of State papers in Persian, Arabic and Turkish, 
Feridun (Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. turc, 79), which contains some letters and 
decrees of the earliest sultans, but there is no proof of the authenticity 
of these documents. 

2 Neshri and Idris, end fifteenth century; Seadeddin, end sixteenth 
century ; Hadji Khalfa, seventeenth century. See Bibliography. 

3 In the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, I have examined, as far as 
I know, all the books concerning Turkey printed before 1600. See list 
in Bibliography. 

4 Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (in the Geschichte der euro- 
paischen Staaten), published 1908-13, preface and i. 152-3. 



OSMAN 



I!) 



Who were the people that took upon themselves the name 
of Osman, their chief, and whom we must, from the moment 
of their very first encounters with the Byzantines, clearly 
distinguish from the other groups of Anatolian Turks that 
had gathered around other leaders ? Did they, at the 
beginning of Osman's career, have any distinct national 
consciousness ? Did they have any past ? Did they start 
the foundation of a state with a definite goal before them ? 
Was there any other cause for their amazing growth and 
success than the mere fact that they had the most fortu- 
nate geographical position, on the confines of a decaying 
empire ? 

With the purpose, then, of suggesting an answer to some 
of these questions, and paving the way for an answer to 
the others later on, what the Osmanlis accept concerning 
their origin and their history before 1300 must be set forth 
and examined. 1 

In the year of the Hegira 616, 2 ' because there was no 
more rest to be found in all Persia 5 for the Turks who had 
been forced out of the Khorassan 3 by the approach of 
Djenghiz Khan, ' all the wandering Turks, fifty thousand 

1 Up to the death of Ertogrul (1288), I follow Neshri, ZDMG., xiii. 188- 
98, unless otherwise specified. Direct quotation is indicated by quotation 
marks. 

2 a.d. 1219. Evliya effendi, i. 27, gives a.h. 600 ; Seadeddin and Hadji 
Khalfa, a.h. 619 ; Drechsler, Chron. Saracenorum, a.h. 610. 

3 Or Kharesm ? Schefer, in preface to his translation of Riza Kouly's 
embassy to Kharesm, Bibl. de VEcole des langues viv. orientates, l re serie, 
vol. iii, says that Kharesm in part was identical with Khorassan. But 
Shehabeddin, trans, by Quatremere in Notices et Extraits, xiii. 289, declares 
that Kharesm is a country distinct from Khorassan. Hadji Khalfa, 
Djihannuma, MS. fr., Bibl. Nat., Paris, nouv. ac, no. 888, p. 815, supports 
this opinion. The very fact that these writers are so careful to make this 
assertion shows, however, that there was much confusion as to these terms. 
According to Vambery, Kharesm is still in Djagatai Turkish, the diplo- 
matical and political name for the modern Khanate of Khiva. Ho worth, 
History of Mongols, ii. 78, says that the Turkish tribes remained in these 
countries after the Mongol conquest. Is this the Organa or Urgheuz of 
Marco Polo ? 

B 2 



20 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



families, followed their leader, Soleiman Shah, 1 and set out 
for Rum. Then was Alaeddin I, son of Kai Kosrew, the 
builder of Konia, entered upon the rule of Rum. These 
fifty thousand nomad families journeyed several years in 
the neighbourhood of Erzerum and Erzindjian, changing 
from winter to summer quarters and plundering the un- 
believers who lived there. But . . . finally . . . Soleiman 
Shah marched again towards his homeland, with the inten- 
tion of passing through the district of Aleppo. As they 
came to the neighbourhood of Djaber, they wanted to 
venture across the Euphrates. Soleiman Shah drove his 
horse into the river to seek a ford. The bank was rocky, 
so the horse slipped and fell into the river with Soleiman 
Shah. His end was regarded as a warning (decision) of 
destiny : it appeared to be the command of God. ... A part 
of these Turks remained to dwell there. . . . There was 
a division among the followers of Soleiman Shah. Some of 
them, who now carry the name of Turcomans of Syria, went 
into the wilderness. Others went towards Rum, and became 
ancestors of the nomad tribes who still wander in Rum. 

* Soleiman Shah at his death left four sons : Sonkur tigin, 
Gundogdu, Ertogrul, the champion of the faith, 2 and Dundar. 
Some of the Turks followed these four brothers, turned 
themselves again in the direction of Rum, and came to 
the . . . source of the Euphrates. While Ertogrul and 
Dundar remained there with about four hundred nomad 
families, the two other brothers turned back again to their 
home.' Ertogrul marched farther into Rum, and settled 
near Angora at the foot of Karadjadagh. From there he 
wandered to Sultan Oejoenu. 3 

1 Hussein Hezarfenn, ii. 287, and Chalcocondylas (Patr. Graec, Migne, 
vol clix). 21, call the father of Ertogrul Oguzalp. For critical discussion 

see Appendix A. 

2 This title is invariably given by Neshri to every ruler in the direct line of 
Osman, just as he calls the Christian opponents of the Osmanlis unbelievers. 

3 Probably Sultan Inoenu, anticipating the later name of this district 



OSMAN 



21 



Neshri now tells a story which is repeated by later Otto- 
man historians as a fact. Neshri says that he heard this 
story from a ' trustworthy 5 man, who had heard it from 
the stirrup -holder of Orkhan, who, in turn, had heard it 
from his father and his grandfather. This is worthy of 
mention, for it is one of the very few instances where an 
Oriental historian has taken the trouble to connect his facts 
with what might be termed an original source : 

' As Ertogrul, with about four hundred men, was marching 
into Rum, Sultan Alaeddin 1 was engaged in a fight with 
some of his enemies. As they came near, they found that 
the Tartars were on the point of beating Sultan Alaeddin. 
Now Ertogrul had several hundred excellent companions 
with him. He spoke to them : " Friends, we come straight 
upon a battle. We carry swords at our side. To flee like 
women and resume our journey is not manly. We must 
help one of the two. Shall we aid those who are winning 
or those who are losing ? " Then they said unto him, " It 
will be difficult to aid the losers. Our people are weak in 
number, and the victors are strong ! " Ertogrul replied, 
" This is not the speech of bold men. The manly part is 
to aid the vanquished. The prophet says that he shall 
come to the helpless in time of need. Were man to make 
a thousand pilgrimages, he finds not the reward that comes 
to him when at the right moment he turns aside affliction 
from the helpless ! " Thereupon Ertogrul and his followers 
immediately grasped their swords, and fell upon the Tartars 
. . . and drove them in flight. When the Sultan saw this 
he came to meet Ertogrul, who dismounted, and kissed the 
Sultan's hand. Whereupon Alaeddin gave him a splendid 
robe of honour and many gifts for his companions. Then 
gave he to the people of Ertogrul a country by name Sugut 

1 Sagredo, the Italian historian, whose work was greatly esteemed by 
Gibbon, makes the curious error of calling Alaeddin ' Lord of Aleppo and 
Damascus '. 



22 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



for winter and the mountain range of Dumanij 1 for summer 
residence. From this decides one rightly that the champion 
of the faith, Osman, was born at Sugut. Then was Karadja 
Hissar, like Biledjik, not yet captured, but was subject to 
Sultan Alaeddin. These were three districts.' 

Some time later, Ertogrul, acting as commander of the 
advance-guard of Alaeddin's army, defeated a force of 
Greeks and their Tartar mercenaries, in a three days' battle, 
and pursued them as far as the Hellespont. Ertogrul 's 
force consisted of four hundred and forty-four horsemen, 
which he commanded in person. After this battle Alaeddin 
bestowed upon Ertogrul as fief the district of Eski Sheir, 
comprising Sugut on the north, and Karadja Hissar on the 
south, of Eski Sheir. Karadja Hissar was reported captured 
after an elaborate siege and assault by Ertogrul when he 
first came into the country. But it is again mentioned as 
one of the first conquests of Osman from the Christians 
after his father's death. 2 None of the Ottoman historians 
records any progress of conquest during the long years of 
Ertogrul's peaceable existence. When he died, in 1288, 
Osman was thirty years old. He gave to his son less than 
the Ottoman historians claim was his actual grant from 
Alaeddin I. If their own records of Osman's conquests 
after 1289 are correct, we must believe that his tribe 
possessed only Sugut and a portion of the mountain range 
lying directly west. When Ertogrul died, they had no other 
village — not even a small mountain castle. 

IV 

After Ertogrul's death there was an amazing change. 
Osman and his villagers began to attack their neighbours, 

1 A great mountain situated between Kutayia and BrUsa ' : Hadji 
Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1975 ; ' The paths up this mountain are so difficult 
that one on foot has a thousand pains to reach the top ' : ibid., fol. 1850. 

2 Rasmussen, Annahs Islamici, p. 41, confuses this city with Kutayia, 
and gives its capture by Ertogrul under date of 1285. 



OSMAN 



23 



extend their boundaries, and form a state. We cannot go 
on to a consideration of these events without mentioning 
some traditions of this period which furnish us with a clue 
to the explanation of this sudden change of a very small 
pastoral tribe, leading a harmless sleepy existence in the 
valley of the Kara Su, into a warlike, aggressive, fighting 
people. 

Osman once passed the night in the home of a pious 
Moslem. Before he went to sleep his host entered the room, 
and placed on a shelf a book, of which Osman asked the 
title. ' It is the Koran,' he responded. ' What is its 
object ? ' again asked Osman. ' The Koran ', his host 
explained, ' is the word of God, given to the world through 
his prophet Mohammed.' Osman took the book and began 
to read. He remained standing, and read all night. Towards 
morning he fell asleep exhausted. An angel appeared to 
him, and said, ' Since thou hast read my eternal word with 
so great respect, thy children and the children of thy 
children shall be honoured from generation to generation.' 1 

In Itburnu, a village not far from Eski Shei'r, and also 
not far from Sugut, lived a Moslem cadi, who dispensed 
justice and legal advice to those of his faith in that neigh- 
bourhood. He had a daughter, Malkhatun, whose hand was 
demanded in marriage by Osman. But the sheik Edebali, 
for a period of two years, persisted in refusing his consent 
to this union. 2 Finally, Osman, when sleeping one night in 
the home of Edebali, had a dream. 

He saw himself lying beside the sheik. A moon arose 

1 Thus in Ali and Neshri. Seadeddin attributes this dream to Ertogrul. 
But the confusion between Ertogrul and Osman is marked in all the 
Ottoman historians. 

2 The Ottoman historians give as reason for the refusal the social 
difference between his daughter and the ' young prince '. This is an 
excellent illustration of how, writing in the zenith of Ottoman prosperity, 
the historians lost their sense of proportion or were actually compelled 
to write in nattering terms of the founder of their royal house. 



24 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



out of the breast of Edebali, and, when it had become full, 
descended and hid itself in his breast. Then from his own 
loins there began to arise a tree which, as it grew, became 
greener and more beautiful, and covered with the shadow 
of its branches the whole world. Beneath the tree he saw 
four mountain ranges, the Caucasus, the Atlas, the Taurus, 
and the Balkans. From the roots of the tree issued forth 
the Tigris, the Euphrates, the Nile, and the Danube, covered 
with vessels like the sea. The fields were full of harvests, 
and the mountains were crowned with thick forests. In 
the valleys everywhere were cities, whose golden domes 
were invariably surmounted by a crescent, and from whose 
countless minarets sounded forth the call to prayer, that 
mingled itself with the chattering of birds upon the branches 
of the tree. The leaves of the tree began to lengthen out 
into swordblades. Then came a wind that pointed the 
leaves towards the city of Constantinople, which, ' situated 
at the junction of two seas and of two continents, seemed 
like a diamond mounted between two sapphires and two 
emeralds, and appeared thus to form the precious stone of 
the ring of a vast dominion which embraced the entire 
world.' As Osman was putting on the ring he awoke. 1 

When this dream was told to Edebali, he interpreted it 
as a sign from God that he should give his daughter to 
Osman in order that these wonderful things might be brought 
about for the glory of the true faith. So the marriage was 
arranged. 2 

1 Hammer, i. 67, in relating this dream, has transcribed with fidelity 
and felicity the Persian poetry of Idris. 

2 Leimclavius, Pandectes, p. 113, following Ali, attributes the moon 
dream to Ertogrul, and places it at Konia. Boeder, Commentarius de 
rebus turcicis, pp. 104-5, following Chalcocondylas, does likewise, but 
relates the Koran dream of Osman. Seadeddin, p. 11, makes the dream 
distinctly religious, and while not mentioning the love story or Malkhatun 
by name, infers that Osman receives intimation of his marriage with 
Edebali's daughter only through Edebali's interpretation of the dream. 
This failure to mention Malkhatun is all the more significant when we see 



OSMAN 



25 



That Osman and his people were good Moslems them- 
selves, and of Moslem ancestry, is not questioned by the 
Ottoman and Byzantine writers, and seems to have been 
accepted as a matter of fact by the European historians 
who have written upon the history of the Ottoman Empire. 1 
But it seems very clear that Osman and his tribe, when 
they settled at Sugut, must have been pagans. There is 
no direct mention, in any historical record, of the conversion 
to Islam of the tribes from the Khorassan and other trans- 
oxanian regions which, in the beginning of the thirteenth 
century, appeared on the confines of Asia Minor. The 
earlier Turkish invaders entered the country only after they 
had already for generations been in contact with Arabic 
Islam. Although they displayed no great knowledge of or 
zeal for their religion and were free from the fanaticism of 
the Saracens, the Seljuks were certainly Moslems. 

But the Turks of the later immigration, from whom Osman 
sprang, had never come to any great extent under the 
influence of Islam, even though they had settled for some 
generations on the frontiers of Persia. If we accept the 
testimony of the Osmanlis themselves concerning their 
descent from Soleiman Shah, who had left Mahan with fifty 
thousand families, we have a clear indication of their being 
non-Moslems from Neshri's account of the dispersion of this 
horde after the death of Soleiman Shah. He says that some 
were ancestors of the Syrian Turcomans and others of all 
the wandering tribes in Rum — the habitual nomads of his 

later how much attention Seadeddin gives to Nilufer. Evliya effendi, 
ii. 19, says that through the marriage of Osman to Malkhatun, the Otto- 
man sultans became descendants of the Prophet ! 

1 I should except from this statement Rambaud, who, in Hist, generate, 
hi. 832-4, states that the conversion of the Osmanlis to Islam took place 
dur g the chieftainship of Osman. The general character of the work 
to Tich he was contributing, and the limits of space, did not allow him 
to gm^i any reasons in support of this position. Vanell, Histoire de V Empire 
otto Tin, p. 357, says that Ertogrul was a pagan until he became converted 
through reading the Koran. 



26 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



own day. The testimony of travellers from the twelfth 
century onwards is overwhelming in support of the pagan 
character of these tribes. 1 

The various Turkish tribes which entered Asia Minor at 
the same time as that of Osman, and had penetrated into 
the western part of the peninsula, soon found themselves 
in a Moslem atmosphere. They were few in number. 
Nothing was more natural for them than to adopt the faith 
of their Seljuk kinsmen. This they did, for exactly the same 
reason that the Bulgarians, although they had originally 
a tendency towards Islam, adopted Christianity. 2 It was 
so natural that it passed without comment. These Turks 
were primarily warriors, indifferent to deep religious feeling 
and conviction. So they could take on a new faith — if we 
can say that they ever had a faith before — without any 
trouble or without any noise being made over it. Between 
800 and 1000 the Seljuks changed their religion three times. 3 
At the sack of Mosul, in 1286, the Turks and Turcomans made 
no distinction between Moslem and Christian, massacring the 
men and carrying off the women of both sects alike. 4 

The tract ability of the Turks, as of the Tartars and 
Mongols, in the matter of religion was noted by every 
traveller, and was so well known in western Europe that 
strenuous efforts were made by the popes at various times 
from Djenghiz Khan to Gazan Khan to bring these Asiatic 
hordes into the Christian fold. A united Christendom, even 
a united Rome, might have seen its missionary work crowned 
with success. 

1 From personal acquaintance with them, I can testify that these nomads 
(Yuruks) have remained up to the twentieth century with only the most 
vague idea of Mohammed and with no idea at all of the Koran and the 
ritual observances of Islam. 

2 See Shehabeddin, MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., fonds arabe 2325, folin/e6 7 o_ 
70 r°, citing Mesoudi and earlier writers for the propagation of IslanwhatVng 
the Bulgarians. ,ivett~ j 

3 Cf. Cahun's masterly contribution to Hist, generale, ii. 887. wapj 

4 Abul Farad j, Chronicon Syr., pp. 606-8. 



OSMAN 



27 



Of the village and castle chieftains with whom Osman at 
the beginning of his career lived on friendly terms, almost 
every one was a Christian. His lot was cast with them. 
He was cut off from the decaying Seljuk dominion of Konia. 
He had practically no intercourse with the other Turkish 
emirs of Asia Minor. 1 His only serious foes were the Mongols, 
pagans like himself, who had, at the very year of his birth, 
given what seemed a death-blow to Islam in destroying the 
Khalifate at Bagdad in 1258, and who were, when Osman 
began his active career, plotting with the Franks of the 
Holy Land to aid them against the Egyptian sultanate — 
the last strong bulwark of Islam. 

We see, then, the tremendous importance of these dreams 
of Osman, of his meeting with Edebali, and of his marriage 
with Malkhatun. We cannot regard these events in any 
other light than as recording, in a truly Oriental way, his 
conversion to Islam. The interpretation of the dream of 
the Holy Book strikes one immediately. Except in Sea- 
deddin, the religious significance of the moon and tree dream 
is overshadowed by the romance of Osman and Malkhatun. 
Let us give to sheik Edebali his proper place in history as 
the great missionary of Islam, who found for his faith in 
its hour of dire need a race of swordbearers worthy of the 
task of reconstituting the Khalifate and of spreading once 
more the name of Mohammed in three continents. 

It was the conversion of Osman and his tribe which gave 
birth to the Osmanli people, because it welded into one 
race the various elements living in the north-western corner 
of Asia Minor. The new faith gave them a raison d'etre. 
This conversion, and not the disappearance of the Seljuks 
of Konia, 2 is the explanation of the activity of Osman after 

1 The Ottoman historians mention none, either of friendship or enmity, 
during the entire life of Osman. 

2 The improbable connexion between Ertogrul and Osman and the Seljuk 
sovereigns of Konia has been accepted without question by European 



28 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



1290, as in sharp contrast with the preceding fifty years 1 
of easy, slothful existence at Sugut. 

Ertogrul and Osman, village chieftain at Sugut, had lived 
the life of a simple, pastoral folk, with no ambition beyond 
the horizon of their little village. No record exists of any 
battle fought, of any conquest made. Turks had already 
made their appearance in raids against the coast cities of 
Asia Minor, upon the islands of the Aegaean Sea, and even 
in the Balkan peninsula. But they were not the Turks of 
Osman. Until the students of the later Byzantine Empire, 
and of the Italian commercial cities in their relations with 
the Levant, make a clear distinction between Turk and 
Osmanli, there will always be confusion upon this point. 
Ertogrul had about four hundred fighting men. 2 There is 
no reason to believe that Osman had more. His relations 
with his neighbours were those of perfect amity. 3 There is 
no question of believer and unbeliever. 

Suddenly we find Osman attacking his neighbours and 
capturing their castles. During the decade from 1290 to 
1300 he extends his boundaries until he comes into contact 

historians, on the strength of the assertions of the Ottoman historians. 
This is curious, because the evidence against this connexion is over- 
whelming. The Seljuk Empire of Rum lost its independence at the battle 
of Erzindjian, 1244 (cf. Heyd, Histoire du commerce dans le Levant, i. 534). 
Neshri himself confesses that after this date ' now remained only the bare 
name of the Seljuk Kings ' : ZDMG., xiii. 195. In view of the established 
facts of history, it is astonishing that European historians should have up 
to this time perpetuated, and given their sanction to, a fiction which was 
invented for the purpose of helping Mohammed II to incorporate 
Karamania in his empire ! The limits of a footnote forbidding the 
adequate discussion of this question and the citation of the authorities, 
I must refer my readers to Appendix A. 

1 Neshri, ZDMG., xiii. 196, says seventy years. But in his reckoning he 
constantly contradicts himself. Sheir means city, esJci old, and yeni new. 

2 All the Ottoman historians agree upon this number. 

3 ' The unbelievers and believers of that land honoured Ertogrul and his 
son ' : Neshri, p. 197. That Christians lived everywhere without molesta- 
tion in the midst of non-converted Turkish tribes is asserted by Heyd, 
ii. 65. 



OSMAN 



29 



with the Byzantines. His four hundred warriors grow to 
four thousand. We begin to hear of a people called, not 
Turks, but Osmanlis, after a leader whose own name first 
appears at the same time as that of his people. 1 They are 
foes of Greeks and Tartars alike. They are definitely allied 
to Islam. They possess a missionary spirit and a desire to 
proselytize such as one always finds in new converts. Their 
unity among themselves, and their distinctively different 
character from that of the other Turks of Asia Minor, 
becomes, during the first sixty years of the fourteenth 
century, so marked that Europe is forced to recognize them 
as a nation. Being more in the presence of Europe than 
the other groups of Asia Minor, the Europeans begin to 
call them simply Turks, and to take them as representing 
all the Turks of Anatolia. 

But they had never called themselves Turks until they 
got the habit of doing so through the influence of European 
education upon their higher classes, and because of the 
awakening since 1789 of the sentiment of nationality among 
the subject Christian races. Mouradjea d'Ohsson, who 
understood the Osmanlis better than any other European 
writer of his day, wrote in 1785 : 'The Osmanlis employ 
the term " Turk " in referring to a coarse and brutal man. 
According to the Osmanlis, the word Turk belongs only to 
the peoples of the Turkestan and to those vagabond hordes 
who lead a stagnant life in the deserts of the Khorassan. 
All the peoples submitted to the Empire are designated 
under the name " Osmanlis and they do not understand 
why they are called Turks by Europeans. As they attach to 
this word the idea of the most marked insult, no foreigner in 
the Empire ever allows himself to use it in speaking to them.' 2 

1 It is altogether likely that Osman received his name at the time of 
his conversion. Is it not significant that his father, his brothers, his son 
even, as well as most of his warriors, had purely pagan Turkish names ? 

2 Tableau de P Empire ottoman, iv. 373. 



30 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



V 

Nor were the Osmanlis, until the reign of Bayezid, one 
hundred years later, the strongest military and political 
factor in Asia Minor. The Turkish emirates of Sarukhan, 
of Kermian, and especially of Karaman, could match the 
Osmanlis in extent of territory and ability to defend it. 1 
We shall see later how the Osmanlis conquered their Ana- 
tolian neighbours by a prestige won in Europe and by 
soldiers gathered in Europe. One of the principal tasks of 
this book is to correct the fundamental misconception of the 
foundation of the Ottoman Empire, which has persisted to 
this day. 2 It seems to be a pretty generally accepted idea 
that the Osmanlis were a Turkish Moslem race, who invaded 
Asia Minor, and, having established themselves there, pushed 
on into Europe and overthrew the Byzantine Empire. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Osmanlis 
were masters of the whole Balkan peninsula before they 
had subjugated Asia Minor as far as Konia ! 
4)sman and his people have no history until they come 
in contact with the Byzantines. The Ottoman chroniclers, 
and the Byzantine and European historians who have 
followed them, give at some length the early conquests of 
Osman. But the accounts are fantastical, obscure, and 
frequently contradictory. It is the story of a village chief- 
tain, who succeeded in imposing his authority upon his 
neighbours over an increasingly wider area, until a small 
state was formed. But it is not the same story as that of 
the other emirs who built up independent states in the old 
Seljuk provinces. For Osman founded his principality in 
territory contiguous to Constantinople, and by attacking 

1 See Appendix B. 

2 During the late war with the Balkan allies, the newspapers of the 
world spoke of ' driving the Turks back to Asia, where they belong ', and 
of the re-establishment of the Ottoman capital at Brnsa or Konia ! 



32 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and conquering the last fragments of the Byzantine posses- 
sions along and in the hinterland of the Bosphorus and the 
Sea of Marmora. Osman's opponents were all Christians. 
Had he attacked his Turkish neighbours first, had he gone 
south and east instead of north and west, in building up 
his state, there would never have been a new race born to 
change the history of the world. 

It is impossible to state with any degree of certitude the 
conquests of Osman before 1300. The record of village 
warfare, with its names of localities which even the most 
celebrated Ottoman geographer could not, three centuries 
later, identify, 1 is of no importance whatever. The extent 
of Osman's principality, when he and his people first appear 
in history, was very insignificant. In 1300 he had succeeded 
in submitting to his authority a part of ancient Phrygia 
Epictetus and Bithynia, whose four corners were : south- 
east, Eski Sheir ; south-west, the eastern end of Mount 
Olympus ; north-east, the junction of the Kara Su and the 
Sangarius ; north-west, Yeni Sheir. In 1299 Osman took 
up his residence in Yeni Sheir. This was the outpost of 
his principality, in a position of extreme importance, about 
half-way between Brusa and Nicaea. 2 In sixty years the 
tribe of Osman had advanced sixty miles from Eski Sheir, 
the old city, to Yeni Sheir, the new city. 3 They held 

1 See Armain's translation of the Djihannuma (Mirror of the World), 
a universal geography by Hadji Khalfa, in the Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS., 
fonds francais, nouv. ac., nos. 888-9. The section on Asia Minor; although 
written in some detail, does not contain many of the names which we find 
in the Ottoman historians. I wish to register a protest against inflicting 
on students and readers of history lists of names that can have no possible 
meaning to them. I have omitted from this work the names of places 
and persons upon which I can get no light. 

2 Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1917, makes an error in giving the distance 
from Brusa to Yeni Sheir as two days. I have driven from Brusa to 
Nicaea in one day of not fast going. Yeni She'ir is on the main road 
between these cities, six hours from Brusa and four hours from Nicaea. 

3 The early European historians make the wildest statements about 
Osman's field of action. Many of them call Ottomanjik, a place four 



OSMAN 



33 



undisputed sway only in the valley of the Kara Su, 1 and 
their important villages and castles, Biledjik, 2 Itburnu, 
Inoenu, Sugut, Amegoel, 3 Karadja Hissar, 4 Yundhissar, and 

days or five north-east of Eski Sheir, his first conquest : Cuspianus (Ant- 
werp ed., 1541), p. 6; Spandugino, in Sansovino, p. 143 ; Egnatius, p. 28. 
Cf. Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1789. But this place was not captured by 
the Osmanlis until the reign of Bayezid : Evliya, op. cit., ii. 95. Paulo 
Giovio, an Italian historian greatly esteemed in his day, puts among the 
notable conquests of Osman the city and district of Sivas, as does also 
Rabbi Joseph, in his famous Chronicles, Eng. trans, of Biallobotzky, 
ii. 505. Donado da Lezze, Historia Turchesca, Rumanian edition of Ursu, 
pp. 4 and 5, makes him conqueror of Rum, province of Sivas, Phoenicia, 
' et altri luoghi ' ! Cuspianus, De Turcarum Origine, quotes Donado da 
Lezze almost literally. Richer, De Rebus Turcarum, written for the 
information of Francis I of France, says, p. 11 : ' Circiter 1300, Otto- 
mannus impune invitis omnibus summam imperii, quod ante partitum 
tenebant factiosi magistratus, occupavit, seseque Asiae minoris sive Ana- 
toliae imperatorem nominare sit aggressus. Syvam, quae eadem cum 
Sebaste est, expugnavit, et oppida ad Euxinum posita non pauca cepit.' 
(The italics are mine.) Hussein Hezarfenn, one of the Ottoman historians 
whose work has been most widely read and quoted in Europe, says of 
Ertogrul, who never saw the sea, ' He equipped several ships, with which 
he made a raid into the Aegaean Sea, pillaged the islands, descended upon 
Greece, penetrated up to the Peloponnesus, and returned to his home 
{the little village of Sugut !) laden down with wealth and followed by a great 
army composed of experienced warriors of all sorts of nations whom the 
renown of his bravery and his good fortune attracted to his service : which 
increased so greatly his reputation in Asia that Sultan Alaeddin even found 
it to his advantage to cultivate him ' : trans, of Petits de la Croix, ii. 
288-9. 

1 I am not sure that I am justified in using the expression ' undisputed 
sway ' even for this small territory. Pachymeres, IV. 30, pp. 345-7, speaks 
of a certain Soleiman pasha, who was threatening Nicomedia in 1303 ; 
and V. 23, p. 427, of Alisur retiring to the Sangarius after Roger had 
relieved Philadelphia in 1307. 

2 Probably the first conquest of Osman. This city, on the Kara Su, is 
still a thriving place. Its situation is most picturesque. The author of 
the Arabic History of the Kurds (Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. of Ducaurroy, 
fol. 151 r°, 152 r°) makes Biledjik the city granted to Ertogrul by Alaeddin, 
and declares that he captured Sugut (Sukidjeh) from the 'infidels of 
Tekkur '. 

3 Angelcoma of the Byzantines. 

4 The only conquest of Osman not in the direction of Byzantium. 
Hadji Khalfa, op. cit., fol. 1851. 

1736 C 



34 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Yar Hissar, 1 were all within a day's journey of each 
other. 

In 1301, twelve years after Osman began to form his state, 
he fought his first battle, and came into direct contact with 
the Byzantine Empire. At Baphaeon, 2 near Mcomedia, the 
heterarch Muzalon, with 2,000 men, attempted to check 
a raid the Osmanlis were making into the fertile valley 
whose products contributed so greatly to the well-being of 
Nicomedia. It was midsummer, just before the gathering 
of the harvests. 3 In a pitched battle, the unarmoured 
horsemen of Osman charged so speedily and so impetuously 
that they broke through the heavy line of their opponents, 
and the Greek commander's retreat was covered only by 
the opportune arrival of Slavic mercenaries. 4 The Osmanlis 
were too few in number to follow up this victory. It is 
hardly probable that they made any attack on Mcomedia. 5 
But they laid waste all the districts into which they 
dared to venture. 

VI 

At this same time the emirs whose possessions bordered 
on the Aegaean Sea began to press hard upon the Greek coast 
cities and those few cities of the interior, such as Magnesia, 
Philadelphia, and Sardes, which still acknowledged the 

1 ' Situated between Yeni Sheir, Brusa, and Amegoel. They count one 
day from Yeni Sheir to Yar Hissar by the road which goes to \Kutayia ' : 
Hadji Khalfa, fol. 1917. 

2 The Ottomans name this place Kuyun Hissar. See Schefer edition 
of Spandugino, p. 16 n. 

3 Pachymeres, IV. 25, p. 327, says the battle was fought July 27. Jorga, 
Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, i. 157, is in error in placing date 
June 27 ; Hammer, i. 190, and Jorga both give year 1301. Muralt, 
Chronographie Byzantine, ii. 480. has this battle under 1302; 

4 Pach., IV. 25, p. 335. 

5 Cantemir, Rumanian ed., i. 20, seems to infer that Osman attacked 
Nicomedia after this battle. He is certainly wrong in stating that Osman 
captured Kutayia. See pp. 274, 292-3. 



OSMAN 



.35 



authority of Byzantium. In the spring of 1302, Michael IX 
Palaeologos came to Asia Minor to take command of the 
Slavic mercenaries. At first the Turks were in conster- 
nation, if we can believe Pachymeres, but when they saw 
the unwillingness of Michael to fight, they grew bold, 
and compelled the Emperor to take refuge in Magnesia. 
Michael's unwillingness was not due to lack of courage, 
but because he could not rely upon his Slavs. As true 
mercenaries, they were fighting for pay, and there was 
no gold to give them. Michael's father, the old Emperor 
Andronicus II, had not sent him any money. In Con- 
stantinople the Venetians were threatening to depose 
Andronicus ; the almost annual ecclesiastical quarrels, which 
form so large and wearisome and disastrous a place in the 
last century and a half of Byzantine history, were embar- 
rassing him ; and the treasury was empty. Even if there 
had been money to send, it wouid have been a perilous 
undertaking, for the Turkish pirates were swarming in the 
Sea of Marmora, and had even seized the Princes' Islands, 
which are within sight of the Imperial City. 

When they saw that neither pay nor booty was forth- 
coming, and that they were engaged in a hopeless struggle, 
the mercenaries forced Michael to allow them to return to 
Europe. This was the last genuine personal effort on the 
part of a successor of the Caesars to save the Asiatic themes. 
It ended in ignominious failure. Not one battle had been 
fought. The withdrawal of the Slavs was followed by an 
exodus of Greeks to the Aegaean coast, and from there to 
Europe. Pachymeres claims that this exodus was general. 
But we cannot accept the testimony of Pachymeres as 
altogether trustworthy on this point. Many Greeks, for 
reasons which are set forth later, remained in the coast 
districts of Asia Minor, and they did not leave, to any 
noticeable extent, the territory in which Osman was opera- 
ting. The Turks, however, made a raid into all the islands 

G 2 



36 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



along the Aegaean littoral, and crossed over into Thrace, 
where for two years the fields could not be cultivated. 1 

At this critical moment, had there been any united action 
on the part of the Turkish emirs, Constantinople would 
probably have fallen an easy prey to their armies and to 
their fleets. But each emir was acting for himself, and was 
as much an enemy of his Turkish rivals as he was of the 
Byzantine emperors. There is no instance in which any two 
of them joined forces, and acted together. Throughout 
the fourteenth century the armies defending the Byzantine 
Empire contained almost as many Turks as those attackingit. 

To the east and to the west Andronicus II, utterly unable 
to defend himself, looked for aid. From this time on to 
the fall of Constantinople the history of the Byzantine 
Empire becomes what the history of the Ottoman Empire 
has been during the last hundred years. It is the story of 
an uninterrupted succession of bitter internal quarrels, of 
attacks by former vassals upon the immediate frontiers 
of its shrunken territory, of subtle undermining by hostile 
colonies of foreigners whose one thought was commercial 
gain, and of intermittent, and in almost all cases selfishly 
inspired, efforts of western Europe to put off the fatal day. 

In the east, Andronicus expected much of Ghazan Khan. 
Were not the Turks of Asia Minor vassals of the Mongol 
overlord ? Andronicus sent envoys to Ghazan to offer him 
the hand of a young princess who passed at Constantinople 
as his natural daughter. Ghazan received them cordially, 
accepted the proffered marriage alliance, and promised to 
exercise a pressure upon the Turks of western Asia Minor. 2 

1 Pach., V. 9 ; Gregoras, VII, i, p. 214. 

2 Pach., in Stritter, Memoriae Populorum, iii. 1086-7 ; D'Ohsson, 
Histoire des Mongols, iv. 315. Andronicus made a second appeal in 1308, 
and gave his own sister, Marie, who is known to later Mongol historians 
as ' Despina Khatun to Mohammed Khodabendah Khan, after Khoda- 
bendah's conversion to Islam : ibid., iv. 536 ; Hertzberg, Geschichte der 
Byzantiner und des Osmanischen Retches, p. 461. 



OSMAN 37 

This promise, however, was not followed by any serious 
action. The Mongols were never more than mere raiders 
in Asia Minor. 1 Before this marriage could be consummated, 
Ghazan Khan died. The young princess was offered to and 
accepted by his successor. It was a useless sacrifice. For in 
this first decade of the fourteenth century the long struggle 
between Christian and Moslem to win the Mongols ended, 
temporarily at least, in the conversion of the Khans to Islam. 2 
From the west, Andronicus received aid of the most 
disastrous sort. When Ferdinand of Aragon made peace 
with Charles d'Anjou, King of Sicily, in 1302, he got rid of 
his troublesome mercenaries by sending them to serve the 
Byzantine Empire. Roger de Flor, typical soldier of fortune, 
who could not be matched in his generation for daring, 
insolence, rapacity, cruelty, and Achillean belief in his own 
invulnerability, arrived at Constantinople with eight thou- 
sand Catalans and Almogavares, the former heavy-armed 
j plainsmen and mariners, the latter light-armed mountaineers 
of northern Spain. They were true prototypes of the soldiers 
of Alva and Cortes. Roger was made Grand Duke, and 
married to Princess Marie, niece of Andronicus. 

Almost immediately after their arrival, the Catalans 
became engaged in such bloody conflicts with the Genoese 
I 1 of Galata, and robbed and murdered the Greeks with such 
r alacrity, that Andronicus hastened to turn them loose in 
B Asia. Roger established himself in the peninsula of Cyzicus. 
Here his Catalans fell immediately to plundering the inhabi- 

0 tants of the country, who soon found that they had passed 

1 from Scylla to Charybdis, and carried heartrending tales of 
1 lust and greed and massacre to Constantinople. 3 The one 

1 I can find no justification for Ho worth's statement, ' This alliance 
seems to have had a restraining influence upon the Turks ', in his History 

^ of the Mongols, iii. 464. 

2 See Bibliotheque de VEcole des Chartes, vi. 318, where the date of this 
momentous event is given as ' vers 1305 '. 

l * 3 Pach., V. 14, pp. 399-400 ; 21, pp. 410, 417. 



38 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Greek general who was doing anything noteworthy against 
the Turks was relieved of his spoils of war by Roger. 

In 1305, by a swift march to the relief of Philadelphia, 
which was being besieged by Alisur, prince of Karamania, 
Roger and his Catalans showed what they could do, if they 
would. The Turks were compelled to raise the siege. Roger 
pursued them to the source of the Sangarius. 1 But, on the 
way, the Catalans deprived their Greek allies of any portion 
of the rich spoils, and massacred the Slavic mercenaries who 
dared to argue with them. 2 Gregoras says, probably with 
reason, that Roger could have reconquered the whole of Asia 
Minor for the Byzantines. 3 But that country seemed to attract 
him as little as it had attracted the Mongols. He was no 
Crusader, glad and eager to undergo the terrible hardships 
which military operations among mountains and on arid 
plateaus demanded. There was no motive to make the 
effort worth while. So he left the Turks to themselves and 
went to Gallipoli, where he let it be known that the Catalans 
were preparing an expedition to repeat the Fourth Crusade. 

In fear for his life as well as for his throne, Andronicus 
sent an envoy to offer Roger the ' government of the Orient ', 
general command of all the troops in Asia, and twenty 
thousand pieces of gold. For full measure he added enough 
wheat to nourish the Catalans for a year. The ' government 
of the Orient ' was as empty and meaningless a gift as the 
supposed ' grants ' of the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin to the 
Turkish nomad chieftains. The only troops who could go 
into Asia and accomplish anything were already under 
Roger's command. But the gold, which might have worked 
a charm, was left behind, as the envoy was afraid to bring 
it. Roger scorned the emperor's offer. Ten days later he 
repented, and accepted from Emperor Andronicus thirty 

1 Pach., V. 23, pp. 426-8 ; Greg., VII. 3, p. 221. 

2 Pach., V. 21, p. 423 ; Greg., loc. cit. 

3 Greg., loc. cit. Cf. Muralt, after Latin authorities, ii. 487. 



OSMAN 



39 



thousand pieces of gold, one hundred thousand measures of 
wheat, and the title of Caesar. In return for these princely 
gifts he had only to promise to lead three thousand men 
against the Turks. 

But a host of Spaniards, long before the discovery of 
America, were already in search of ' El Dorado '. They 
poured into Gallipoli on every merchant ship from the West, 
and made the Byzantines begin to fear Roger more than 
they feared the Turks. The remedy was getting to be 
worse than the evil ! Before leaving for his campaign, Roger 
rashly went to Adrianople to pay his respects to the young 
Emperor Michael IX, who was holding his court there. On 
the threshold of Michael's bedchamber, like the Duke of 
Guise at Blois, he was stabbed to death. A massacre of 
his attendants followed. 

A train of evils fell upon Macedonia and Thrace as a result 
of the assassination of Roger de Flor. Michael soon had 
reason to regret this ill-advised deed. Not only did the 
Catalans, in their first access of fury, avenge the death of 
their great leader and their comrades by unspeakable 
cruelties and by the destruction of every village which they 
came upon, not only did they defeat the young emperor in 
open battle and almost capture him as he fled from the 
field, but they invited over from Asia Minor into Macedonia 
all the Turks who could be induced to come. 

At Gallipoli the Catalans tried to form a state. It failed 
owing to dissensions among their leaders. Their raids into 
Thrace had so ruined that country that they themselves 
began to starve. So they started upon an odyssey into 
Macedonia, where the common soldiers, wearied of the civil 
strife engendered by their leaders, who were continually 
ordering them to cut each other's throats, decided to make 
an end of these costly personal jealousies. They killed the 
nobles who led them, and marched south into Thessaly. 
Gauthier de la Brienne committed the imprudence of seeking 



40 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



their aid in Athens. In 1310 they killed Brienne, set up in 
Athens a military democracy, and started to revive the 
Peloponnesian Wars. 1 

The further fortunes of the Grand Catalan Company do 
not come within the limits of our work. Roger and the 
Catalans, for that matter, were never in direct contact with 
the Osmanlis. But it was necessary to give a brief state- 
ment of their services to the Byzantine Empire in order 
that we might have a proper appreciation of their services 
to the Ottoman Empire. When they withdrew into Thessaly 
they had left the Turks behind them in Thrace and Mace- 
donia. To the unhappy emperor who had received them nine 
years before as saviours of the Empire, this was their legacy. 

Owing to the adroit leadership of their chief, Halil, and 
to the impotence of Michael, whose Slavic mercenaries had 
deserted him and withdrawn into Bulgaria, these Turks were 
soon able to throw Macedonia and Thrace into so great 
anarchy that communication by land between Salonika and 
the capital was no longer safe. 2 And yet Halil had only 
eighteen hundred men under his command ! In 1311, 
shortly after the Catalans had left, Halil concluded with 
Andronicus and Michael an agreement by which he and his 
companions in arms were to have a safe-conduct and free 
passage across the Hellespont. But the Greeks, in violation 
of one of the most important points of this arrangement, 
attempted to take from the Turks their booty. Halil, 
instead of quitting European soil, sent for reinforcements. 
The imperial army suffered a decisive defeat, and Michael 
fled, having abandoned his personal baggage. In insolent 

1 Pachymeres, Books V, VI, and VII ; Gregoras, Book VII, passim, 
and Phrantzes, Book I ; Moncada, Expedition de los Catalanes ; Muntaner, 
in Bibliothek des lit. Vereins zu Stuttgart, vol. viii. For their later adven- 
tures there is an excellent account in Finlay, History of Greece, iv. 146-56. 

2 Andronicus wrote to his empress, urging her not to try to return to 
Constantinople from Salonika by land : Pach., VII. 12, p. 586 ; Chalco- 
condylas (ed. Bonn), I, p. 19. 



OSMAN 



41 



triumph, Halil adorned himself with the imperial insignia. 1 
All the region around the Hellespont and the Gulf of Saros 
remained for three years without cultivation. So desperate 
did the situation become that Michael was compelled to 
seek aid of the Genoese and the Serbians. In 1314 the 
Turks of Halil were entrapped near Gallipoli and massacred. 
But at what a price ! The Serbians, whose co-operation 
had won the day for the Greeks, saw eastern Macedonia and 
the open sea. They liked it. New troubles began to brew 
for the Byzantines. 

There were other long-standing troubles threatening from 
abroad. In the East, the Mongols had overrun southern 
Russia, and were as great a nightmare to Andronicus as the 
Goths had formerly been to Valens. The rulers of Con- 
stantinople did not hesitate to purchase security on the 
Black Sea by truces, which were sealed with the sacrifice 
of purple-born princesses to pagan harems, and by humble 
protestations of friendship to khans who treated the imperial 
ambassadors as the envoys of a vassal. 2 

In the West, another sword of Damocles was hanging over 
the emperors of Byzantium. We must remember that the 
Greeks had been in possession of their capital again only 
since 1260, and that the heirs of the Frankish emperors still 
cherished the dream of a Latin re-establishment at Con- 
stantinople. In 1305, on the very day Clement V mounted 
the papal throne, Philippe le Bel of France discussed with 
Charles de Valois the question of retaking Constantinople. 3 

1 Greg. VII. 8, pp. 254-8 ; Chalc., 1, p. 19 ; Jorga, op. cit., i. 160, 
speaks of ' die schone mit Perlen und Edelsteinen geschmiickte Krone ' of 
Michael. Was it not rather a turban ? See Hammer, i. 364, note x. 

2 ' The emperor of Constantinople fears the anger of the Khan of Kapdjak 
and is eager to disarm him by protestations of submission and efforts to 
obtain a continuance of the truce. Things have always been on this 
footing since the children of Djenghiz Khan began to reign in this country ' : 
Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fol. 70 r°. 

3 Ducange, Hist, de Constantinople sous les Emp. Frangais, map section, 
p. 46. 



42 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



The following year Clement V exhorted the Venetians to co- 
operate in the conquest of the Byzantine Empire. 1 Because 
they had grievances against Andronicus which had already 
almost brought them to an open rupture, 2 the Venetians 
readily lent ear to the Pope's project. A treaty of alliance 
was concluded between Venice and Charles de Valois, who 
had the powerful backing of the King of France. 3 In 1307 
Clement V wrote to Charles II of Naples urging him to 
reconquer Constantinople. 4 But the Pope's interest was 
soon diverted by the project of a crusade to support Armenia 
and Cyprus against the Egyptians. 5 Philippe le Bel turned 
his attention to the spoliation of the Knights Templars and 
to the important ecclesiastical questions arising out of the 
movement to rehabilitate the memory of the unfortunate 
Boniface VIII. 

Until the death of Philippe le Bel, in 1314, however, 
Andronicus and Michael always felt that there might at any 
moment be a repetition of the Fourth Crusade. In seeking 
the reasons for the almost unhampered progress of Osman 
against Mcomedia, Nicaea, and Brusa, it must not be for- 
gotten that the Byzantine emperors did not have even the 
moral support of Christendom in their losing fight. 

VII 

During this first decade of the fourteenth century, the 
Byzantines had lost control of practically all the Aegaean 

1 Ducange, Hist, de Constantinople sous les Emp. Frangais, map section, 
p. 54. 

2 The Venetians were jealous of the growing power of Genoa and the 
hostility shown to Venetian merchants at Constantinople. See Appendix B. 
Also Heyd, Handelsgeschichte des Mitielalters, i. 366. 

3 Ducange, ibid., p. 57 ; Buchon, Collection des chroniques nat.fr., p. lv. 

4 Muralt, Chronographie Byzantine, ii. 493, no. 21, n. 

5 A rabble without arms actually arrived at Marseilles. The ships were 
prevented from leaving Brindisi by a storm. Cf . Iacomo Bosio, Delia Historia 
delta Religione, ii. 1. At the very moment this effort to start a crusade was 
ending in dismal failure, the two kings on whose behalf it was planned were 
engaged in a bitter quarrel ! Clement V, Epistola Comm. vii. 773-4, 787. 



OSMAN 



43 



Sea, and had to struggle for a passage through the Sea of 
Marmora. After the recent Balkan War, the Sublime Porte 
presented a memorandum to the Powers, in which it was 
stated that the possession of Rhodes, Lesbos, and Chios was 
absolutely essential to a maintenance of Ottoman power in 
Asia Minor. History, from the time of the ancient Persian 
wars to the present day, confirms this point of view. So, 
before taking up the progress of Osman's conquests, it is 
important to note that during the years of Osman's conflict 
with the Byzantines Chios and Rhodes passed out of their 
hands. 

In 1303 Roger de Flor had prepared the way for the Turks 
in Chios by sacking the island. What he did not destroy 
or carry off fell to the Turks when they raided the island 
the following year. ' Andronicus saw that he was no longer 
able to defend Chios against the Turks because of the 
cowardice of his governors. The Turks already considered 
themselves masters of Asia Minor and the majority of the 
islands.' 1 So he made Benedetto of Phocaea lord of Chios, 
and the island was lost to the Byzantines. The Giustiniani 
family kept Chios until the Ottoman conquest. 

The emir of Menteshe invaded Rhodes about 1300. 2 But 
he did not succeed in entirely conquering it. For ten years 
Greek and Turk struggled for the mastery of this gateway 
to the Aegaean Sea. Then suddenly an outside foe arrived 
and made the double conquest of Christian and Moslem 
alike. The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, driven from 
the Holy Land by the Egyptian conquest, had tired of their 
refuge in Cyprus. 3 After vainly endeavouring to negotiate 
with Constantinople for the transfer of the proprietary rights 
of the island to their order, they attacked and conquered 

1 Les Giustiniani, Dynastes de Chios, Vlasto's French translation of 
Hopf's great monograph, p. 8. 

2 Mas-Latrie, Histoire de Chypre, ii. 602. 

3 Mas-Latrie, op. et loc. cit. ; Heyd, French edition, i. 537. 



44 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Rhodes with the encouragement of Philippe le Bel and the 
Pope. This great event, equally disastrous to Turk and 
Greek, happened on August 15, 1310. For more than two 
centuries they were able to maintain at Rhodes a citadel 
and outpost of Christianity in a part of the world which 
was rapidly becoming in partibus infidelium. 1 

The emir of Menteshe made a strenuous effort to recapture 
Rhodes. The Hospitallers, attacked before they had time 
to repair and strengthen the fortifications of the island, 
were saved only by the timely arrival and heroism of 
Amadeus of Savoy. This is said to be the origin of the 
arms of Savoy, which are perpetuated on the flag of modern 
Italy, and of the motto of the sovereigns of Piedmont — 
F E R T, Fortitude* Eius Rhodum Tenuit. 2 The historians of 
Rhodes, as well as the chroniclers of the House of Savoy, 
declare that Osman was the leader of the Turks who attacked 
Rhodes in 1310 or 1311, 3 and that he was instigated by the 
Genoese. 4 

VIII 

But while Osman was, in the minds of these and other 
later historians, supposed to be attacking Rhodes and 

1 A splendid field for historical research, which, as far as I know, has 
never yet been touched, is the compilation, from the Vatican records, of 
the dates for the extinction of the dioceses of the early Christian world 
in Africa and Asia. When did the bishops of these dioceses begin to be 
appointed and consecrated in partibus ? 

2 Bosio, op. cit., ii. 37 ; Abbe Vertot, Histoire des Chevaliers de Malte, i. 106. 

3 See Bosio, ii. 37 1, and Vertot, i. 101 f. With a view to glorifying 
the Order, and also the Duke of Savoy, this fiction has been fabricated 
and perpetuated. Even such a serious work as that of Muralt gives, upon 
the strength of Raynaldus, who merely quotes Bosio, Osman as leader of 
this attack upon Rhodes : see Chronographie Byzantine, ii. 507. During 
the recent war between Italy and Turkey, when it was a question of 
Rhodes, more than one leading Italian newspaper revived this story of 
the founder of the Italian royal house defeating the founder of the Ottoman 
royal house. There is, of course, no foundation whatever for the statement. 

4 So Clement V evidently believed. See his letter to the Genoese in 
Epistola Comm. vii. 10. 



OSMAN 



45 



making himself master of Asia Minor, he stayed within the 
narrow limits of his little principality, from which he never 
issued forth, as far as we know, during his circumscribed 
career. For he had, within a day's journey of his residence, 
the imperial cities of Brusa and Nicaea, whose walls were 
far too strong for the infant Osmanlis. A little more to the 
north-west, in a position of unrivalled strategic importance, 
defending the logical 1 waterway to Constantinople from the 
valley of the Sangarius, lay Mcomedia. 

After the battle of Kuyun Hissar (Baphaeon) we hear 
nothing of Osman until 1308. This year is memorable for 
several events of great importance. The first of these is 
the capture of Ak Hissar, the fortress guarding the place 
where the Sangarius finishes its descent and enters the plain 
behind Nicomedia. This was the last barrier opposing the 
progress of the Osmanlis through the narrow peninsula 
which stretches out between the Gulf of Nicomedia and the 
Black Sea to form the extreme north-western corner of 
Asia. Owing to the terrible misfortunes which had fallen 
upon the Byzantines through the Catalans, no effort seems 
to have been made to use Nicomedia as a base of operations 
for defending this peninsula. So before the year was out 
the Osmanlis appeared for the first time on the Bosphorus, 
In the years following the fall of Ak Hissar the Osmanlis 
slowly but thoroughly extended their authority until they 
were in possession of the harbours and fortresses of the 
Black Sea littoral between the mouth of the Sangarius and 
the Bosphorus. 

In the same year Kalolimni, an island of the Marmora, 
which lies near the mouth of the Gulf of Mudania, was 

1 That the Sangarius used to run into the Gulf of Nicomedia instead 
of into the Black Sea is the opinion of many geographers, ancient as well 
as modern. There have been a number of projects to connect the Sangarius, 
Lake Sabandja, and the Gulf of Nicomedia by canals that would give 
a deep waterway across the plain and prevent the frequent overflooding 
which has always been a source of loss to cultivators in that region. 



46 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



occupied by Kara AIL 1 By this the water-route from Brusa 
to Constantinople, and one Of the two routes from Mcaea to 
Constantinople, were obstructed. 2 Kalolimni has the honour 
of being the first Ottoman island and the only one captured 
during the chieftainship of Osman. The investment of 
Brusa from the land side now began. So alarmed was the 
commandant that he sent Osman a £ gift ' of money to 
purchase peace, 3 thus inaugurating the humiliating precedent 
which the mightiest emperors and kings of Christendom 
came in time to follow. 

It was in 1308, also, that Osman captured Tricocca, 4 
which cut off the communication by land between Mcaea 
and Nicomedia. While he was engaged in dealing with 
Mcaea and Brusa, a danger threatened Osman from the 
east. A horde of Tartars was hovering along the confines 
of his state. 5 Some of them sacked Karadja Hissar at the 
time of the fair, and were prevented from marching on Eski 
Sheir only by the timely arrival of Orkhan, who defeated 
them through the superiority of his cavalry. Instead of 
massacring his prisoners, Orkhan, as was the invariable 
custom of his father with the Greeks, offered the raiders 
Islam and Ottoman nationality. 6 It was in this way that 
the Osmanlis increased in numbers. 

After 1308 the energies of the Osmanlis seem to have 
been directed against Mcaea and Brusa. The fall of Brusa 
is the only other event recorded during the lifetime of 

1 Idris, quoted by Hammer, i. 192. 

2 Brusa is three hours by carriage from its port on the southern side of 
the Gulf of Mudania, or one hour by narrow-gauge railway. One can 
reach Nicaea either from the Gulf of Mudania or that of Nicomedia. 

3 Pach., VII. 18, pp. 597-9. 

4 Pach., VII. 25, p. 620. The Turks call this castle Hodjahissar. 

5 Ibid., loc. cit. But Pachymeres puts the number of these Tartars as 
30,000, which must be at least a tenfold exaggeration. 

6 Seadeddin, translation Brattuti, p. 27. Bratutti, whose transcription 
of Turkish names is often unintelligible to me, calls Karadja Hissar 
' Codgia \ 



OSMAN 



47 



Osman. Just when and how Brusa fell cannot be stated 
with precision. We shall find the same difficulty later in 
connexion with the fall of Mcaea and Nicomedia. The 
Turkish traditions, as Seadeddin gathered them, state that 
Osman besieged Brusa with a great army in 1317. He 
erected a fortress near Kaplidja, and put his nephew, Ak 
Timur, in charge of it. A second fortress, either erected 
by Osman or captured by him, was put in care of Balaban, 
' his most faithful follower.' Kaplidja, now known as 
Tchekirdje, celebrated for its hot baths, 1 is on a ridge not 
more than a mile from the citadel of Brusa. It commands 
the approach from the port of Brusa, not far from where 
the road must cross the river. Traditional remains of the 
second fortress are still to be seen on a foothill of Mount 
Olympus, about two miles south-east of the citadel. 

Of the actual fall of Brusa there is no definite statement 
in Seadeddin except that the city surrendered to Orkhan, 
who brought the news to his dying father. As Osman died 
in 1326, there is a gap of nine years to be accounted for 
between the investment of the city and its capture. To 
one who has studied the contour of this country and the 
nearness of the two fortresses to the citadel of Brusa it is 
clear either that Brusa was surrounded or fell very soon 
after the Osmanlis settled garrisons at the gates of the city, 
or that some modus vivendi was arranged between the 
Osmanlis and the local garrison during those years. A 
decade has been the conventional period for legendary 
sieges since Homer sa,ng of Troy. 

From the Byzantine contemporary writers one gains the 

impression, which is probably a correct one, that Brusa was 

simply abandoned to the Osmanlis. There Avas no assault, 

1 Ibn Batutah, Voyages, ii. 320, speaks of buildings which must have 
been erected at these baths by Orkhan within the decade following the 
capture of Brusa. Earlier buildings, according to him, were constructed 
' by a Turcoman king ' : ibid., p. 318. Tchekirdje is still a favourite 
resort for foreigners as well as for natives. 



48 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and no bitter struggle outside the walls of the city. 1 The 
Greek commander, discouraged by the apparent inability 
or unwillingness 2 of the emperors to come to his relief, 
surrendered the city. Deeply disgusted, as he had every 
reason to be, Evrenos became a Moslem, and cast his 
fortunes with the Osmanlis. Many of the leading Greeks 
followed his example. For, while the people of Brusa 
through long years were straining every nerve to preserve j 
their city and to maintain the honour of Byzantium in 
Asia, the elder Andronicus and his grandson, Andronicus III, 
were engaged in trying to destroy each other. It was 
a sordid civil strife with no redeeming feature. Neither 
emperor had the slightest conception of patriotism or of 
personal honour or of the sacredness of family ties. From 
this time onward the Palaeologi put themselves on record as 
one of the most iniquitous families that have ever disgraced 
the kingly office. When Constantine, one hundred and 
twenty-seven years later, fell with the walls of his city, his 
death was a striking illustration of the wrath of God upon 
the fourth generation of those who had hated and despised 
Him. 

In the same year that Brusa fell, and with the same fate 
imminent for Nicaea and Nicomedia, young Andronicus 
celebrated with great pomp his wedding. The Hippodrome, 
in sight of Mount Olympus, was the scene of a gay tourna- 
ment in which young Andronicus distinguished himself by 
breaking more lances than any of his courtiers, From his 
imperial throne, the elder Andronicus looked on, and turned 
over in his head various schemes for making his grand- [ 
son's bride a widow. After the wedding festivities, while 
Andronicus was taking his bride to Demotika, he was set 
upon by a band of roving Turks, at whose hands he and 
Cantacuzenos both received wounds. When he reached 
Demotika, he learned that his grandfather was preparing 

1 Cantacuzenos and Gregoras. 2 Greg., IX. 2, p. 401. 



OSMAN 



49 



another war against him. 1 Is it any wonder that the Greeks 
of Asia Minor were not averse to becoming Moslems and 
helping in the founding of a new nation to inherit Con- 
stantinople ? There is one more charge which must be 
recorded against the elder Andronicus. When a crusade for 
the stemming of the Moslem invasion was planned by Marino 
Sanudo, Andronicus not only refused to co-operate, but he 
would not even consent to interrupt his friendly relations 
with the Sultan of Egypt. 2 

IX 

Osman spent his life in endeavouring to capture the three 
Byzantine cities which were all within a day's journey of 
his birthplace. When we consider how near he was at 
the very beginning of the struggle, and how weak and 
demoralized the Byzantines had become, we realize that 
we have to do with no impetuous invasion of an Asiatic 
race, sweeping before it and destroying an effete civilization. 
It is the birth of a new race that we are recording — a race 
formed by the fusion of elements already existing at the 
place of birth. The political unity of the Byzantine Empire 
had been destroyed by enemies from without and from 
within. The social unity, which had been secured by the 
one bond of a common religion that imposed upon the people 
its standards and dominated every phase of their life, was 
[ disappearing. For when the Eastern Church lost its spiritual 
life, it lost its hold on the Levantine Christians, who were 
centuries ahead of the West in intellectual development. 
The time for its reformation had come and passed without 
a Savonarola, a Luther, or a Calvin. Nor was there any 

1 Cant., I. 42, pp. 204-6, 208 ; Greg., VIII. 15, p. 384 ; Greg., IX, c. 1, 
I pp. 390-2, says it was the young Andronicus who first planned to break 
; again with his grandfather. However that may be, the impression among 
j the Greeks in Asia Minor who were endeavouring to hold back the enemies 

of the empire must have been the same ! 

2 Greg., IX. 1, p. 392. 

1736 d 



50 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Loyola to fight for the ancient faith. The Church was 
unable to absorb the pagan invaders, as primitive Latin 
Christianity had done, by an irresistible moral superiority. 1 
The appeal of Islam was greater than that of Christianity. 
Pagan and Christian alike, then, in their conversion to 
a new, fresh faith, joined in the formation of a new race. 
This is the story of Osman and of the people who took his 
name. 2 

The legends which inevitably surround the founders of 
nations have buried the personality of Osman, and make 
an estimate of his character difficult. We must reject 
entirely the appreciations of the Ottoman historians. None 
has yet arisen of his own people who has attempted to 
separate the small measure of truth from the mass of fiction 
that obscures the real man in the founder of the Ottoman 
Empire. He is represented by the same writers as a powerful 
prince and as a simple peasant ; as the master of Asia Minor 
and as the village chieftain fighting for very existence with 
his neighbours a few miles away ; as reading the Koran and 
as illiterate ; as the cruel and imperious murderer of his 
uncle Dundar for opposing a plan of campaign in his council 
of war and as the merciful, clement conqueror ; as the Moslem 
fanatic who ordered the mutilation of dying infidels on the 
battlefield and as the wise ruler who dispensed justice to 
Moslem and Christian with no distinction of creed ; as 

1 In the volume on ' L'Ancien Regime ' in Taine's Origines de la France 
contemporaine, pp. 3-6, there is a wonderful analysis of the effect of early 
Latin Christianity upon the pagan mind. The Greek Church of the four- 
teenth century could produce no such impression. 

2 From the earliest Ottoman times to the present day religion and 
nationality have not been divorced. Osmanli and Moslem were synonymous 
terms, just as to-day in the Balkan peninsula, where the Ottoman Empire 
was really founded, Turk and Moslem are synonymous terms. When once 
this is understood, the student and traveller is freed from his preconceived 
notion that the ' Turks as that expression is to-day understood in 
Turkey, are an Asiatic race, who have held the country as conquering 
invaders. 



OSMAN 



51 



depositing his treasures of gold and silver in the castle of 
a neighbour and as leaving at his death only a robe, a salt- 
cellar, a spoon, and a few sheep. 

In the absence of contemporary evidence and of uncon- 
flicting tradition, we must form our judgement of Osman 
wholly upon what he accomplished. He certainly was not 
the son of a prince. He did not become in his day more 
than the ruler of a very small domain. He did not compass 
within his lifetime the task at his very threshold — the 
subjection of the three imperial cities. It was certainly not 
by astounding successes on the battlefield that he made 
people flock to him and form around him the nucleus of 
a state. And this state, although it did not come enough 
in contact with the outside world to have money of its 
own, 1 grew steadily year after year. The way his state was 
formed was the assurance of its permanence and of its 
great future. It is also an indication of the real greatness 
j of the man who formed it. 

Osman was founder of one of the greatest empires the 
world has ever known, of a people unique in history through 
the blending of wild Asiatic blood with the oldest as well 
as the newest European stock, of a royal family which 
claims the distinction of six hundred years of uninterrupted 
male succession. When we place these results over against 
the limited field in which he worked, and acknowledge our 
lack of any outstanding deeds in Osman's life by which 
these results can be explained, we find ourselves in the 

1 Jorga, i. 162, is mistaken in saying, ' iiberall wurden die Goldmimzen 
Osmans gem angenommen.' Hadji Khalfa says that Osman struck no 
j money. Also Colonel Djevad bey, Histoire militaire de V Empire ottoman, 
<■ i. 95. Save several silver pieces, which are not proven genuine, of the 
I collection of Abbe Sestini (Salaberry, Hist, de VEmp. ott, iv. 193), I can 
j find record in numismatic collections of no money of Osman. For dis- 
i cussion of this question see Hammer, i. 117, who cites several Ottoman 
I j historians against coinage before Orkhan, and Toderini, Historia della 
letteratura ottomana, French trans., iii. 183. 

\\ D 2 



52 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

presence of a combination of a character and a cause which 
reminds us of William of Orange and England. 

Osman was a man of compelling personality, whom men j 
loved to serve, even when their own ability matched or was | 
superior to his. The families of the Michaelogli and Marco- j 
zogli were founded by Christian companions of Osman, j 
who became Moslem only after long association with him. I 
Michael, Marco, and other leaders, including Osman's own : 
son, made for themselves more distinguished military careers 
than Osman. But they always worked for their leader. 
Their harmony and loyalty is in striking contrast to that 
of the Byzantine and Catalan captains. Osman was great 
enough to use masterful men. He never needed to assert 
his superiority, as mediocre men always love to do, by 
getting rid of possible rivals and surrounding himself with 
lesser stars. He was able to hold himself, as well as others, 
in check. He was patient and he was thorough. We know j 
the founder by his foundation. 

Then there was the cause. The giants of the forward 
march of Islam were dead. The tide had seemed to turn. 
Pagans ruled in Asia. Africa was asleep. In 1309 the i 
Faithful in Spain were receiving their first serious reverse. 
Osman brought to his new religion the simple faith and the 
fresh enthusiasm of the neophyte. He was a reincarnation < 
of his great namesake and the other early Khalifs. The 
prayer which Seadeddin puts in Osman's mouth illustrates 
his character : 

0 Lord, make upright my thoughts and just my designs. 

Exalt the faith and the Religion, and destroy those who 
rise up against it. 

Scatter the hosts of the enemy, and bring to confusion 
evil men. 

Make my sword the lantern of Thy holy faith, and the 
guiding torch of my warriors. 

Give unto me a glorious name, and victory against mine 
adversaries. 



OSMAN 



53 



Watch me with Thine eyes, and show me the way of Thy 
holy will. 

Make me a true observer of the laws of Mohammed, and 
sustain me in the shock of battle. 

Osman was a fanatic, if by fanatic is meant one who is 
stirred with religious zeal and makes his religion the first 
and prime object in his life. But he was not intolerant, 
nor were his immediate successors. Had he started to 
persecute Christians, the Greek Church would have taken 
a new lease of life, and Osman could not have gained the 
converts who made possible the Ottoman race. 

Attila, Djenghiz Khan, Timur, the greatest conquerors of 
the stock from which Osman came, utilized a race already 
made. They were leaders of a united people. In spite of 
their dazzling exploits, they were mere raiders, and their 
empires were the territories of an unassimilated path of 
conquest. Osman's work was more enduring than theirs, 
more far-reaching in its results. For he was building in 
silence while they were destroying with a blast of trumpets. 
We may place him with them, perhaps above them, for 
which of them gave his name to a people ? 



CHAPTER II 



ORKHAN 

A NEW NATION IS FORMED AND COMES INTO CONTACT 
WITH THE WESTERN WORLD 

I 

The greatest inheritance that a father can leave to his 
son is uncompleted work, especially if the work present 
difficulties of a formidable character, which must be met and 
overcome immediately. No man is born great. No man 
has greatness thrust upon him. History recognizes only the 
category of achievement. Facing an unfinished task is the 
best spur. 

Osman died at the moment of the surrender of Brusa. 
He left to Orkhan the inheritance of Nicaea and Nicomedia 
unconquered ; a state without laws, coinage, and definite 
boundaries ; a people just beginning to awaken to a national 
consciousness ; and hostile neighbours far more powerful 
than himself. 1 Orkhan found himself without seaport, ships, 
or sailors. His fighting men were regarded among his 
Turkish rivals as poor material for an army. 2 Even the 
chieftainship of the Osmanlis had not come to him by mere 
right of birth. 3 He had been chosen because of his ability 

1 Appendix B, on the Emirates of Asia Minor during the Fourteenth 
Century, contains the identification and description of these neighbours. 

2 See Shehabeddin, Paris MS., 139 v°, which is cited in part on p. 70. 

3 The chieftainship among the Turks was elective rather than hereditary. 
The Armenian Haython, who had excellent opportunities for observing 
their customs at this period, wrote : ' Puisque les Turcs pristrent la sei- 
gneurie de Turquie, ilz ordonnerent un seigneur entre eulx, lequel ilz 
appelerent le Soudan ' : MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds francais, 2810, 
fol. 230 v°. Hussein Hezarfenn says tii. 287-9 that Ertogrul succeeded 



ORKHAN 



55 



to lead and to attract men. Now that Brusa had fallen 
into the hands of the Osmanlis, more was demanded in 
their emir than personal charm and daring in battle. He 
must establish his right to the chieftainship by making 
a viable state. This could be done only by the addition 
of Nicaea and Nicomedia to his dominions, and by the 
transformation of his followers into a nation. 

Nowhere are the Ottoman historians more unsatisfactory 
than in their accounts of the reign of Orkhan. They fail 
to describe — much less to explain — the evolution of their 
race during these thirty-five years from a heterogeneous 
band of adventurers into a nation. Several of the Ottoman 
historians write so admirably of later periods that we must 
attribute this failure as much to their lack of sources of 
information as to their inability to measure up to the 
demands of the modern mind which never asks how without 
adding why. The re- writing of history in the twentieth 
century is not actuated by belief in superior ability. Our 
new and wider point of view is gained from the advantage 
we have had in securing and comparing sources which were 
inaccessible to those who have gone before us. If, in this 
chapter, Byzantine sources are largely used, it is because 
we are writing the history of a people who built their nation 
directly upon the ruins of the Byzantine Empire, and 
because the Byzantine sources are contemporary ; while 
the earliest Ottoman historians wrote more than a century 
later than this period. 1 

The reign of Orkhan is divided into two parts by the 
events of the year 1344. From 1326 to 1344 he was occupied 
in subduing the territory of which he had been tentative 

his father by election and, in turn, manoeuvred to secure the election of 
Osman. Evliya effendi, i. 27, declares that Osman was elected chief. 
This is also stated by Barletius, in Lonicerus, vol. ii, fol. 231-2 ; Spandu- 
gino ; Cantemir (Rumanian ed.), i. 19 ; and Vanell, p. 359. Cf. Chalco- 
condylas (ed. Migne), col. 24. 
1 For dates see Bibliography. 



56 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



master at the death of Osman, in forming his nation, and 
in organizing his army. From 1344 until his death in 1360, 
his energies were bent chiefly upon getting a foothold in 
Macedonia and Thrace. 

II 

The first task which imposed itself upon Orkhan was the 
subjection of Nicaea and Nicomedia. Just as the walls of 
Brusa had defied him to the end, those of Nicomedia and 
Nicaea were equally impregnable to the kind of army he 
could assemble. Whether it was that neither Byzantine nor 
Turk nor Slav nor Bulgarian were of the stock who would 
spend themselves scaling walls and battering down gates, 
or that the weapons of those days were more favourable 
for the purpose of defence than of assault, cannot be deter- 
mined. But the curious fact remains that during this 
century there are few instances of cities taken by storm. 
Captures were effected for the most part by capitulation or 
by treachery. 

Complete investment and consequent threatened starva- 
tion did not occur in the case of Brusa. Nor did Nicaea 
and Nicomedia surrender from starvation. This is the place, 
rather than at the end of the last chapter, to give two of 
the long list of reasons for surrender which Neshri puts into 
the mouth of the commandant and the leading citizens of 
Brusa. 1 For they state equally plainly and convincingly 
the case of Nicaea and Nicomedia. 

The economic reason was that the inhabitants saw the 
Osmanlis settling themselves in all the country round about 
the three cities, and undisturbed in their permanent occupa- 
tion of these regions by any aggressive movement from Con- 
stantinople. Nicomedia, although advantageously located 
for commerce, was not a port of call on the great trade 

1 Noldeke's translation, in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen 
Gesellschaft, xiii. 214-17. 



ORKHAN 



57 



route. It depended for its well-being upon an unrestricted 
communication with the interior. Brusa and Nicaea were 
manufacturing cities, whose prosperity was due to the use 
of raw materials produced in the vicinity, and to the ability 
to market the manufactured products. While food was still 
procurable, trade and business languished. When the Greeks 
saw that the Osmanlis had come in their midst to remain, 
and were not mere raiders like the Seljuk Turks, they 
realized that the alternative to submission was ruin. 

The moral reason I have already touched upon in relation 
to Brusa. If there had been any hope of relief from the 
intolerable economic conditions under which they were 
living, the Mcaeans and Mcomedians might have resisted 
indefinitely, and maintained a gallant struggle for love of 
God and country. Their successful resistance, continued 
through many weary years, is a remarkable testimony to 
their religious zeal and to their patriotism. It was not until 
they felt themselves deserted by their brothers of blood and 
religion that they finally yielded. The Osmanlis did not 
prevail over them in battle. Their walls were not stormed. 
Their gates held fast. They were not starved out. They 
were abandoned by the Byzantines. So they became 
Osmanlis. 

Ill 

To understand the how and why of the fall of these 
cities and of the mingling of victor and vanquished in 
one race, we must review the history of the Byzantines 
during the years immediately following the death of 
Osman. 

The loss of Brusa did not cause any cessation in the 
suicidal strife between Andronicus and his grandson. After 
: the brilliant marriage festivities of which we have already 
I spoken, young Andronicus took his bride to Demotika, 
where, in the summer of 1327, he planned to surprise and 



58 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



oust his grandfather. 1 He was not content to wait for the 
old man's death. Nor was he deterred from reopening 
the civil war by the thought of the imminent danger of the 
Byzantine cities in Bithynia. Old Andronicus, informed of 
his grandson's intention, forbade his entrance to the capita], 
and negotiated with the Serbians to attack him from the 
rear. 2 This was a deliberate invitation to the Serbians, who 
were rapidly becoming dangerous enemies of the Empire, 
to enter Byzantine territory. 

The appeal of young Andronicus to be allowed to come 
to Constantinople to justify himself was answered by an 
imperial rescript ordering the Patriarch to ' strike out the 
rebel's name from public prayers '. The Patriarch refused. 3 
More than that, His Holiness threatened to unfrock any 
priest who would obey the imperial command. Old Andro- 
nicus had the Patriarch deposed by a packed synod of his 
creatures, and thrown into prison. 4 

War broke out. After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise 
Constantinople, 5 young Andronicus besieged the army of his 
grandfather and the Serbians in Serres. They did not care 
to risk a battle, so he marched on Salonika, which he captured 
through the connivance of its inhabitants. 6 Macedonia and 
Thrace, with the exception of two or three fortresses, fell 
into his hands without a struggle. 7 

Stephen, Krai of Serbia, now turned a deaf ear to the 
old emperor's reiterated appeals for further aid. In his 
desperation, old Andronicus called in the Bulgarians, to 

1 Gregoras, IX. 1, pp. 390-2. But Cantacuzenos, I. 42, pp. 208-15, 
maintains that young Andronicus heard that his grandfather was preparing 
a coup before he thought of taking any action himself. 

2 Cant., I. 44, pp. 215-16 ; Greg., IX. 1, p. 392 ; Phrantzes, I. 6, p. 35. 

3 Cant., I. 4-5, pp. 216-23 ; Greg., IX. 1, p. 396. 

4 Cant., I. 50, pp. 248, 252 ; Greg., IX. 3, pp. 405-7. . 

5 Cant., ibid. ; Greg., IX. 3, pp. 407-9. 

6 Cant., I. 52, pp. 260-2; Greg., IX. 4, pp. 409-10; Cant, I. 53, 
pp. 267-70. 

7 Cant., I. 55, pp. 277, 281-2 ; Greg., IX. 4, p. 414. 



ORKHAN 



59 



whom he would have betrayed Constantinople, had not 
young Andronicus appeared in time to anticipate this 
culminating infamy of the older Palaeologos. A Venetian 
fleet, which was besieging the city, retired, because its 
commander did not want to appear to take sides either for 
or against the younger emperor. Friends inside left a gate 
open. Young Andronicus entered and appeared suddenly at 
the palace. The Patriarch was re-established. Old Andronicus 
was deposed and imprisoned. 1 

The old man, after having become, as Gregoras charitably 
puts it, ' blind through tears ', 2 retired to a monastery, and 
died there in great poverty. 3 Like many others of the 
Palaeologi, Andronicus II had no redeeming trait of character, 
no single good deed to his credit. Stranger to every natural 
affection, he died as he had lived, hating his own flesh and 
blood, striving to ruin his country, mocking God by the 
very monk's garb that he wore. 

The first care of young Andronicus, after ridding himself 
of his grandfather and rival, was to march on Adrianople, 
where, according to Cantacuzenos, he forced Michael Asan 
of Bulgaria to make peace by the display of his ' fine 
army '. 4 Either the Bulgarians were very weak at this 
time, or the ' fine army ' of Andronicus III melted away 
quickly. For in the spring of the following year, 1329, 
Andronicus had to ' gather hastily ' 5 an army, when for the 
first time he felt it his duty to go to the aid of beleaguered 
Nicaea. He crossed the Bosphorus, and joined the battle 
with the Osmanlis at Pelecanon, now Maltepe, on the north 

1 Cant., I. 55-11. 1, pp. 277-312 ; Greg., IX. 4-8, pp. 411-32 ; Phr. 
I. 6, p. 35. 

2 IX. 8, p. 431. 

3 Cant., II. 28, p. 473 ; Greg., IX. 14, p. 461, and X. 1, p. 474. 

4 II. 3, p. 324. 

5 Cantacuzenos uses this same expression concerning the collecting of 
the army with which Andronicus III repelled an invasion of seventy 
Turkish vessels in the autumn of the same year. Cf. II. 13, p. 390. 



60 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



shore of the gulf of Nicomedia, a few miles from Chalcedon, 
the modern Haidar Pasha. 

The battle of Pelecanon is passed over in silence by the 
Ottoman historians as too insignificant to mention. But it 
is of the utmost importance in showing why the Mcaeans 
surrendered their city to Orkhan. Cantacuzenos, who took 
part in this battle, gives a long story in which the result 
of the battle he is compelled to record belies all that 
goes before it. The Byzantines, according to Cantacu- 
zenos, were eminently successful in repelling the attacks 
of the Osmanlis. On all sides the Greeks won, and killed 
hundreds of their opponents, while their own losses were 
slight. After inflicting this defeat upon Orkhan, Andronicus 
proposed, at nightfall, that the army withdraw to Con- 
stantinople ! Some of his ardent warriors continued, how- 
ever, to engage the enemy. Andronicus, surprised with 
only a few followers around him, was wounded, and escaped 
capture only by a hasty retreat. He was carried in a litter 
to Scutari, where he did not wait for news of his army. 
A caique conveyed him safely home. Thus the successors 
of the Caesars abandoned Asia for ever. 

Old Andronicus, in his hour of humiliation, did not 
hesitate to strike one more blow against his country. Spies 
of his in the army spread the rumour that the young emperor 
was dead. The imperial troops fled. They abandoned all 
their baggage, and were massacred by the Osmanlis, who 
hunted them down in the hills from which the fugitives 
could see the dome of St. Sophia. 1 

When we contrast the long story of the civil war between 
Andronicus and his grandfather, the armies gathered, the 
money expended, the energy displayed with this one pitiful 

1 I have gathered the account of this battle from Cant., II. 6-8, pp. 341- 
60 ; Greg., IX. 9, pp. 433-5 ; Phr., I. 7, pp. 36-7 ; Chalcocondylas (ed. 
Migne), 1. 11, col. 32. It is interesting to note how much space Cantacuzenos 
gives in contrast to the brevity of the other writers. 



ORKHAN 



61 



attempt to aid the three great cities of Bithynia, there is 
no need for further speculation as to why these cities fell 
into the hands of the Osmanlis. No wearers of the imperial 
purple had ever made a more dismal showing : old Andro- 
nicus plotting to demoralize the army of his country by 
false rumours, and young Andronicus making such rumours 
possible by being the first to flee from the field after receiving 
a slight wound. It is no wonder that Cantacuzenos records 
that after this battle Nicaea fell into the hands of the 
Osmanlis. 1 It is altogether natural, too, that the inhabitants 
of Nicaea should refuse, as those of Brusa had done, to 
profit by the terms of the capitulation, and leave for Con- 
stantinople. 2 Their trades, silk-weaving and pottery, were 
dependent upon local materials, which they could not get 
elsewhere. There had been nothing to inspire in them that 
devotion to a faith which made the Huguenots long after- 
wards leave all without hesitation after the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes. 

Hadji Khalfa says that in the seventeenth century the 
walls of Nicaea were entirely ruined. 3 The condition of 
these walls to-day (for they have not been repaired in modern 
times) contradicts this statement. It has been the claim 
of the Osmanlis that Nicaea was reduced by fighting. If 
this were true the walls must have suffered. It is also the 
common belief 4 that Nicaea, at the time of the Ottoman 
conquest, and for some time after, was a prosperous city. 5 

1 II, c. 8, 363. Seadeddin, Neshri, and Idris agree with Gregoras, 
IX. 13, p. 458, in putting the fall of Nicaea in 1330 or 1331. Gregoras 
euphemistically says the city was ' pillaged by the Turks '. But Leun- 
clavius, on the authority of Ali, gives a. h. 734, which would be 1333 
or 1334. 

2 Phr., I. 7. 

3 In Djihannuma, Paris MS., fol. 1934. 

4 When I was in Mcaea in 1913, the imam of the Yeshil Djami told me 
that there were seventy thousand houses at the time of the Ottoman 
conquest. This is the local tradition. 

5 Hammer, i. 146, makes this claim. 



62 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



But Ibn Batutah, who visited Nicaea within five or six 
years after its change of ownership, wrote that its walls 
were intact, that the sole entrance to the city was by a road 
built up like a bridge and so narrow that horsemen could 
not pass on it, and that the walls were surrounded by a wide 
deep moat filled with water. One had to reach the gate 
by a pont-levis, which was in working order and used at 
the time of his visit. The city itself was in ruins and 
occupied only by a small number of men in the service of 
Orkhan. He was told that Orkhan had besieged the city 
ten years, and Osman before him twenty years. As the 
famous traveller was an honoured guest in the palace of 
Orkhan, where Orkhan's wife was living at the time, and 
where the emir himself came for a few days during the 
forty days which Ibn Batutah spent in Nicaea, his testimony 
is certainly worthy of credence. 1 

That Nicaea, while preserving its admirable fortifications, 
should have decreased so rapidly in importance and popula- 
tion during the seventy years between the return of the 
Byzantine emperors to Constantinople and the Ottoman 
occupation, is explainable only by three suppositions : that 
a majority of the inhabitants had died off, that they had 
emigrated, or that they had gradually joined their fortunes 
with the people of Osman. We find in Byzantine annals 
no record of a disastrous plague or of a large emigration of 
potters and porcelain workers and weavers to the capital 
or elsewhere from Nicaea. There was little fighting. The 
Osmanlis had not yet learned to massacre. What are we 
to believe, then, concerning the large population of this so 
recently flourishing city ? 

It is hardly a conjecture to affirm that the Nicaeans must 

have cast their fortunes with that steadily growing band 

whose firm conviction, forced upon them against their will 

1 Ibn Batutah, ii. 322-3. For discussion of the value of Ibn Batutah' s 
testimony see Appendix B and Bibliography. 



ORKHAN 



63 



and in violence to centuries-old traditions and sentiments, 
was that the old structure of society could not be repaired, 
and that there must be an entirely new building upon the 
old foundation. This conviction did not come suddenly or 
to all at once. It was a gradual dawning and awakening 
which caused the ranks of the Osmanlis to become greater 
every year. Before the end of Orkhan's reign the nucleus 
of Asiatic adventurers which had gathered around Osman 
in the little village of Sugut had grown to half a million. 
It could not have been by natural increase. It could not 
have been by the nocking in of nomads from the East. 
Orkhan was cut off from contact with the Asiatic hinter- 
land. His rivals of Karaman, Satalia, Aidin, and Sarukhan 
would have attracted adventurers from the outside before 
himself. Orkhan formed his nation out of the elements on 
the ground. These were mostly Greek. Nicaea is but an 
illustration of the way in which the new race was born and 
the new nation formed. 

This conviction that no good could come from Constanti- 
nople went farther than a transference of allegiance from 
the Palaeologi to the family of Osman. Mohammed was 
substituted for Christ. What a momentous significance 
there is in the records of the Greek Orthodox Church that 
in 1339 and again in 1340 the Patriarch sent an impassioned 
appeal to the Mcaeans that they should not abjure the 
Christian faith ! 1 At that very moment when the eccle- 
siastics of Constantinople were espousing the rival claims 
of unworthy aspirants to the imperial purple and were 
anathematizing each other in supporting trivial theological 
arguments, Christians were adopting the new Credo : ' I 
believe in one God, and Mohammed is his prophet ! ' in the 
city of the Nicene Creed. 

We may place the surrender of Nicomedia in 1337 or 

1 Miklositch-MiiUer, Act. LXXXII, anno 1339, and Act. XCII, anno 
1340 



64 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



1338. 1 This was the last Byzantine possession in the Otto- 
man corner of Asia Minor. The fall of Aidos and Semendria 
on the hills behind Scutari had opened the way to the 
Bosphorus. Yalova, renowned for its baths, and Hereke, 
where Constantine the Great died, gave the Osmanlis undis- 
puted control of the entrance to the Gulf of Nicomedia and 
secure possession of the city where Diocletian had made 
a new capital for the Roman Empire. 

IV 

Orkhan had now accomplished the first part of the great 
task left unfinished by Osman. But, before he could proceed 
to the establishment of laws for his new sta^e, it was neces- 
sary for him to consolidate and strengthen his position in 
relation to his formidable neighbours. Dangers threatened 
from the east and from the south. In 1327 Timurtash, 
a son of Choban, who was Mongol governor of Rum, pushed 
his raids as far as the Mediterranean, which the Mongol 
arms had not hitherto reached. He fought in turn Greeks 
and Turks. 2 Fortunately for Orkhan, the emir of Kermian, 
whose capital was Kutayia, had appeared so unpromising 
to the eyes of Timurtash that the Mongols had not come 

1 There is no way of establishing the date of the fall of Nicomedia. 
The Ottoman historians report that it was added to the dominions of 
Orkhan in 1326, the year of his accession and of the fall of Brusa. It is 
best here to follow the unanimous testimony of the Byzantine sources, 
which is in accord with the natural inference that Nicomedia fell some 
time after Nicaea : Greg., XI. 6, p. 545 ; Phr., I. 8, p. 38. Hammer 
cannot disregard the testimony of Gregoras here. He ingenuously suggests 
that the city might have been lost by the Osmanlis, and recaptured. 
Cantacuzenos (II. 24, p. 446, and 26, p. 459) says that Andronicus III 
went twice to the aid of Nicomedia in 1331, but he does not record the 
loss of either Brusa or Nicomedia. In the collection of Feridun, Bibl. Nat., 
Paris, MS. anc. fonds turc 79, there is a diploma appointing Soleiman 
governor of Nicomedia in 1332, but the authenticity of the earlier pieces 
in this collection is open to grave suspicion (cf. Bibliography). 

2 Howorth, iii. 613. 



ORKHAN 



65 



northward. But they were an ever imminent source of 
danger to the emirs of Asia Minor, and to Orkhan among 
them, until 1335, when the death of Bahadur Khan, just 
the year before the birth of Timur, caused the disintegration 
of the Mongol power in western Asia. 1 

The Mongol menace had contributed to the undisturbed 
operations of Orkhan against the Byzantines. Immediately 
upon its removal he was threatened by the other Turkish 
emirs. It was a critical moment for Orkhan, whose terri- 
tories had not yet reached the proportions of a large state, 
like those of Omar of Aidin and Mohammed of Sarukhan. 
Singly they might have crushed Orkhan. United they 
certainly would have done so. But here again the Byzan- 
tines contributed to their own downfall. 

In 1329, at Phocaea, Andronicus had conducted his first 
negotiations with the emirs of Aidin and Sarukhan. 2 This 
unsuccessful attempt to embroil the Anatolian emirs with 
each other was a pitiful confession of weakness on the part 
of Andronicus. It did no harm to Orkhan. But it called 
the attention of these emirs to the impotence of Andronicus, 
and led to a series of petty raids in Macedonia and Thrace. 
Emboldened by the ease of initial successes, Mohammed of 
Sarukhan in 1333 led in person an expedition of seventy-five 
ships against the Macedonian coast. Andronicus was too 
weak to oppose his landing. 3 In the same year Turkish 
pirates seized for a short time Rodosto, on the Sea of 
Marmora, only a few hours' sail from Constantinople. 4 The 
following year the emperor was compelled to put an army 
in the field to save Salonika from the Turks. 5 

1 Canale, i. 215. 

2 Not ari actual defensive alliance against Orkhan;, as Schlumberger, 
Numismatique de V Orient latin, p. 480, strpposes. See Cant., II. 13, 
pp. 388-90 ; Phr., I. 8, p. 37. 

3 Cant., II. 28, pp. 470-3. 

4 Ibid., 22, p. 435. 

5 Ibid., 25, pp. 455-6. 

1736 E 



66 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



These attentions from his proposed allies did not 
prevent Andronicus from seeking aid in the same quarters 
in 1336 when he was besieging the Genoese of Phocaea. 
Mohammed sent twenty-four ships, numerous troops, and 
all the provisions necessary to sustain the imperial 
army. The net gain to Andronicus from this expedition 
was the empty acknowledgement from Cattaneo of 
Phocaea, who was not afraid of Andronicus but did not 
want to be bothered by him and his Turkish allies, that 
he would hold as a ' fief of the empire ' what Andronicus, 
even with the help of the Turks, could not take from 
him ! 1 

This momentary diversion of the attention and energies 
of his neighbours was most propitious for Orkhan. Andro- 
nicus had rendered him good service. It gave to Orkhan 
an opportunity of enlarging and rounding out his dominions 
without incurring opposition that would not only have 
prevented him from carrying out his schemes but might also 
have destroyed him. Orkhan had been waiting for this 
moment. In 1333, the Turcoman emir of Mysia had died. 
His younger son had taken refuge with Orkhan, and promised 
in return for aid in dispossessing his brother to surrender 
to the Osmanlis Balikesri and three other border cities. 
Orkhan could not act immediately. He contented himself 
with advising the elder brother to divide his dominions with 
Tursun. Tursun went to negotiate in person, and was 
killed by his brother. This was shortly before the expedition jj 
to Phocaea. Orkhan was now ready. He put in the field 
an expedition, ostensibly to punish the assassination of his 
protege Tursun, and was so successful that he forced the 
emir of Karasi to give up Pergamos and go into exile in 
Brusa. 2 In another expedition, which probably occurred in 

1 Cant. IL, 29-30, pp. 480-4 ; Greg., XI. 2, p. 530. 

2 Hammer, quoting Ashikpashazade, i. 150-1. 



ORKHAN 




E 2 



68 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



1337 at the earliest, 1 Orkhan added Mikhalitsch, Ulubad, 
and Kermasti to his dominions. He was now virtually 
master of Mysia. 

This was the extent of Orkhan's conquests in Asia Minor. 
It is necessary to emphasize this point, owing to the 
erroneous idea which has so long been accepted and which 
has found its way into many modern writers. 2 No corro- 
boration can be found for the statement of Cantacuzenos 
that Soleiman captured Angora from the Tartars in 1354. 3 
Aside from this, neither Byzantines nor Osmanlis report any 
further conquests of Orkhan in Asia Minor. From the fact 

1 Mordtmann, in ZDMG. (1911), Ixv. 105, basing his statement, like 
Hammer, on Ashikpashazade, Vatican MS., fol. 33, gives a.h. 735, 737, 
or 740. The earliest of these dates is precluded by the testimony of Ibn 
Batutah, who found these places still independent about a. h. 735. a. h. 737 
might be possible, if we decide that Orkhan accomplished everything 
during the one expedition against Pergama. Mordtmann, still quoting 
Ashikpashazade, says that these three cities were held by relatives of 
the Palaeologi. If this be true, it goes to prove that there must have 
existed all along in the reigns of Osman and Orkhan quasi- friendly relations 
between Moslem and Christian. There was certainly no religious fanaticism 
during this period of Ottoman history. 

2 ' Les Osmanlis avaient etendu leur domination en Asie Mineure et 
absorbe les etats dont 1'independance avait jusqu'alors empeche 1'unite 
politique de l'Empire musulman ! ' Delaville-Leroulx, France en Orient au 
XIV c Steele, i. 118. ' Osmans Sohn Orkhan Kleinasien unterworfen 
hatte ' : Wiistenfeld, Geschichte der Tilrken, p. 16. ' Orkan s'impadroni 
di quasi tutta la Natolia ' : Alberi, in preface (viii) to series III, vol. i, 
of Relazione Ven. Arab. One of the earliest western historians gives Orkhan's j 
ambition as ' solus cupiens in minore Asia regnare ' : Cervarius, p. 5. 
Even Hammer, i. 150, is considerably ahead of time in saying, in one of 
his chapters on Orkhan, ' Les hordes ottomanes se precipiterent du haut 
de l'Olympe comme une avalanche, franchissant montagnes et vallees, 
ajoutant a leurs possessions les neuf royaumes nes des debris de l'Empire 
seljukide, inondant Asie Mineure depuis l'Olympe jusqu'au Taurus.' ; 
Hammer does not mean to give this wrong impression, but one has to 
read very closely not to get it. See discussion of this error in Appendix B. 

3 Cant., IV. 37, p. 284. Is it on the strength of this evident error of 
a Greek writer that Evliya effendi, ii. 229, says ' Orkhan captured 
Angora from the Prince of Kutayia of the Kermian family ' ? Hussein 
Hezarfenn, following Chalcocondylas, is an example of an Ottoman historian 
basing his statements on a Greek authority. 



ORKHAN 



69 



that there is a complete silence as to their fate, it is reason- 
able to suppose that the Osmanlis during the last decade 
of Orkhan's reign destroyed the independence of several 
little states of which Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin report 
the existence between 1334 and 1349. 1 But these were all 
in a general sense either included in Mysia (Karasi) or in 
the territory which Orkhan is popularly supposed to have 
inherited from Osman. 2 

After the Mysian expedition and the fall of Nicomedia, 
Orkhan may be regarded as the acknowledged sovereign of 
a definite state. We have good contemporary testimony 
to his character, his power and his reputation at this period 
just before he became an active factor in deciding the 
destinies of the Byzantine Empire. 

Ibn Batutah calls him the ' lord of Brusa, son of Osman 
the Little, powerful and rich among the Turcoman kings, 
in treasures, cities and soldiers '. He never ceased making 
the tour of the hundred castles he possessed. In each 
of these he would pass several days to repair them and 
inspect their situation. It was common report that he 
never spent a whole month in a city, not even in Brusa. 
He was all the time fighting and besieging the infidels. It 
was his indomitable energy which seems to have impressed 
the traveller from Morocco. The absolute lack of slothful, 
indifferent acquiescence in the will of God of these latter- 
day Turkish converts was naturally a source of continual 
surprise to this doctor of Islam, fresh from his observation 

1 For the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin see Appendix B, p. 279. 
Mas-Latrie, Tresor de Chronologie, col. 1796, after careful collation of 
Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, comes to the conclusion that Orkhan added 
the emirates of Balikesri, Marmara, Akbara, Kaouia, Keredek, Kul Hissar, 
and Thingizlu to his state between 1349 and 1360. This, too, is discussed 
in Appendix B. 

2 Marmara, for example, is given by the Ottoman historians as a conquest 
made by Osman. See Hammer, i. 89. But it is mentioned as an inde- 
pendent principality by Shehabeddin, in Notices et Extraits des MSS. de la 
Bibl. du roi, xiii. 358, 366 



70 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



of races who had been for hundreds of years in the faith 
of Mohammed. 1 

Shehabeddin is less complimentary. He says : ' Or khan 
has under his domination fifty cities and a still larger 
number of castles. His army consists of 40,000 horsemen, 
and an almost innumerable host of foot -soldiers. But these 
troops are not warlike, and their number is more formidable 
in appearance than in reality. This prince shows himself 
very pacific in regard to his neighbours, and always ready 
to help his allies. However, he is engaged in continual 
wars and is always at odds with many enemies. If he gains 
little from these struggles, it is because his soldiers do not 
serve him well, his subjects are not well disposed towards 
him, and several of his neighbours live in open hostility 
to him. I am told that the Osmanlis are treacherous 
men, whose hearts know only hatred and whose heads are 
filled with base thoughts.' 2 In another place Shehabeddin 
records that Orkhan has in the field 25,000 horsemen who 
are fighting daily the prince of Constantinople. ' The Greek 
emperor is eager to buy the goodwill of Orkhan by paying 
him a monthly tribute.' Orkhan sends expeditions into 
Europe, ' where waves of blood flow '. 3 

V 

The first Ottoman legislation, and the organization of 
the army, is attributed by tradition to Or khan's brother, 
Alaeddin, rather than to the emir himself. The story goes 
that Alaeddin was a man of peace, and did not engage in 
war. 4 He refused to accept the generous offer of Orkhan 

1 Ibn Batutah, ii. 321-2. 

2 Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fonds arabe 2325, fol. 139 v°-140 r°. 

3 Ibid., fol. 125 v°. 

4 Hammer, i. 110-11, says that Alaeddin, 'stranger to the profession 
of arms, occupied himself solely with the cares of state but on p. 133 he 
has Alaeddin commanding the troops in battle while Orkhan watches from 
the top of a hill ! 



ORKHAN 71 

to share the states of Osman, when their father died. Not 
only would he not accept a division of the chieftainship, but 
he also refused to share the personal possessions of Osman. 
Then Orkhan said, e Since you will not rule, be my vizier, 
and bear the burdens of the organization of the state.' 
Thus was created the office of Grand Vizier, which has 
played so important a part in Ottoman history. 1 

In the various lists, which were compiled at a much later 
date, Alaeddin is given as the first Grand Vizier. That this 
office, in its accepted form, was created during the reign 
of Orkhan is altogether improbable. The story of the 
affectionate relationship between Orkhan and Alaeddin, 
and the sharing of duties by them, is, like the story of 
Ertogrul's receiving the promise after reading the Koran, 
a reminiscence of patriarchal days. The dream with its 
promise harks back to Jacob and the ladder. 2 The relation 
between Orkhan and Alaeddin reminds one too strongly of 
Moses and Aaron to be accepted without reserve. One has 
only to turn to the twentieth Sura of the Koran to find 
the connexion and the suggestion : ' And Moses answered, 
Lord, give me a vizier of my family, Aaron, my brother. 
Gird up my loins by him, and make him my colleague in 
the business : that we may praise thee greatly, and remem- 
ber thee often ; for thou regardest us.' 3 

What a contrast between this idyllic story of Orkhan and 
Alaeddin, and the killing of Yakub by Bayezid on the 
battlefield of Kossova fifty years later ! 

Alaeddin was also the first Osmanli to receive the title 
of pasha. He is always spoken of as Alaeddin pasha. This 
same title was conferred on Soleiman, the eldest son of 
Orkhan. The oldest son of Murad proving a traitor, and 

1 For the derivation of vizier, with the double meaning of burden-bearer 
and the one who aids, see Ibn Khaldun, Prolegomena, in Notices et Extraits, 
xx. 4. 

2 Gen. xxviii. 11-18. 3 Sale's translation, c. 20, verse 30, p. 234. 



72 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



there being no other son mature enough, Murad transferred 
the title to Kara Khalil. This word, which came from the 
Persian, was thus early deflected by the Ottoman sovereigns 
from its original significance, the title of the eldest son of 
the ruler. 1 It soon came to be bestowed upon high military 
and civil dignitaries. Similarly, the rank of vizier passed 
immediately out of the imperial family. 

That Alaeddin could have accomplished the work attri- 
buted to him by the Ottoman historians, the making of 
laws and the organization of the army, is impossible for 
three reasons. The time for this great work was too short 
and not a propitious period : Alaeddin died seven years 
after his father, in 13 33, 2 before Or khan was firmly estab- 
lished in his sovereignty ; the statement is incompatible 
with what we know of the character of Orkhan ; finally, 
the organization of the state and of the army must have 
been the result of a slow development through many years, 
and its perfection belongs to the middle or latter part of 
Orkhan 's career, years after Alaeddin pasha's death. 

The whole scheme of an Islamic state is theocratic. Its 
laws, its customs are founded directly upon the Koran and 
the interpretation of the Koran by the early ' fathers ' of 
Mohammedanism. There is no civil law as distinct from 
ecclesiastical law. 3 The judges and the lawyers belong to 

1 Col. Djevad bey, p. 20, n. 2. Col. Djevad claims that von Hammer's 
derivation of the word ' pasha ' from the Persian is wrong. But he gives 
no reason, which would satisfy the philologist when he asserts* that this 
word is essentially Turkish. Nor does he attempt to explain its original 
meaning. ' Pasha ' is probably a shortened form of ' padishah ' . See Century 
Dictionary, v. 4228. 

2 According to the biographer of Brusa, cited by Hammer, i. 146, n. 4. 

3 I do not understand what Hammer means when he says, i. 116, that 
the Kanunname must be taken in the sense of political rather than 
ecclesiastical law. The two cannot be separated in Islam. Or, perhaps, 
it is better to say that there is no political law. The very word Kanun 
was taken from the Greeks, was used by them for ecclesiastical law, and 
its adoption by the Osmanlis (at a much later period than Orkhan) serves 
to emphasize the fact that there was no other kind of law conceivable 



ORKHAN 73 

the clergy. Orkhan's problem was exceedingly difficult. 
Whether they were Turkish converts or Greek renegades, 
the Osmanlis were all on common ground in their entire 
ignorance of the art of building a Moslem state. It is idle 
to speculate upon the early legislation of the Osmanlis, 
for there are no records. But it is probable that the 
Osmanlis did not at this early time make any attempt to 
establish a body of laws in conformity with the Koran. 
Where the Sheri'at (the sacred law) was understood, and 
where it was applicable to local conditions, it was naturally 
used. But, side by side with the sacred Moslem law, existed 
the old Byzantine code. This was used by the Osmanlis 
until they were firmly seated in Constantinople. Only then 
did they acquire a complete system of Moslem canon law. 
It is within the scope of a work covering a later period than 
that included in this volume to point out the strong Byzan- 
tine and moderate Turkish influences in the Kanunname of 
Mohammed the Conqueror. 



VI 

For dealing with Ottoman subjects and with those 
who might be conquered in war, certain principles were, 
however, adopted by the Osmanlis in the time of Orkhan. 
The foremost of these was complete religious toleration. 
This made possible, to a large measure it explains, the 
development of the Osmanlis into a powerful empire. 

The propagation of Islam by the sword under the early 
Khalifs, the sudden and unparalleled spread of the new 
religion from the Arabian desert to Syria, Egypt, North 
Africa, and Spain, until the hordes of the invaders were 

than the law of the Church. The word Kavwv had of course other meanings, 
but in its collective legal sense it seems to have stood only for rules or 
laws that had to do with things ecclesiastical or religious. See the 
various meanings of this word in A. Souter's Text and Canon of the New 
Testament (London, 1913), pp. 154-5. 



74 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



stopped by Charles Mart el at Tours, the terrible ravages of 
the Moslem corsairs in the Mediterranean — here were the 
sources of the deep impression of fanaticism and cruelty 
that the rise of Islam and the followers of Mohammed 
had made upon an equally fanatical and cruel Europe. 
That the recrudescence of the Islamic movement under the 
Osmanlis was represented in the same colours by the early 
European writers is explicable when we consider their lack 
of unbiased information and their confusion of the Osmanlis 
with the Asiatic conquerors." such as Attila and the Huns, 
Djenghiz Khan and the Mongols, Tirnur and the Tartars. 
We must take into account, too, the fact that these historians 
wrote at a time when the Osmanlis were beginning to be 
perverted by fanatical Arab influences, and were a real 
menace to the peace of Europe. From the fifteenth to the 
seventeenth century, ' the Turk ' was a monster of iniquity 
and cruelty, from whom even the distant English in the 
security of their island home prayed to be delivered. 1 The 
recent history of the Ottoman Empire has unfortunately 
contributed much to keep alive this impression. 

In spite of the accumulated evidence which on the surface 
points to a contrary conclusion, the Osmanli is not and 
never has been a religious fanatic like the Arab Moslem. 2 
He is not by nature zealous or enthusiastic, nor is he by 
nature cruel. Docile, tractable, gentle, in a word, lovable — 

1 This petition is in the Litany of the Prayer Book of Edward VI. 
Cf. Schaff, Church History, iv. 151. 

2 I do not mean to assert that religious feeling has played no part- in 
the massacres of our own day. But these massacres were arranged by 
the goyernment, who incited the Moslems to attack their Christian neigh- 
bours, inflaming the ignorant mind more by an appeal to racial hatred, 
to loot, to lust, than to defence of the sacred faith. In the Armenian 
massacres it was represented to the ignorant yillage Moslem that the 
Armenians were plotting to set up an independent goyernment or to 
betray the fatherland to some European power. I was in Adana during 
the terrible massacre of 1909, and make this statement from personal 
experience and obseryation. 



ORKHAN 



75 



this is the verdict of the traveller who has had an opportunity 
of knowing that portion of the Moslem population of the 
Ottoman Empire which is popularly called Turkish. Other 
influences of their religion than hatred for the Christian have 
prevented the Osmanlis from winning and keeping a place 
among the civilized peoples of the world. Whatever one 
may claim in abstract theory for the Koran and the whole 
body of Moslem teaching, its practical concrete results have 
been ignorance, stagnation, immorality, subserviency of 
womanhood, indifference, paralysis of the will, absence of 
incentive to altruism. These are the causes of the irremedi- 
able decay of every Mohammedan empire, of every Moham- 
medan people. 

The government and the ruling classes of the Ottoman 
Empire are negatively rather than positively evil. There 
is nothing inherently bad about the Osmanli. He is inert, 
and has thus failed to reach the standards set by the 
progress of civilization. He lacks ideals, and has thus 
shocked the enlightened conscience of the modern world. 
By the law of the survival of the fittest, he has been cast 
aside. 

But when we compare the early Osmanlis with the 
Byzantines and with the other elements in the Balkan 
peninsula, it is the Osmanlis who must be pronounced the 
fittest. They were fresh, enthusiastic, uncontaminated, 
energetic. They had ideals : they had a goal. As it is 
with the individual, so it is with the nation. Ideals are lost 
when the goal is reached. Decay sets in when the struggle 
for existence ceases. 

Pressed on the one side by his Turkish neighbours and 
on the other by the danger of including in his dominions 
a large and unassimilated mass of Christians, Orkhan was 
wise enough to desist from any attempt at forcible con- 
version. But some modus vivendi had to be arranged. 
A mere raider would have massacred and destroyed, and 



76 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



the empire he built would not have outlived the century 
of its birth. Or khan was neither raider nor invader. He 
lived in the country of his father and of his grandfather. 
Many of his lieutenants — certainly his ablest ones 1 — were 
descendants of the oldest stock in Asia Minor. His nation, 
if it was to be a nation, depended upon at least a partial 
assimilation of the Byzantines. As his dominions increased, 
it became clear that there had to be some distinction between 
Moslem and Christian other than a profession of faith. He 
must devise some reward, which would be so attractive that 
the Christians, especially the higher classes among them, 
would change their faith in order to secure its benefits. 
This was the problem. 

Orkhan solved this problem by establishing a system of 
rewards for military service, and then by restricting military 
service to Moslems. He divided the land he had conquered 
among his faithful warriors, and let it be known that in 
future conquests a large portion of the territory won, out- 
side of the cities, would be bestowed upon soldiers who took 
part in his campaigns. These lands were to be held as 
military fiefs. The only obligation was that of military 
service, which could be performed either by actually putting 
into the field a number of men in proportion to the land held 
or by paying a sum sufficient to replace the quota by hired 
troops. So far this was but an adaptation of the European 
feudal system. But it was superior to the European system 
in that the holdings were small and that there was through 
two centuries an ever-present opportunity of winning new 
holdings. 

Except in Albania and Bosnia, where the old nobility 
were to preserve their lands by conversion to Islam, there 
were no local traditions to prevent such a scheme by neces- 
sitating the dispossession of former great landowners. The 

1 Michail Koeze, Marco, and Evrenos were Greeks. Cf. Leunclavius, 

Pandectes, p. 125. 



ORKHAN 



77 



Seljuks, the Crusaders, and the Mongols in Asia Minor, 
the Catalans, the Bulgarians, the Serbians and the civil 
wars between the emperors in Macedonia and Thrace, the 
hangers-on of the Fourth Crusade in Thessaly, Greece, and 
the Aegaean Islands, had made so clean a sweep of the 
old aristocracy, attached to the soil, that Orkhan's idea was 
feasible. Through these small holdings and through the 
rapid increase of conquered territory, the Ottoman sultans 
were able, almost from the beginning, to exercise an absolute 
sovereignty over their expanding dominions, and to prevent 
the rise of a class of nobles. The Ottoman Empire has 
never known an hereditary nobility. In the later conquests, 
the Sublime Porte sometimes granted life rights of governor- 
ship, with a tacit understanding that the succession should 
go to the son, to local chieftains or to large landowners. 
But these concessions were in regions never fully conquered, 
and remote from Constantinople. Those to whom these 
privileges were given had no part in the central government 
and no rank outside of their immediate locality. 

In place of military service, every adult Christian paid 
a special head-tax, to be used for the support of the army. 
The Christian was exempt from military service ; the Mussul- 
man was exempt from taxes. 1 This head-tax was heavy, 
and so gauged as to keep the Christian, unless he lived in 
a city, in economic dependence upon the Moslem landowner. 
As a general rule, during the first century and a half of 
Ottoman conquest, those who held to the old faith went 
to the cities and large towns. The Moslem thus became, 
without any attempt at forcible conversion or need to 
massacre, the undisputed possessor of the country districts. 

Aside from the onerous head-tax, there were grave 

1 Up to the time of the Tanzimat, in 1849, Christians were called raias. 
The original meaning of raia was a flock, and was not a term of contempt, 
but a recognition of the fact that Christians were a taxable asset to the 
nation, at so much per head. 



78 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



inequalities for the Christian in matters of law and in inter- 
marriage. After the fall of Constantinople, Mohammed the 
Conqueror gave the Christians a large measure of self-govern- 
ment by putting them in millets (nations) under t he headship of 
the ecclesiastical authorities . But the inequality in t he matt er 
of intermarriage has never been done away with. A Moslem 
may marry a Christian woman, but a Christian is forbidden 
to marry a Mohammedan woman. In the earliest days, 
when there was neither racial nor religious antipathy and 
Christian and Moslem lived in close social intercourse, this 
law was a powerful proselytizing agency. It furnished 
a temptation to a change of faith which, whenever it arose, 
was far stronger than the temptation of lands, of power, 
of economic independence, or of civil equality. 

The moment one professed Islam he became an Osmanli. 
Religion has always been the test of nationality in the Otto- 
man Empire. 1 The Osmanlis increased from the thousands 
to the millions, in Macedonia, in Thrace, and in Asia Minor. 
Ancestry was quickly forgotten in the midst of ever-changing 
conditions and the founding of a new social order. It is 
still a characteristic of the Osmanli that he has no surname. 
The most widely-read English writer of the seventeenth 
century on the ' Turks ' emphasized the mixture of blood 
in the Osmanli, when he wrote : ' At present the blood of 
the Turks is so mixed with that of all sorts of Languages 

1 In western Asia Minor, in Macedonia and Thrace, up to the present 
day the convert to Islam, no matter of what race, is immediately classified 
before the law as a Turk. When the Sublime Porte, after the reoccupation 
of Adrianople in the summer of 1913, laid a memorial before the Powers, 
it was claimed that the large majority of the population of the vilayet 
of Thrace was ' Turkish '. This word had absolutely no racial significance. 
Every Mohammedan in Thrace, no matter what his race or language, 
would be considered a Turk. The Young Turks, when they established 
the Constitution in 1908, tried to revive the word ' Osmanli ' as a term 
including all Ottoman subjects. But they not only failed to convince 
the nation — they failed to convince themselves — that a Christian could 
really be an Osmanli, with the full rights and privileges enjoyed by the 
Moslems. 



ORKHAN 



79 



and Nations, that none of them can derive his Lineage from 
the ancient blood of the Saracens.' 1 

A majority of the Byzantines whom Orkhan, Murad, and 
Bayezid conquered must have become Osmanlis. Once the 
change of religion was made, the development of the new 
race was not difficult . There Was much in common between 
the Turk of Asia Minor and the Byzantine. An Armenian 
contemporary wrote of them as if they were alike. 2 The 
Greeks did not take to heart the new regime, 3 for the fiscal 
evils of the Byzantine system reconciled them in advance 
to a change. Nothing could be worse than that which they 
had suffered. 4 

Of course, the love of woman, the desire for adventure, 
hope of economic independence through rewards of land 
and removal of onerous taxes, disgust with the Byzantine 
administration and with the lack of support from their 
rulers and ecclesiastical authorities — these influences did not 
cause the conversion of all the Christians. In the cities, 
where the inequality and the inconvenience of remaining 
true to the old faith was minimized, and where Christianity 
has always been able to make itself felt and heard, 5 there 

1 Ricaut, ed. 1682, p. 148. For confusion of the name 'Turk' with 
' Saracen ' by early western writers, see Chronique latine de Guillaume de 
Nangis, Geraud ed., i. 46, 86-8 ; Memoir es d' 'Olivier de la Marche, Beaune 
and d'Arbaumont ed., i. 22-5, iv. 83 ; Gilles le Muisit, Lemaitre ed., p. 196. 
The mistake of Ricaut is common with many of the fifteenth- to seven- 
teenth-century writers on the Crusades. 

2 Matthew of Edessa (Urfa), fol. 8 of MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds 
armenien, No. 95, quoted in Notices et Extraits, ix, lere partie, p. 281, 
speaks of ' les calamites que des peuples barbares et corrompus, tels que 
les Turcs et les Grecs, leurs semblables, ont causees '. 

3 This was true even of the conquest of Constantinople, which caused 
much more dismay and regret in Europe than among the Greeks. See 
the remarkable letter of Francis Fielphus to Mohammed II in Bibl. de 
VEcole des langues vivantes orientates, serie 3, xii. 63-6, 211-14. 

4 Cf. Rambaud in Hist. Generate, ii. 816. 

5 In Constantinople, Smyrna, Salonika, and the lesser coast cities of the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as in many of the cities of the interior, one feels 
the atmosphere of Sabbath rest much more on a Sunday than on a Friday. 



80 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



was no great temptation to a change of religion. After the 
Osmanlis became stronger, and entered into the aggressive 
period of conquest, they resorted to other means to swell 
their numbers. The institution of the Janissaries, and the 
permission to enslave those whom they conquered, gave the 
Osmanlis more potent and immediately pressing arguments. 

From the completion of the conquest of Bithynia by 
Orkhan, the Osmanlis can be called a distinct race with 
a national consciousness and a desire for expansion. They 
can be distinguished from the Turks of the emirates of Asia 
Minor and from the Byzantines. The Turk did not absorb 
the Greek, nor did the Greek absorb the Turk. Both had 
taken a new religion, and if the Turkish language was 
adopted, it was rather the customs and laws of the Byzan- 
tines which prevailed until the influence of the Arabs, 
enhanced as it was with the prestige of centuries of Islam, 
gained the ascendancy over Turkish and Byzantine tradition 
alike. But this did not occur until the Osmanlis invaded 
Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century. 

It must be remembered that the Greeks were not the 
only element added to the Turkish stock. The adoption of 
the Turkish language by the Osmanlis was due not only to 
the fact that from the beginning it was the military and 
governmental language, but to its being the simplest and 
most vigorous medium of communication for the different 
peoples who became Osmanlis. 

Calling the Osmanlis Turks, and regarding them as 
invaders upon the soil of Europe, is an historical error which 
has persisted so long that the Osmanlis themselves have 
fallen into it ! They have always distinguished themselves 
from the Turks. This is proved by their own use of that 
word to describe a people as different from themselves 
as were the Greeks. Evliya effendi spoke of the ' harsh 
language of the Turks ', and said of Turbeli Ko'ilik, which 



ORKHAN 



8] 



was conquered by Osman in 1312, ' Though its inhabitants 
are Turks, it is a sweet town.' 1 Hadji Khalfa regarded 
the Turks as synonymous with the Tartars, and an altogether 
foreign race. 2 

Whether their tolerance was actuated by policy, by 
genuine kindly feeling, or by indifference, 3 the fact cannot 
be gainsaid that the Osmanlis were the first nation in 
modern history to lay down the principle of religious freedom 
as the corner-stone in the building up of their nation. During 
the centuries that bear the stain of unremitting persecu- 
tion of the Jew and the responsibility for official support 
of the Inquisition, Christian and Moslem lived together in 
harmony under the rule of the Osmanlis. This was generally, 
though not universally, the case throughout the fourteenth 
century in the Turkish emirates of Asia Minor. 4 



VII 

The army of Osman consisted entirely of volunteer horse- 
men, who were called akindjis. They wore no specified 
uniform. But they were superb riders and moved together 
' like a wall ' — an expression that has come down to the 
present day in Ottoman military drills. 5 When Osman 
planned a campaign, he sent criers into the villages to pro- 
claim that ' whoever wanted to fight ' should be at a certain 
place on a certain day. 

Orkhan was the organizer of the Ottoman army. He and 

1 Evliya effendi, ii. 241. 

2 In the Djihannuma, p. 951. 

3 In a popular Anatolian love-song, there is the line, ' Benini sevdijimie 
din var iman yok', ' She whom I love has religion, but not a bit of faith 
which illustrates the lack of deep religious feeling in the Osmanli. In this 
he is like the Greek, and different from the Slav, the Persian and Arab. 
See Kiinos, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlcindischen Oesellschaft, liii. 237. 

4 At Balikesri the sultan Dambur told Ibn Batutah that ' the men 
follow the religion of their king ' : ii. 317. Here was the principle of 
cuius regio eius religio two centuries before Augsburg ! 

5 Col. Djevad bey, pp. 18-19. 

1736 x? 



82 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



his successor Murad laid the foundations of a military power 
which was without rival for two centuries. Although there 
is no ground for the claim of many historians that the 
Osmanlis were a hundred years ahead of Europe in organizing 
a standing army, 1 they were certainly pioneers in the com- 
plete organization of an army on a permanent war footing. 
Orkhan understood well the principle qui se laisse payer se 
laisse commander thirty years before Charles V of France. 

His irregular infantry (azabs) were placed in the front 
when battle was engaged. 2 It made little difference how 
many of these were killed, or whether they made a good 
show. They served to draw the first fire of the enemy. 
When the enemy's energy was exhausted or when he was 
led to pursue the fleeing azabs, thinking the victory his, 
he came upon the second line, which consisted of paid, 
disciplined troops. These were accustomed to fighting 
together, were acquainted with their leaders' commands 
and strategy, and had a tremendous advantage over the 
usual mercenaries of the period in that they served a cause 
to which their lives were devoted and a sovereign whose 
interests were identical with their own. Whether this were 
due to training begun in the days of adolescence, or to the 
knowledge that bravery would be rewarded not by booty 
alone (always an uncertain quantity which the ordinary 
mercenary invariably begins to think of securing before his 
fighting work is really accomplished), but by promotion in 
the service and substantial gifts of land, the result was the 
same. 

The corps of salaried soldiers were called Kapu-Kali 
Odjaks, and their service was centred in the person of their 
sovereign. They were supposed to be continually ' at the 

1 Edward III of England had created a sort of obligatory military 
service. His organized infantry took part in the Battle of Crecy, 1346. 
Lavisse-Rambaud, Hist, generate, iii. 76. 

2 Halil Ganem, i. 39. 



ORKHAN 



83 



door of the Sultan's tent '. The Sultan paid them regularly 
and personally. They served him regularly and personally. 
When they went into the field with a commander other 
than the Sultan, the commander was regarded, during the 
term of his commission, as in the place of the Sultan. 1 
There came to be seven of these odjaks : the janissaries, 
the adjami-oghlular (novices), the topjis (field-artillerymen), 
the djebedjis (smiths), the toparabadjis (artillery and muni- 
tion drivers), the Jchumbaradjis (siege -artillerymen), and the 
sakkas (water-carriers). 2 It is impossible to state just when 
these distinctive corps arose, but they are the logical develop- 
ment of Orkhan's Eulufeli, the year-in and year-out soldiery 
who followed arms as a definite profession and enjoyed 
a regular salary fixed by law. 

The akindjis, cavalry scouts and yet more than that, 
served as an advance-guard, and opened up the country 
to be conquered. The greatest dangers and the richest 
rewards fell to them. They were recruited from among the 
holders of military fiefs (timarets). Guides (tchaousches) and 
regular paid corps of cavalry (spahis) completed the organiza- 
tion. 

It may be that Orkhan had learned a valuable lesson from 
his observation of the Catalans and of the early Turkish 
invaders in Europe. For he arranged his organization in 
such a way that the army would depend directly upon him, 
and not upon subordinates who might be led to put their 
personal interests above those of their chief. With the 
exception of the akindjis, whose loyalty was secured by 
their fiefs, there were no irregular bands raised and led 
by adventurers. Unity was the first striking characteristic 
of the Ottoman army. 

1 This still holds. In October 1912, on the Seraskerat Square in Con- 
stantinople, I saw Sultan Mehmed V give over the command of the army 
for the Balkan War to Nazim pasha. 

2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 18. 

F 2 



84 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



The second characteristic was readiness. We have already 
seen how Andronicus III ' gathered in haste ' the army 
which he tried to oppose to the Osmanlis. Lack of time 
for preparation is the excuse for many a Byzantine disaster. 
An early and competent traveller wrote that the Osmanlis 
knew beforehand just when the Christian armies were coming 
and where they could be met to the best advantage. For 
they were always on a war footing, and their tchaousches 
and spies knew how and where to lead. ' They can start 
suddenly, and a hundred Christian soldiers would make 
more noise than ten thousand Osmanlis. When the drum 
is sounded they put themselves immediately in march, never 
breaking step, never stopping till the word is given. Lightly 
armed, in one night they travel as far as their Christian 
adversaries in three days.' 1 

VIII 

The fall of Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia did not cause 
alarm in Europe. The rise of the Osmanlis had scarcely 
been noticed, even by the Byzantines ! The Turkish pirates 
in the Aegaean, who had no connexion whatever with the 
Osmanlis, 2 were becoming, however, a menace to the com- 
merce of the Venetians and Genoese and to the sovereignty 
of the remaining Latin princes of Achaia and of the islands. 
In one of Marino Sanudo's letters we find the following 
significant passage : 6 Marco Gradenigo, writing to me from 
Negropont (Euboea) on September eighteenth, 1328, declares 
that unless some remedy be found against the Turks, who 

1 Bertrandon de la Broquiere, Schefer ed., pp. 220-1. 

2 This statement needs especial emphasis, as many historians have 
followed Chalcocondylas and Bosio in attributing the corsair fleets to 
Osman and Orkhan. An instance of a careful modern historian making 
this error is found in Romanin, Historia documentata di Venezia, iii. 147, 
where he says, ' La lega . . . per raffrenare l'ognor crescente potenza 
otto7nana.' 



ORKHAN 



85 



have marvellously increased in numbers, Negropont and all 
the islands of the Archipelago will be infallibly lost.' 1 

In 1327 Andronicus II wrote to Pope John XXII, calling 
his attention to the Turks as a danger to Christendom, and 
appealing for aid. 2 Nothing was done at this time. The 
Byzantines were schismatics, and France at least was more 
intent upon a recovery of the Holy Land than upon checking 
the advance of the Moslem corsairs. 3 

Andronicus III, in 1333, followed the example of his 
grandfather by making another overture to John XXII. 
He did not scruple to dangle before the Pope the bait of 
a reunion of the Churches. 4 The same year Venice urged 
Cyprus and Rhodes to join in a coalition against the Turks. 5 
The only practical outcome of the efforts of the popes, the 
Venetian senate, and the Byzantine emperors to raise a 
crusade during the reign of Orkhan was the capture of 
Smyrna, in October 1344. Omar bey, emir of Aidin, had 
been caught napping. 6 Smyrna remained in possession of 
the Knights of Rhodes until it was taken by Timur in 



The futile agitation in Europe against the reawakening 

1 In Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos, ii. 313. 

2 This letter, from the manuscript in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, 
is published in Bibl. de VEcole des Chartes (1906), lxvii. 587. Other docu- 
ments on this mission, ibid. (1892), liii. 254-7. 

3 See papers of H. Lot in Bibl. de VEcole des Chartes, 4 e serie (1859), 
v. 503-9, and (1875) xxxvi. 588-600. Also Bosio, ii. 58. 



4 Raynaldus, Ann. 1334, pp. 17-19. As the repetition of all the negotia- 
tions in connexion with papal attempts for crusades cannot be included 
in the text of my book, I refer the reader to the section on papal 
negotiations in the Chronological Tables. 

5 Deliberation of Senate, November 18, 1333, in Misti, XVI, fol. 40. 

6 Raynaldus, Ann. 1344, p. 11 ; Stella (in Muratori), col. 1080 ; Dandolo, 
p. 418 ; Greg., II, p. 686 ; Cant., Ill, p. 192 ; Mon. Hist Pair. x. 757 ; 

j Misti for 1344, fol. 30 ; Rymer, Acta Publica, vol. ii, part IV, p. 172 ; 
I Commemorialia, iv. 80. 

7 For relations of Rhodes with Smyrna from 1347 onwards, see Bosio, 
| passim, but especially ii. 80 and 118-19. 



1403. 7 



86 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



of Islam did not in any way hurt Or khan. On the con- 
trary it helped him greatly. Just as the petty conflict of 
Andronicus III with Phocaea in 1336 had diverted Orkhaivs 
powerful southern neighbours, this interference of the Pope, 
and the activity of Rhodes and Venice, contributed to the 
prosperity and growth of the Osmanlis by striking a blow 
at his most dangerous rivals, the Emirs of Sarukhan. Aidin. 
and Hamid. After 1340 Orkhan was ready to extend his 
dominion into Europe. He did not have long to wait. 

IX 

Orkhan had one rival whose goal was similar to his own. 
Stephen Dushan. kral of Serbia, was openly aspiring to the 
imperial throne. Byzantium had no more formidable enemy 
than this warrior king, who in twenty-five years led thirteen 
campaigns against the Greeks. 1 The memory of his ephe- 
meral empire has been cherished by the Serbians to this 
day. In their folk-lore Stephen Dushan and his deeds are 
immortalized. The halo of romance still surrounds the man 
and his conquests. It is in vain that historical science has 
demonstrated the purely temporary character of Stephen's 
conquests. It is in vain that he has been divested of the 
glamour of the chronicles and songs, and pictured in con- 
formity with fact. To the Serbian peasant he is Saint 
Stephen, the glorious Czar, who brought the Serbian Empire 
to its zenith. All the cities in which this adventurer and 
raider set foot are claimed in the twentieth century as 
a legitimate part of ' Greater Serbia \ Men have engaged 
in a bloody war and have died for this fiction. 2 

1 Serbian chronicles, quoted by von Kallay, Geschichte der Serlen, i. 66. 

2 In the fratricidal war of July 1913, the ignorant Serbian peasants really 
believed that they were fighting to take from the Bulgarians ' the sacred 
soil of the fatherland ', as their newspapers and addresses to the soldiers 
called Macedonia. The name of St. Stephen was invoked when they 
went into battle. 



ORKHAX 



87 



Stephen Dushan demands our attention because he is 
the one man who could have anticipated the Osmanlis in 
winning the inheritance of the Caesars. A statement of 
his career is necessary before we take up the narration of 
the events which led to the invasion of the Balkan peninsula 
by the Osmanlis. 

Stephen came into prominence in 1330 during the war 
which his father, Urosh, made upon Bulgaria. Czar Michael 
had repudiated the Serbian princess Anna in order to marry 
a sister of Andronicus III. The Bulgarians were badly 
beaten. Stephen received for his brilliant part in the 
campaign the province of Zenta. Although he was only 
twenty-three, his ambition to rule was already awakened. 
Dissatisfied, he demanded a half of his father's possessions. 
Urosh refused. Stephen marched against him, dethroned 
him, and imprisoned him. According to some authorities, 
he had Urosh killed. 1 Whether he actually ordered the 
assassination or not, he profited by the crime. 

During the first decade of his reign, Stephen gathered 
a majority of the Serbian-speaking peoples under his rule, 
pushed down to the Dalmatian coast, and asserted Serbian 
supremacy over a large portion of the territory which his 
race had hitherto contested with the Bulgarians. His 
appearance on the Adriatic led to a nominal alliance with 
Venice. 2 In 1340 he began the invasion of lower Macedonia. 
When the valley of the Vardar was conquered, he attacked 
Serres. This city fell into his possession. He now con- 
sidered himself ready for the advance on Constantinople. 

1 Orbini, II Regno degli Slavi, p. 259, gives a circumstantial account 
of the assassination. He says that Stephen gave the order to men who 
strangled the old king in his cell at midnight. This does not prevent 
Orbini from saving later of Stephen ' fu huomo molto pio " ! Borschgrave, 
p. 266, is not certain of Stephen's connivance. 

2 J. Schafarik. Ehnchus actorum spectantium ad historiam Serborum. 

xxv-xxvn. 



88 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Drunk with success, he crowned himself at Serres 1 ' King 
by the grace of God of Serbia, of Albania, and of the mari- 
time region, prince of the Bulgarian empire, and master of 
almost all the Roman empire '. 2 A few months later he 
changed the title to ' emperor and autocrat of Serbia and 
Romania '. 3 

The relations between Stephen and Venice during the 
period between 1345 and 1350 show how easily an alliance 
between the Serbians and the Venetians might have been 
concluded. It was a critical time for Orkhan. Had Stephen 
Dushan, with the help of the Venetians, attacked Con- 
stantinople before 1350, the Osmanlis would have lost their 
goal. After his coronation, the ' Roman emperor 5 sent an 
embassy to Venice to secure the Senate's aid for the definite 
purpose of acquiring Constantinople. 4 In 1347 the Senate, 
in response to a second overture, congratulated Stephen on 
having been crowned ' emperor of Constantinople ', but 
regretted the impossibility of aiding him. There was a truce 
between Venice and the Byzantine Empire, and they were 
at that moment engaged in a war with Zara. 5 However, 
like typical merchants, they consented to sell arms to 
Stephen. 6 

In January 1348 the Senate congratulated Stephen upon 
his exploits, 7 and later in the same year granted him three, 
then four, galleys. 8 This seems to be the extent of the help 

1 I find no documentary authority for the often repeated statement 
that this coronation took place at Skoplje (Uskub or Scopia). At the time 
of the recent Balkan War, the Serbians, in order to preserve their friendly 
relations with Greece, supported the Uskub theory. But see Ljubic, 
Monumenta spectantia ad hist. Slavorum meridionalium, ii. 278, 279, 326; 
Commemorialia, IV ; Seer eta Bog., A. 33. 

2 ' Stephanus, D. G. Serviae . . . Albaniae, maritimae regionis rex, 
Bulgariae imperii princeps et fere totius imperii Romariiae dominus ' : 
Ljubic, ii. 278. 

3 Ibid., ii. 326. 4 Ibid., loc. cit. 5 Seer. Bog., A. 33. 
6 Misti, xxiv. 12. 7 Ibid., xxiv. 110. 

8 Seer. Bog., II, B. 4 ; Misti, xxiv. 103. 



ORKHAN 



89 



rendered by Venice to Stephen Dushan. The success of 
Stephen in subjugating Thessaly, and his progress farther 
south until, in 1349, the Serbian flags waved on the main- 
land opposite the Venetian castle of Ptelion in Euboea, 
alarmed the Venetians. The Senate complained of the 
piracy of the Serbians in the Aegaean, and tried to re- 
establish peace between Serbians and Greeks. 1 Stephen 
became more insistent and the Senate more reluctant. On 
April 13, 1350, the Senate considered several demands made 
upon them by an envoy of ' Stephen Dushan, emperor of 
Serbia and Romania, despot of Arta and count of Wal- 
lachia '. Among them were Venetian citizenship for himself, 
his wife and his son, a conference with the Doge at Ragusa, 
and substantial aid for the attack upon Constantinople, 
' when he shall have conquered the ten parts of Romania 
outside of Constantinople.' 2 The chart of citizenship was 
accorded. But he was informed that the Doge never left 
Venice during his tenure of office, and that there was 
a treaty of friendship with the Byzantines which prevented 
Venice from joining in an attempt to capture the imperial 
city. 3 

Convinced that he could expect no substantial assistance 
from Venice, Stephen planned to work the old trick of the 
Byzantine emperors. The Serbians were already excom- 
municated by the Greek Orthodox Church. Stephen nego- 
tiated with the Pope for the return of the Serbians into the 
Roman fold. 4 

When war arose between Venice and Genoa, Stephen sent 
envoys to Orkhan to propose a union of the Serbian and 
Ottoman armies for a campaign against Constantinople. The 

1 Cf. Misti, xxv. 7, 10. Fiorinsky, The South Slavs and Byzantium in 
the second quarter of the Fourteenth Century, quoted by Borchgrave in 
Bulletin de V'Academie royale de Belgique for 1884, 8 e serie, iv. 429-30. 

2 Commem. iv. 172. 

3 Misti, xxvi. 16-22 ; Commem. iv. 157. 

4 MS. Vatican 3765, quoted by Raynaldus, ann. 1347, XXX. 



90 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



marriage of his daughter to Orkhan's son was to seal the 
alliance. Orkhan accepted this proposal. An embassy was 
immediately sent to Stephen to arrange the details of the 
alliance. But Cantacuzenos determined to prevent this 
change of Orkhan's allegiance by a most drastic measure. 
He did not fear the anger of Orkhan as greatly as he feared 
a union between Orkhan and Dushan. The Ottoman envoys 
were ambushed. Some were killed. Those who escaped, 
together with the presents destined for Stephen, were taken 
to Demotika. 1 

Neither Stephen nor Orkhan tried to reopen the negotia- 
tions. They realized that their ambitions were too nearly 
identical to permit a harmonious agreement as to a division 
of the sjDoils. Macedonia was as hard to divide in the 
fourteenth century as it is in the twentieth. After 1351 
Stephen watched to see what effect the war between Venice 
and Genoa was going to have upon his fortunes. He also 
intrigued, as Orkhan was doing, in the civil war of the 
Byzantines. These were his Capuan days. They were fatal 
to the fame of Stephen — outside of the Serbian folk-lore ! 
The first expedition of Orkhan's son Soleiman, in 1353, so 
alarmed Stephen that he tried to become reconciled to the 
Orthodox Church. He sent an embassy to Constantinople, 
but the patriarch refused his blessing until Stephen had 
renounced the title of emperor and his conquests east of 
the Vardar. 2 Stephen could not do this. Nor could he wait 
longer. If he did not strike quickly, the Osmanlis would 
be in his path. He took what was now a gambler's chance. 
With eighty thousand men he started for Constantinople. 
Death claimed him on the second day of the march. 3 The 
Serbian Empire did not outlive its founder. 

1 Fforinsky, p. 207. 

2 Engel, Geschichte von Serbien, 285-6 ; Miiller, Beitrdge Byz. Chron., 
p. 406 n. 

3 Cant., IV. 43, p. 315 ; Greg., XXVII. 50, p. 557 ; von Kallay, i. 69. 



ORKHAN 



91 



The public life of John Cantacuzenos was contemporary 
almost to the year with that of Stephen Dushan. He was 
associated with Andronicus III in the capacity of grand 
chancellor and confidential adviser throughout the decade 
which saw the loss of Nicaea and Nicomedia. Shortly after 
he had succeeded in deposing his grandfather, Andronicus III 
was taken with a violent fever. His crime-stained mind 
could not rid itself of the idea that he was going to die, 
even after he had become convalescent. He solicited 
Cantacuzenos to assume the imperial purple. He wanted 
to abdicate and take monk's orders. A drink from a 
miraculous spring gave him a new grip on life. 1 For eleven 
years he lived on, in every crisis irresolute, in every disaster 
unkingly, bending always before the stronger will of Canta- 
cuzenos. In 1341, at the early age of forty-five, his worthless 
life ended. His legacy to the Empress Anna and his child 
heir was the guardianship of his ' friend and counsellor, John 
Cantacuzenos '. The grand chancellor accepted the regency 
with alacrity. 2 

Three months after the death of Andronicus III, Canta- 
cuzenos crowned himself emperor at Demotika. He put the 
imperial crown also upon the head of his wife Irene, a Bul- 
garian princess. Neither in Constantinople nor in Adrianople 
were the pretensions of Cantacuzenos admitted. The widow 
of Andronicus, Anna of Savoy, refused to acknowledge 
the usurper. In Adrianople the inhabitants called in both 
Bulgarians and Turks to defend them against Cantacuzenos. 3 
The Bulgarian Czar took sides secretly against his son- 
in-law. 

1 Cant., II. 9, pp. 363-70 ; Greg., XII. 3, p. 582 ; Ducas, p. 6. 

2 Cant., II. 1, pp. 14-18; 40, p. 560 ; and III. 4, p. 91 ; Greg., IX. 11, 
pp. 560-8 ; XII. 2, p. 576. 

3 Cant., II. 24-7, pp. 145-67; Greg., XII. 11-16, pp. 608-26; Phr. 
I. 9, p. 40 ; Ducas, 6, p. 24, to 7, p 26. 



92 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



The year 1342 saw the Byzantines engaged in another 
terrible civil war. The self-appointed emperor did not 
hesitate to go to Pristina and offer to Stephen Dushan 
Macedonia as far as Serres in exchange for Serbian aid 
against the Palaeologi. 1 

When the Serbian assistance proved unsatisfactory, 
Cantacuzenos called in the Turks of Aidin. Omar, with 
83 ships and 29,000 soldiers, came to his aid, but, because 
of the severe cold, returned to Asia before anything could 
be accomplished. 2 He came back in the spring of 1343 with 
290 vessels and helped Cantacuzenos to enter Salonika. In 
the fall of this year Cantacuzenos led his Turkish mercenaries 
into Thrace. Anna appealed in vain to Venice to exercise 
a pressure upon the Turks and Serbians, so that they would 
no longer support her rival. 3 In desperation she gave 
Alexander of Bulgaria nine strongholds in the Rhodope 
Mountains in exchange for a few thousand soldiers. She 
resorted also to bribing the Turks in Cantacuzenos's service, 
and made overtures to Orkhan. 

The crusade of 1344 against the Turks of Aidin, which 
resulted in the capture of Smyrna, prevented Cantacuzenos 
from continuing to receive substantial aid from Omar, who 
died four years later in an attempt to win back Smyrna. 4 
Stephen Dushan, as we have already seen, was laying claim 
to the Byzantine throne himself. Cantacuzenos could turn 
only to the Osmanlis. 

It was in January 1345 that Cantacuzenos made his 
infamous proposal to Orkhan. In exchange for six thousand 

1 Cantacuzenos tries to make out that this was a justifiable arrangement, 
as this district had already been conquered by Stephen Dushan. But Ducas, 
6, p. 26, and 8, p. 30, declares that Cantacuzenos sacrificed the empire 
to the Serbians. 

2 Cant., III. 57, pp. 347-8 ; Greg., XIII. 4, pp. 648-52. 

3 Misti, xxi. 35. 

4 Greg., XVI. 6, pp. 834-5 ; Ducas, 7, p. 29 ; Clement VI, Epp. Seer. 
vii. 99. "Afxvfj is either ' Emir ' or ' Omar '. 



ORKHAN 



93 



soldiers he was to give his daughter Theodora to the Otto- 
man emir. 1 Orkhan now turned a deaf ear to the appeals 
of Anna. This was a better offer. The Osmanlis crossed 
into Europe. With their help Cantacuzenos got possession 
of all the coast cities of the Black Sea except Sozopolis, 
besieged Constantinople, ravaged the neighbourhood of the 
capital, and won Adrianople. 2 

It was only by threatening to change to the side of the 
Palaeologi that Orkhan secured the fulfilment of the bargain. 
In May 1346 Theodora became his bride. 3 A few days later, 
while Cantacuzenos was besieging the capital with the 
soldiers for whom he had paid so dearly, the beleaguered 
city was awakened by an ominous event. The eastern 
portion of the Church of St. Sophia had fallen. 4 

Throughout the year 1346 Constantinople was invested 
by Cantacuzenos and his mercenaries. The aristocratic 
party was almost openly championing the cause of the 
usurper, while Anna relied upon the democratic party and 
the Genoese. As for the clergy, they and the bulk of the 
population were more interested in the ecclesiastical trial 
of Barlaam for the Bogomile heresy 5 than in the civil war. 
In February 1347, while the Synod was in the act of 
condemning Barlaam, and Anna was confined to her bed 
with a serious illness, partisans of Cantacuzenos left the 
Golden Gate open. The ' faithful friend and counsellor ' of 
Andronicus III entered without opposition. The garrison 
had been bribed, and prevented the Genoese from coming 
to the rescue of the empress. She yielded only when the 
palace of the Blachernae was attacked. 

Anna agreed to recognize Cantacuzenos and Irene as 

1 Cant., III. 31, p. 498 ; Ducas 9, pp. 33-4 ; Chalc., I, p. 24. 

2 Cant., III. 81, pp. 501-2 ; 84, pp. 518-19 ; 85, pp. 525-9. 

3 Cant., III. 95, pp. 585-9 ; Greg., XV. 5, pp. 762-3 ; Ducas, 9, p. 35. 

4 Greg., XV. 2, p. 749. 

5 For the action against Barlaam spoken of here, see Muralt, ii. 575, 
No. 17 ; .p. 576, No. 22 ; p. 578, No. 37. 



94 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



co-rulers, and to a union of the families by the betrothal 
of Helen, daughter of Cantacuzenos, to the young John 
Palaeologos. John, who was fifteen, protested against marry- 
ing the thirteen-year-old Helen. His mother overruled his 
objections. In May the marriage took place in the church 
of the Blachernae, as St. Sophia was still in ruins. This 
ceremony was followed by the coronation of the two 
emperors, John Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos, and the 
three empresses, Anna, Irene, and Helen. 1 Five rulers for 
the remnant of the Byzantine Empire ! At that very moment 
in France, the Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin 
emperors of Constantinople, was planning with the Pope 
to drive out both Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos. 2 

Orkhan was well satisfied with this entering wedge. He 
was now son-in-law of one emperor and brother-in-law of 
the other. His wife Theodora was granddaughter of the 
Bulgarian Czar. He had open to him also a marriage 
alliance with Stephen Dushan. The gods were first making 
mad. 

Cantacuzenos was compelled immediately to seek aid 
again of Orkhan. While he had been expending his energies 
against Constantinople, Stephen Dushan had made great 
strides in Macedonia. At Scutari, where Orkhan had come 
to congratulate his father-in-law upon the happy issue of 
the struggle for the imperial purple, Cantacuzenos asked 
for six thousand Osmanlis to dislodge the Serbians from 
the coast cities of Macedonia. Orkhan sent the soldiers 
willingly. He must, however, have given them secret 
instructions, for after having taken immense booty they 
returned to Nicomedia without having captured for Canta- 
cuzenos a single one of the cities held by Stephen. 3 

1 Cant., III. 98, p. 604, to IV. 4, p. 29; C4reg., XV. 9, p. 781, to 11, 
p. 791 ; Ducas, 9, p. 37, to 10 ; p. 38. 
.' 2 Cant., IV. 1, p. 12, to 2, p. 19. 

3 Cant., IV. 4, p. 30 ; 5, p. 32 ; 20, p. 147. 



ORKHAN 



95 



XI 



It is impossible to believe that Cantacuzenos from this time 
onwards did not realize the danger to which he had exposed 
the state and the noose into which he had put his neck. 
The papal archives and the writings of Cantacuzenos him- 
self reveal the fact that as early as 1347 Cantacuzenos had 
appealed to the Pope to unite the western princes in a crusade 
against the Osmanlis, 1 that these negotiations were renewed 
in 1349 2 and 1350, 3 and that in 1353 a last definite appeal 
was made to Clement by Cantacuzenos for relief against those 
whom he had invited into Europe to fight his battles. 4 

The five years between 1348 and 1353 gave rise to three 
events which were fatal to the Byzantine Empire. They 
made possible the permanent foothold of the Osmanlis in 
Europe. A man's own efforts and a man's ability are not 
the sole factors in his success. Work and genius avail 
nothing where opportunity is lacking. Circumstances over 
which he has no control contribute largely to the making 
of a man. Orkhan, at this culminating stage of his career, 
when he was ready to lead his people into the promised 
land, was aided by the ' black death ', the war between 
Venice and Genoa, and the conflict between John Canta- 
cuzenos and John Palaeologos. 

The ' black death ' was first heard of in the Euxine ports. 
It reached Constantinople in 1347, and spread to Europe 
the following year. In Italy it was universal, and lasted 
three years. From 15 to 20 per cent, of the total population 
died. 5 In the maritime cities that had been in close contact 
with the East, the duration of the epidemic was longer and 

1 Cant., IV. 9, pp. 53-7. 

2 Raynaldus, ann. 1349, XXXI. 

3 Clement VI, Epp. Seer. viii. 248-50. 

4 Cant., IV. 13, p. 85. 

5 Marco Guazzo, Cronica, p. 269 ; Stella, Annates Genuenses, in Muratori, 




ii, col. 1090. 



96 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



the mortality higher. The moral and economic effect was 
great throughout Europe. Men looked with horror upon 
this inexplicable malady, which struck down every fifth 
person. It gave no warning. There were few recoveries. 
For years after the last case was recorded there was nervous 
fear of its return. Communications with the Levant had 
been partially cut off. 1 Full intercourse was not resumed 
until after Orkhan and the Osmanlis were rooted in Mace- 
donia and Thrace. Orkhan had no crusade to fear as long 
as there lingered in the minds of the European peoples the 
memory of this scourge. The bravest and most adventurous 
were unwilling to fight the angel of death. 

Plagues continued to visit the coast cities of the Balkan 
peninsula and Asia Minor from time to time during the 
rest of the fourteenth and the first thirty years of the 
fifteenth century. Between 1348 and 1431, nine great 
plagues are recorded. 2 These dates coincide with the most 
aggressive period of Ottoman conquest. As the city popula- 
tion was very largely Greek and Christian, we cannot 
over-estimate the importance of these epidemics. They were 
a valuable auxiliary in enabling the Osmanlis to advance 
and assimilate without formidable opposition. 

The ' black death ' had hardly run its course in Italy 
when the commercial rivalries of Genoa and Venice cul- 
minated in a bitter war, that lasted for two years, with 
varying fortunes, until the battle of Lojera in 1353 broke 
the sea-power of Genoa. After five centuries of independence 
the Genoese were compelled to put themselves under the 

1 MS. Vatican 2040, cited by Muralt, ii. 618 : Petrarch, Epp. fam. 
vii. 7. For historical and medical importance of the black death, see 
Hecker, Der schwarze Tod im liten Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1832). MSS. 
Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds latin 8369-70, contain an interesting contemporary 
account, mostly in hexameter verse, by Symon de Cavino, a Paris 
physician. 

2 Breve Chronicon at end of Ducas, cited by Finlay, History of Greece, 
iv. 409 n. 



ORKHAN 



97 



protection of Milan. The hatred engendered by this struggle 
is revealed in the archives of the two republics. They left 
unturned no stone to destroy each other. The history of 
Venice and Genoa during the fourteenth century reads like 
that of Sparta and Athens. The scene of the conflict is the 
same : the motive, the spirit, and the result are identical. 
Venice gained no material advantage from the war. She 
had long been alive to the menace of the Osmanlis. 1 She 
had been warned by Petrarch of the certain danger which 
a war with Genoa would entail, whether its outcome were 
favourable or unfavourable. 2 

The Ottoman and Byzantine historians are silent con- 
cerning the relations of the Osmanlis with the Genoese 
during this war. That the Genoese asked for and received 
aid from Orkhan is certain. There had been a convention 
beforehand between the Osmanlis and the Genoese of Pera. 3 
Both against the Greeks and against the Venetians the 
assistance of Orkhan must have been substantial. 4 It was 
remembered with gratitude forty years later. 5 

The triumphal entry into Constantinople and the sanction 
of the Church upon his imperial office did not end the 

1 In 1340 Venice had refused a loan of ships and money to Edward III 
of England on the ground that she needed all her resources * to guard 
against the Turkish danger about to become universal ' : Wiel, p. 204. 

2 On March 17, 1351, Petrarch addressed from Padua to Doge Andrea 
Dandolo a letter of remonstrance and warning against engaging in a war 
with Genoa. This letter is quoted in Hazlitt, iii. 122. 

3 The Genoese archives contain a treaty between the Byzantine Empire 
and Genoa, dated May 6, 1352, which says : ' debbono eziandio ritenersi 
per valide e ferme le convenzioni e la pace stipulata dai genovesi con 
Orcan bey.' Belgrano, Atti della Societa Ligure di Storia Patria, xiii. 124. 

4 The Signory of Genoa, writing to the Podesta of Pera, March 21, 1356, 
said : ' Nobis, vobis ac omnibus ianuenibus est notorium et manifestum 
quantum bonum et gratias habuimus a domino Orchano amirato Turchie 
ad destructionem et mortem tarn venetorum quam grecorum tempore 
guerre nostre ' : ibid., p. 127. 

5 In the treaty of 1387 with Murad, the Genoese said : ' quam inter reco- 
lendam memoriam magnifici domini Orchani patris sui ex una parte et 
illustrem Commune Ianue ex altera ' : ibid., p. 147. 

1738 G 



98 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



troubles of Cantacuzenos. The first to turn against him 
was his own son Matthew, who also wanted to be emperor. 
Cantacuzenos appeased him for a time by giving him 
a portion of Thrace. Then the Genoese of Pera, dissatisfied 
with the lowering of the customs tariff to other nations, 
burned the Greek galleys and arsenals, and attacked Con- 
stantinople. Cantacuzenos had to leave a sick-bed at 
Demotika to hurry to save the city. The Greek fleet was 
destroyed by the Genoese. The army of Cantacuzenos failed 
in an attack upon Galata. Peace was concluded only when 
the unhappy emperor agreed to sell more land on the Golden 
Horn to the Genoese, and restore them in the customs 
tariffs to their former place as ' most favoured nation '. 1 

In 1349 Cantacuzenos called again upon Orkhan to send 
soldiers to him in Europe. Twenty thousand Ottoman 
cavaliers, under the command of Matthew, marched against 
Salonika, which was on the point of giving itself to Stephen 
Dushan. Cantacuzenos, with the young emperor John, went 
by sea. Orkhan, as on the last occasion, secretly worked 
against his father-in-law. After Cantacuzenos had already 
sailed, he recalled the horsemen who were with Matthew. 
It was fortunate for Cantacuzenos that he met at Amphipolis 
a Turkish fleet which was about to land a force of raiders 
to ravage the country, and persuaded the commander to 
join with him in a demonstration against Salonika. Other- 
wise the expedition would have been a fiasco. As it was, 
Salonika surrendered. The army of Cantacuzenos ascended 
the Vardar as far as Uskub, which was reoccupied. 2 

It would be too wearisome to go into all the details of 
the civil war between Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos. 
Involved in it are the intrigues of Stephen Dushan of Serbia 

1 Cant., IV. 11, pp. 68-77 ; Greg., XVI. 6, p. 835, to XVII. 7, p. 865. 

2 Cant., IV. 16-17, pp. 104-5, 108-11, 114-30; 19, pp. 133-5; 22, 
p. 156; Greg., XVI. 1, p. 795; XVIII. 2, p. 876. Phr., I. 9, p. 40, gives 
this as the time Cantacuzenos married his daughter to Orkhan. 



ORKHAN 



99 



and Alexander of Bulgaria, and the attitude of Venice and 
Genoa. At first it seemed as if Cantacuzenos would be 
crushed. The partisans of Palaeologos besieged Matthew in 
the citadel of Adrianople. The Genoese of Galata, in spite 
of the strong Venetian fleet whose co-operation, however, 
with the Greeks was lukewarm, 1 compelled Cantacuzenos to 
cede Silivria and Heraclea, besides increasing their Galata 
lands. 2 In the fall of 1352 the Venetians and Bulgarians 
declared openly for Palaeologos. 3 

In desperation Cantacuzenos fell back for the last time 
upon the Osmanlis. He robbed the churches of the capital 
to pay Orkhan for twenty thousand soldiers, and promised 
him a fortress in the Thracian Chersonese. 4 With this help 
he recaptured Adrianople, and relieved Matthew, who was 
still holding the citadel. The Serbians were beaten by 
Orkhan's eldest son, Soleiman, near Demotika. All of 
Thrace and most of Macedonia returned to the allegiance 
of Cantacuzenos. 5 

In 1353 Cantacuzenos seemed to have recovered all the 
lost ground, and to be at the height of his fortunes. John 
Palaeologos, abandoned by his partisans, was in exile at 
Tenedos. An attempt to win back Constantinople by 
intrigue failed. Cantacuzenos, now practically sole ruler, 
felt that it was time to establish a new imperial line. He 
had Matthew proclaimed co-emperor. 6 In his prosperity he 

1 Cant., IV. 30, pp. 218-20 ; Greg., XXVI. 19, p. 86, and 22, p. 88. 
For explanation of action of Venetian admiral, Pisani, see histories of 
Daru and Romanin. 

2 Villani, Historia Venetiana (Muratori), xiv. 200 ; Canale, Nuova istoria 
di Genova, i. 222. 

3 Cant., IV. 33, pp. 246-7 ; 36, p. 266. Cantacuzenos had tried to get 
the Bulgarians to attack Stephen Dushan in 1351. Cf. Cant., IV. 22, 
pp. 162-6. 

4 Greg., XXVII. 30, pp. 150-1. 

5 Cant., IV. 36, pp. 265-6 ; Greg., XXVII. 55, p. 171, and XXVIII. 3, 
pp. 177-8 ; Cant., IV. 34, pp. 247-50 ; Greg., XXVIII. 7, pp. 181-2. 

6 Cant., IV. 34, pp. 250-3 ; 36, p. 266 ; Greg., XXVIII. 19, p. 188. 

G 2 



100 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



forgot about Orkhan, who had put him where he was, he 
forgot that he had invited the Osmanlis into Europe and 
had shown them the fertile valleys of Macedonia and Thrace, 
that their fighting men had passed along the military roads 
of the empire under the command of himself and his son, 
that he had mustered Ottoman armies under the walls of 
Salonika, of Adrianople, of Demotika, and even of Con- 
stantinople. 

XII 

The Ottoman historians place the first invasion of Euro- 
pean territory by the Osmanlis in the year of the Hegira 
758 (1356), and state that Soleiman crossed the Hellespont 
one moonlight night with three hundred warriors, and seized 
the castle of Tzympe, between Gallipoli and the Aegaean 
Sea end of the strait. 1 It is represented as a romantic 
adventure, prompted by a dream in which Soleiman saw 
the moonbeams make a tempting path for him from Asia 
into Europe. 2 The earlier western historians give a variety 
of dates. Some ascribe the first crossing to Murad. 3 Several 
claim that the Osmanlis were transported by two small 
Genoese merchant ships, and that there were sixty thousand 
of them ! The Genoese received a ducat per head. All the 
calamities of the ' Turks ' were brought upon Europe by 
the avarice of the Genoese. 4 

1 About two hours on horse from Gallipoli. 

2 Seadeddin, i. 58-63. 

3 Gilbert Cousin, Opera, i. 399 (evidently copying Dreehsler), and 
Egnatius, de Origine Turcarum (Paris, 1539), p. 29, give date a, d. 1363. 
But do they not follow Phr., I. 26, p. 80 ? 

4 Donado de Lezze, p. 7, and Paolo Giovio, both ardent Venetians, and 
Rabbi Joseph, i. 245, give the names of these vessels, though differently. 
Nicolas de Nicolay, who passed through the Hellespont in 1551, says 
that this story of the Genoese was a tradition of the locality. He locates 
the castle of Tzympe a few miles from the Aegaean end of the strait ! 
Les quatre limes des navigations (1587 ed.), p. 58. Sauli, Delia Colonia 
Genovese in Galata, ii. 44-5, vigorously defends the Genoese against this 
calumny. 



ORKHAN 



101 



We can reject these stories without hesitation, just as we 
can reject the date which the Ottoman historians give. 1 
The Osmanlis had been fighting in Europe since 1345. They 
had come over in large numbers on different occasions. 
There is nothing mysterious or romantic about their first 
foothold in Europe. In 1352 Cantacuzenos had promised 
to Orkhan a fortress in the Thracian Chersonese. Tzympe 
may have been given to Soleiman, or it was taken by him 
when the promise of Cantacuzenos was not fulfilled. He 
did not have to cross secretly from Asia. The Ottoman 
soldiers were already at home in Europe, and Soleiman had 
been their leader in several expeditions. 

Shortly after the occupation of Tzympe, one of those 
earthquakes which occur so often in the Thracian Chersonese 
destroyed a portion of the walls of Gallipoli. This was 
Soleiman's opportunity. He occupied the city, repaired the 
breaches, and called over from Bithynia the first colony of 
Osmanlis. Other colonies followed rapidly, as the soldiers 
of Soleiman took Malgara, Bulair (the key of the peninsula), 2 
and the European littoral of the Sea of Marmora as far as 
Rodosto. The advance-guard of the Osmanlis appeared 
within a few miles of Constantinople ; and ' conducted 
themselves as masters '. 3 This colonization was so quickly 
and easily effected that one is led to believe that these 
colonists were for the most part renegade Greeks returning 
to their former homes. 

Cantacuzenos now reaped the full harvest of his policy. 
The patriarch Callixtus refused to consecrate Matthew. He 
reproached Cantacuzenos for having delivered Christians 

1 There is no room for doubt about this date. Cf. Cant., IV. 38, pp. 277- 
80 ; Greg., XXXIII. 67, p. 220, and XXVIII. 40-2, pp. 202-4 ; Villani, 
p. 105 ; Byz. Annalen, ed. Muller, in Sitzungs-Berichte der Wiener Akademie, 
ix. 392 ; Muralt, Chronographie Byz., ii. 643. 

2 This place figured in the recent Balkan War. It was here that the 
Osmanlis stationed their army for the defence of the Dardanelles. 

3 Greg., XXIX. 26, p. 241. 



102 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



into the hands of the infidels, and accused him of having 
given to Orkhan the money sent by a Russian prince for 
the restoration of St. Sophia. 1 Compelled to flee for his 
life to the Genoese in Galata, the patriarch decided to 
declare for Palaeologos. When Cantacuzenos chose a new 
patriarch, Philotheus, who consented as price of office to 
consecrate Matthew, Callixtus excommunicated him. Philo- 
theus returned the compliment. Then Callixtus sailed for 
Tenedos to join John Palaeologos. 2 

Cantacuzenos, feeling the precariousness of his position 
at Constantinople just at the moment when he thought he 
had triumphed over every obstacle to his ambition, bitterly 
reproached Orkhan for not having kept faith with him. He 
offered to buy back Tzympe for ten thousand ducats, and 
asked Orkhan to order the Osmanlis to leave Gallipoli. 
Orkhan accepted the ransom for Tzympe, knowing well that 
he could reoccupy this fortress when he wanted to. 3 As 
for Gallipoli, he declared that he could not give back what 
God had given him. Was it not the will of God rather 
than force of arms that had opened the gates of Gallipoli 
to him ? Cantacuzenos sought an interview with his son- 
in-law, for he thought that gold might induce the Osmanlis 
to withdraw. A meeting was arranged in the Gulf of Nico- 
media. When the emperor arrived at the rendezvous, 
a messenger from Orkhan reported that his master was ill 
and could not come. 4 No way was left open for further 
negotiations. The rupture was complete. 

After his return to Constantinople, Cantacuzenos sent 
envoys to the Serbians and to the Bulgarians to urge a 
defensive alliance of the Balkan Christians. They answered, 

1 Greg., XXVIII. 30, pp. 195-201. 

2 Cant,, IV. 37, pp. 270-2 ; 38, p. 276 ; Greg., XXIX. 17-48, pp. 234-G ; 
49, p. 257. 

3 At least, Cantacuzenos, IV. 38, p. 276, claims that he ransomed 
Tzympe. 

4 Cant., IV. 38, p. 283. 



ORKHAN 



103 



' Defend yourself as best you can.' A second embassy met 
with the response from Czar Alexander : ' Three years ago 
I remonstrated with you for your unholy alliances with the 
Turks. Now that the storm has broken, let the Byzantines 
weather it. If the Turks come against us, we shall know 
how to defend ourselves.' 1 

The indignation of the Greeks against the man who 
had sacrificed them to his inordinate ambition reached the 
breaking-point in November 1354. The inhabitants of 
Constantinople declared for John Palaeologos . Cantacuzenos 
was forced to barricade himself in his palace. Protected 
by Catalans and other mercenaries, he tried to temporize. 
He offered to abdicate if Matthew were allowed to retain 
the title of emperor with the governorship of Adrianople 
and the Rhodope district. Encouraged by a lull in the 
storm of popular feeling, he had the audacity to make an 
' appeal to patriotism ', as he himself put it. He urged the 
people to support him in an expedition to retake the 
provinces conquered by the Serbians and the Osmanlis. 
This exhibition of effrontery was greeted with cries of scorn. 
Cantacuzenos was publicly accused of wishing to deliver 
Constantinople to Orkhan. A second revolution forced his 
abdication. He became a monk. Irene took the veil. 2 

John Palaeologos returned from exile, and restored Callixtus 
to the patriarchal throne. It took several years of fighting 
and negotiating to compel Matthew's abdication. Not 
until 1358 did John V become undisputed ruler of the 
remnant of the empire in Macedonia and Thrace. 3 But 
the mischief was done. The Osmanlis had put their foot 
as settlers on European soil. 

1 Rumanian Chronicle, cited by Gregorovic, Relations of Serbia with her 
Neighbouring States, principally in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, 
Kazan, 1859, in an appendix. 

2 Cant., IV. 39-43, pp. 284-307 ; Greg., XXIX. 27-30, pp. 242-3. 

3 Cant., IV. 49, pp. 358-60. 



104 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Cantacuzenos lived for thirty years in the monastery of 
Mistra, near old Sparta. It was long enough for him to see ^ 
the irreparable injury that his ambition had caused to his 
country, and to realize how he had destroyed the people to 
rule over whom he had sacrificed every higher and nobler 
instinct. Cantacuzenos has had a fair trial before the 
bar of posterity. For many long years, far removed from 
the turmoil of the world, were spent in the building up of 
his brief of justification. He left a history of his life and 
times. So he pleads for himself. But even if we did not 
have the testimony of Gregoras, and of the archives of the 
Italian cities and of the Vatican, to supplement the story 
of Cantacuzenos, he would stand condemned by his own 
record of facts. 

Cantacuzenos had far more natural ability than Andro- 
nicus II and Andronicus III. During the long and arduous 
struggle to satisfy his personal ambition, he showed himself 
a keen, courageous, resourceful leader. At the beginning 
of his career he was in a position of commanding influence. 
His country was facing a crisis which would have called 
forth the best and noblest in one who loved his race, his 
religion, and his fatherland. But John Cantacuzenos loved 
only himself. The legacy of the widow and helpless child 
of the friend who had trusted and honoured him gave to 
Cantacuzenos the opportunity for developing true greatness 
in the fulfilment of that highest of missions — a sacred trust. 
But Cantacuzenos saw only the opportunity for taking 
advantage of a dead man's faith. 

To say that Cantacuzenos was the cause of the downfall 
of the Byzantine Empire would be to ignore other forces 
working to the same end, and to put too great an emphasis 
upon the power of an individual human will to shape the 
destinies of the world. However, in the stage of world 
history, leaders of men are the personification of causes. 
We group everything around them. The character and acts 



ORKHAN 



105 



of Cantacuzenos reveal the fatal weakness in the Balkan 
peninsula of his day. The Ottoman conquest was possible 
because there was no consciousness of religious or racial 
commonweal. How could this larger devotion, this larger 
sense of duty and obligation, be expected in men who were 
not influenced, much less constrained, by ties of blood and 
personal friendship ? 

XIII 

Cantacuzenos ceased to be a factor in Byzantine affairs 
in 1355. But the Greeks could not rid themselves as easily 
of Orkhan. The Osmanlis had come to stay. 

It is impossible to establish with any degree of certainty 
the conquests of Soleiman pasha in the hinterland of the 
Gulf of Saros and of the Sea of Marmora. But we know 
that he captured Demotika, and cut off Constantinople from 
Adrianople by occupying Tchorlu. 1 If these important 
places were retaken by the Byzantines after the premature 
death of Soleiman, it was only for a brief time. At the 
beginning of the reign of Murad the Osmanlis were firmly 
ensconced along the coasts of Thrace, and had made some 
permanent progress into the interior. 

There was a sudden and full awakening on the part of 
the Greeks to the knowledge that the Ottoman invasion 
of 1354 was an irreparable disaster. A year before Soleiman 
pasha settled his Moslem colonies in the Thracian Chersonese, 
the inhabitants of Philadelphia had felt themselves so com- 
pletely abandoned by their emperors that they had appealed 
directly to the Pope for aid, promising to return to the 
Roman communion. 2 At the approach of the Osmanlis in 

1 Tchorlu was the head-quarters of the Ottoman General Staff during 
the first month of the Balkan War. After the battle of Lule Burgas, it became 
the head- quarters of the Bulgarians. From here the attack upon the 
defences of Constantinople was directed. 

2 Muralt, ii. 640, No. 10, n. 



106 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Thrace, the country population had fled to Constantinople, 
abandoning everything. Those who had money to emigrate 
elsewhere did so immediately. They had no hope of a change 
in the fortunes of their country. 1 

The annalists of the Byzantine Empire record no heroic, 
bitter resistance to the army of Soleiman pasha. There 
was no mayor of the palace, no Joan, to revive the con- 
fidence of the people in their rulers, or to replace the family 
that had proved its unfitness. The Greeks had feared 
Cantacuzenos, and had attributed their hopeless condition 
to his alliance with the Osmanlis. But they could not have 
greater confidence in John Palaeologos. For he made no 
effort, not even in the smallest way, to demonstrate that 
he was different from his weak and disloyal forbears. 

The Byzantines feared also the intrigues of the Genoese, 
who were as persistent in their efforts to undermine the 
integrity of the Byzantine Empire, as are the foreigners 
to-day engaged in commerce in the Levant to weaken and 
destroy the authority of the Ottoman Empire. 2 The banish- 
ment of Cantacuzenos could not save them from the 
Osmanlis. Palaeologos could not save them. They could 
not save themselves. The only way which occurred to them 
of preventing the Ottoman conquest was to give themselves 
to some Christian power. There were actually plans on foot 
to offer the remnant of the empire to Venice, to Hungary, 
even to Serbia ! 3 

In France, during the fourteenth century, the Turks were 
not regarded as a permanent factor in the Near East. 
Western Asia Minor was not called ' Turquie ' or ' Turque- 

1 Greg., XXIX. 34, pp. 224-6. 

2 During the five years following the proclamation of the Constitution 
in 1908, 1 lived, and travelled extensively, in the Ottoman Empire. Rarely 
did I meet a foreigner engaged in business there who had the slightest 
sympathy with the Osmanlis in their aspirations or in their successive 
crushing misfortunes. This is not a criticism, but merely the record of a fact. 

3 Schafarik, CVII. 



ORKHAN 



107 



manie but ' the land which the Turks hold \ 1 There was 
no such illusion among the Italians. They accustomed them- 
selves very rapidly to the idea that the Osmanlis, if not the 
Turkish tribes, were in Asia Minor and the Aegaean to stay. 

The immigration across the Hellespont in 1354 was not 
looked upon by those who were acquainted with the weak- 
ness and impotence of the Byzantines as a raid or as 
a temporary affair. For several years the Genoese had 
thought it to their advantage to seek the friendship of 
Orkhan. 2 In 1355 two far-sighted Venetians wrote the 
whole truth to the Senate. They did not mince matters. 
Matteo Venier, baily at Constantinople, warned the Senate 
in the strongest terms about the menace of Ottoman 
aggrandizement. 3 Marino Falieri went farther. He pointed 
out that the Byzantine Empire must inevitably become the 
booty of the Osmanlis, and urged his countrymen to get 
ahead of them. 4 Prophetic words and daring suggestion. 
Had Venice at this time had a Dandolo of the stamp of the 
intrepid blind Doge who diverted the Fourth Crusade to 
wreak his vengeance upon his mutilators, Islam might have 
been kept out of Europe. 

When John Palaeologos resumed the throne of his fathers, 
he found himself as much at the mercy of Orkhan as Cant a - 
cuzenos had been. His dependence is revealed in the story 
of Halil. Halil, son of Orkhan and Theodora, was captured 
by pirates in 1357, and taken to Phocaea. Orkhan held his 
brother-in-law responsible for this kidnapping, and called 
upon him to rescue his nephew. In February 135S, while the 
Osmanlis under Soleiman pasha were advancing in Thrace, 

1 The expression ' la terre que les Turcs tiennent ' is always used to 
designate Asia Minor in the opinion which the council of the French King 
Philippe de Valois gave concerning the route to be followed in the abortive 

; crusade of 1332. See Archives Nationales, Paris, P. 2289, pp. 711-12. 

2 See p. 97, and notes 3 and 4 on that page. 

3 Quoted from the Cancelleria Secreta by Romanin, iv. 232. 

4 This letter is reproduced by Jirecek, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 309. 



108 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



we see John V, at the behest of Orkhan, spending what 
strength and energy he had in the siege of Phocaea. Later, 
when he went back to Constantinople, Orkhan peremptorily 
ordered him to return to direct in person the siege. John 
started out, and met his fleet, which had become anxious 
about his absence and had given up the siege. He could 
not persuade the galleys to turn back with him. So he 
wrote to Orkhan begging to be excused from continuing an 
undertaking beyond his power to carry through successfully. 

Orkhan was inflexible. He had now become the overlord 
of the Byzantine emperor, In March 1359 the successor of 
Constantine went as a vassal to meet his Ottoman suzerain 
at Scutari. He appeased the wrath of Orkhan only by 
agreeing to pay a half of Halil's ransom, and by signing 
a treaty of peace that was a virtual acceptance of the new 
status quo in Thrace. The peace was to be sealed by the 
betrothal of his ten-year-old daughter to Halil. It was as 
errand boy of Orkhan that John V made one more trip to 
Phocaea, paid one hundred thousand pieces of gold for 
Halil, and brought him to Nicaea. There the betrothal of 
the Christian princess to her Moslem cousin was celebrated 
by splendid fetes. 1 

John Cantacuzenos introduced the Osmanlis into Europe. 
John Palaeologos accepted their presence in Thrace without 
a struggle. There is little choice between these two Johns. 

XIV 

Orkhan died at the end of this memorable decade. 2 If 
to Osman is given the honour of being father of a new 
people, the greater honour of founding the nation must be 

1 Greg., XXXVII. 52, p. 558 ; 59-63, pp. 561-3 ; 67-9, pp. 565-6 ; 
XXXVI. 6-8, pp. 504-9 ; Cant., IV. 44, p. 320. 

2 The generally accepted date of Orkhan's death is 1359 or 1360, following 
Ottoman sources. But Jirecek, a careful and able scholar, p. 321, n. 10, 
is inclined to accept March 1362. There is great confusion about this 
period. I think that the Ottoman date is undoubtedly correct here. 



ORKHAN 



109 



ascribed to Orkhan. 1 Few men have accomplished a greater 
work and seen more sweeping changes in two generations. 
According to popular legend, Orkhan won his spurs as 
a warrior, and a bride to boot, at the capture of Biledjik, 
when he was twelve years old. His life was spent in fighting 
and in making permanent the results of his fighting. He 
was as simple in his tastes as his father had been. At 
Nicaea he distributed soup and bread to the poor with his 
own hands. 2 

There seems to be no basis for the characterization of 
Orkhan which the early western historians handed down to 
posterity. He was neither vicious nor cruel nor deceitful. 
His three striking characteristics were those which mark 
all men who have accomplished a great work in history, 
oneness of purpose, inexhaustible energy, and an unlimited 
capacity for detail. He began life as a village lad of an 
obscure tribe. After a public career of sixty years he died, 
I the brother-in-law of the emperor of Byzantium, the friend 
and ally of Genoa, and potentially master of Thrace. The 
purpose of his life is summed up in the sentence we find 
upon his coins : ' May God cause to endure the empire of 
Orkhan, son of Osman.' 

1 ' Der eigentliche Begriinder der osmanischen Macht war Orchan 
Fessler, Geschichte von Ungarn, ii. 151. 

2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 254. 




CHAPTER III 



MURAD 

THE OSMANLIS LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN 
EMPIRE IN EUROPE 

The use of Ottoman mercenaries in the Byzantine civil 
wars was fatal to the Empire. From the very fact that 
they were Osmanlis and mercenaries, the auxiliaries of 
Cantacuzenos were dangerous allies for a man who claimed 
to be fighting for his fatherland. The fertile valleys which 
Bulgarian and Serbian had so long disputed with Greek 
fired the imagination of these ambitious adventurers. The 
conquest of Macedonia and Thrace seemed to them as 
feasible as it was worth while. For they had a revelation 
of the weakness of the Balkan peoples that could have 
come to them in no other way. It was as if Cantacuzenos 
had said to Orkhan and his followers : Here is our country. 
You see how rich it is. You see how we hate each other, 
race striving with race, faction with faction. We have no 
patriotism. We have no rulers or leaders actuated by other 
than purely selfish motives. Our religion means no more 
to us than does our fatherland. Here are our military roads. 
We give you the opportunity of becoming acquainted with 
the easiest routes, of learning the best methods of provision- 
ing. We initiate you into the art of besieging our cities 
and our strongholds. Under our guidance, you discover the 
vulnerable places in the walls of our fortresses. 

Murad had not enjoyed training in leadership and 
responsibility to fit him for his sudden accession to the 
chieftainship of the Osmanlis. He had been overshadowed 
by the heir apparent, and never dreamed of ruling. Soleiman 



MURAD 



111 



pasha, brilliant captain and idol of the army, would not have 
brooked a rival in popular favour. When Orkhan died, two 
months after the fatal fall of his eldest son at Bulair, Murad 
was elevated to the emirship before he had had time to 
adjust himself to his new fortunes. But he could not pause 
to get his bearings. The army was on the march. The 
conquest of Thrace had already been started. 

Osman and Orkhan were able to build up a race and 
a nation without notice and, consequently, without hindrance. 
For their little corner of Asia Minor had been abandoned 
by the Byzantines. Since the days when Nicaea became the 
capital of the empire, after the Latin conquest of Constanti- 
nople, its commercial relations with Europe were interrupted. 
None knew or cared about the rise of the Osmanlis until 
they appeared in Thrace. Orkhan had assured himself of 
his inheritance by patient waiting. Of Murad immediate 
action was demanded. 

The actual European conquests of Orkhan, outside of the 
Thracian Chersonese, had been negligible. But Europe was 
excited over the capture of Gallipoli. Murad had little to 
fear from a union of the indigenous Balkan elements. Greek 

I and Serbian and Bulgarian hate each other far worse than 
they hate the Osmanli. This fact of history, demonstrated 
so forcibly by the events of the year 1913, was known and 
appreciated at its full value by the earliest of the Ottoman 
conquerors. There was, however, just cause for apprehension 
of the intervention of Hungary in conjunction with the 
j Serbians, or of Venice in conjunction with the Byzantines. 
Murad' s success depended upon his ability to gain an 
immediate and vital foothold in the Balkan peninsula. 

This foothold was obtained in the epoch-making cam- 
paign of 1360-1. Astounding success attended the initial 
; efforts of Murad. If he were not himself a trained and 
seasoned warrior, he had a precious legacy of generals in 
whom he could put implicit trust. Realizing his own 



112 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



inexperience, he created Kara Khalil Tchenderli vizier, and 
allowed himself to be guided by the judgement of this tried 
friend and servant of his grandfather and his father. To 
Lalashahin, companion of Soleiman in the capture of Tzympe, 
was given the title of beylerbey, and chief command of the 
army in Thrace. Adrianople was the goal. To Evrenos bey 
Murad entrusted a second army, whose mission was to 
prevent an attack from the Serbians in the west. 1 

Tchorlu was the first objective point, because its capture 
would protect the rear of the army operating against 
Adrianople. This city, only forty-six miles from Constanti- 
nople, offered a stubborn resistance, and had to be taken 
by assault. The commandant was decapitated, the garrison 
massacred, and the walls razed. 2 The Osmanlis saw to it 
that the fate of the defenders of Tchorlu was heralded far 
and wide, so that it might serve as a lesson to other cities 
before which their armies appeared. Evrenos bey, pushing 
forward on the left, occupied Demotika, 3 and then Gumuldjina. 
This operation gave to the Osmanlis control of the basin of 
the Maritza River, and removed the danger of a Serbian 
attack. A column on the right moved up the coast of the 
Black Sea and captured Kirk Kilisse, a position of extreme 
strategic importance in preventing a possible Bulgarian 
attempt to relieve Adrianople by bringing an army through 
the mountainous country between the river and the sea. 4 

After the capture of Tchorlu, Murad advanced to Lule 
Burgas on the north bank of the Ergene, where he effected 
a junction with the armies of Evrenos and Lalashahin. 
The decisive battle was fought between Bunar Hissar and 
Eski Baba, to which point the defenders of Adrianople had 

1 Seadeddin, i. 80. 

2 Seadeddin, i. 82 ; Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 19. 

3 But Matteo Villain, in Muratori, xiv. 672, who is followed by Leun- 
clavius, says that Demotika was abandoned to Orkhan in November 1361. 

4 Cf. marginal note in Barberini MS. of Pachymeres, cited by Muralt, 
ii. 663, No. 9. 



114 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



advanced. 1 The Byzantines and Bulgarians were defeated. 
The Greek commandant of Adrianople, Avith a portion of 
his army, managed to flee down the Maritza to Enos. 2 
It is one of the remarkable coincidences of history that 
the Osmanlis should have won the first battle which opened 
up to them their glorious future in Europe in exactly the 
same place that was to witness five hundred and fifty 
years later their last desperate stand in the Balkan peninsula. 

Deserted by their commandant, and overwhelmed by the 
disaster of Eski Baba, the inhabitants of Adrianople opened 
their gates to the Osmanlis. 3 Murad installed Lalashahin in 
Adrianople, and took up his own head-quarters in Demotika, 4 
where he built a palace and a mosque. Lalashahin, before 
settling down in Adrianople, carried his victorious arms up 
the valley of the Maritza as far as Philippopolis, which he 
fortified strongly. A stone bridge was built across the river. 5 
The occupation of Philippopolis not only gave to the Osmanlis 
an advantageous base of operations against the Bulgarians, 
but also brought them the most fruitful source of revenue 
they had yet enjoyed. It enabled them to levy taxes upon 
the rice-growing industry. Bulgarians and Serbians were 
both dependent upon the harvests of the rice fields around 
Philippopolis. 

II 

In fifteen months the Osmanlis had become masters of 
the principal strategic points in Thrace. This great campaign, 
undertaken and carried through under the spur of necessity, 
was an auspicious beginning for the reign of Murad and for 

1 Seadeddin, i. 84-5 ; Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 22. 

2 All the Ottoman historians. 

3 MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, p. 25 ; Leunclavius, Annales, 
p. 30 ; Seadeddin, i. 85. 

4 Muklis Abderrahman Efendy, quoted by Schefer, in his edition of 
Bertrandon de la Broquiere, p. 170, n. 3. 

5 Seadeddin, i. 89 ; Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 52. 



MURAD 



115 



the supremacy of the Osmanlis in the Balkan peninsula. 
Europe was suffering from another visitation of the Black 
Death. 1 The Balkan nations were completely demoralized. 
So unpopular was John Palaeologos in his own capital that 
Murad contemplated entering into a conspiracy with some 
Byzantine traitors to have John assassinated and complete 
the conquest of the empire. 2 If he did enter fully into this 
plot, it was as fortunate for him that the undertaking failed 
as it was for the Bulgarians in 1912 that their columns did 
not pierce the lines of Ottoman defence at Tchataldja. 
For the disaster that follows a too extended and too rapid 
subjugation of unassimilated masses is as sudden as it is 
irreparable. Durable empire-building is governed by a law 
of homogeneity. 

The Osmanlis were still a race of limited numbers, and at 
the beginning of their existence as a nation. The process of 
assimilating the racial elements in conquered territories, 
begun by Osmaii when he first left the village of Sugut, 
could not be arrested ; for the existence of the Ottoman 
state depended upon its continuance. The Greek of Bithynia 
had lived with Turk and Moslem for two centuries, and had 
found him a good neighbour. There was neither racial 
antipathy nor abhorrence of the religion of Mohammed to 
overcome. Nor had there been the hatred and dread of the 
conquered on the one side and the arrogance of the conqueror 
on the other. The Anatolian Greeks had been accustomed 
j for generations to the economic and political conditions 
that finally caused the majority of them to cast their 
fortunes with the rising star of the Osmanlis. 

The problem of assimilating the Christians, who formed 
the total population of the Balkan peninsula, was a new one. 

1 Villani tells of its terrible ravages in 1360 ' ricominciata in diversi 
I paesi del mondo Muratori, xiv. 653, 688-90, 727. 

2 Ibid., pp. 649-50. He declares that Murad had been ' molte volte 
tentato di vincere Constantinopoli '. 

H 2 



116 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Here were huge and compact masses of Christians, who had 
come suddenly under the yoke of the Osmanlis in the first 
two years of Murad's reign. They did not know their new 
masters. They did not know Islam. Benevolent assimilation 
by voluntary conversion seemed no longer possible. A radical 
change in the attitude of the Osmanlis towards the question 
of religion was demanded. Wholesale massacre was imprac- 
ticable, for the Osmanlis had no reserve of colonists to call 
upon to replace the indigenous elements. Their position 
was still too precarious to allow them to draw freely from 
their adherents in the corner of Asia Minor under their 
dominion. To win the Macedonians and Thracians by 
forcible conversion was not feasible. It required the 
expenditure of all his military resources for Murad to hold 
what he had conquered. He could not add police duty to 
his already superhuman burden. Even had he thought of 
this method of conversion, he would have been deterred 
by the nightmare of a crusade. 

Murad and hiscounsellors solved the problem of assimila- 
tion by sanctioning the reduction of captives to slavery, and 
by creating the corps of janissaries. 

A law was promulgated which gave to the Osmanli 
soldier absolute right to the possession of prisoners, unless 
they consented to profess and practise Islam. Prisoners 
were regarded as booty. They could be kept for domestic L 
or agricultural labour, or sold in the open market, subject 
to the government's equity of one in five. The disgrace, 8 
even more than the hardships, of slavery was so keenly felt 
by the Greeks 1 that many for whom there was no other way j 
preferred a change of religion to loss of freedom. The right 
to make slaves of prisoners was efficacious in providing 
wives and concubines for the conquerors, who were practically 
without women of their own. The widows of the fallen, 
and the daughters of Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians, 
1 Cf. Finlay, iv. 45, 169. 



MURAD 



117 



became the instruments of increasing the Ottoman race. 
In the hundred years from Murad I to Mohammed II, the 
Osmanlis became in blood the most cosmopolitan and 
vigorous race the world had known since the days of the 
Greeks and Romans. Greek, Turkish, Serbian, Bulgarian, 
Albanian, Armenian, Wallachian, Hungarian, German, 
Italian, Russian, Tartar, Mongol, Circassian, Georgian, 
Persian, Syrian, and Arabian — this was the ancestry of the 
Osmanlis who, under Soleiman the Magnificent, made the 
whole world tremble. In richness of blood the only parallel 
to the Osmanlis in modern times is the present population 
of the United States and Canada. 

But this indirect method of conversion as an alternative 
to slavery did not immediately increase the masculine 
element among the Osmanlis. In a city taken by assault 
the more virile portion of the male population was killed 
off, and those who remained were able to buy life and 
freedom. Male slaves were an embarrassment to the ever- 
moving armies of Murad. Ransom money was welcomed 
by the captors. In many cities the inhabitants surrendered 
without a struggle, and were secured in their freedom by 
the terms of capitulation. In rural districts the threat of 
slavery was little felt. The Osmanlis had neither time nor 
strength to put out the drag-net. Everywhere in the Balkans 
refuge in the mountains is easy. Then, too, the loss of 
cultivators would have made the highly prized timarets 
worthless, and would have caused a famine in foodstuffs or 
a diminution of iaxes on harvests . Another means of bringing 
pressure to bear upon the Christians had to be devised. 

The famous corps of the janissaries was, according to the 
Ottoman historians, a creation of Orkhan. 1 As a bodyguard 

1 Seadeddin, i. 42. Hammer, i. 384-5, n. viii, says that Ottoman 
historians are unanimous in this assertion as against Byzantine sources. 
Col. Djevad bey, the modern Ottoman authority on military history, is 
disappointing and unconvincing in his discussion of this question. On 



118 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



of slaves, cut off from their families and educated and trained 
to serve nearest the person of the sovereign, the janissaries 
may have originated with Orkhan. If so, it was but the 
adoption of the idea already put into practice by the 
sovereigns of Egypt in the organization of the Mamelukes. 1 
But as an agency of forcible conversion by the incorporation 
of Christian youths in the Ottoman army, there is no evidence 
of its existence before Murad. In fact, historians are agreed 
that the janissaries were recruited only from the Christian 
population in Europe. 2 So Orkhan could hardly have 
conceived this scheme. The problem of which it was 
a solution did not arise until after Orkhan's death. 

That the corps of the janissaries was an agency for forcible 
conversion, and was not created in order to increase the 
strength and efficiency of the Ottoman army, is proved by 
the records we have of the number of janissaries in the early 
days of Ottoman history. Murad and Bayezid are repre- 
sented as having a thousand or less janissaries. In the 

p. 25 he gives 726 (1326) for the date, and on p. 78 730 (1329). He cites 
no sources, for there are none, and has to admit, p. 54, that Murad I 
made the laws for the janissaries. Among early European historians 
there is much divergency. Spandugino, p. 185, attributes their origin to 
Osman, and the name from the village of Sar : they are ' the young men 
of Sar '. Ricaut, ed. 1682, p. 357, also attributes to Osman. Reineccius, 
influencing the Latin editor of Chalcocondylas (see ed. Migne, p. 26, n. 11), 
makes Osman the founder, and derives the name from ' J anuae ' : they are 
the custodes corporis. Leuncl., Pandectes, p. 129, discusses these theories 1 
without coming to any conclusion. Giovio, Geuffraeus, and Hicolay, p. 83, 
attribute origin to Murad II. Certainly it was not earlier than his day that 
the janissaries attracted attention in Europe. D'Ohsson, vii. 311, asserts 
that there was no definite organization until Mohammed II. Mignot, i. 
119-20, is in favour of the theory that Murad I created this corps. 

1 Seignobos, in Hist, generate, ii. 334. 

2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 251, says that Anatolian Christians were exempt 
to give time to recuperate ' after the exhausting struggles of generations \ 
But exhausting struggles had been no less frequent and no less severe in 
the Balkan peninsula. Gibbon's suggestion, that the levies were made 
in Europe because Moslem and Christian Anatolians were not apt for war, 
shows how completely the great English historian missed the raison d'etre 
of the janissaries. 



MURAD 



119 



confusion of the ten years of civil strife among the sons of 

Bayezid, the janissaries played no part. There were only 

twelve hundred janissaries in the time of Mohammed the 

Conqueror, 1 and twelve thousand when the Ottoman Empire 

was at its zenith under Soleiman the Magnificent. 2 But 

Mahmud II counted one hundred and forty thousand in 

his army. 3 These figures show that this most celebrated of 

Ottoman military organizations did not become a powerful 

factor until the period of decadence. The janissaries were 

not, as has been commonly represented, the principal 

element of the Osmanlis' fighting strength in the wars of 

conquest of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Their 

great role in Ottoman history was that of maintainers and 

defenders of conquests already made. In organizing the 

janissaries, Murad was certainly influenced by the desire 

of forming a bodyguard on whose loyalty and devotion he 

could rely implicitly, But his principal purpose was to 

emasculate the Christian elements in Macedonia and Thrace, 

which were too fanatical or too ignorant to see of their own 

accord that self-interest should lead them to renounce their 

nationality and their religion. 

Murad's law of drafting (devchurme) provided that in each 

conquered district in Europe the privilege of exemption 

from military service through the payment of the capitation 

tax (kharadj) should be denied to Christian youths. The 

Osmanlis reserved the right to select at discretion Christian 

boys, who were taken from home and kindred and brought 

up in the Mohammedan religion. They were trained for 

service as the Sultan's bodyguard. They depended directly 

upon the sovereign, who paid them according to a definite 

scale. Their insignia were the pot and the spoon, and their 

officers received names which symbolized the functions of the 

camp kitchen. 4 

1 Hammer, i. 126. 2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 90. 3 Ibid. 

4 Ibid., pp. 55-6 ; Ducas, p. 16 ; Leuncl., A?males, p. 34 ; Ricaut, 
pp. 358-9. 



120 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



One is compelled to dissent from the consensus of opinion 
of European historians on the organization of the janissaries. 
Their scathing criticisms are best summed up in the words 
of a French historian : ' It is the most fearful tribute of 
human flesh that has ever been levied by victors upon the 
vanquished. ... It justifies the execration of which the 
Osmanlis have been the object on the part of Europeans 
during centuries. Let us add that, by this strange mode of 
recruiting, the Osmanlis have found, at the same time, the 
means of taking away from the Christian populations their 
most virile element, and of doubling their troops without 
putting arms into the hands of the conquered.' 1 

The actual number of janissaries under arms refutes the 
latter part of this criticism, when it is applied to any one of 
the Ottoman sovereigns of the period of conquest. As for 
putting arms into the hands of the conquered, we shall see 
that both Murad and Bayezid availed themselves of the 
services in war of their Christian subjects, led by their own 
princes. The tearing away of boys from their homes, and 
the loss of their Christian heritage, is a shock to humanitarian 
and religious sensibilities. But we must judge the Osmanlis 
of Murad and Bayezid by the Christians of their own century. 
When we compare the methods of conquest of the Osmanlis 
with those of the Spaniards against the Moors, of the 
English against the French and Scotch, of the Italians 
against each other, we must concede that Murad devised 
a humane, clever, and highly successful scheme in the 
institution of the janissaries. 

The ignorant Balkan peasantry — especially the Slavic 
elements — prized their sons far more highly than their 
daughters. Recruiting for the army was a greater blow to 
them than recruiting for the harem. It was the strong, 
sturdy son who was chosen. This touched the pocket-book 
as well as the heart-strings. The Anatolian Greek, especially 
1 Lavaltee, i. 190-L 



MURAD 



121 



of the cities, had been deterred from becoming a Moslem 
more by a lack of eagerness to assume military obligations 
than by a zeal for his ancestral faith. The Macedonian 
Greek, the Bulgarian, and the Serbian regarded the bearing 
of arms as a natural obligation. Fighting was a part of 
living. Better the faith of Mohammed, then, than the loss 
of the son's help with the harvest. That there were wholesale 
conversions to Islam as a result of the threat to apply the 
law of devchurme is a logical inference from the fact that 
Murad never mustered more than a' thousand janissaries. 

Ill 

The Byzantine Empire did not recover, even temporarily, 
from the effect of Murad 's first campaign in Europe. The 
fall of Demotika and Adrianople, followed so closely by that 
of Philippopolis, removed within eighteen months the last 
hope of retrieving the fortunes of the empire. There were 
still many places remaining to the Byzantines in Thrace. 
But the surrender of the fortresses in the valleys of the 
Ergene and the Maritza had destroyed the military prestige 
of the Byzantines, and foreshadowed the speedy subjugation 
of the whole country. The loss of the revenues of Thrace 
and of the great plain south of the main Balkan range 
reduced the imperial treasury to dependence upon the port 
duties and city taxes of Salonika and Constantinople. For 
ninety years the shadow of the empire remained. But 
whatever power, whatever influence was left to the successors 
; of Constantine, it was rather in western Europe than in the 
Balkan peninsula. The impress of one thousand and thirty 
i years of continuous existence from the renaming of old 
: Byzantium to the fall of Adrianople was too deep to vanish 
| in a few years. The decay had been going on for cen- 
turies. The final extinction would of necessity take several 
J generations. 

The complete abasement of the Byzantines is revealed 



122 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

in the treaty that John V Palaeologos was compelled to 
conclude with Murad shortly after the capture of Philippo- 
polis. In the fall of 1362 or the spring of 1363, John bound 
himself to refrain from any attempt to win back what he 
had lost in Thrace, either by a separate attack or by joining 
the Serbians or other enemies of the Osmanlis. In addition 
he promised to aid Murad against his Anatolian enemies, 
the Turkish emirs. 1 

After this treaty was signed, Murad withdrew to Brusa 
in order to provide for the organization of the new possessions 
that had come to him by a successful expedition against 
Angora. His letters, written at this time to announce to his 
Anatolian neighbours and to the Moslem princes of Asia 
the victories in Thrace, show clearly that he did not yet 
feel himself strong enough to assume the position of overlord 
to the other great emirs of Asia Minor. While he was in 
Brusa, in the spring of 1363, an event happened which led 
Murad to make the momentous decision that shaped the 
destinies of the Ottoman Empire. The first coalition against 
the Osmanlis was formed in Europe. 

IV 

After the fall of Philippopolis, the Greek commandant 
had succeeded in escaping, and took refuge with Krai 
Urosh V of Serbia. 2 He pointed out to Urosh most eloquently 
the paucity of numbers of the Osmanlis, their insecure 
position, and the danger that would overwhelm the 
Serbians if they waited until the Osmanlis were firmly 
grounded in Thrace. Urged by Pope Urban V, the princes 
of Wallachia and Bosnia, together with King Louis of 
Hungary, joined the Serbians in upper Macedonia. Under 
the guidance of the Greek refugee, they started on a swift 

1 Phr., I. 26, p. 80 ; Chalc, I, p. 25. Cf. Michaud, Hist, des Croisades, 
v. 275. 

2 Seadeddin, i. 91. 



MURAD 



123 



march to win back Adrianople. It was an expedition under- 
taken as a crusade. The allies mustered at least twenty 
thousand. 

Lalashahin had hardly more than twelve thousand men 
under his command, and a portion of these were scattered 
in the captured cities. Murad, who had started to return to 
Thrace as soon as he had heard the news, was detained by 
the necessity of capturing a fortress on the Sea of Marmora, 
near Cyzicus, which was in the hands of a turbulent band of 
second-generation Catalans, whom he feared to leave behind 
him. 1 They were suspected of plotting with his southern 
rivals to organize a movement against his Anatolian 
possessions. 

If the Greeks had had the power or the will to co-operate 
with the crusaders, the Ottoman domination in Thrace 
would have ended even more suddenly than it had begun. 
But they made no move. In fact, one of the Byzantine his- 
torians charges John Palaeologos with aiding the Osmanlis ! 2 
Lalashahin was able to draw from the garrisons of the recently 
occupied cities, and to send forward to meet the crusaders 
some ten thousand men under Hadji Ilbeki. It was the 
intention of Lalashahin to have this army act wholly on the 
defensive. If only Hadji Ilbeki could prevent their passing 
the Maritza, they would be turned southward towards 
Enos. By that time he felt sure that he could rely upon 
one of three things happening : dissensions would arise 
among the crusaders, the Greeks would be alarmed by the 
Serbian approach to Enos and the sea and attack the 
crusaders, or Murad would have time to bring his army 
across the Dardanelles. The one purpose of Lalashahin 
was to prevent the invasion of Thrace and the investment 
of Adrianople. 

But Hadji Ilbeki did better than keep the crusaders from 

1 This colony was at Bigha. See Appendix B, p. 301. 

2 Phr., I. 26, p. 80. 



124 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



crossing the river. They had already crossed, and had 
celebrated the unopposed passage of the Maritza by an 
evening of feasting. Hadji Ilbeki surprised them as they 
were sleeping in a drunken stupor. 1 Without hesitation 
he fell upon them like a Gideon. Seized with panic, the 
crusaders were driven back into the river. Those who 
escaped massacre and drowning fled precipitately. There 
was no attempt to rally. In the little town of Mariazell, on 
the northern frontier of Styria near the foot of the Semmering 
Alps, there stands a votive church built by Louis out of 
gratitude to the Virgin for having saved him from death in 
this battle. 2 

Lalashahin, instead of rewarding the daring of his lieu- 
tenant, which had saved the Osmanlis from an irreparable 
disaster, was consumed with jealous fury. His only thought 
when he received the news was that Hadji Ilbeki had robbed 
him of the glory of so great a victory. He had his too 
successful subordinate poisoned. 3 

The sudden and complete collapse of the first crusade 
organized against the Osmanlis did not give to Murad any 
false sense of security. He saw in the successful meeting 
of this danger, which had threatened to destroy him, not 
the opportunity for exultation and for the relaxation of 
effort, but the spur for straining still further every nerve 
to learn and profit by the lesson. The battle of the Maritza 
was a warning to Murad. The danger would be renewed, 
and renewed soon. It was now for him to make the choice 

1 Katona, x. 393. 

2 Chalc, I, p. 30, and the chronicle of Rabbi Joseph, i. 240, confuse 
this battle with that of Cernomen, near the same place and with the same 
result, in 1370. But there were certainly two distinct battles. Louis of 
Hungary took part in the first, as is shown by the date recorded at 
Mariazell and by a diploma in Fejer, Cod. Dipl. Hung., 9 e partie, vii. 212. 
Cf. Aschbach, Oeschichte Kaiser Sigmunds, 1. 87. The account in Vambery's 
Hungary, Story of Nations Series, p. 171, is wholly wrong. 

3 Seadeddin, i. 94. 



MURAD 



125 



between remaining an Asiatic emir and becoming a European 
sovereign, between endeavouring to impose first his authority 
on the other emirs of Asia Minor and the conquest of the 
Balkan peninsula. Were the Osmanlis to be on the offensive 
in Europe or in Asia ? 

Murad decided to build his empire in the Balkan peninsula. 
It was not that he coveted less the mountains and valleys 
of Asia Minor. It was not that his ambitions failed to extend 
to the Taurus. But he had the vision to realize that the 
Ottoman race could not subjugate the Turkish elements in 
Asia Minor by a gradual assimilation of those elements alone. 
The race had to grow, as it began, by the incorporation of 
the various Christian elements, which alone possessed the 
finesse, the knowledge of government, the organizing capacity 
necessary to cope with the problems of facing Europe and 
inheriting the Byzantine Empire. From Europe, Asia 
Minor and more could be conquered : from Asia, no portion 
of Europe could be conquered. 

The Osmanlis do not possess written records of the reign of 
Murad. There is no source to which we can go to read what 
Murad thought or what others of his day thought or said 
that he thought. But we know his mind from his actions. 
There is no cause for doubt on this point. After the first 
campaign in Thrace, Murad had returned to Brusa, and 
dated his letters from there. He began to plan an aggressive 
campaign against his neighbours. But after the battle of 
the Maritza, he abandoned Brusa for Demotika, and three 
years later, in 1366, Adrianople became the first real capital 
of the Ottoman Empire. 

In spite of all that has been written about the unique position 
of Brusa in Ottoman history, it is no more to the Osmanlis 
than is Saint-Denis to the French or Winchester to the 
English. The Osmanlis have never really been at home in 
Constantinople. Historically and architecturally speaking, 
they have been under the shadow of a greater past. 



126 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Adrianople, although always a city of importance since the 
days of Hadrian, reached its greatest splendour and glory 
under the Ottoman sultans. Here were planned, and from 
here started, the expeditions westward and eastward, which 
increased in strength, in efficiency, and in inspiring terror 
as the circle gradually widened, until the star and crescent 
appeared under the walls of Vienna and Cairo, on the shores 
of Italy and in the heart of Persia. No student of Ottoman 
annals can fail to support the contention of the Sublime 
Porte after the last Balkan war, that Adrianople is to the 
Osmanlis their sacred city. From Lalashahin to Shukri 
pasha, the proudest and most precious memories of the 
Osmanlis are in Adrianople, whose great mosque, still awe- 
inspiring and altogether admirable in its decay, is typical 
both of what has been and what is. 

The decision of Murad was accepted by his successors. 
Even after the capture of Constantinople, many an Ottoman 
sultan felt more at home in Adrianople than in the imperial 
city. For more than a century the Osmanlis directed their 
energies almost exclusively to European conquests. What- 
ever they accomplished in Asia was the indirect result of 
their stupendous successes in Europe. From first to last, 
the extension of Ottoman sovereignty over the Moslems of 
Asia was by means of a soldiery gathered and war-hardened 
in Europe, themselves Christian or of Christian ancestry, in 
whose veins ran the blood of Greek and Roman, of Goth and 
Hun, of Albanian and Slav. 

V 

In 1365, Murad received from the outside world the 
first acknowledgement of his commanding position as heir 
apparent of the Byzantine Empire. It was an overture from 
the nourishing republic of Ragusa, on the Dalmatian coast, 
for a treaty guaranteeing freedom of trade in the Ottoman 
dominions to the merchants of Ragusa. In return for 



MURAD 



127 



unrestricted commercial privileges, the republic offered to 
pay a large sum annually, which the givers called a grant, 
but which was invariably accepted by the recipients as 
tribute. 1 However it may have been at the beginning, the 
grant soon became tribute, for after some years the existence 
of Ragusa depended upon purchasing the benevolence of 
the Ottoman sultans. As the helplessness of the Ragusans 
increased, the tribute became larger. If we except the 
convention between the Genoese and Orkhan, of whose 
provisions and character we know nothing, the Ragusan 
commercial treaty is the first of the long series of treaties 
by which European cities and nations purchased the right 
to trade in the Ottoman Empire and to sail the high seas. 
Since in most cases the Osmanlis pledged themselves to 
nothing except to refrain from robbing merchants or from 
preventing their trading, the gifts exacted were nothing 
less than blackmail. After the sea-power of the Osmanlis 
had been broken, the Barbary corsairs inherited the privileges 
of this system which had been started in so small a way by 
the Ragusans. 

Murad could not write. When the treaty with Ragusa 
was brought for his signature, he put his hand in the ink 
and made the impression of his fingers upon the paper. 
This is the origin of the tughra, which has ever since been 
the official signature of the house of Osman. 2 

VI 

When Murad was settling himself in Adrianople, and 
laying plans for the conquest of Macedonia and Bulgaria, 

1 Miltitz, ii. lere partie, 166. 

2 Col. Djevad bey, p. 97, n. 1 ; Engel, Geschichte Rag., p. 141 ; Hammer, 
i. 231, 405. But this was also Timur's ordinary method of signing 
ordinances : cf. Shereffeddin, iv. 55. The document, with the marks of 
Murad' s hand, is preserved in the museum of the Communal Palace 
at Ragusa. 



128 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



he was menaced by a new crusade. Despite its futile 
ending, or better, for that very reason, the expedition of 
Amadeo of Savoy in 1366 commands our attention. For 
it furnishes, as does the expedition of Admiral Boucicaut 
from Genoa in 1399, a striking illustration of how easily 
the growing Ottoman power might have been crushed by 
a resolute body of crusaders with a single aim. and of how 
impossible it was to secure that oneness of purpose, owing 
to the ingrained animosity of the East and West, of the 
Greek and Catholic Churches. 

In 1361, when Lorenzo Celsi was elevated to the dogeship 
of Venice, the Senate had made overtures to John Palaeologos 
for an alliance against Murad. 1 This plan was frustrated 
by the successes of the Osmanlis in Thrace. The Venetians 
held back, and allowed John to suffer the humiliation of 
signing the treaty that made him a vassal of Murad. 
In the crusade that ended in the disaster of the Maritza, 
the Venetian participation was half-hearted, and it proved 
valueless. The Venetians were not even on hand to prevent 
Murad from crossing the Dardanelles. In fact, there is 
every reason to believe that they now began to look upon 
the Osmanlis as a valuable tool in checkmating the ambition 
of Louis of Hungary to inherit the shortlived empire of 
Stephen Dushan. 2 

When he saw that Murad had come into Thrace to stay, 
and that there was no hope from the Venetians, John 
Palaeologos turned to the Hungarians. He made a secret 
visit to Buda to enlist the aid of Louis, and made the usual 
promise that the Byzantines would return to the Roman 
fold. 3 On his return he passed through the principality of 
Sisman, who had just inherited the lower portion of Bulgaria. 
Sisman, either at the suggestion of Andronicus Palaeologos, 
who wanted to succeed his father, or in the hope of winning 

1 Villani, x. 30. 2 Cf. Hazlitt, iii. 216. 

3 Urban V, Epp. seer. iv. 114. 



MURAD 



129 



favour with Murad, detained the emperor in the fortress of 
Nicopolis on the Danube. 1 

Amadeo VI of Savoy was one of the princes who had 
taken the cross from Pope Urban V at Avignon on Holy 
Friday, 1363, for the crusade that never materialized. 
The receipt of a letter from Louis of Hungary, informing 
him of the imprisonment of his cousin (John's mother was 
a princess of Savoy), and pointing out the rapid spread of 
Ottoman power, caused Amadeo to yield to the Pope's 
continued and urgent solicitations. 2 With some fifteen 
hundred soldiers, he embarked for the East on fifteen galleys. 
After a stop at Negropont and Mitylene to get reinforcements, 
Amadeo entered the Hellespont, and captured Gallipoli 
without difficulty. The Osmanlis fled by night, abandoning 
the fortress. 3 

But the Savoyards made no attempt to follow up this 
victory, or even to keep Gallipoli. Instead of attacking 
the infidels, they sailed into the Black Sea, and started 
a vigorous campaign against the Bulgarians. Sozopolis 
and Burgas were captured, and several other important 
fortresses to the north. The bravery of the crusaders was 
rivalled only by their cruelty. Their bloodlust made such 
an impression upon the Bulgarians that they wanted nothing 
to do with Franks bearing the cross. When the Savoyards 
laid siege to Varna, Sisman gave up his prisoner to save the 
| city. 

John Palaeologos was borne back triumphantly to Con- 
stantinople. But friction soon arose. When Amadeo urged 

1 ' II le print por prisonnyer, et le destint a cause de ce que le roy de 
Bourgarye sy sestoit accorde et alyez secrettement avecques le turc ' : 
Chronicques de Savoye, col. 300. 

2 Cf. Jirecek, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 325. 

3 Cibrario, Storia di Savoy a, iii. 193. But I have followed closely the 
i account of the expedition as given in the anonymous French chronicle, 
'cols. 299-319, in Monumenta Historiae Patriae, Turin, 1840, vol. i. There 
is a modern book by Datta. Cf. also Delaville le Roulx, i. 148 f. 

1736 I 



130 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

upon his kinsman the necessity of paying the price of his 
rescue and of the continued support of the crusaders by 
fulfilling his promise to return to the Roman Church, he 
met with stubborn refusal on the part of emperor and 
patriarch alike. In wild rage. Amadeo withdrew to Pera, 
and began to fight the Greeks by sea and land. The 
Const antinopolitans were so frightened that ' they did not 
dare to show their head out of doors '. Pressed on all sides 
by Osmanli and Bulgarian, as well as by his deliverers, the 
wretched John saw no other way but than to promise openly 
to abjure his errors and swear allegiance to the Pope. 

Having wrung this promise from those whom he had come 
to defend, Amadeo sailed away to Rome, where he reported 
to the Pope in full consistory ' how at his request the emperor 
of Constantinople and his people desired to submit to the 
obedience and belief of the Holy Roman Church in hope 
that the Church would aid them against the infidels who 
were too strongly oppressing them '. 

Urban and the cardinals listened without great interest to 
the Count of Savoy's recital of his success in preparing the 
ground for a reunion of the churches. The story was 
getting to be an old one. John's overture was received j 
with suspicion. Urban had got the same promise in the , 
spring of 1366 in a letter from Louis, which reported the 
interview John had sought at Buda. 1 To the envoy of Louis, 
who had arrived in Avignon just as Urban was starting for j 
Rome, the Pope gave a letter commanding the King of 
Hungary to put off his crusade until the union of the 
churches was actually accomplished. 2 

VII 

What lay behind the eagerness of Urban, at the beginning 
of his reign, to revive the crusades ? Was he burning with 
holy zeal to recover the sepulchre of Christ from the hands 
1 Urban V, Epp. seer. iv. 124. 2 Ibid., iv. 240. 



I 



MURAD 



131 



of the Moslems ? Was his heart set on protecting Cyprus 
and Rhodes ? Had he determined to leave no stone unturned 
to protect the Byzantines and other eastern Christians from 
the encroachment and persecution of Murad ? His letters 
indicate that his chief interest was the recovery of the lost 
power and glory of the papacy. There is the same revelation 
in the letters of his immediate successor. Gregory XI. 
These two popes had no catholic vision. They tried to 
keep their position as arbiters between France and England 
and Spain at Avignon, and at the same time to inherit the 
temporal power of the decaying Holy Roman Empire by 
circumventing the Visconti of Milan. The great schism in 
the Western Church, which so aided Murad and Bayezid in 
laying solidly the foundations of an empire in Europe, was 
the outcome of the short-sighted and purely selfish policy of 
these two popes. How far from the truth it is to represent 
them as courageously, whole-heartedly, and persistently 
jj endeavouring to awaken the interest and attention of 
Europe in the peril from the East ! 

The fall of Adrianople and of Philippopolis should have 
been a warning to Urban. He read in it, however, not 
a glorious opportunity to demonstrate the solidarity of 
Christendom by driving the Moslems out of Europe and 
rescuing fellow Christians from apostasy, slavery, and death, 
but an occasion to force the schismatic Greeks to return to 
the Roman communion. Of the popes of the fourteenth 
century, Urban had the greatest chance to prove himself 
a worthy champion of Christ and civilization. For it was 
during his reign that the Osmanlis began their conquests 
and their proselytizing in Europe. At the beginning they 
could easily have been checked. But it never occurred to 
Urban that there was a common interest of Christendom 
higher than and outside of the Roman Church. 

The fault lay not wholly with Urban and with Gregory. 
They reflected the spirit of their age. But it does no credit 

I 2 



132 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



to their personal character nor to the high position which 
they held to say that they were the victims, rather than the 
masters, of the prevailing bigotry and ignorance of their 
generation. In the fourteenth century, the West had 
already begun to try to impose its commerce, its customs, 
its laws, and its religion upon the East. There was not, nor 
has there ever been since, a sympathetic ' give and take ' 
between Occident and Orient. In a mint, if the coin when 
stamped does not correspond exactly to the mould, it is 
rejected. Similarly the West, when it tries to put every 
eastern people through its mould and finds no exact 
correspondence, rejects. Hence, on the one side, the scorn 
of the ' I am better than thou ' : on the other side, a hatred 
born not only of fear and of conviction of inferiority, but of 
a sense of injustice which is none the less vital from a know- 
ledge that the wrong is not, and will not be, righted. 

Amadeo of Savoy, uncivilized, fanatical through ignorance, 
the fertile breeding-ground of fanaticism, true and unchanged 
descendant of the Fourth Crusaders, was a prophetic figure 
at Constantinople in 1366. He represented the only possible 
type of deliverer for Byzantium. But deliverance on his 
terms the Greeks would not accept. Death or Islam were 
preferable. And who can blame them ? Two years before 
Amadeo 's expedition, the Greeks of Crete had risen in 
rebellion against their Venetian overlords because an at- 
tempt had been made to impose upon them the Latin faith 
and rites. 1 When they were hunted down and -massacred 
for refusing to worship after the western fashion, not only 
Pope Urban, but also Petrarch, wrote to the Doge congratu- 
lating him upon his valiant and successful efforts to save the 
Church of Christ in Crete ! 2 

In a letter to Pope Urban, Petrarch spoke with approval 
of the policy of using the Ottoman menace to stamp out the 

1 Greg., XXV. 17, p. 41. 

2 Urban V, Epp. seer. ii. 230 ; Petrarch, Senilia, iv. 2. 



MURAD 



133 



Eastern heresy. ' The Osmanlis are merely enemies,' he 
wrote, 'but the schismatic Greeks are worse than enemies. 
The Osmanlis hate us less, for they fear us less. The Greeks, 
however, both fear and hate us with all their soul.' 1 These 
words of Petrarch epitomize the feeling between the Eastern 
and Western Churches during his own day, and, if what one 
can see with his own eyes in Jerusalem and elsewhere is 
a fair example, up to the twentieth century. 2 

If the European nations regarded the adherents of the 
Orthodox Church (the term Greek in its religious sense 
must be taken to include all the Balkan races) as e worse 
than enemies ', that is, than the Osmanlis, it is equally true 
that the Osmanlis found from 1350 to 1500 that the hatred 
of the Balkan races for the Latin Church was their most 
potent ally, not only in the actual conquest, but in reconciling 
the conquered to their fate. One does not want to detract 
from the genius of the early Ottoman sovereigns and from 

( the reputation for superb fighting ability so honestly won 
by the Ottoman armies. But it must not be forgotten that 
each separate race in the Balkans preferred the rule of the 
Osmanlis to that of their neighbours, and that the one point 

1 in which the Balkan races were of the same mind was that 
Ottoman domination was preferable to that of the Hun- 
garians and the Italians. For every crusade was a scheme 
for religious propaganda and territorial aggrandizement, in 

1 ' Nescio enim an peius sit amisisse Hierusalem an ita Bizantion 
possidere. Ibi enim non agnoscitur Christus, hie neglegitur dum sic colitur. 
Mi (Turcae) hostes, hi scismatici feiores hostibus : illi aperte nostrum 
Imperium detractant : hi verbo Romanam ecclesiam matrem dicunt : cui 
quam devoti filii sint, quam humiliter Romani pontificis iussa suscipiant, 
tuus a te ille datus patriarcha testabitur. Illi minus nos oderunt quam 
minus metuunt. Isti autem totis nos visceribus et metuunt et oderunt.'' 

! Senilia, vol. vii. 

2 In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, and in the Church 
; of the Holy Nativity, Bethlehem, anarchy — even bloodshed — is prevented 
I only by the constant vigilance of the Ottoman military authorities. If 
; one asks the Latin and Greek priests in Jerusalem, they will admit without 

shame that this statement is true. 



134 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



just the same spirit as in modern times the nations of 
Europe have exploited the misery of Ottoman Christians 
for the purpose of securing concessions. 

In spite of the fact that John Palaeologos ' was informed 
by the Patriarch Philotheus that a mixed council of clergy 
and government officials, presided over by the empress, 
had been held in June 1376, and had decided against the 
reunion of the churches, 1 John persisted in his negotiations 
with the Pope. Urban did all that he could to facilitate the 
visit of the Byzantine emperor to Rome. 2 But at the same 
time he was writing to the Venetians and to the Dalmatian 
cities to protect the Catholics of Cattaro against the Serbian 
and Albanian heretics, 3 and was encouraging Louis in his 
suicidal campaign against the Bulgarians. 

In 1369, John Palaeologos left the government of Constan- 
tinople to his elder son Andronicus, and set out for Rome, 
where, on October eighteenth, he made his profession of 
faith in the presence of four cardinals, and confirmed it 
by a golden bull. The next morning, at St. Peter's, he 
formally abjured the errors of the Orthodox Church before 
the high altar, with his hands in those of the Pope. 4 The 
Pope accepted him as a ' son of the Church promised 
that he should be relieved of the Turk, and gave him 
letters earnestly recommending his cause to the princes of 
Christendom. 5 

Urban V was quick to use the prestige which he believed 
the adhesion of John Palaeologos had given him. He 

1 Miklositch-Miiller, Acta et diplomata graeca, CLXXXIV. 

2 Epistolae secretae, vi. 1-10. 

3 Ibid., vi. 3. 

4 The date of this visit is certain from the formal act of abjuration, 
which is given in full in Raynaldus, ann. 1369, XI. Ducas, c. 11, and 
Chalc, I, p. 25, are in error in placing this voyage later. Berger de 
Xivrey, Mem. de VAcad. des Inscriptions, xix, 2 e partie, p. 35, suggests 
that the Byzantine historians have confused this voyage with that of 
Manuel, thirty years later. 

5 Epp. seer., viii. 37, 38, 80. 



MURAD 



135 



announced broadcast the happy consummation of his 
efforts, stating that the Byzantine emperor had done 
homage to the Vicar of Christ in St. Peter's. 1 But letters 
sent during the same winter to the Greek clergy, urging 
them to accept the action of their emperor, 2 and other 
letters from his secret correspondence of this year, indicate 
how little faith he had in the Emperor's sincerity or ability 
to fulfil his promises. Was the abjuration in St. Peter's 
a farce, in which Emperor and Pope allowed themselves 
to trifle with holy things, each for the sake of his immediate 
advantage ? 

John had hoped that his adhesion to the Roman Church 
would bring to him grants of money, ships, and men from 
the Latin princes, and that an army would rally around 
him to fight the Osmanlis. But not only did he return 
from France ' with empty hands ', but he was detained 
at Venice because of debts owing to merchants. In vain 
he begged Andronicus to send the money for his release. 
The son who had four years before been charged with being 
party to his father's imprisonment in Bulgaria was no more 
filial at this humiliating crisis. He answered that there 
was no money in the treasury, and that he could get nothing 
from the clergy. But his younger son, Manuel, brought 
from Salonika the ransom. 3 

John Palaeologos returned to his capital poorer than when 
he left. He brought no help from Europe, and he had bound 
himself publicly by oath to an obligation which he had known 
he could not fulfil. He had broken faith with Murad, who 
during these years had been growing more and more powerful. 
There was nothing for him to do but to make himself 
tributary to Murad in order that he might enjoy ' up to the 

1 By an encyclical : Epp. seer., viii. 4. Cf, also his letters to the doges 
of Venice and Genoa, ibid., p. 24. 

2 Ibid., viii. 55. 

3 Phr., I. 22, pp. 52-3 ; Chalc, I, pp. 50-1 ; Morosini, p. 13. 



136 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



end of his life ' his last possessions in peace. 1 Three years 
later, in 1373, when his ambassador John Lascaris failed in 
a second attempt to get aid from the Western princes, 2 the 
Byzantine emperor recognized Murad as his suzerain, 
promised to do military service in person in Murad's army, 
and gave to him his son Manuel as hostage. 3 

Urban died a few months after John's visit to Rome. 
Gregory XI, who succeeded him in December 1370, had 
little hope of carrying on further negotiations with the 
Eastern Church ; for the Greek ecclesiastics were stubborn 
in their determination to maintain the absolute indepen- 
dence of the patriarchate. The Genoese and Venetians were 
fighting bitterly in Cyprus. In 1371, Gregory made a strong 
appeal to France, England, Venice, and Flanders to co-operate 
with Genoa in saving the last Christians of the Holy Land. 4 
There was no response. 

That Gregory realized clearly the peril to Christendom 
in the advance of Murad's armies is shown in two remarkable 
letters written to Louis of Hungary in May and November 
1372. His words were prophetic. He urged Louis to resist the 
Osmanlis before they advanced farther into Europe. They 
had already entered Serbia. He trembled to think what would 
happen if they pushed through Albania and secured a port 
on the Adriatic. Unless Louis entered without delay into 
an alliance with his Christian neighbours, how could he 
protect his own kingdom and all Christendom from the 
Mohammedan peril. 5 Seconding this warning to the King 
of Hungary, the Pope commanded the Hungarian and 
Slavic archbishops to preach the crusade in Hungary, 
Poland, and the Dalmatian cities. Everywhere special boxes 

1 Phr., I. 11, p. 46. 2 Gregory XI, Epp. seer. iii. 36, 58. 

3 Chalc, I, pp. 51-2. 4 Raynaldus, ann. 1371, VIII. 

5 Epp. seer., ii. 32, 87. Similar letter to Louis in December 1375, ibid. 

v. 46. Other letters reprinted in Fejer, 9 e partie, iv. 583-4 ; v. 54-6 ; 

vi. 155-6. 



MURAD 



187 



were placed in the churches for collecting funds. A tithe 
was levied on the monasteries and abbeys of Hungary and 
Dalmatia. Louis, with five of his most powerful nobles, 
took the cross, and swore to the Pope that he would put an 
army in the field within a year. 1 Louis asked Venice for 
triremes, but when the Venetians found that he intended 
them to be a donation for ' the common cause ', they found 
that they could not build them. 2 Padua declined an invitation 
to guarantee the cost of construction. The Hungarians did 
not fulfil their promises. In fact, there is no evidence that 
they made any effort to acquit themselves of their oath. 

When John Palaeologos made a last desperate appeal to 
the Pope, before he entered into his third and final compact 
with Murad, Gregory, in receiving the imperial envoy, burst 
into tears, and promised that he would save Constantinople, 
if only the Byzantine emperor would cause his people to 
renounce their heresies and return to the Roman Church. 
In 1375, he wrote once more to Louis to inform him that 
Constantinople was in danger of capture from Murad. 3 
Letters in the same year to Edward of England pictured 
the Ottoman advance and the peril of Christendom, urged 
a general war against the Osmanlis, and asked for a subsidy 
to provide galleys ' to prevent the crossing into Europe of 
more Turks, because Constantinople is in imminent danger \ 4 
The letters of Gregory XI to the Christian princes prove 
conclusively that the full import of Murad's early successes 
was understood by the Pope and was impressed upon both 
secular and ecclesiastical authorities throughout Europe. 

But both John and Gregory lost heart. Neither was able 
to fulfil the compact made in Rome. Gregory could not 
unite Christendom to relieve the Byzantines. John could 
not persuade the Byzantines to renounce, as he had done, 
the ' Greek heresies '. So, as we have seen, he became 

1 Bernino, pp. 15-20. 2 Fejer, 9 e partie, iv. 427-8. 

3 Ibid., v. 52-3. 4 Rymer, Ada Publica, III, part 3, pp. 38-40. 



138 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Murad's vassal. 1 The Pope, involved in the quarrel of 
Emperor Charles IV and the Duke of Bavaria with the 
Marquis of Brandenburg, and anxious over the outcome, 
for the papacy, of the continual unrest in the Italian cities, 
returned from Avignon to Rome in 1378. He died a few 
months later. 2 The struggle arising from the election 
of Gregory's successor gave birth to the 'Great Schism'. 
This left Murad a free hand in subjugating the Balkan 
peninsula . 

VIII 

The sources of information for the movements from the 
outside for the relief of the Balkan Christians, and for the 
religious and political quarrels of the Byzantines, are so 
numerous and so detailed that one is embarrassed by too 
much material. Many interesting facts cannot even be 
mentioned. But when we come to the beginning of the 
Ottoman conquest in Europe under Murad and Bayezid, 
we find ourselves in the midst of what an eminent Slavic 
historian has called ' the most obscure and difficult period 
of South-Slavic history \ 3 The chroniclers, whether they 
be Slavic, Rumanian, or Ottoman, are so contradictory and 
so lacking in explicit statement that we cannot speak with 
certainty of the sequence of events. The Byzantine chro- 
niclers, verbose to the point of weariness in detailing petty 
and trifling quarrels and happenings, are almost silent con- 
cerning the momentous events that marked the ruin of 
their empire. It is difficult to unravel the twisted skeins, and 
find a thread to carry the story of the conquest from 
1366 to 1389. When it is impossible to choose between 
contradictory records, the geography of the field of action. 

1 On December 12, 1374, Gregory XI wrote to John from Avignon, 
predicting that his 1 alliance with Murad ' would bring about the destruc- 
tion of the empire : Epistolae secreiae, iv. 68. 

2 Raynaldus, aim. 1378, XIX. 

3 Jirecek, Geschichte der Bulgaren. p. 317. 



MURAD 



139 



with which one can gain a first-hand knowledge, must be 
the final factor in determining the sequence of conquest 
between the adoption of Adrianople by Murad as his capital 
and the downfall of the Serbians at Kossova. 

The occupation of Adrianople and Philippopolis was as 
severe a blow to the Bulgarians as to the Byzantines. In 
spite of the fact, however, that Greek and Bulgarian had 
a common interest in driving the Osmanli from Thrace, 
or at the very least in checking his advance, there was no 
move made at this time for an alliance. On the contrary, 
even when the Osmanlis were engaged in the Thracian 
campaign, war arose between John V and Alexander. 
The Byzantines captured Anchiale, and tried desperately 
to take Mesembria by assault. 1 The Greek patriarch wrote 
to Czar Alexander, reminding him of the sacredness of 
harmony and the necessity of accord at that critical moment, 
but the letter was not backed by the good faith and good 
will of the Byzantine emperor. Neither John nor Alexander 
attempted to give assistance to the Serbian and Hungarian 
crusade that ended so disastrously on the banks of the 
Maritza. 

The conquest of Bulgaria up to the main Balkan range 
imposed itself upon Murad as a corollary to the Ottoman 
dominion in Thrace, and the undisturbed possession of 
Adrianople and Philippopolis. For the Bulgarians, through 
centuries of varying fortunes, had grown accustomed to 
fighting for the right to live in Thrace. Often had they 
been beaten back to the Balkans, and as often pressed 
forward again to the Ergene. To win and lose Adrianople 
and other Thracian cities was old history with them. They 
always came back. Between 1362 and 1365, Murad had 
experience with Bulgarian persistence and tenacity of 
purpose. They were masters again of Kirk Kilisse, Midia, 
Bunar Hissar, and Viza when Murad made his change of 
1 Cant. IV, 50, pp. 362-3. 



140 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



capital from Brusa to Adrianople. Yamboli had been 
strongly fortified by Alexander. Bulgaria seemed as 
formidable and as forbidding to Murad's dream of empire 
as the emirates of Asia Minor. 

Fortune again favoured the Osmanlis. Czar Alexander 
died in 1365, 1 leaving three heirs. To John Sisman fell 
middle and southern Bulgaria from the Danube to the 
Rhodope Mountains and the Bulgarian pretensions in Thrace. 
Old Tirnovo was his capital. Stracimir inherited western 
Bulgaria, with Widin for capital, and the Bulgarian preten- 
sions to the valley of the Vardar and western Macedonia. 
(The Bulgarian remnant of eastern Macedonia was in the 
hands of an independent Bulgarian prince, Constantine, 
whose stronghold was Kustendil.) .Dobrotich became master 
of the Dobrudja and the upper Black Sea coast, where 
Bulgarian, Cuman and Alan lived together with hardly any 
distinguishing characteristics . 

The division of Bulgaria, at the moment when union was 
essential, proved fatal. The sons of Alexander never joined 
to face the common danger. So marked was the division 
of Alexander's kingdom that thirty years after the conquest 
the conquered territories were known as ' the three Bulgarias '. 2 

Stracimir, jealous because Sisman seemed to have received 
the lion's share of Alexander's inheritance, did not hesitate 
to make overtures to Murad, offering to co-operate with the 
Osmanlis against his brother and to share the portion of 
Sisman with them. 3 Before any agreement could be made, 
however, Stracimir found himself face to face with a terrible 
danger in the west, which soon caused him to forget both 
Sisman and Murad. Louis of Hungary had interpreted his 

1 Although Engel says 1353, others 1356, and the Rumanian chronicle 
1371, there can be no question that 1365 is the correct date; for both 
Byzantine and Ottoman historians speak of Alexander as Bulgarian Czar 
in 1364, and do not mention him later, while Sisman and his brothers 
come immediately into prominence. 

2 Schiltberger, Neumann ed., p. 93. 3 Orbini, pp. 472-3. 



MURAD 



141 



crusader's commission as an authorization to ' make war 
against the heretics '. It was a pretext to get possession of 
Widin, which was essential to his ambitious project of adding 
Serbia to his kingdom. He attacked the Bulgarians on the 
ground that they were enemies of the Church and must be 
forced to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. Widin was 
captured and Stracimir imprisoned. 1 Stracimir's dominions 
were flooded with Franciscan missionaries, who were backed 
by a brutal soldiery in their proselytizing efforts. 2 Two 
hundred thousand Bulgarians abjured the orthodox heresy, 
and were re -baptized in the Latin rite. This forcible 
conversion, which was purely a political matter, was as 
objectionable to the Bulgarians as to the Cretans. They 
hated ' with a perfect hatred ' the Franciscans whom Pope 
Urban had sent, and the cause for which they stood. 

At the first opportunity, the Bulgarians of the west called 
in Sisman and Vadislav of Wallachia. The Hungarians 
were driven out of Widin and the Franciscans in the city 
massacred. 3 Louis was powerful enough to wreak terrible 
vengeance. In 1370, Widin fell once more into his hands. 
The Bulgarians of the western Balkans were subjected to 
such a relentless persecution that they welcomed the Moslem 
conquest to secure freedom of worship. Urban had incited 
Louis to this war, and had congratulated him upon his 
laudable zeal in converting the heretics. 4 

We have already spoken of the punishment that came 
to Sisman as a result of the detention of John Palaeologos. 
The Italian crusaders on the Black Sea coast were as 
powerful an aid to Murad's empire-building as were the 
Hungarian crusaders on the western frontier. The successors 
of Louis reaped the bitter fruits of his insane policy. Louis 
and Amadeo of Savoy contributed in no little measure to 

1 Bonfinius, II. 10. 2 Fessler, Oeschichle von Ungarn, ii. 152. 

3 Wadding, Annates minorum, arm. 1369, XI. 

4 Epp. seer., VI. 131, 136. 



142 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



make possible the conquests of Murad. When Amadeo 
withdrew from Bulgaria, he left the cities he had captured 
to the Greeks. Sisman was compelled to expend his energy 
in recapturing them. But Murad had already anticipated 
him in the important fortress of Sozopolis, which commanded 
the entrance to the port of Burgas. 1 

Shortly after the Ottoman occupation of Sozopolis, the 
Bulgarians were everywhere dispossessed in Thrace, and 
the capture of Yamboli 2 forced Sisman to follow the example 
of John Palaeologos. He became a vassal of Murad. His 
sister Mara entered Murad's harem, but with the stipulation 
that she be allowed to retain her Christian faith. 

Murad gladly gave his new ally and brother-in-law 
a strong Ottoman army to co-operate in the attack upon 
the Hungarians. The Osmanlis helped in driving Louis out 
of Widin. Sisman, like Cantacuzenos, first guided the 
Osmanlis through the heart of his county. It was under 
the leadership of Sisman that they saw the Danube, their 
river of destiny. When Sisman, even with the help of the 
Osmanlis and Wallachians, could not gain possession of 
Stracimir's inheritance, he returned to Tirnovo. There he 
learned t hat Lalashahin was planning an expedition westward, 
which seemed to be intended against Sofia. 

Sisman now realized that his position was critical and 
that the fate, of Bulgaria was at stake. In the early spring 
of 1371, he hurried into the Rilo Mountains and sent out an 
appeal to the Serbian kral who was at that time ruling in 
eastern Macedonia. Then he went to the relief of Ishtiman, 
which was already menaced by the Osmanlis. Failing in 
this effort, Sisman fell back to Samakov, where he was 
joined by the Serbians. Lalashahin led his army from 
Ishtiman into the valley of the Isker. The two krals joined 

1 Called Ishebol by the Ottoman historians. 

2 By the second division of the Ottoman army under Timurtash. Murad 
himself had captured Sozopolis. Cf. Jirecek, p 326. 



MURAD 



143 



battle with him in the plain of Samakov. The Ottoman 
victory was decisive. 1 The Serbians and Bulgarians fled 
into the recesses of Musalla, the highest mountain in the 
Balkan peninsula, and of Popova Shapka. Sisman disappeared 
after the battle. 2 The way to Sofia was open. All Bulgaria 
lay at the feet of the conqueror. It is from the battle of 
Samakov that we must dat e the destruction of an independent 
Bulgaria. 

But Murad was not yet ready to follow up this decisive 
victory. The only immediate result of the battle of Samakov 
was the submission of Const antine, Bulgarian prince of 
Kustendil, in the upper valley of the Struma. After the 
fall of Samakov, his position was untenable. Constantine 
hurried to Murad's camp, and did homage to the conqueror. 
Murad gave back to him as vassal his principality. 3 With 
the wisdom that marked every successive step of his 
progress in Europe, Murad refrained from advancing beyond 
Samakov. He ordered Lalashahin to lead the army into 
Macedonia, and to join Evrenos in the advance towards the 
Vardar. 

IX 

The dramatic death of Stephen Dushan, in 1355, just as 
he was starting upon the expedition against Constantinople 
for which his whole life had been a preparation, is 
recorded in. the previous chapter. Stephen's son was so 
unfit to inherit the aspirations and carry on the work of his 
father that he was called in derision by his people Nejaki, 

1 Seadeddin, i. 104. He does not give the name of the Serbian kral. 

2 The peasantry around Samakov will point out to you the ridge, south- 
east of the modern town, over which he vanished. They believe that 
Sisman haunts the foothills of the Rhodope mountains, and rides headless 
in the night down into the plain. This tradition, and the statement of 
Ducange, viii. 289, that Sisman died in 1373 in Naples, makes possible 
the theory that there were three successive Sismans connected with the 
Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria. 

3 Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 38. 



144 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



the weakling. 1 The nobles and generals of Stephen Nejaki 
ignored him. Each man seized what territory he could hold 
and defend against his neighbour. There was anarchy in 
Macedonia and Serbia. The dissolution of Stephen Dushan's 
conquests resulted in a bloody and destructive civil war 
between cities and factions. 2 The dowager Czarina managed 
to preserve a semblance of prestige, if not of authority, at 
Serres. But the 'empire' was no more. As local rulers, 
Serbians stayed in the principal cities of Macedonia. There 
was undoubtedly a Serbian element in the village population. 
Many villagers, however, who acknowledged the overlords hip 
of Stephen's warriors and other Serbian nobles, did not 
know then, any more than they knoiv now, to what race they 
themselves belonged. This has always been the Macedonian 
problem. 

The defeat of the crusaders on the banks of the Maritza 
in 1363 had been a defensive battle on the part of the 
Osmanlis. There was no attempt to invade Macedonia. 
While Murad was occupied in the subjugation of Thrace 
and of southern Bulgaria, several efforts were made by the 
Byzantines to come to an understanding with the Serbians. 
In 1364, the patriarch Callixtus went to Serres to see 
Stephen's widow, who had retired to a convent. His 
purpose was to form an alliance. Soon after reaching 
Serres, Callixtus succumbed to the hardships of the journey. 3 
His effort came to nothing. That Stephen's son still held 
to the pretensions of his father and had no intention of 
treating with the Byzantines, is demonstrated by a bull, 
dated from Pristina in 1365, in which he calls himself 
' emperor of the Servians and of the Greeks '. 4 

1 von Kallay, Geschichte der Serben, i. 152. 

2 Ibid., i. 152-9 ; Jirecek, op. cit., 319-20 ; Ljubic, Monumenta spect. 
ad hist. Slav, merid., iv. 189. 

3 Cant. IV., 50, pp. 360-2 ; Miiller, Chron. Byz., under 1364. 

4 Miklositch, Acta Serbica, CLIII. 



MURAD 



145 



Stephen Urosh, the ' weakling died in 1367. 1 Uglesa, who 
usurped the kralship of Serres and shared the ' empire ' of 
Stephen Dushan with his brothers and fellow adventurers, 
Vukasin and Goiko, 2 sent an embassy to the patriarch 
Philotheos declaring that he would annul the bull of 1352, 
by which Dushan had created an autocephalous Serbian 
Church, 3 and would cause all the Serbians to return to the 
Orthodox allegiance. 4 After three years of negotiation, 
precious time wasted with trifling formalities, the reconcilia- 
tion and union of the Serbian and Greek Churches was 
effected. 5 But, if we are to believe the authorities of Orbini, 
Uglesa, while he was negotiating with the Greeks of Con- 
stantinople, had levied tribute upon the Greeks of Salonika, 
and would have made himself master of Salonika, had not his 
untimely death prevented the consummation of the great 
Serbian dream. 6 

At the time of the reconciliation with the Orthodox Church, 
Uglesa had completed a plan of united action with hjs two 
brothers to oppose the Ottoman invasion of Macedonia. 7 
Uglesa had been informed that a great army was gathered 
in Adrianople, which awaited the return of Murad from 
Bulgaria to commence its march. Four weeks after the 
negotiations with the Byzantines had been successfully con- 
! eluded, in the early summer of 1371, the Serbian army 
reached the Maritza at Cernomen, 8 between Adrianople and 

1 Ibid., CLX. 

2 Sons of a poor Dalmatian nobleman : Ducange, Familiae Byz. 
viii. 294. 

3 At Ipek, with an independent patriarch : Engel, Geschichte von 
Serbien, p. 279. 

4 Miklositch-Miiller, Acta gf., CLXII ; MS. Wiener Bibl., Gesch. gr., 
No. 47, fol. 290. 

5 Ibid., CLX ; ibid., fol. 286. 
I 6 Orbini, p. 275. 

7 Engel, op. cit., pp. 321 f. For documented details, Miiller, ed. Byz. 
Analekten, pp. 359-64, 405-6, based on Vienna MS. referred to above. 

8 Now called Cermen or Tchirman. 



1736 



K 



146 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Svilen, 1 This battle has been confused with the earlier 
battle of 1363, and it is impossible to separate the accounts 
of the two actions. 2 The Osmanlis were again victorious, 
Uglesa and Goiko were drowned in the Maritza. Vukasin 
escaped from the field of battle only to be killed by his 
servant for the gold chain he wore around his neck. 3 

The battle of Cernomen lost Macedonia to the Serbians. 
The three princes were killed. Most of the Serbian adven- 
turers who had been the companions of Stephen Dushan, 
and who had profited by his Macedonian conquests, dis- 
appeared. The Osmanlis had no opposition in penetrating 
to the valley of the Vardar. 

The monk Isaias of Serres has left a graphic contemporary 
picture of the Ottoman invasion of Macedonia. ' Like the 
birds of Heaven, the Ishinaelites spread themselves over the 
land, and never ceased murdering the inhabitants or carrying 
them off into slavery. The country was empty of men. of 
cattle, and of the fruits of the fields. There was no prince 
or leader : there was no redeemer or saviour among the 
people. All faded away before the fear of the Ishinaelites, 
and even the brave hearts of heroic men were transformed 
into weak hearts of women. Rightly were the dead envied 
by the living.' 4 

The invasion of Macedonia in 1371-2 was as rapid and 
decisive a campaign as the invasion of Thrace had been ten 
years before. Kavalla, Drama and Serres were occupied by 
Khaireddin and Evrenos. 5 Drama and Serres were colo- 

1 Svilengrad, now the frontier station of Bulgaria, was known from 
1361 to 1913 as Mustapha Pasha. Before the recent Balkan war, it was 
the frontier railway station of Turkey. 

2 But there were certainly two distinct battles here, in 1363 and in 
1371. See p. 124, n. 2, above. 

3 Ducange, op. cit., p. 294 ; Bialloblotszky's translation oi Rabbi 
Joseph, i. 240 ; Klaic, p. 199 : Jirecek, pp. 329-30. Zinkeisen, i. 224, 
confuses this battle with the one fought in 1363. 

4 In Miklositck, Chrestomaihia palaeoslav., p. 77. 

5 Phr., I. 26, p. 80, gives the capture of these cities in the same campaign 



MURAD 



147 



nized, their churches converted into mosques, and they soon 
became the residence of the owners of the timarets granted 
in eastern Macedonia. These two cities have always been 
the strongholds of the Mohammedan element in Macedonia, 
and the residence of the great Moslem landowners. The 
cities and villages in the valleys of the Mesta and the Struma 
acknowledged Murad as sovereign, and submitted without 
resistance to Ottoman laws and Ottoman taxation. 1 Where- 
ever it was safe to do so, Murad seized the lands, and ap- 
pointed Ottoman governors. In districts where pacification 
would have proved a difficult task, he allowed Serbian chiefs 
to rule as his vassals. 

With the same impetuosity that had carried them to the 
foothills of the Rhodope Mountains after the capture of 
Adrianople, the Osmanlis crossed the Vardar in 1372, and 
pushed their arms into Old Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, and even 
to the mountains of Dalmatia, from which they could see 
the Adriatic. 2 Other adventurous bands, eager to attract 
the attention, the commendation, and the rewards of Murad, 
followed the footsteps of the Catalans, traversed Thessaly, 
and appeared in the plains of Attica. 3 

Murad destroyed the Macedonian empire of Stephen 
Dushan without great effort. The Serbians remaining east 
of the Vardar, nobles and peasants, became Ottoman sub- 
jects. In upper Serbia, they rallied round one of their 

as that in which Monastir was acquired, with 1386 as date. But the 
Serbian chronicles are so explicit here that we can follow them without 
hesitation, especially as they are seconded by the Ottoman historians. 
Cf. Hammer, i. 241, and Zinkeisen, i. 229. 

1 Pope Gregory XI, writing to Louis of Hungary, May 14, 1372, informed 
him that the Osmanlis had conquered some parts of Greece, ' subactis 
quibusdam magnatibus Rasciae, turn in eis dominantibus '. Rascia was 
Servia. Theiner, Monumenta Hungarica, ii. 115. 

2 Gregory XI, Epp. seer. ii. 32-3. 

3 According to Amilhau and Jirecek, who rely on Reynaldus, ann. 1364, 
XXVIII, this first invasion of the Greek peninsula took place in 1363. 
But the Turks referred to in that year, probably of the perennial corsair 
type, could not have been Osmanlis. They were from Aidin or Sarukhan, 

K 2 



148 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



number, Lazar Gresljanovitch, whom they formally elected 
as successor of the Serbian kings. But Lazar was so weak 
that he did not take the title of emperor (tzar) or of king 
(hral), but called himself merely prince (knez). 1 To secure 
the existence of his kingdom or principality, he sought 
peace with Murad, and, following the example of the Bj^zan- 
tine and Bulgarian rulers, became vassal and tributary of 
the Ottoman emir. 2 

X 

Before the end of the year 1372, it was recognized that the 
Osmanlis had come into the Balkans to stay. The conquest 
of Macedonia east of the Yardar, following so closely upon 
the subjugation of southern Bulgaria and the completion of 
the Thracian conquest, gave to Murad a preponderant 
position in the Balkan peninsula. The Byzantine emperor 
and the Bulgarian and Serbian princes were his tributaries. 
Wallachia, Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, Attica and 
the Peloponnesus were now on the confines of the Ottoman 
Empire, and menaced by Ottoman invasion. 

In Europe, Murad was credited with having the intention 
of invading Hungary. It was reported that he had made 
an alliance with the Tartars of Russia to attack Hungary. 
The Tartars were to cross the Carpathians by way of Mol- 
davia into Transylvania, while Murad was to work his way 
up the valley of the Danube. 3 Murad may have dreamed of 
such a project, just as he had thought of making a supreme 
effort to enter Constantinople after his first Thraeian cam- 
paign. But, if he did, he was deterred b}^ the same well- 
grounded fear of moving too fast. Ten years before he had 
refrained from committing a fatal error. He would continue 
to make haste slowly. The early Osmanlis were not raiders. 

1 Klaic, Geschichte Bosniens, p. 200. 

2 Hammer, i. 242, 409, places the first relations of Lazar with Murad 
after the fall of Xish, which he erroneously puts in 1376. See below, 
p. 161, n. 3. 3 Gregory XI, Epp. sccr. iii. 42. 



MURAD 



149 



They were empire-builders. They succeeded because they 
never forgot that their greatest problem was that of assimila- 
tion. When they extended their conquests beyond the area 
of possible assimilation, the period of decay automatically 
commenced. 

The decade following the Macedonian campaign of 1371-2 
was spent in ottomanizing southern Bulgaria and eastern 
Macedonia, in completing the assimilation of Thrace, in 
reorganizing the army, and in a rearrangement of the 
system of distributing the timarets or military fiefs. Royal 
domains were created, and lands were set aside for the 
support of the mosques and other religious institutions in 
the form of inalienable endowments (vakufs). 

The only move of Murad against the Hungarians was to 
send five thousand archers, upon the request of the Senate, 
to help the Venetians in their war against Louis. 1 

After the Macedonian campaign, Murad turned his atten- 
tion once more to Byzantium. John, when he returned 
from his unsuccessful trip to Rome, placated Murad by 
sending his third son, Theodore, to serve in the Ottoman 
army. In 1373, John, passing over Andronicus, raised 
Manuel to the imperial purple as co-emperor. The dis- 
loyalty of his eldest son in the question of the emperor's 
ransom from his Venetian creditors made it natural that 
John should have selected Manuel to rule with him. 

John was not wrong in his estimate of the character of 
Andronicus. The disappointed prince entered into a con- 
spiracy with Saoudji, son of Murad, who had been entrusted 
with the command of the Thracian army while his father 
was occupied in Anatolia. John and Manuel, according to 
some accounts, were also in the field with Murad. So the 
moment was propitious. The two sons raised the standard 
of revolt against their fathers. 2 Murad, who hated his own 

1 June. 15, 1373 : Andrea Gataro, in Muratori, xvii, col. 176. 

2 Ducas, 12, pp. 43-4 ; Phr., I. 11, pp. 49-50. 



150 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

son and feared him, crossed immediately into Thrace. The 
army which was supporting the cause of the young princes 
abandoned them, and the rebels fled to shut themselves up 
in Demotika. 1 

Faced with starvation, the inhabitants of Demotika opened 
the gates of their city to Murad. He exacted a most atro- 
cious vengeance. The garrison were bound hand and foot 
and thrown into the river. The young Osmanlis and Greeks 
who had been led astray by the princes, were put to death. 
Wherever possible Murad compelled fathers to act as 
executioners of their sons. He set the example by tearing 
out Saoudji's eyes, and then cutting off his head. 2 

It has been generally written that Murad intended that 
the same punishment should be meted out to Andronicus. 
For the sake of appearances, he did order John Palaeologos 
to have his son's eyes put out. But there was no order for 
execution. John Palaeologos consented to the blinding of 
Andronicus and of his grandson and namesake, who was only 
five years old. 3 The operation was not successfully per- 
formed. Both Andronicus and his son, even if temporarily 
blinded, recovered their eyesight. Some have explained this 
by stating that they were healed by a Genoese physician. 4 
There is recorded a beautiful story that Andronicus owed 
the restoration of his sight to the empress, his mother, who 
visited him daily in the tower of Anemas and was prodigal 
in her efforts to heal him. He was in despair for some 
months, until one day he saw a lizard climbing on a wall. 5 

1 Chalc, I, pp. 42-3. But Murad, according to the Collection of Feridun, 
when he wrote to the Prince of Karamania, stated that Saoudji had been 
conquered in a pitched battle : MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, 
p. 30. 

2 Letter just cited ; Chalc, I, pp. 44-5 ; Phr., I. 12, p. 51. Saoudji 
is called Kontouz by Ducas, Mosis by Phrantzes, and Saouzis by Chalco- 
condylas. I cannot find the reading Siaous which Hammer, i. 412, and 
n. lix, attributes to Chalcocondylas. 

3 Chalc, I, p. 46 ; II, p. 69 ; Phr., I. 12, p. 51 ; Due, 12, p. 44. 

4 Canale, ii. 16. 5 Clavijo de Gonzales, 15 v° and 16 r°. 



MURAD 



151 



If Murad had really desired the death or total blindness of 
Andronicus, he could easily have secured this result. While 
punishing his own son, however, he saw to it that Andronicus 
escaped the consequences of the same crime. Here we have 
a revelation of the far-sightedness and cold-bloodedness of 
Murad. He killed his own son, because he feared his rivalry. 
He spared the son of John Palaeologos in order to perpetuate 
the rivalry between the emperor and his son. To have 
killed or incapacitated Andronicus would have been from 
his view-point an act of folly rather than of justice ; for 
Andronicus, brilliant, adventurous, magnetic, was at the 
same time a worthy exemplar of the name he bore, a name 
that stood for the acme of unscrupulous conduct and 
contempt for ties of blood. Murad had only to wait, and 
history would repeat itself. Internal dissensions in the family 
of the Palaeologi had made the fortunes of Orkhan. Murad 
had no intention of getting rid of Andronicus, in whom he saw 
the means of still further enmeshing the Byzantine emperors. 1 

The Byzantine historians record for the year 1374 another 
event, which illustrates the power of Murad over John Palaeo- 
logos. Manuel, who had resumed the government of 
Salonika, tried to induce the inhabitants of Serres to recover 
their liberty by massacring the Ottoman garrison and the 
Ottoman colonists. Serres, in spite of its prominent place 
in recent Serbian history, was regarded by the Byzantines 
(as it still is by the Greeks of to-day) as a city of their com- 
patriots. We have no means of establishing the grounds 
upon which Manuel believed it possible to restore the Byzan- 
tine authority in the country between the Struma and the 
Vardar. The sequel indicates that it was a wild and un- 
founded hope of a desperate man, and shows how thoroughly 
in two years the Osmanlis had become masters of the situa- 
tion in Macedonia. 

1 So Phrantzes thinks, I. 12, p. 51 : ravrqv w/xoV^ra kcii anavdpoinlav 
6 AfxovpaTrjs eTTOirjcrev del els ra iravra KaXcos noXirevoiievos. 



152 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Murad, warned in time of the project, sent Khaireddin 
pasha with a large army to Serres. The Greeks implicated 
in the plot were promptly executed, and Khaireddin moved 
against Salonika. At the approach of the army, Manuel 
fled by sea to Constantinople. John Palaeologos was so 
frightened that he did not dare to receive in the imperial 
city the beloved son whom he had raised to the dignity of 
.co-emperorship. Manuel then went to Lesbos, whose 
Genoese lord was his uncle by marriage. But the fear of 
Murad had reached the Aegaean Sea. The fugitive was 
turned away. Staking all upon the issue, Manuel went to 
Brusa and threw himself at Murad 's feet. The time was not 
yet ripe to destroy the Palaeologi. Murad pardoned Manuel, 
and sent him back to Constantinople. It was only after 
Manuel had presented a letter from Murad, confirming the 
fact that forgiveness had been granted, that the emperor of 
Byzantium dared to receive his son and heir within the 
walls of Constantinople. 1 

Pressed by the Venetians, John made in 1375 the mistake 
of giving them, in exchange for three thousand ducats and 
the jewels which had been pledged for his debts after the 
visit to Rome, the island of Tenedos. 2 The strategic im- 
portance of Tenedos was so vital that the Genoese could 
not allow this island to fall into the hands of their rivals. It 
is an axiom as old as history that who holds Tenedos con- 
trols the entrance and exit to the Dardanelles. Until the 
Black Sea dries up and the wheat-fields of Russia fail to 
yield, there will be a ' question of the Straits '. 

The news of this grant to Venice meant but one thing to 
the Genoese. There was feverish activity at Genoa. A 
fleet was manned, ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining 

1 Chalc., I, pp. 46-7 ; Phr., I. 11, pp. 47-9. 

2 Komanin, iii. 255. This project, according to Cicogna, Istoria di 
Venezia, vi. 95, was first broached to John at the time of his visit to 
Venice in 1370. 



MURAD 



153 



the Levant colonies against the Turks. 1 Pope Gregory XI 
allowed the archbishop of Genoa to raise enormous sums by 
questionable means for equipping and increasing the fleet. 2 
Instead of using this fleet to free the Aegaean and the 
Black Sea from the ever-increasing Turkish pirates, or to 
attack the Osmanlis, the Genoese admiral sailed to Con- 
stantinople. Aided by the Genoese of Galata and by 
Bayezid, Andronicus had escaped from the tower of Anemas. 
When the fleet arrived from Genoa, he gave to its admiral 
a golden bull, awarding Tenedos to Genoa. 3 To Murad he 
offered his sister in exchange for help. 4 The old story was 
repeated. After a month's siege, Andronicus, by the aid of 
his Ottoman and Genoese supporters, entered Constantinople. 
His father and his two brothers, Manuel and Theodore, were 
imprisoned in the Tower of Anemas, where he and his son 
had been shut up for two years. 5 The foresight of Murad 
in regard to Andronicus was justified. 

While Andronicus was besieging Constantinople, John V 
managed to send word to the inhabitants of Tenedos to 
resist the Genoese and give themselves to the Venetians. If 
this were not possible, they were to abandon the island to 
the Turks rather than allow the Genoese to occupy it. 6 

After a year's imprisonment, the emperor, through the 
wife of his jailer, succeeded in perfecting with Venetians 
residing in Constantinople a plan of escape. But its execu- 
tion was deferred when John discovered that his sons, who 
were confined to separate rooms, could not be included in the 
rescue. Later, the efforts of the Venetians were renewed 
upon the solemn promise that Tenedos should revert to 
Venice. The plot was discovered. The Venetians, availing 
themselves of the lucky chance that a Venetian fleet had 

1 Raynaldus, ann. 1376, XXIII. 2 Epp. seer., vi. 236. 

3 Ducas, 12, p. 45. 4 Caresino, in Muratori, xii. 

5 Ducas, 12, p. 45 ; Chalc, II, p. 63 ; and Phr., I. 13, p. 54, say that 
Bayezid had given him 1,000 men, and had often advised him to have his 
father and brothers assassinated. Cf. Muralt, ii. 706. 6 Sauli, ii. 57. 

| 



154 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



just arrived in the Golden Horn from the Black Sea, fled 
from Constantinople, abandoning John Palaeologos to his 
fate. 1 Andronicus IV was solemnly crowned in St. Sophia 
sole emperor of Byzantium. 

After two more years of imprisonment, 2 John and his sons 
succeeded in escaping in June 1379. They got across the 
Bosphorus, and took refuge with Bayezid, who was again 
watching the course of events at Scutari. Murad, still playing 
the game of pitting father against son, drove a hard bargain. 
Andronicus must be pardoned once more, and given the 
government of several cities, probably including Salonika. 3 
John and Manuel, as a price for freedom and restoration to 
the imperial throne, agreed to pay an annual tribute of 
thirty thousand pieces of gold, furnish a contingent of twelve 
thousand soldiers to the Ottoman army, and surrender to the 
Osmanlis Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession in 
Asia. 4 When the Philadelphians refused to assent to this 
shameful transaction, John and Manuel joined the Ottoman 
army and fought against their last Christian subjects in Asia 
to force upon them the Moslem yoke. 5 

Thus did Murad hold to the lips of John Palaeologos the 
cup of humiliation, nay, more, of degradation, until he 
drained the last bitter dregs. We do not need to pass 
judgement upon John and Manuel. It is sufficient to say 
that they drank and did not die ! 

The question of Tenedos brought Venice and Genoa into 
their most bitter conflict of the century. The Visconti of 
Milan were allied to the Venetians, while the Hungarians [ 

attacked them by land. 6 After initial successes, the great j 

i 

1 Quirino. Vita di Zeno, cited by Muralt, ii. 707, Nos. 6-9. 

2 Ducas, 12, p. 45. 

3 The fortunes of Salonika at this period are obscure. See p. 231, below. 

4 Chalc, II, p. 63 ; Phr., I. 13, pp. 55-6. 

5 Chalc, II, p. 64. But Ducas, 4, p. 19, says that Bayezid captured 
this city. 

6 Bonfinius, II. 10 ; Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi,i n Muratori, xxii, col. 680. 



MURAD 



155 



Venetian admiral Pisani was beaten decisively in 1379. The 
Genoese captured Chioggia, and held Venice at bay in her 

I own lagoons. It was the timely arrival of Charles Zeno and 
the fleet from the Levant that saved the Adriatic republic. 1 
In 1381, peace was made through the intermediary of Count 
Amadeo of Savoy, on condition that the Senate surrendered 
Tenedos to Amadeo, who guaranteed to demolish the fortress 
within two years. It was also a stipulation of the treaty of 

| Turin that Andronicus IV be recognized as heir to John V. 2 
Did the influence of Murad reach as far as the peace negotia- 
tions in the capital of far-off Savoy ? The Count of Savoy 
fulfilled his promise. In 1383, the fortifications of Tenedos 

; were rased, and the inhabitants of the island removed to 

! Crete and Negropont. 3 

The war over Tenedos had kept open the Straits, but 
it helped Murad in an inestimable degree to tighten the 
grip of the Osmanlis upon Thrace and Macedonia. The 
Italian republics thought no more of driving the Osmanlis 
out of Europe. From now on until they themselves see 
their possessions wrested from them and their commerce in 
the Levant ruined by the successors of Murad, the Venetians 
and Genoese are suitors for favours at the door of the tent 
of the Moslem conqueror. 

XI 

While the struggle between the Palaeologi and the Venetian 
war with Genoa and Hungary were strengthening Murad 's 
position in Europe, he began to turn his attention, for the 
I first time since the expedition against Angora at the beginning 
of his reign, to the expansion of Ottoman authority in Asia 
Minor. The antipathy of the South Slavs for the Hungarians, 

1 An excellent brief account of this war is found in Wiel's Story of 
( Venice, pp. 227-37. 

2 The Genoese forced John V to make peace with Andronicus in 
I November 1382 : Sauli, ii. 260. 

3 Cicogna, op. cit., vi. 97 ; Romanin, iii. 301. 



156 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



the anarchy among the Serbians, the lack of leadership - 
among the Bulgarians, and the civil strife in the Byzantine 
imperial family made the period from 1376 to 1381 peculiarly 
appropriate for initiating a movement against the emirates j 
on the confines of his own state. Murad felt for the moment 1 
secure in Macedonia and Thrace. The inhabitants of the I 
conquered countries could do nothing. There were no pros- 
pects of a crusade. Through the rapid increase of the 
Ottoman race during the first fifteen years in Europe, and 
through the vassalage of the Christian princes, which com- j 
pelled them to furnish contingents for war, Murad now had 
money and soldiers to confront his nearer Anatolian rivals. 

In 1360, after the capture of Angora and the defeat of the 
Galatian village chiefs, 1 Murad did not lose his head. He 
was wise enough to fear an attack on Kermian. Noav he 
had only to threaten, thanks to the prestige and actual 
power he had gained in Europe. The emir of Kermian was 
too prudent to risk a war with the son of the rival whom he 
had despised. In order to preserve his independence and 
at the same time his pride, he agreed to give his daughter in 
marriage to Bayezid. The territories which Murad coveted, 
and was ready to try to take by force, went with her as her \ 
marriage portion. It was a munificent dot. The western 
and northern part of Kermian became Ottoman. The most 
important city in the new territory was Kutayia, the ancient 
Cotyaeum, a strategic point of great value. Its remarkable 1 
citadel of countless towers is still standing. 

The marriage of the emir of Kermian 's daughter to Bayezid 
was celebrated at Brusa with much splendour. For the 
first time we hear of the Osmanlis interested in matters of 
court and luxury. The simple warriors, who had known 
nothing but the village council and the camp fire, were 
becoming accustomed to the more formal and more complex 
life of the Greek cities. With every victory and every 

1 Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1852 ; Evliya effendi, ii. 229. 



MURAD 



157 



extension of sovereignty, with every addition to the army and 
to the body of civilian officials, the distance between the 
sovereign and his people was widened. The ceremonial 
evolved by the Ottoman court was that of Byzantium : the 
customs of the higher classes, who were just beginning to 
realize their self-made rank, were Byzantine, even to the 
veiling of women. 1 The Osmanlis had not yet come into 

f touch with the Arabs or Egyptians. If they received any- 

I thing from the Persians, it was by way of Constantinople. 
The Ottoman occupation of Kutayia was a grave blow to 

I the security of the emirates of Tekke and Hamid. The 
emir of Hamid saw the hopelessness of a struggle. He 

| compounded with his pride by 1 selling ' to Murad, in 1377, the 
territory between Tekke, Kermian, and Karamania. Several 
cities, including Sparta and Kara-Agatch, became Ottoman, 

; but most important of all, Ak Sheir, which brought the 

. Osmanlis to the frontier of Karamania. 

1 The testimony of Ibn Batutah, who travelled extensively among the 
Turks in Anatolia, southern Russia, and elsewhere between 1325 and 1340, 
is conclusive on this point. ' Whenever we stopped in a house of this 
' country (Anatolia), our neighbours of both sexes took care of us : the 
. women were not veiled . . .' : ii. 256. ' I was witness of a remarkable 
thing, that is, of the consideration which the women enjoy among the 
Turks : they hold, in fact, a rank more elevated than that of the men. . . . 
As for the women of the lower classes, I have seen them also. One of them 
will be, for example, in a cart drawn by horses. Near her will be three 
or four young girls. . . . The windows of the cart will be open and you 
can see the women's faces : for the women of the Turks are not veiled. . . . 
Often the woman is accompanied by her husband, whom whoever sees 
him takes for one of her servants ' : ii. 377-9. Xo student can have any 
doubt whatever upon the position of Turkish women during the fourteenth 
century. As among all vigorous peoples, the women of the Osmanlis held 
a high place, and were never secluded. It was not until Murad II that 
even the sovereign had a harem. The Moslem conception of the inferiority 
of women was not prevalent among the Osmanlis until after the reign of 
Soleiman the Magnificent. Immediately it became prevalent, the race 
' began its decline. 

So universal did veiling become in the seventeenth century that it was 
adopted by Christian and Jewish women in Turkey as well. See Pere 
Febre, Theatre de la Turquie (1682), pp. 164-5. Pere Febre spoke from 
personal experience ; dans la plupart des lieux de la Turquie '. 



158 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



The purchase of this important territory extended the 
Ottoman state south to the border of Tekke. In 1378, 
Murad made his only conquest by arms from a rival emir in 
Asia. He invaded Tekke, and annexed the districts at the 
south and south-west of the lake region. But he did not 
cross the mountains to the Mediterranean, so the emir of 
Tekke still retained Adalia, and Alaya was undisturbed. 

For three years Murad devoted his energies to the pacifica- 
tion and. assimilation of these slices of Kermian, Hamid and 
Tekke. But none of the three principalities had been 
extinguished. And Sarukhan, A'idin and Menteshe were 
untouched. There was still much to be accomplished in 
western Asia Minor. But Murad preferred to return to 
Adrianople. He would increase his power and prestige in 
Europe, recruit his armies in the Balkans, and then come 
once more into Anatolia. 

XII 

To assure to the Osmanlis their preponderant position in 
the Balkan peninsula, the possession of three cities was neces- 
sary. The capture of Sofia meant the extension of Ottoman 
sovereignty over Bulgaria to the Danube. Msh was the key 
to Serbia. Monastir was indispensable, if the Osmanlis 
intended to be more than raiders west of the Vardar. 

In 1380, Murad ordered the advance to the Vardar. Istip 
was captured, and colonized in the same thorough way as 
had been done at Drama and Serres. A large army under 
Timurtash crossed the Vardar, took Monastir by assault 
through the marshes, and pushed north to Prilep. 1 Monastir 
and Prilep became frontier fortresses of the empire. The 
conquest of Macedonia was now complete. These cities were 
excellent bases of operation against the Albanians to the 
west and the Epirotes to the south-west. 

During the reign of Murad, the Osmanlis did not attempt 
1 Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 98. 



MURAD 



159 



a subjugation of Albania and Epirus. They were, however, 
i invited into these countries by native princes. 

Thomas, despot of Janina, used Ottoman mercenaries 
against the Souliotes in 1382. 1 Two years later, after the 
! assassination of Thomas, the Albanians besieged Janina with 
Ottoman aid. 2 The civil war that arose around the widow 
of Thomas prepared the way for the Osmanlis to extend 
their rule to the Gulf of Art a. 

In 1385, Khai'reddin pasha, who had occupied Okrida, 
the ancient ecclesiastical seat of the Bulgarians, a day's 
journey west of Monastir, was invited by Charles Thopia, 
lord of Durazzo, to aid him in his war against Balsa, the 
most powerful Frankish prince of Albania. Khai'reddin was 
glad of the opportunity afforded by this overture. He 
crossed the mountains to Elbasan, and then turned south- 
ward to meet Balsa. The first battle of the Osmanlis in 
Albania was fought in the salt -wastes of Savra, on the left 
; bank of the river Devol. The Osmanlis faced fighting men 
I who were fully their equals in courage, in resourcefulness, in 
- strength, and in willingness to engage in a hand-to-hand 
i struggle to death. The issue was long in doubt, and the 
I victory costly. Balsa and his ally and guest, Ivanitch, son 
s of kral Vukasin, were killed. 3 The Osmanlis gained one im- 
portant result from this battle. Albanian renegades joined 
: their army in great numbers. 4 From that day to this the 
| Albanian element in the Ottoman army, especially among 
U its officers, has been a source of strength which cannot be 
l over-estimated. 

It is doubtful if the Osmanlis withdrew from Albania, even 
! temporarily, after the battle of Savra ; for in 1388 the 
a princess of Valona (Avlona) was so hard pressed by the 
Osmanlis that she put her domains under the protection of 
! Venice. 5 

1 Historia epirotica, Bonn ed., p. 228. 2 Ibid., pp. 230-1. 

3 Ducange, viii. 292. 4 Jirecek, op. cit., 340. 5 Misti, XL. 154. 



160 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

In northern Albania, the invaders captured Croia and 
Scutari in 1386. Scutari was given back by Murad in ex- 
change for the addition of a member of the ruling family 
of Zenta to his harem. From Croia, also, the Osmanlis 
withdrew. Murad did not want to excite and alarm Venice 
at the moment when Philippe de Mezieres was preaching so 
vigorously and successfully a new crusade. 1 

The plain in which four tributaries join the Isker is the 
very heart of the Balkan peninsula, almost equidistant from 1 
the Adriatic, the Aegaean, and the Black Sea. Here the j 
three great ranges of the West Balkan, the Central Balkan, 3 
and the Rhodope Mountains converge, and three important 
rivers find their source. The Struma flows south through 
Macedonia, the Isker north-east through a canyon of the \ 
Balkans into the Danube, and the Msava north-west into the 
Morava. In the middle of the southern border of this plain, 
under the shadow of a lofty mountain, lies Sofia. 

The way to Sofia had been opened by the battle of Bama- 
ko v. But its occupation was not the next logical step to I 
Murad until the valleys of the Vardar and the Struma had 
been conquered. The occupation of Sofia was a temptation 
splendidly resisted in 1371. In 1381 it was a necessity. For 
it opened the path to trans-Balkan Bulgaria and to Serbia, i 
and Murad was now ready to extend his conquest to the 
Danube by way of the Isker and the Morava. 

The Slavic chronicles are silent concerning the fall of Sofia. I 
From the late Ottoman accounts, it would seem that the city j 
was intermittently besieged for several years. Then a young J 
Osmanli, who had entered the city as refugee, and had be- 
come the confidant and falconer of its commandant, betrayed 
him. He urged his master in a chase some distance in front 
of his followers, and fell upon him in a mountain gorge. 
The commandant was bound to his horse, and taken a 
prisoner to Ishtiman. Indje Balaban, son of the general of 
1 See below, p. 203. 



MURAD 



16L 



Osman who had besieged Brusa for ten years, brought his 
army from Philippopolis, and paraded the commandant, 
garrotted, under the walls of Sofia. The Bulgarians, dis- 
couraged and despairing of aid, surrendered. 1 We can be 
certain neither of the name of the Bulgarian commandant 
nor of the date of the surrender. But it was probably in 
1385. 2 Bulgaria up to the main Balkan range was now 
Ottoman territory. 

The fall of Nish, in the summer of 1386, marked the next 
extension of Murad's empire. 3 The Serbians did not yield 

1 Silvestre de Sacy, in Mem. de VAcad. des Inscript., vii. 327-34. But 
the commandant could hardly have been carried by his falconer in such 
a fashion as far as Philippopolis. The Ottoman historians probably forgot 
that Ishtiman, at the mouth of the pass, on the road to Philippopolis 
from Sofia, contained an Ottoman garrison. 

2 According to the anonymous Ein gantz ?ieu Eeysebuch von Prag auss 
hiss gen Constantinopel, Niirnberg, 1622, p. 33, Sofia was captured in 1362. 
Hadji Khalfa, Rumeli, p. 51, with whom Schefer, ed. Bertrandon de la 
Broquiere, p. 202 n., seems to agree by citing, says Sofia capitulated in 
780 (1378). Seadeddin, i. 125, is followed by Hammer, i. 250, Klaic, p. 237, 
and others in fixing the date as 1382. But these same authorities give 
1375 and 1376 for Nish, which is altogether impossible. Phr., I. 26, p. 80, 
seems to place the capture of Sofia for 1385. This is the most reasonable 
date. It is consistent both with the topography of the places in question 
and with Murad's methods of campaigning, as exemplified by all his 
conquests, to place the taking of Sofia close to the end of his reign, and 
within a year or two before the capture of Nish. To corroborate this 
date, letters in the collection of Feridun can be cited. Indje Bala ban's 
letter to Murad, announcing the acquisition of Sofia, is not dated. But 
immediately after it is the response of Murad, in which he gives to Indje 
Balaban for life the government of the new province, and states that he 
is sending him a fine horse and robes of honour because of his success. 
This letter is dated from Adrianople in the middle of the month of Redjeb, 
788, which corresponds to 1386 in our era. These letters are in MS. Bibl. 
Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, pp. 31-2. 

3 Nish, from its geographical position, could not have fallen in 1375, 
as Chalcocondylas says. Hammer, i. 241, and Zinkeisen, i. 230, show an 
amazing nonchalance in transporting the Osmanlis from Kavalla, Drama, 

i and Serres in the course of this one year, 1375. Engel, Geschichte von 
Serbien, p. 341, who, according to Hammer, ' deceives himself by thirteen 
years in placing the capture of Nish in 1388 is eleven years nearer the 
truth than Hammer ! Strumnitza, from a diploma delivered in the name 
1736 L 



162 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



without a struggle, as the Bulgarians had done. Nish was 
taken by assault. Lazar secured peace only by increasing 
the amount of his tribute and adding one thousand cavaliers 
to his contingent in the Ottoman army. 1 

Nish was sixteen days by carriage from Constantinople. 
Murad was now master of four-fifths of the great Roman 
highway from Belgrade to the Bosphorus ; for Tchorlu, 
Demotika, Adrianople, Philippopolis, Ishtiman, Sofia, and 
Nish were in his hands. Nish was also the point where the 
road from Belgrade to Salonika turned southward. Practi- 
cally all but the last day's journey of the road across the 
Balkan peninsula from Constantinople to Durazzo on the 
Adriatic was Ottoman territory. In Asia Minor, Murad 
held the ancient highway from Constantinople to Trebizond 
as far as Angora, and the road which the pilgrims and 
Crusaders, Jerusalem-bent, had travelled as far as Ak Sheiir. 
From Angora to Nish took twenty-five days ; from Con- 
stantinople to Durazzo seventeen days. 2 Twenty-five years 
before, when Murad came to the chieftainship of the Osmanlis, 
the Ottoman dominions could have been traversed in any 
direction in three days. 

XIII 

The treaty concluded between the Byzantines and Genoese 
in 1386 affords a striking illustration of Murad's power after 
the Nish campaign. This treaty, whose text has been pre- 
served, was signed by John and Andronicus Palaeologos, the 
podesta of Pera, and the Genoese ambassador. John Palaeo- 

of the Serbian empress Eudoxia (Muller, Acta Serbica, CXXXI), was 
independent in 1379. Sofia did not fall before 1382. How, then, could 
Xish have been an Ottoman fortress from 1375 ? 

1 Von Kallay, i. 166. 

2 For distances between cities in the Balkan peninsula, see Jirecek's 
important and interesting work, Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Kon- 
stantinopel und die Balkanpasse, p. 122. Jirecek, for time of transit, 
depends upon Hadji Khalfa. 



MURAD 



163 



logos bound himself to live in peace with his son Andronicus, 
and to move his army against all the enemies of Genoa 
* except Morat bey and his Turks The Genoese in turn 
promised to defend Constantinople ' against all enemies of 
whatever nationality except the said Morat bey and his 
Turks, who acted according to the will of the said Morat bey ' ! 
Throughout the treaty, Murad is carefully excepted on both 
sides. 1 

Genoa made a formal treaty with Murad in 1385. Favours 
were granted to the Osmanlis who did business in Pera, in 
return for liberty to Genoese merchants to reside and con- 
duct business in the states of Murad. The treaty recalls the 
friendship of the Genoese for Orkhan, and speaks of Murad 
as ' the magnificent and powerful lord of lords, Moratibei, 
grand admiral 2 and lord of the admirals of Turchie \ 3 But 
in the very next year Genoa secretly joined an offensive 
league with Cyprus, Scio (Chios) and Mytilene ' against that 
Turk, son of unrighteousness and evil, and also of the Holy 
Cross Morat bey, and his sect, who are attempting so 
grievously to attack the Christian race '. 4 

In the first year of Murad's reign, the Venetian energy 
had become so sapped by prosperity and luxury that the 
Senate passed a sumptuary law. 5 The recent triumph over 

1 Text in Sauli, ii. 260-8. 

2 armiratus or amiratus, then amiralus, of which we have made admiral, 
originally had nothing whatever to do with the sea. It is a corruption 
of emir. 

3 ' Magnificus et potens dominus, dominus Moratibei, magnus armiratus 
et dominus armiratorum Turchie ' : the whole text is reproduced from 
the Genoese archives by Belgrano, in Atti delta Societa Ligure di Storia, 
xiii. 146-9, and by Silvestre de Sacy, in Notices et Extraits, xi. 58-61. 
Cf. Canale, ii. 59. 

4 ' Contra ilium Turcum filiurn iniquitatis et nequiciae, ac Sancte Crucis 
inimicum, Moratum bey et eius sectam, cristianum genus sic graviter 
invadere conantes.' The text of this treaty is also in Belgrano, ibid., 
xiii. 953-65. 

5 Text in Romanin, iii. 386-9. There was an earlier law of similar 
nature enacted in 1334. 



164 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Genoa had given them a belief in their invincibility. Their 
self-sufficiency, and the growing disinclination to la}^ aside 
the pen and ledger for the sword and shield, were alarming 
symptoms of decay. The lesson of the Genoese at Chioggia 
was needed to teach the Venetians that the struggle for 
existence never ceases. 

In spite of their vital interest in the development of the 
Levant, and the power that their wealth gave them in a 
generation when fighting strength could be purchased so 
easily, Venice made no effort to oppose the progress of 
Ottoman conquest. On the contrary, in 1368, long before 
an invasion of Albania was imminent, the Senate negotiated 
with the Osmanlis for the reddition of Scutari. This 
project was again taken up in 1384, in a tentative way, 
during negotiations to fix the customs-duties of Venetian 
merchant -vessels. 1 Following the example of Ragusa and 
Genoa, Venice concluded, in 1388, a commercial treaty with 
Murad. 2 

The traffic of the Italian republics with the Moslems had 
been denounced by Gregory X in 1272, by Boniface VIII in 
1299, by Urban V in 1366, and by Gregory XI in 1372. 3 
In vain the popes exhorted ; in vain they threatened inter- 
dict and excommunication ; in vain they held up to execra- 
tion the abominable slave traffic. Trade interests alone 
decided the policies of the maritime cities. Their citizens 
never hesitated to cut each other's throats for the oppor- 
tunity of selling goods. To them the crusades were a purely 
commercial proposition. More than once the archives of 
Venice reveal the approval of the Senate upon the action 
of merchants who warned Moslem princes of the crusaders' 

1 Cf. Delaville Leroulx, i. 159-60. 2 Romanin, iii. 331. 

3 BuUarum, III, part 2, pp. 4, 92, 338 ; Urban V, Epp. seer. iii. 25, 
iv. 256 ; Gregory XI, Epp. seer. ii. 32-3, v. 88-9, 311 ; Philippe de Mezeray, 
p. 19 ; Raynaldus, ann. 1372, XXIX. In 1425 Martin V repeated the 
anathema against those who sold Christian slaves to the Turks : BuUarum, 
III, part 2, p. 454. 



MURAD 



165 



intentions. Guillaume d'Adam declared with reason that 
the Saracens maintained their supremacy in the Holy Land 
and Egypt through the support of the traders, who furnished 
them with Christian slaves to keep up their armies. 1 Genoa 
passed laws in 1315 and in 1340 against the slave traffic of 
the Black Sea, 2 but these laws were never enforced. 3 

Venice and Genoa turned a deaf ear to papal remonstrances 
and to papal appeals for aid in crusades against the Osmanlis. 
For the sake of preserving their commerce, they flattered 
Murad, and aided him, indirectly at least, to subjugate the 
Christians of the Levant. Their children of the third and 
fourth generation paid to the descendants of Murad the 
penalty of their greed. They lost their commerce in trying 
to save it . 

XIV 

It was not until 1387 that Murad believed himself strong 
enough to measure arms with Karamania. His son-in-law, 
Alaeddin, whose name is reminiscent of the earlier glory of 
Konia, was emir of the most powerful state in Anatolia. 
The Ottoman historians have represented Alaeddin's re- 
sistance of the encroachment of the Osmanlis, and his 
defiance of Murad, as rebellion, and have been blindly fol- 
lowed in this by most of the European historians. Such 
a conception of the conflict between the Osmanlis and the 
Karamanlis is far from the truth. There is no record of 
when and how Karamania had become subject to Murad. 
In fact, up to 1387, Murad had not yet extended his 
sovereignty over all of Tekke and Hamid, the states which 
bordered Karamania on the west. 

1 MS., Bibl. de Bale, A 1, 28, fols. 232-54, cited by Delaville Leroulx, 
i. 70, n. 2. Adam's project was a revival of Sanudo's attempt to ruin 
Moslem trading. 

2 Monumenta historiae patriae, i. 320 ; iii. 336, 371. 

3 In 1432 Bertrandon de la Broquiere met at Damascus one of these 
Genoese of Kaff a, who sold slaves to the Sultan of Egypt : Voyage. Schefer 
ed., p. 68. 



166 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Neither Alaeddin himself nor his predecessors had ever 
acknowledged the suzerainty of the house of Osman. From 
the standpoint of the Karamanians, the Ottoman emir was 
not even primus inter pares of the Turkish princes in Ana- 
tolia. Osman had probably not been known by name to 
the founder of the house of Karaman. Orkhan never came 
into direct contact with the Karamanlis. Murad, at the 
beginning of his reign, had indirectly gained an advantage 
over the emir of Karaman in the successful issue of his ex- 
pedition against the Phrygian chiefs and the capture of 
Angora. Fifteen years later his accessions of territory in 
Kermian, Hamid, and Tekke brought him into rivalry with 
Alaeddin . But it was the prestige and power gained by Murad 
in European conquests that made him a rival to be reckoned 
with. The first acknowledgement of his growing strength 
was the marriage alliance between the houses of these 
two emirs. Alaeddin, however, did not by this marriage 
constitute himself a vassal of his father-in-law. The letters 
of Murad to Alaeddin in the collection of Feridun are 
couched in terms of equality. 

Murad rallied his army at Kutayia for the first great 
Ottoman campaign in Asia. He could not muster enough 
Osmanlis to undertake so formidable a feat as the invasion 
of Karamania, and had to rely upon large contingents of 
Greeks and Serbians, who were sent to him, in accordance 
with their conventions, by his vassals, the emperor John and 
the kral Lazar. 1 The Balkan soldiers, under the cbmmand 
of Bayezid, formed the left wing of the Ottoman army. 

Battle was joined in the great plain before Konia, which 
has so often been the scene of Ottoman triumphs and re- 
verses. The Ottoman historians declare that Alaeddin was 
defeated, largely through the bravery of Timurtash, and 
represent the battle of Konia as a decisive victory, which 
'put down the rebellion'. According to them, Alaeddin 
1 Chalc, I, p. 53 ; Phr., I. 26, p. 81. Cf. Hertzberg, p. 503. 



MURAD 



167 



' sued for peace Murad c forgave ' him, because he was 
moved by the tearful pleadings of his daughter, Alaeddin's 
wife. 1 

But the net result of the costly expedition was the recon- 
ciliation of the two emirs. The only result recorded by the 
Ottoman historians is that Alaeddin kissed Murad's hands ! 
Murad withdrew to Kutayia without annexing any portion 
of the Karamanian emirate, without booty, and without 
promise either of tribute or military contingents for the 
European wars. Had Murad actually accomplished more 
than merely holding his own in the battle of Konia, the 
campaign would not have ended so profitlessly. Granting 
the Ottoman victory, Murad's conduct after the battle is 
inconsistent with his whole life and character. We are com- 
pelled to discard the story of a decisive victory. It must be 
that Murad, who had been able to reduce to vassalage the 
Byzantines, the Bulgarians, and the Serbians, found himself 
unable, even with the help of his European allies, to break 
the power of this rival Anatolian emir. 

XV 

During the Karamanian campaign, Murad adopted the 
policy of treating non-combatants in a friendly fashion. 
Strict orders were given to refrain from violence and looting. 
Murad hoped to win the Karamanlis by kindness, and to pave 
the way for a later assimilation. It was the first campaign 
undertaken against fellow Moslems. The Serbian contingent, 
who cared nothing for the success of this policy, and who 
claimed that they had been promised booty in return for 
their services, did not obey the order. A number of them 
were summarily executed. 2 

1 Seadeddin, i. 130-2, draws here upon Idris and Neshri, and has been 
followed by all the Ottoman historians down to the present day. 

2 Col. Djevad, pp. 62-3. He speaks of Alaeddin bey 6 ayant leve 
l'etendard de la revolte and calls the punishment of the Serbians in this 
campaign the chief cause of Kossova. 



168 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



When the survivors returned to their homes in the spring 
of 1388, they complained bitterly of the way they had been 
treated, and declared that service in the Ottoman army, for 
the Christian all risk and no gain, was nothing less than a 
slavery leading to death. This discontent gave Lazar the 
opportunity for which he had long been looking. He 
decided to profit by the resentment of the Serbians against 
Murad, 1 and make a supreme effort to free Serbia from the 
menace of the Ottoman yoke, which had grown very real 
since the capture of Nish. 

The Slavs of upper Serbia and of Bosnia realized the 
imminence of an Ottoman invasion, and they were now 
ready — or at least they appeared to be ready — to rally 
around Lazar. Up to this time the Serbians had never 
recognized Lazar as the leader of the race. 

The pan-Serbian alliance was made possible by the adhe- 
sion of Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia. He had come into promi- 
nence after the battle of Cernomen as a supporter of Lazar 
against the sons of Vukasin and other Serbian chieftains who 
were dissatisfied with the election of Lazar. But in return 
for his aid, he got under his control a large part of upper 
Serbia, including Milesevo, which was the burial-place of 
St. Sava, apostle to the Serbians. In 1376, he crowned him- 
self ' king of Bosnia and Serbia ' on the tomb of St. Sava, 
placing upon his head the two crowns, and changing his 
name to Stephen. Neither Louis of Hungary nor Lazar 
was consulted by Tvrtko, and he took no measures to secure 
their assent to his pretensions. After his coronation, he 
conquered Cattaro, and fought successfully with Balza of 
Albania. 2 

In 1383 Tvrtko had become so powerful on the Dalmatian 
coast that the Senate recognized him as ' king of Serbia, 

1 Chalc., I, p. 53 ; Phr., I. 26, p. 81. 

2 Up to 1383, in outlining the career of Tvrtko, I have followed Klaic, 
pp. 201-3. 



MURAD 



169 



Bosnia and the Riviera ', and bestowed upon him the privi- 
lege of Venetian citizenship. 1 It was evidently the intention 
of Venice to favour Tvrtko as an opponent to Louis of 
Hungary, who had himself taken in 1382 the title of ' king 
of Serbia, Dalmatia and Bulgaria \ 2 Venice lost her grip 
upon or interest in the east coast of the Adriatic for a few 
years immediately following the treaty of Turin. We have 
already seen how in 1384 the Senate professed a willingness 
to treat with the Osmanlis on the basis of giving up Scutari. 
In 1385 they became indifferent to currying further the 
favour of Tvrtko, and sent an embassy to press him for the 
payment of money due to Venice. 3 Tvrtko continued to con- 
solidate his position on the Dalmatian coast, until the capture 
of Nish influenced him to aid Lazar against the Osmanlis. 

It was not a moment too soon. An Ottoman army had 
already crossed the Vardar and was marching forward for 
the invasion of Bosnia. Thirty thousand Serbians and 
|j Bosnians under the command of Tvrtko and Lazar met the 
invading army at Plochnik, in the valley of the Toplika. 
Of twenty thousand Osmanlis scarcely one-fifth escaped 
death or captivity. 4 The Bosnians successfully opposed two 
other Ottoman armies at Rudnik and Biletchia. 5 

A delirium of joy spread through the Slavic population 
of the Balkans at the news of the battle of Plochnik. The 
| uninterrupted chain of thirty years of Ottoman victories had 
been broken. The slavery and horror of military service 
with the Osmanlis, price of their vassalage, so vividly 
depicted by the survivors of the Karamanian campaign, had 
\ made the Slavs desperate. This victory, following closely 
f upon the moral revolt against the Osmanlis, gave them hope. 

1 Schaffarik, Acta archivii Veneti, &c, CXLI. 

2 In a letter of April 1, published in Ljubic, iv. 185-6. 

3 Misti, xxxix. 113. 

4 Klaic, p. 237 ; Jirecek, p. 341. But von Kallay, i. 166, attributes 
this victory to George Kastriota of Albania. 

5 Orbini, p. 361. 



170 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



The South Slavs are like children in the extremes of their 
emotions. Tears to laughter — laughter to tears : easily 
despairing, as easily hopeful, and from as little cause. The 
slightest reverse brings distrust in their ability to cope with 
forces that have once successfully opposed them. Slight 
success brings overwhelming confidence, and leads to colossal 
mistakes of judgement. With this trait of character is 
coupled an intuitive distrust of one's neighbour, of the dis- 
interestedness of his motives, and an intuitive resentment of 
'the other fellow' doing something better than you do it. 
This makes impossible solidarity and esprit de corps. The 
South Slavic character explains the series of events which 
brought the Serbians to their final and irretrievable disaster. 

Around Lazar the Serbian nobles rallied as they had never 
rallied before. Krai Tvrtko of Bosnia, George Kastriota of 
Albania, and the minor princes of Albania and Serbia joined 
in an alliance against the Osmanlis. The two remaining 
successors of Alexander of Bulgaria, Sisman and Ivanko, 
son of Dobrotich, threw off their allegiance to Murad, and 
promised contingents for the common struggle. The prince 
of Wallachia assured Lazar of the co-operation of the 
Rumanians. 

Venice, fearing lest Murad fall upon the Peloponnesus 
to seek vengeance for the defeat of Plochnik, tried to 
form a league of all the Greek and Frankish lords in the 
Morea and central Greece. 1 As far as one can judge from 
the records, the effort of Venice was an intention rather than 
an action. It did not get beyond the paper stage. The 
Senate gave to the Slavic alliance no encouragement more 
substantial than words. On the other hand, some of the 
border nobles of the Hungarian banats, of their own volition, 
informed Lazar of their intention to co-operate in an 
offensive movement against the Osmanlis. 

1 Hopf, in Ersch-Gruber, Allgemeine Encycl., Ixxxvi. 49, 



MURAD 



171 



XVI 

Murad did not set his army in motion against the Serbians 
immediately after the disaster at Plochnik. There was none 
of that feverish haste which had characterized his move- 
ments when he received the news of the Serbian and Hun- 
garian crusade in 1363. For while the victory had aroused 
in the Balkan Christians a determination that they must 
drive the Osmanlis out of Europe, and a feeling that they 
could accomplish this end. its immediate result had been 
merely to repel the projected Ottoman invasion of Bosnia. 
Ali pasha disposed of sufficient forces to hold the conquests 
that had already been made. Murad had come to know 
the people with whom he was dealing. It was not so much 
to recruit his own army as to give the allies time to fall out 
with each other that Murad remained in Asia during the 
early months of 1388. To strike in the first flush of enthu- 
J' siasm and buoyant hope would have brought him face to 
face with a united enemy. If he waited, he knew from past 
experience with the Balkan princes that the poison of jealousy 
would permeate the ranks of his ostensibly united enemies. 
The Osmanlis never made a mistake of judgement in dealing 
with Balkan alliances until the autumn of 1912. 

Far from planning an offensive movement against the 
I Serbians, Murad allowed Evrenos of Yanitza to lead a band 
i. of Ottoman mercenaries into the Morea, at the invitation of 
■ Theodore Palaeologos, to support the authority of the Byzan- 
tine Empire against the Frankish barons. 1 At the same 
time he ordered Ali pasha to cross the Balkans into northern 
Bulgaria. 

Ali pasha started from Adrianople in the spring of 1388 
| with thirty thousand men to complete the conquest of 

1 Chronique de Moree, p. 516. Evrenos is called Branezis. This is not 
the Evrenos heretofore mentioned, but another Christian renegade, of 
Macedonia. Cf. Finlay, iv. 233 n. 



172 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Bulgaria. He crossed the Balkans by the pass north of Aitos, 
which has ever since been called by the Osinanlis Nadir 
Derbend from the neighbouring town of Xadirkeuy. 1 Pro- 
vadia was taken by surprise in the night. Slmman and the 
villages around it were next conquered. After an unsuc- 
cessful attack upon Varna, the Osmanlis retraced their 
steps through Provadia and Shuman. following the line of 
the modern railway from Varna to Sofia . Tirnovo. the ancient 
capital of Bulgaria, capitulated after a short struggle. 

Si- man withdrew to the Danube through the valley of the 
Osnia. and shut himself up in the fortress of XicopoLU. 
Owing to the ease of provisioning from the river side, it was 
impossible to starve him out. Ali pasha was compelled to 
call upon Murad, who had just crossed over from Asia to 
Thrace. When Murad arrived before Xicopolis, Sisman sued 
for peace. The conditions of Murad. that he pay the tribute 
due from the previous year and allow an Ottoman garrison 
to occupy the fortress of Drster as gage of future good 
conduct, were gladly accepted. 

Xo sooner had Murad started southward than Sisman 
decided upon a final desperate resistance. He refused to give 
up Drster. But he had forgotten that Ah pasha was master 
of Shuman and the route to Varna. The Osmanlis took 
Drster by storm. Many villages along the Danube between 
Rustuk and Xicopolis fell into the hands of the Osmanlis. 
Ali pasha besieged Sisman for a second time in Xicopolis. 
The revelation of his own weakness and of the strength of 
the Osmanlis was a crushing blow to Sisman. He sur- 
rendered without conditions, and was taken, with his wife 
and children, to Murad's camp. For reasons which the 
chroniclers do not indicate. Sisman was able to secure for- 
giveness and restoration to his former position as vassal 
prince of Bulgaria. But the Osmanlis were now installed 
in north-central Bulgaria up to the Danube River. Shuman 
1 Jirecek, Die Heerstrasse, &c, p. Ii7. 



MURAD 



173 



and Nicopolis were Ottoman fortresses. Sisman had 
been rendered impotent to give effective aid in the great 
alliance. 1 

XVII 

Not all the Christians were loyal to the cause of Balkan 
freedom. In their conquest of the Balkan peninsula, it is 
remarkable that the Osmanlis never fought a battle without 
the help of allies of the faith and blood of those whom they 
were putting under the Moslem yoke. At the beginning of 
this chapter, it has been shown that there is no historical 
basis for the assertion that the Osmanlis conquered the 
Balkan states by the use of the janissaries. But they did 
have Christian aid of a far more powerful kind than the 
janissaries could have given them. The old fiction of the 
janissaries won for the Balkan people the sympathies of 
western Europe. The truth concerning the Christian aid 
which the Moslem conquerors received alienates rather than 
wins our sympathies. 

When, in the spring of 1389, Murad found himself ready 
to exact vengeance for Plochnik, and started from Bulgaria 
on his punitive expedition, he was joined by Const ant ine of 
Kustendil, by the Serbian Dragash, to whom he had given 
Serres as fief, and even by the sons of Vukasin, the Serbian 
kral who had been killed in 1371 at Cernomen. 2 Balsa, 
prince of Zenta (upper Albania), postponed his march to join 
the allies, and entered secretly into correspondence with 
Murad through a Serbian nobleman in the Ottoman camp. 
Lazar knew of this treachery. He knew also that some of 
his own lieutenants had in all probability arranged to sell 
him out to the Ottoman emir. 3 

1 Leunclavius (1611 Frankfort ed.), pp. 268-76. Jirecek, Geschichte der 
Bulgaren, pp. 341-2, points out that Seadeddin and Leunclavius, whom 
Zinkeisen, i. 252-5, follows, are in error in representing the Bulgarians 
as wholly subdued in 1388. 

2 Mijatovitch, from Serbian sources, p. 13. 3 Ibid., pp. 1G— 17- 



174 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Kossovapol, the plain of the blackbirds, is the name given 
to the valley of the Sitnika River (an upper tributary of 
the Morava) west of Pristina and south of Mitrovitza. 1 
Here the decisive battle for Serbian independence was 
fought on June 20, 1389. 2 

Serbian chronicles state that Murad had enjoined upon 
his soldiers that they should neither destroy nor sack the 
rich castles, villages, and cities of this region after the battle. 
Only four castles in all were destroyed. 3 This command 
shows that Murad was confident of the outcome. He was 
fighting for the possession of this country, for the wealth and 
the prestige that it would give him . He had no intention of 
destroying what he knew would be his to enjoy, nor did he 
desire to alienate the Serbian peasantry by unnecessary 
harshness. Here, as elsewhere, new Osmanlis rather than 
Ottoman subjects were the desiderata : they could be won 
only by kindness. Since the clemency of the Osmanlis in deal- 
ing with the vanquished after the battle is frankly recorded 
by the Serbians themselves, we cannot doubt that the wise 
and far-seeing provisions of the conqueror were carried out. 

Of Kossova much has been written. It was the culminat- 
ing event in that legendary period of Serbian history which 
had begun fifty years before with the exploits of Stephen 
Dushan. Lazar, Serbian chieftain with no long line of 

1 The railway between Mitrovitza and Skoplje (before the Balkan War 
Uskub) passes through the plain of Kossova. When this railway is con- 
nected through the former Sandjak of Novi Bazar with the Austrian (?) 
railways in Bosnia, Kossovapol will be on one of the great transcontinental 
routes. 

2 The date June 15 is fixed by the Serbian chronicles and songs and 
by unbroken tradition. Also by Tvrtko's letter to Florence. But Tvrtko, 
in another letter to the inhabitants of Trau in Dalmatia, gives June 20 
(Pray, Annates, ii. 90). Seadeddin stands alone in placing the death of 
Murad on the 4th Ramazan (August 27). The other Ottoman historians, 
as well as Chalcocondylas, Ducas, and the anonymous Hist. Epirot., speak 
of these events occurring ' in the springtime ' . 

3 Chron. of Abbey of Tronosha, section 54, p. 84, and Ghron. of Pelc, 
p. 53 : cited by Mijatovitch, p. 12 n. 



MURAD 



175 



royal ancestors behind him, with no great weight of authority 
among his contemporaries, who began his career by craven 
submission to Murad and, after eighteen years in which no 
deed to his credit is recorded, survived a crushing defeat to 
be executed on the field of battle — this is the Charlemagne 
of Serbian poetry. On the anniversary of Kossova, the 
Serbians pray for his soul. As a saint, he gets many more 
candles at his shrine than his namesake of Bethany who was 
raised from the dead. Such is legend in history. But what 
amazes one is the curious fact that the very folksongs that 
glorify Saint Lazar and lament Kossova reveal a frank and 
true picture of the events, and prove how little warrant there 
is for the legend ! 

The Serbians despaired of their cause before the battle. 
The enormous number of the enemy dismayed them. 1 
Rumours of treachery were current in the allied camp. 
Their lack of courage, and the spirit of distrust of each 
other's good faith, is strikingly voiced in the oration of Lazar 
at a banquet the evening before the battle. He pleaded 
for a courage and confidence which he himself did not 
feel. He openly accused his son-in-law, Milosh Obravitch, 
of treason. Gloom and hopelessness had settled over the 
Serbian camp, reflected from leaders to the common soldiery. 
The battle was already lost. For victory is never won by 
those who feel that they are going to lose. 2 

The battle was begun by the Osmanlis. Murad sent 
forward an advance guard of two thousand archers. 3 The 
allies responded with a charge in which the left wing of the 

1 ' Sans arreter, pendant quinze jours pleins, 

J'ai chemine le long des hordes turques, 

Sans en trouver ni la fin ni le nombre.' — A. d'Avril, p. 36. 

2 Orbinij pp. 314-15. See also the Serbian songs about Kossova, which 
are accessible in the form of a continuous narrative in French by Adolphe 
d'Avril, and in English by Mme Mijatovitch, based on the composite 
poems of Stoyan Novakovich and A. Pavich. 

3 Solakzade, cited by Col. Djevad bey, p. 196. The bow was used as 
an offensive arm by the Osmanlis until the middle of Murad II's reign. 



176 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Ottoman army was broken through by Lazar. For a while 
the issue seemed in doubt. Bayezid held out against the 
impetuosity of the Serbians, but the Osnianlis made no 
attempt to take the offensive. At this critical juncture, 
when the battle was by no means decided. Vuk Brankovitch. 
another son-in-law of Lazar. quietly withdrew from the field 
with twelve thousand men. This desertion,, which had 
probably been arranged for with Murad. so weakened the 
Serbians that they broke and fled. Lazar and many of his 
leading noblemen, and thousands of his soldiers, were taken 
prisoners. It was not a fight to the bitter end. 1 

Murad won the battle of Kossova at the cost of Ms own life. 
From the story which Clavijo de Gonzales heard fifteen years 
later, one might infer that Murad was killed in the course of the 
battle, and that the fighting was renewed around his body. 2 
It was then that Bayezid cut down Lazar with his own sword. 
Pray declared that the two sovereigns were mortally wounded 
in a personal combat, 3 The Ottoman historians believed 
that Murad met his death when walking across the field 
after the battle. A wounded Serbian soldier, who was 
believed to be dead, rose with a supreme effort to his knees 
and thrust his sword into Murad as he passed. 

According to the Serbian songs, whose testimony the 
Byzantine historians corroborate,, and whose story has been 
followed by some Osmanlis as well. Murad was assassinated 
after the battle, or perhaps while the battle was in progress, 
by Milosh Obravitch. Stung by the unjust accusation of 
treason in the speech of Lazar on the eve of the battle, 4 

1 Seadeddin. i. 147-52 ; Chalc... I. p. 53 ; Ducas, 3, pp. 15-16 ; Hist. 
Epir., p. 234 ■ the Serbian chants; Bonincontrius. col. 52; and the 
modem writers,. Hertzberg. pp. 503-7 ; Jirecek, pp. 342-4 ; Fessler, 
ii. 254 : von Kallay. i. 166 : Klaic. pp. 236-40. Most illuminating of 
all is RacM, in Croatian,, in Jugoslav. Akademie, hi. 92 f. 

2 Clavijo de Gonzales, foL 27 r°. 3 AnnaJes, ii. 186. 

4 This speech, from the chronicle of Monk Pahomye, is given in 
Mijatovitch. p. 17. 



MTJRAD 



177 



Milosh determined to prove his loyalty beyond any question. 
He got through the Ottoman ranks as a deserter,, of whom 
there must have been many on that fatal day. His claim 
of high rank, which was attested by his princely bearing, 
secured for him an audience with Murad. When he was 
face to face with the emir, he plunged his dagger into the 
destroyer of his country's liberties. It is a commentary on 
the Serbian character that this questionable act has been held 
up to posterity as the most saintly and heroic deed of national 
history. 

In the seventeenth century it was believed, and this belief 
has been reproduced as a fact by some modern writers on 
the Ottoman Empire., that the custom of holding a foreign 
ambassador's arms when he entered the presence of the 
sultan, originated from a regulation to prevent the recur- 
rence of such a crime. 1 Like many other Ottoman customs, 
however, this consistorial ceremony is found among the 
usages of the Byzantine court.' 2 and has persisted in some 
oriental courts to the present day. It has been explained 
on the ground that ' : a stranger before the sovereign is so 
overwhelmed by the effulgence of his rays that he cannot 
stand without support \ 3 

The statements of the numbers engaged in the battle of 
Kossova are so conflicting that it is impossible to determine 
how many men took part in the action., or which side was 
the stronger. The Serbian folksongs dwell upon the tre- 
mendous number of the enemy, while the Ottoman historian- 
report that the Osmanlis mustered so few in comparison with 
the reported strength of the Serbians that there was serious 
question before the battle of the advisability of taking so 
great a risk as to engage a foe whose numerical advantage 

1 Busbecq, English ed., i. 153 : cf. Ricaut. ed. of 16S2.. p. 159. 

2 Const. Porphvr., i. 394, 396, 405. 

3 Howorth. ii. 796, commenting on Stoddard's audience with the Emir 
of Bukhara. 

1736 M 



178 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



was so marked. Including the prisoners, who were massacred 
when Murad's death was learned by the soldiers, the Serbians 
calculated their loss at seventy-seven thousand killed, while 
only twelve thousand of the Osmanlis fell. One important 
fact we do know. The loss of life during the battle and sub- 
sequent massacre on the part of the Serbian nobility was so 
great that the nation, for the third time within thirty years, 
found itself without leaders. 

Tvrtko hurried away from Kossova so fast that he did 
not realize how overwhelming had been the defeat. In fact, 
when he learned of the death of Murad, he wrote to Florence 
announcing the glorious victory won under his leadership, 
and the death of the arch enemy of Christendom. 1 The 
Florentines, therefore, celebrated the news of Kossova with 
a Te Deum in the cathedral. Either this perverted account 
also reached France, or too great significance was placed 
upon the death of Murad, for Charles VI went to Notre Dame 
to render thanks to God in all solemnity for what had 
happened at Kossova ! 2 The Serbians themselves were not 
deceived. To them, Kossova was the death-knell to inde- 
pendence. The Hungarians, also, awoke immediately to a 
sense of the danger that threatened them. 

XVIII 

For thirty years Murad had guided the destinies of the 
Osmanlis with a political sagacity surpassed by no states- 
man of his age. It is only because we know so much 
more of Mohammed the Conqueror and of Soleiman the 
Magnificent that Murad has never received his proper place 
as the most remarkable and most successful statesman and 
warrior of the house of Osman. When we measure the diffi- 
culties which confronted him, the problems which he solved, 

1 Text in Mon. sped, hist, Slav. Mend., i. 528-9. 

2 Chronique du Beligieux de St.-Denis (ed. Bellaguet), ii. 391. 



MURAD 



179 



and the results of his reign, against the deeds of his more 
dazzling successors, we see how easily he stands with them, 
if not above them. The transformation effected in his life- 
time is one of the most wonderful records in all history. His 
conquests were to endure for five centuries, until the Treaty 
of Berlin, in 1878: some of them have survived the cataclysm 
of the recent Balkan wars. 

His energy and zeal for fighting, so like his father's, and 
yet put to the test of being extended over a field of action 
far wider than his father ever dreamed of, did not flag. He 
never had a disagreement with any of his generals or ad- 
ministrators. His system of conquest and of government, 
unsupported by tradition or the background of a gradual 
growth, fitted every condition for which it had been framed. 
His treatment of the Greeks showed superb skill in estimat- 
ing their character. Although an infidel and enemy of Christ 
in the eyes of the Byzantine ecclesiastics, he handled them 
so much better than the popes that he won their sympathies. 
No more striking proof of his complete success in a problem 
of assimilation, at once racial as well as religious, can be found 
than the letter of the Orthodox patriarch written to Pope 
Urban VI in 1385, in which it is stated that Murad left to the 
Church entire liberty of action. 1 In the records of the Greek 
patriarchate from 1360 to 1389, 2 one does not find a single 
instance of complaint received of ill treatment of the priest- 
hood by the Osmanlis. 

Osman gathered around him a race, Orkhan created a 
state, but it was Murad who founded the empire. 

1 MS., Wiener Bibl., Gesch. gr., 48. 

2 As far as such records are accessible in the great collection of Miklositch 
and Muller. The statement of Ducas, 23, p. 137, about the persecutions 
of Christians by Murad, is without any foundation. 



M2 



CHAPTER IV 



BAYEZID 

THE OSMANLIS INHERIT THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 

I 

The death of Murad was immediately avenged upon the 
battle-field by the execution of the prisoners of noble birth. 
Practically all the Serbian aristocracy that had remained 
loyal to Lazar and the national cause perished. 

In the midst of this bloody work, Bayezid sent servants to 
seek out his brother Yakub, who had distinguished himself 
during the battle, and was being acclaimed by his soldiers. 
Yakub was taken to Bayezid's tent, and strangled with a 
bowstring. 1 The new emir justified this crime by a verse 
conveniently found for him by his theologians in the 
Koran : ' So often as they return to sedition, they shall be 
subverted therein ; and if they depart not from you, and 
offer you peace and restrain their hands from warring against 
you, take them and kill them wheresoever ye find them.' 2 
They declared that the temptation to treason and revolt was 
always present in the brothers of the ruler, and that murder 
was better than sedition. These doctors of the law might 
better have pointed out to Bayezid the admonition of the 
Prophet : ' But his soul suffered him to slay his brother, and 
he slew him : wherefore he became of the number of those 
who perish.' 3 For the abominable practice of removing 

1 Phr., I. 26, p. 82 ; Chalc, I, p. 59 ; Due, 3, p. 16 ; also the Ottoman 
historians. 

2 Sura IV, verse 94 (Sale trans., p. 64). 

3 Sura V, verse 53 (ibid., p. 77). 



BAYEZID 



181 



possible rival claimants by assassination, thus begun on the 
field of Kossova, was elevated to the dignity of a law by 
Mohammed II, 1 and has been until our own times a blot upon 
the house of Osman. 

Bayezid, however, was only following the example of 
Christian princes of his own century. Pedro of Castille 
killed his brother Don Fadrique ; 2 Andronicus III Com- 
nenos of Trebizond, killed his two brothers, Michael and 
George ; 3 and Andronicus III Palaeologos assassinated his 
brother when his father was dying. 4 

An order was issued from the battle-field of Kossova to 
the Kadi of Brusa, enjoining him to keep secret the death 
of Murad, and to appear to be occupied only with public 
rejoicing for the victory ( won from the Hungarians '. With 
this order, Bayezid forwarded the bodies of his father and 
brother for secret burial at Brusa. 5 

Agents of the Italian cities came to seek Bayezid after the 
battle to congratulate him, and to ask for the confirmation 
of the commercial privileges granted by Murad. Bayezid 
showed himself proud and distant. He declared that after 
he had conquered Hungary he would ride so far that he 
would come to Rome and there give his horse oats to eat 
upon the altar of St. Peter's. 6 A change of attitude towards 
Europe is strikingly revealed in this boast. Murad, in spite 
of crusades projected against him, had been careful not to 
draw upon himself the attention, much less the ill-will, of 
the western Christian princes. He was aggressive, but never 
any more so than he needed to be for the moment at hand : 

1 Hammer, iii. 302-4. Rambaud, Hisioire generate, iii. 831, is mistaken 
in attributing this law to Bayezid. 

2 Ruled 1350 to 1369. 3 In 1330. Panaretos, p. 7. 

4 In 1320 at Salonika : Greg., VII. 13, p. 271. 

5 Month of Shaban, a.h. 791 : MS. turc, Bibl. Nat., Paris, No. 79, 
pp. 35, 40. Cf. Langles, in Notices et Extraits, v. 672. 

6 Froissart, IV. c. 47, in Kervyn ed., xv. 216-17. Froissart calls Bayezid 
' Amorath-Baquin confusing him with Murad. See below, p. 213, n, 2. 



182 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and lie was never aggressively Mohammedan. Bayezid, 
from the very beginning of his reign, took no pains to conceal 
his enmity to Christendom, and his desire to pose as the 
champion of Islam. He sought alliances with the Sultan 
of Egypt 1 and other Moslem rulers, and placed the utmost 
importance upon the extension of Ottoman sovereignty in 
Asia Minor. 

II 

After the bloodthirst of Kossova had been satisfied and 
his father's death avenged, Bayezid was eager to enter into 
friendly relations with Stephen Bulcovitz. son and hen of 
Lazar. He felt that the Serbians had learned their lesson, 
and that they would be more helpful to liim as allies than as 
crushed and sullen foes. He needed their aid in the Anatolian 
campaign which he was contemplating, and they were essen- 
tial to the safety of his European possessions as a buffer 
against the Hungarians, who he knew would take the oppor- 
tunity of his absence in Asia to move down the Danube. So 
he treated Stephen and the surviving Serbians with great 
kindness. Stephen received all the privileges that had 
belonged to his father. 2 The Serbians were assured of an 
equitable share of the booty in the campaigns in which they 
would engage. On the other hand. Stephen agreed to allow 
Bayezid an annual tribute,, secured by the revenues of the 
silver mines, to command a contingent in person in the 
Ottoman army, and to give his sister to the Ottoman emir. 3 
Kossova was forgiven on both sides. 

Bayezid took Despina, daughter of Lazar. as wife by a 
formal marriage act. which was read in the mosque of Aladja 

1 Abul Yussif ibn Taghry. Elmanhal Essafy, Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds 
arabe, Xo. 718, ii, fol. 70. 

2 Vuk Brankovitch, as the reward of his treason, received half of Lazars 
inheritance, however, with Pristina as capital. His family continued as 
Ottoman vassals, with varying fortunes, for a hundred years. 

3 Ducas, 4. p. 6. 



BAYEZID 



183 



Hissar, near Krutchevatz, at the foot of Mount Iastrebatz, 
twenty miles north-west of Nish. 1 This was the last marriage 
ever contracted by a sovereign of the house of Osman. 2 
It sealed an alliance that proved very advantageous to 
Bayezid. Throughout his life he was devoted to Despina, 
and his brother-in-law Stephen in turn was a devoted and 
steadfast friend. The Serbians were faithful allies to the 
Osmanlis, and fought with them at Xicopolis and Angora. 
On his side, Bayezid kept the allegiance of the Serbians by 
giving them opportunities for winning booty in the raids 
against the Albanians, Dalmatians, and Hungarians, and by 
favouring the Orthodox Church. AYhen we see how com- 
placently and cheerfully the Serbians — except the poets — 
took upon themselves the Ottoman yoke, we must believe 
that Kossova was regarded as a terrible calamity only by 
the generations of after centuries, who found the Ottoman 
rule harder than it had been for their ancestors. 

Bayezid placed a strong Ottoman colony in Uskub, and 
settled Moslems in the country between Uskub and Nish. 3 
There were probably many also who saw that conversion 
was to their advantage. However that may be, Bayezid 
never had any trouble from the Serbians during his reign. 

Stephen Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia, did not consider Kossova 
a defeat. Seeing that his great enemy Murad and his great 
rival Lazar had found death on the battle-field, and that the 

1 Kantitz, Serbien, pp. 254 f . 

2 Busbequius was informed at Constantinople that marriage had been 
abolished in the Ottoman royal family because Bayezid took to heart 
the disgrace of Despina by Timur. But Ricaut, p. 296, thinks that it 
was because of dowry expense and the desire of the Ottoman sovereigns 
to keep free from family alliances. Xaturally, the difference of religion 
in time prevented the Osmanlis from finding brides for their sovereigns 
among the European royal families. If they married among their subjects, 
there was always fear of intrigues in the wife's family. At a time when 
family alliances meant so much in Europe, the Ottoman Empire suffered 
greatly from this disability. 

3 Seadeddin, i. 158. 



184 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Osmanlis did not follow up their victory, this view-point was 
natural. After Kossova, Tvrtko increased in power and 
prestige. He called himself king of Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, 
and Dalmatia. Like Stephen Dushan, he was planning ' for 
great things ' when he died in March, 1391, after a reign of 
thirty-eight years. 1 

Shortly before his death, Tvrtko had successfully resisted 
an Ottoman invasion with the help of a Hungarian army 
sent to him by Sigismund. His successor, Stephen Dabitcha, 
however, departed from this wise policy. He quarrelled 
with the Hungarians, and played into Bayezid's hand by 
opposing Sigismund in his final effort to stem the tide of 
Ottoman invasion. The Bosnians paid to the full the penalty 
of their king's folly. In 1398, Bosnia was invaded by a 
great army of Osmanlis and Serbians, who ' destroyed almost 
all the country and led away the people into slavery \ 2 In 
spite of the sweeping assertion of the chronicler, this must 
have been only a raid. For, from 1398 to 1415, the Bosnians, 
still independent, were fighting with Ragusa and Hun- 
gary. In 1415, they voluntarily allied themselves with the 
Osmanlis, and repeated the same old story of the other 
Balkan races. Mohammed I was called in to help them 
against the Hungarians. 3 The Osmanlis came, and they 
remained. 

Ill 

In the second year of his reign, after he had arranged 
a suitable status quo with the Serbians of upper Macedonia, 
Bayezid began that policy of aggrandizement in Asia Minor 
which led finally to his downfall. His first encroachment 

1 Klai<f, p. 248. I think Romanin, iii. 331, has confused Stephen 
Bulcovitch with Stephen Tvrtko. For it is difficult to understand what 
he means by the ' pace vergognosa ' with Venice. 

2 Old Servian chronicle, quoted by Klaic\ p. 271 : ' quasi totaliter 
destruxerunt Bosniam et populum abduxerunt.' 

3 Klaic, pp. 324-5. 



BAYEZID 



185 



was against Isa bey of Aidin. Isa was too weak to oppose 
Bayezid single-handed. Instead of seeking to ally the inde- 
pendent emirs against the Osmanlis, Isa thought he could 
save himself with less risk by becoming a vassal of Bayezid. 
He was compelled to give up Ayasoluk, and make Tyra 
his capital. Bayezid almost immediately broke faith with 
Isa, and exiled him to Brusa or Nicaea, where he died. 1 His 
two sons, Isa and Omar, managed to escape to the court of 
Timur, who was rapidly becoming the most powerful Moslem 
ruler in Asia. 

The occupation of Ephesus aroused momentarily Bayezid 's 
ambition to take possession of Smyrna. In 1391, he did in 
fact make some efforts to overpower the garrison, which was 
greatly weakened by pestilence. 2 Later he occupied the 
passes around Smyrna to prevent the entrance of provisions. 3 
But Smyrna, like Constantinople, could not be starved out 
so long as the Osmanlis were not masters of the sea. Bayezid 

| never pressed this mild form of siege to a definite assault. 
His hands were too full elsewhere. An unsuccessful assault 
against Smyrna would have destroyed his prestige in the 
new territory of Aidin, which was not any too securely his 
by the suppression of its ruling family. Perhaps, also, he 

I realized that Smyrna, more than any other place in the 
Levant except Rhodes, had become the city of promise to the 
Roman Church. He did not want to stir up an active resis- 
tance on the part of the chevaliers of Rhodes, for they might 
easily be induced to lend aid to the emirs whom he was 
destroying. 

Sarukhan and Menteshe, during the reign of Murad, had 

lost the most virile element of their population in corsair 

■ 

1 Accounts differ as to the place. There is some doubt as to whether 
the independence of Aidin was totally destroyed before the restoration 

| of Isa's sons by Timur. Cf. Schlumberger, p. 484 ; Mas-Latrie, Tresor 
de Chronologie, col. 1800. Hammer, i. 300, cites no authorities for his 
statements about this usurpation. 

2 Bosio, ii. 143. 3 Ibid., ii. 148. 



186 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



expeditions. The Turks of whom one reads as the roving 
and raiding adventurers in the Aegaean and Mediterranean 
during the fourteenth century were largely from these 
emirates. Decades of outgo without a corresponding in- 
come in fighting men so depleted the maritime emirates that 
they were not in a position to withstand Bayezid as they had 
done his father and grandfather. Their population was sea- 
faring, and their princes were traders rather than warriors. 
When the armies of Bayezid invaded Sarukhan and Menteshe, 
the two emirs attempted no resistance. They took refuge 
with Bayezid, emir of Kastemuni, and abandoned their 
emirates to the Osmanlis. 1 

The result of the acquisition of Sarukhan, Aldin, and 
Menteshe was the immediate appearance of the Osmanlis 
upon the Aegaean Sea. This is the beginning of the Ottoman 
naval power, which did not, however, have any development 
during the reign of Bayezid. The first Ottoman naval ex- 
pedition started out in the late autumn of 1390. Sixty | 
vessels made a descent upon Chios, and devastated the 
island. Negropont (Euboea) and the coast of Attica suffered 
the ravages of the raiders. 2 Bayezid now forbade the ex- I 
portation of grain from Asia to Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, and 
Rhodes. But he was hardly yet in a position to enforce 
this embargo. 

The Christians of the Aegaean islands and of the eastern 
Mediterranean soon learned that a new design, which had 
before been lacking, animated the Turkish expeditions. It 
was the desire not so much for booty as for the permanent I 
possession of land. Everywhere they went, the Osmanlis 
went as settlers. They fought for homes and wives. 

In the south, Bayezid took Adalia, the last city of the! 

1 There is the same dearth of information about the details of the 
destruction of the power of the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe as there 
is about Aidin. Hammer says simply, ' Les principautes de S. et MJ I 
furent incorporees a 1' empire ottoman,' i. 300. He gives no authorities. 

2 Ducas, 13, p. 47. 



BAYEZID 



187 



emir of Tekke. It was in 1391 that the Osmanlis won this 
seaport, their first on the Mediterranean. If we except the 
southern ports of the Peloponnesus, a whole century passed 
before they added another on the Mediterranean. 

Following up the pretext furnished him by a complaint 
against Alaeddin from his vassal, the emir of Hamid, Bayezid 
determined to measure his forces against the Karamanlis. As 
had been the case in the previous similar expeditions under 
his father, four years before, Bayezid called out the levies 
of his European Christian vassals. Among those who re- 
sponded to the call was Manuel Palaeologos, who passed the 
winter of 1390-91 in the Ottoman camp at Angora. There 
he wrote his famous dialogues on the Christian religion, 
purporting to be discussions with a Moslem professor of 
theology. 1 

Bayezid invaded Karamania, and laid siege to Konia. 
Alaeddin, who had fled to the Taurus Mountains to escape 
being shut up in the city, saw soon that Konia could hold 
out against Bayezid for an indefinite period. The Ottoman 
emir was far from his base of supplies, and nervous about 
what was happening in Europe. So, when Alaeddin asked 
for terms of peace, Bayezid agreed to withdraw from Konia, 
if Alaeddin would formally cede to him the north-western 
corner of his dominions, including the cities of Akshei'r and 
Akserai, which were already in the hands of the Osmanlis. 2 
Bayezid left Timurtash as governor of the new acquisitions, 
and returned to Adrianople. 

1 Dialogi XXVI cum Persa quodam de Christianas religionis veritate, 
Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds grec, No. 1253 : partly printed in Notices et Extraits, 
vol. viii, 2 e partie, and in Migne, 156, pp. 111-74. In Notices et Extraits, 
loc. cit., C. B. Hase has given an interesting critical account of the dialogues, 
and the circumstances under which they were written. 

2 Seadeddin, i. 163. In Hammer, i. 301, in the sentence ' quoique, 
depuis la paix renouvelee avec lui par Orkhan, les deux nations eussent 
continuellement vecu dans des relations de sincere amitie', is not Murad 
meant instead of Orkhan ? 



188 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



While Bayezid was occupied in Bulgaria, in 1392, in his 
first defensive campaign against Sigismund, Alaeddin decided 
upon a supreme effort to wrest from Bayezid the hegemony 
of Asia Minor. He reoccupied the ceded cities, and attacked 
by surprise the Ottoman army in Kermian. Timurtash was 
taken prisoner. One column of the Karamanlis set out for 
Angora, and the other for Brusa. 

Bayezid earned for himself the nickname yildirim 
(thunderbolt) by the rapidity with which he transported 
his army into Anatolia. 1 Fresh from a victory over the 
Hungarians, supported by the trained and hardened soldiery 
of his Christian vassals, Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, and 
Wallachians, his sudden appearance at Brusa caused 
Alaeddin to try once more to treat with the rival who was 
rapidly becoming more powerful than himself. He released 
Timurtash, and suggested a return to the status quo of the 
previous year. 

Bayezid was not only convinced that a decisive struggle 
was now advisable : he was also quick to see that for the 
first time the advantage was all on the side of the Osmanlis. 
Instead of meeting the enemy in the heart of his own country, 
after a long journey across wind-swept plateaux where food 
was scarce, it was the enemy this time who had made the 
journey and was far from home. Defeated, there would be 
no retreat possible for Alaeddin. 

With characteristic celerity, Bayezid sent forward an army 
under Timurtash. Battle was joined in the plain of Ak Tchai 
(the white river). One cannot determine the exact location, 
but it was probably in Kermian not far from Kutayia, for 
that is where the two retreating columns of the Karamanlis 
would naturally have formed a junction. Alaeddin and his 
sons Ali and Mahommed were taken prisoners. When 
Alaeddin was brought before him, Timurtash could not 

1 Evliya effendi, ii. 21, tells how Bayezid passed seven times in one year 
from Anatolia to Wallachia. 



BAYEZID 



189 



restrain his anger until Bayezid arrived. He remembered 
only that the one defeat of his long and brilliant career 
had been administered by Alaeddin. Its disgrace, and 
his feeling towards the emir of Karamania, was in no way 
palliated by the fact that Alaeddin had voluntarily released 
him. Timurtash ordered the prisoner to be hanged. When 
Bayezid arrived, his brother-in-law was dead. He was over- 
joyed that his rival had been removed so conveniently, and 
without any responsibility falling upon himself. 

Karamania lay open before the invaders. The Osmanlis 
occupied Ak Serai, Konia, and Laranda. There was no 
organized resistance. But it is a curious disregard of facts 
to record, as most historians have done, 1 that the result 
of this campaign was the permanent incorporation of Kara- 
mania in the Ottoman Empire. 2 The battle of Ak Tchal 
had been decisive only to the extent that thereafter the 
Osmanlis, and not the Karamanlis, were to be the domi- 
nant race in Asia Minor. Konia and other eastern Kara- 
manian cities were occupied by the Osmanlis after the battle 
because their ruler had been killed and his sons taken into 
captivity. Had Alaeddin escaped from the field, he might 
have organized a successful resistance to the Ottoman in- 
vaders. Bayezid conquered Karamania by the battle of Ak 
Tchai no more than Napoleon conquered Prussia by Jena or 
von Moltke France by Sedan. To enter and occupy for 

1 In matters relating to the progress of Ottoman conquest in Asia 
Minor, French, German, and British writers have been content to repeat, 
without critical comment, what they have culled from Leunclavius or the 
translations of Seadeddin. In many cases, they have gone back no farther 
than Hammer, and have transcribed, often literally, Hammer's words. 
Hammer himself, in this early period of Ottoman history, in spite of 
his attainments as an orientalist, has relied mainly on Leunclavius, and 
on Bratutti's Italian translation of Seadeddin. 

2 ' La principaute fut pour toujours reunie a V empire,'' Hammer, i. 308. 
In speaking of this second campaign, Hammer starts by saying, ' Le prince 
de Karamanie avait de nouveau leve Vetendard de la revolte '. This is 

! hardly the expression to use for the action of an independent prince. 
Alaeddin had never made himself the vassal of the Ottoman emirs. 



190 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



a while the capital of a country does not mean that the 
country is ' incorporated ' in the domains of the successful 
invader. The immediate restoration of the Karamanian 
dynasty after the advent of Timur proves how superficial 
had been the Ottoman occupation. While they were no 
longer able to be a political factor in western Asia Minor, the 
Karamanlis continued until after the fall of Constantinople 
— for seventy years after the battle of Ak Tcha'i — to defy 
successfully the efforts of the Osmanlis to destroy their inde- 
pendence and amalgamate them. 1 

Burhaneddin, who had set up for himself a principality 
north-east of Karamania along the Halys River, which in- 
cluded Caesarea and Sivas, was the next rival on the east 
to be attacked. Burhaneddin is reported to have had 
twenty to thirty thousand followers. 2 This seems to be an 
exaggeration, for we read that he did not resist the Ottoman 
invasion. At the approach of Bayezid, he retired into the 
mountains of Armenia near Kharput. Here he was either 
killed by Kara Yuluk, founder of the famous White Sheep 
dynasty, or put to death by order of Bayezid. 3 His emirate 
was shared by Bayezid and Kara Yuluk, the Ottoman emir 
taking Tokat, Caesarea, and Sivas. There is no certainty 
as to the date of this expedition. From the events which 
followed, it most probably took place in 1395, the year before 
Nicopolis. 4 

1 Striking testimony to the later power of the Kararnanlis* is given by 
Bertrandon de la Broquiere, who visited the court of Ibrahim with the 
Cypriote ambassador in 1443 : cf. Schefer's edition of his voyage, pp. 108- 
20. See Appendix B below, where the relations of the Osmanlis with 
the emirates of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century are discussed 
in detail, with fuller citation of authorities. 

2 Howorth, iii. 749. 

3 Sherefeddin, iii. 256, who is the only contemporary, authority, says 
that Bayezid put him to death. This was one of the charges made 
by Timur against Bayezid. 

4 The earliest possible date could be 1393. Perhaps the Osmanlis first 
appeared near Sivas at this time. But Bayezid would hardly have under- 



BAYEZID 



191 



Kastaniuni, practically coterminous with the Roman 
province of Paphlagonia, stood between the Ottoman pos- 

| sessions and the Black Sea. In the campaign of 1393, 
Samsun and the cities of the interior between Samsun and 
Angora, were captured by the Osmanlis. When the Ottoman 
army advanced to attack Kastamuni, Bayezid offered to 
allow the emir to become his vassal, if he would surrender 
to him the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe. Whether the 

i lesser Bayezid was unwilling to violate the laws of hospi- 
tality, or put little faith in the promises of the conqueror 
after the fate which had overtaken the emir of Aidin, it is 
impossible to say. He and his guests fled to the court of 
Timur. The occupation of Sinope gave the Osmanlis an 
excellent port on the south coast of the Black Sea. 

Bayezid was now master of the greater part of Anatolia, 
but master only in name. He had not assimilated these 
conquests. As later events proved, the inhabitants of these 
territories were still loyal to their former rulers. 

IV 

After his return from the first Anatolian campaign, 
Bayezid ordered a general advance along the northern and 
north-western frontiers. One band invaded Bosnia, but 
did not make much headway. Three bands entered Hun- 
gary, and initiated the system of rapid raiding that in time 
reached as far as Germany, and made the ' Turks ' the night- 
mare of Slavic, Teutonic, and Italian Europe. The first 
| battle on Hungarian soil was fought at Nagy-Olosz, in 
, Syrmia, not far from Karlovitz, where three centuries later 
the Osmanlis signed the death-warrant of their WeltpolitiJc. 
The Danube was crossed also near Silistria. Before the 

( 

i taken so long and perilous an expedition before his position was secure 
in Karamania. Sherefeddin gives the more likely date 1395, while Ibn- 
Hedjir places the death of Burhaneddin in 1396. 



192 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



terrible akindjis could penetrate far into his country, the 
hospodar Mircea surrendered, or was made prisoner. After 
a short exile at Brusa, he regained his liberty by consenting 
to the payment of a tribute of three thousand ducats, thirty 
horses, and twenty falcons. 1 He agreed to help Bayezid 
against the Hungarians, who had long been asserting a 
sovereignty over Wallachia, and in return Bayezid promised 
to settle no Moslems and build no mosques north of the 
Danube. In the first Hungarian invasion, Bayezid received 
more valuable aid from the Wallachians than from his 
janissaries. There were no better fighters in the Balkan 
peninsula than these descendants of the soldiers of Trajan. 
The interference of Sigismund prevented an Ottoman in- 
vasion of Moldavia, whose hospodars remained altogether 
independent of the Osmanlis until the reign of Mohammed 
the Conqueror. 2 

When Louis of Hungary died, he left two daughters. The 
younger, Hedwig, was chosen as queen of Poland by the 
Polish nobles. Her marriage with Jagello of Lithuania, who 
was converted to Christianity and baptized under the name 
of Ladislas, definitely separated the crowns of Poland and 
Hungary, and had a far-reaching influence upon the subse- 
quent fortunes of the Osmanlis. The crown of Hungary 
fell to Mary, whose succession was questioned by Charles of 
Durazzo, king of Naples, the nearest male heir. His invasion 
of Dalmatia, in 1385, brought into Hungary Sigismund, 
second son of Charles IV of Luxemburg, the German 

1 So d'Ohsson fils, vii. 442, says, but gives date 1390. Hammer more 
correctly puts it in 1391. Xenopol, in his authoritative and carefully 
documented history, gives a little different account of Mircea's early 
relations with Bayezid, and attributes to Mircea a larger influence in the 
calculations of Murad than he deserves. But the exposition of Mircea's 
policy in relation to Poland, Hungary, and the Osmanlis, as given by 
Xenopol, cannot be overlooked or disregarded by the student of this 
period. 

2 ' Pierre Aron fut le premier des hospodars qui paya un tribut aux 
Turcs ' : Costin's Hist, de la Moldavie, p. 367, in Notices et Extraits, vol. xi. 



BAYEZID 



193 



Emperor. For Sigismund was betrothed to Mary, but had 
been slow to take upon himself the role of bridegroom, owing 
to his disappointment over Hedwig's election by the Poles. 
Now he entered into the struggle for the Hungarian crown. 
In 1387, it was placed upon his head. The union between 
Poland and Hungary was broken, but the fortunes of Hun- 
gary jind Bohemia, to which throne Sigismund succeeded by 
blood, were joined in a way that has never been broken to 
the present time. The outside connexions of the new Hun- 
garian king were a most important factor in the growth of 
the Ottoman Empire. A strong and vigorous king, whose 
sole interest lay in the crown of Hungary, might have pre- 
vented the spread of the Osmanlis. In fact, after Bayezid's 
death, he might easily have destroyed the Ottoman power 
in Europe. But Sigismund, called in 1411 to the larger role 
of Holy Roman Emperor, became engrossed in the Hussite 
controversy and the Church councils to end the great 
schism. While retaining the crown of Hungary, he allowed 
the Osmanlis to make the preparations which were to end 
in the Moslem subjugation, of that kingdom. 

In the early days, when Sigismund 's interests lay in his 
newly-acquired Hungarian crown, he was alive to the 
menace of the Osmanlis. He sent a message to Bayezid, 
demanding by what right he was interfering with Bulgaria, 
which was a country under Hungarian protection. Bayezid 
made no response to the address of the king's ambassador. 
He merely pointed to the weapons hanging in his tent, 
and gave a sign that the audience was over. 

Sigismund understood, and accepted the challenge. In 
1392, he invaded Bulgaria, won an initial battle from the 
Osmanlis, who would have been annihilated had it not been 
for their new allies, the Wallachians, and, after a long 
siege, took Nicopolis on the Danube. 1 By this time Bayezid 

1 Phr., I. 13-14, pp. 58-9, and 26, p. 82 ; Bonfinius, iii. 2 ; Chron. 
Anon, de St.- Denis ; Chron. of Drechsler ; Campana, fol. 8 (but gives 

1736 X 



194 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



was able to send a large army into Bulgaria. When 
Sigismund realized how numerous were the forces coining 
against him, he saw that his victory bade fair to be 
nothing more than the acquisition of a prison. Before the 
Osmanlis could surround him, he wisely abandoned Nicopolis. 
The retreat became a rout. 1 It was on the return from 
this expedition that Sigismund met Elisabeth Morsinay, 
in the county of Hunyadi. From their union was born 
the great champion, who, while his imperial father was 
engrossed in theological disputes and the complex interests 
of the empire, battled bravely against Mohammed I and 
Murad II. 

The expedition of 1392 demonstrated to Sigismund that 
Bayezid was a foe worthy of a European ruler, that he must 
be checked if Hungary were to be saved, and that the 
Hungarians could not again take the offensive against the 
Osmanlis without aid from western Europe. For the pre- 
tensions of Louis to the overlordship of the Balkan States, 
and the heartless propaganda of the Catholic faith, thinly 
disguising Louis's inordinate ambitions, had turned the 
Balkan peoples against Hungary and ' crusaders ' from the 
west. They chose rather to stand on the side of their 
Moslem enslavers. 

Sigismund's invasion of Bulgaria determined Bayezid to 
put an end to the arrangement concluded just before Kossova 
between Murad and Sisman. Bulgaria, like Thrace and 
Macedonia, was to be an integral part of the empire, and to 
become converted to Islam and ottomanized, in so far as I ] 
that was possible. For Sisman, who had re-established him- 
self in his old capital, was too uncertain an ally to be trusted i ti 

date 1393). Leuncl., Annates, p. 51, following Ottoman sources, speaks 
only of Sigismund's defeat. This earlier victory and' the disastrous 
retreat are mentioned also in several of the French chronicles which 
relate the expedition of 1396. 

1 Engel, Gesch. von Ungarn, ii. 368, who draws on all the earlier Hungarian 
authorities. 



BAYEZID 



195 



in the event of another Hungarian invasion. In the spring 
of 1393, an army under Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid's oldest 
son, to whom this was the first command, surrounded Tir- 
novo. The bulk of Soleiman's army was composed of 
Macedonian Christians and renegades of the first generation. 
In midsummer, 1 after a three months' siege, Tirnovo was 
taken by storm from the side of the old castle, which is still, 
in part, standing. 2 The inhabitants who escaped fire and 
sword were carried into captivity in Anatolia. Among them 
was the patriarch Euthymius. 3 

This was the end of the independence of Bulgaria and of 
the national church. The loss of the church was a more 
serious blow than the loss of independence. For the Bul- 
garian nationality suffered an eclipse of centuries. Under 
the laws of Mohammed the Conqueror for the ' self-govern- 
ment ' of the Christian elements of the empire, the Bulgarians 
were included in the Greek millet (nation). Enemy to every 
influence, every movement that tended to lessen its temporal 
power, the Greek patriarchate of Phanar never wearied in its 
endeavours, and never withheld its approval of the foulest 
means, to stamp out the Bulgarian national spirit. One 
cannot visit the old monastery of Rilo without realizing that 
the Bulgarian sufferings have been more acute from Christian 
priests than from Moslem governors. One cannot follow 
the trail of unending persecution in the mute witness of 
unchurched communities from Monastir to the Black Sea 
through Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia, and to the 
Danube, through Bulgarian Serbia and trans -Rhodopian 
Moesia, without sympathizing with the Bulgarian aspira- 
tions of 1913. and without comprehending the wild rage 

1 Russian source cited by Muralt, vol. ii, No. 10 n. 

2 Cf. Baedeker, Konst. und Kleinasien, 2. Aufl., p. 46. 

3 Jirecek, Gesch. der Bulgaren, pp. 347-9, gives Slavic sources for this 
date, and quotes Camblak's graphic description of the terrible sacking of 
the city, the massacre, and the destruction of the churches. 

N 2 



196 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and hatred that drove an ordinarily clear-headed and im- 
passive people into the second Balkan war. 1 

When Tirnovo fell, Sisman was not found in his palace. 
His fate was a mystery even when Schiltberger went through 
Bulgaria with the crusaders three years later. Schiltberger 
believed that he died in captivity. 2 His son, Alexander, 
became a Moslem to save his life, and was given the governor- 
ship of Samsun. 3 He was killed fighting under the Ottoman 
flag, in 1420, in the rebellion of Dede- Sultan. The royal 
family of Bulgaria had no other heirs. 

Silistria, Mcopolis, Widin, and the other Danube fortresses 
were strongly garrisoned and fortified. 4 By conversion and 
immigration the Moslem population was cultivated, and 
grew rapidly on this northern frontier of the empire. 

V 

The battle of Kossova did not immediately affect Con- 
stantinople. Bayezid was intent upon arranging the new 
status quo in Serbia. After he had assured himself that 
Sigismund was not ready to attack him, he passed over into 
Asia Minor. There he devoted all his energies to the 
destruction of the Turkish emirates. 

1 In Czech, the word jazyk signifies language as well as nation (cf. Lutzow, 
Life and Times of Master John Hus, p. 239). This illustrates the Slavic 
conception of nationality, and explains in a nutshell the Austro-Hungarian 
and Balkan problems. To the Slav, there can be no other test of nation- 
ality. The Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia, carried on through the 
church and the schools, has been the resurrection of the nation through 
the language. The Greeks have used the Orthodox Church to combat 
and stifle this movement. They claim as Greeks all members of the 
Orthodox Church, while the Bulgarians claim that Bulgarophones, even 
if not attached to the exarchate, belong to the Bulgarian nation. 

2 Schiltberger, Neumann ed., p. 65. On this question cf. Jirecek, op. cit., 
pp. 350-2 ; Miller, p. 189 ; and illuminating note of Rambaud, in Hist, 
generate, iii. 832 ri. Also p. 143 of this book and accompanying foot-note. 

3 Schiltberger, op. et loc. cit. 

4 These cities, or rather, their fortresses, were captured and evacuated 
several times by the Osmanlis, especially Widin. 



BAYEZID 



197 



The old family feud of the Palaeologi continued. 1 In April 
1390, John, the son of Andronicus, entered Constantinople, 
and set himself up as emperor in opposition to his grand- 
father and uncle. But upon Manuel's return from Asia in 
September, he was compelled to flee. 2 The obligations of 
Manuel as Ottoman vassal were stronger than the exigencies 
of his precarious position at Constantinople. Although his 
father was in an enfeebled condition and the danger of a 
return of his nephew was very real, Manuel left again in 
November to follow Bayezid in the war against Karamania. 

We have a striking record from Manuel's own pen of his 
humiliation. Proper food was too dear for the purse of the 
heir of Constantine the Great. He was on the verge of 
starvation. In sharp contrast to his own wretchedness, he 
describes the barbaric splendour of the court of Bayezid, and 
the feasting in which he was too insignificant to have a share. 
The Osmanlis treated him with studied insolence and con- 
tempt. 3 

While Bayezid was in Karamania, the old emperor re- 
paired the walls of his capital. Churches were torn down 
in order to rebuild the towers on either side of the Golden 

1 Hammer, at the beginning of the reign of Bayezid, i. 295-7, relates 
the history of the quarrel between Andronicus and his father and Manuel, 
the rescue from the Tower of Anemas, &c, as if these events happened 
in 1389 and 1390, and gives the capture of Philadelphia for 1391. He 
has been led astray here by the story of Ducas, and by the fact that the 
Byzantine historians speak of Bayezid instead of Murad in connexion with 
the negotiations for restoration. By the internal evidence in the Byzantine 
historians themselves, the chronology of this period cannot be decided. 
But, by reading Phrantzes and Chalcocondylas in the light of Quirino, the 
continuation of Dandolo, and the archives of the colony of Pera, and also 
by piecing out the length of time of these events and matching them with 
Bayezid' s occupations during the first two years of his reign, it is not 
difficult to decide to place the Andronicus versus John and Manuel struggles 
just before the Chioggia war. At any rate, Andronicus died ten years 
before the date Hammer gives to these events ! 

2 Poem cited by Muralt, ii. 738, No. 1. 

3 MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds grec, No. 1253, fol. 198 v°. 



198 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Gate. They were given an ornate appearance to disguise 
the purpose of their having been repaired. Bayezid, in- 
formed through his couriers, sent word to John that the 
towers must be rased without delay, or Manuel would lose 
his eyes. The old emperor made haste to obey. Before the 
demolition was finished, he died in the arms of Eudoxia 
Comnena, whom he had taken for his mistress after having 
asked her hand for his son. Gout and debauchery rather 
than grief and humiliation ended his ignoble life ; for he 
was only sixty-one, and, like his father and grandfather, had 
never opposed the Osmanlis with enough energy to under- 
mine his constitution. 1 

When Manuel, in the spring of 1391, returned to Brusa, 
he learned of his father's death, and of the threat that had 
been made concerning himself. Escaping in the night, he 
fled to Constantinople. 

An ultimatum soon followed from Bayezid. Beyond the 
acknowledgement of vassalage and the payment of an in- 
creased tribute, Bayezid demanded the establishment of 
a kadi in Constantinople to judge the Moslem inhabi- 
tants. Upon the heels of his messenger came the Ottoman 
army. The Greeks of southern Thrace who had remained 
Christian were exterminated or carried off into slavery in 
Asia. Like locusts, the Osmanlis swarmed in all directions, 
and no village missed their notice up to the very walls of 
Constantinople. 2 The first Ottoman siege of Constantinople 
began. 

The close investment of the city ended after seven months. 
Bayezid, needing his army in Bulgaria to oppose Sigismund, 
consented to lift the siege on still harder conditions than had 
first been imposed. Manuel authorized the establishment 

1 John V Palaeologos was of those who, in the words of Bernino (p. 9), 
' consumavasi vanamente il tempo piu in dolersi delle calamita che in 
repararle '. 

2 Ducas, 13, pp. 25-49 passim ; Chalc., II, pp. 66, 81-2. 



BAYEZID 



199 



of a Mohammedan tribunal in the Sirkedji quarter, and to 
give seven hundred houses within the city walls to Moslem 
settlers. Half of Galata, from the Genoese Tower to the 
Sweet Waters, was ceded to Bayezid, who placed there a 
garrison of six thousand. The tribute was once more in- 
creased, and the Ottoman treasury was allowed a tithe on the 
vineyards and vegetable gardens outside of the city. 1 From 
the minarets of two mosques, the call to prayer echoed over 
the imperial city, which, from this time, began to be called 
by the Osmanlis Istambul. 2 This was the city of promise. 

From 1391 until the advent of Timur, Constantinople was 
blockaded on the land side. 3 The Galata garrison and the 
posts at Kutchuk and Buyuk Tchekmedje were always alert 
to bully and harass travellers and provision sellers. 

The Grand Vizier, Ali pasha, used the grandson and name- 
sake of John V Palaeologos to make trouble for Manuel. 
It was in his blood to become the willing tool of the Osmanlis. 
In 1393, Ali pasha tried to get the inhabitants of the city 

1 Evliya effendi, i. 29-30 ; ii. 21, who repeats the persistent Ottoman 
tradition of his day, that is also found in Hadji Khalfa and Nazmi Zade. 
Cf. the Genoese accounts of Pera in Jorga's scholarly Notes a servir, &c. 
i. 42. According to Schefer, in his edition of Bertrandon de la Broquiere, 
p. 165, there was a provision that slaves escaping to Constantinople should 
be given back, but we cannot be sure that this stipulation was made under 
Bayezid I. The date of the installation of the cadi, &c, is open to question. 
Some authorities place it after Nicopolis. 

2 Shehabeddin, fol. 72 r°, writes Istanbul ; Sherefeddin, iv. 37, is tran- 
scribed by Petits de la Croix Istanbol ; Arabshah, p. 124, transcribed by 
Vattier Estanbol. Wylie, i. 156, n. 2, gives the time-worn popular deriva- 
tion from els rt)v noXiv ; also Telfer, in his edition of Schiltberger, p. 119. 
Why go so far afield ? Istambul is a natural contraction of Constantinople. 
As the Greeks pronounced this long word, the syllables stan and jpol bore 
the stress, and were naturally put together for a shortened form. As for 
the initial. I, which has troubled the philologists, its explanation is easy 
to one who knows the Osmanlis. They cannot to this day pronounce an 
initial St without putting I before it. 

3 Neshri, trans. Noldeke, ZDMG., xv. 345 ; Seadeddin, i. 189 ; 
Saguntinus, p. 187 ; Drechsler, p. 228, says : ' octo annos vexatur et 
obsidetur.' 



200 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



to depose Manuel in order that John, as heir of the older son 
of the late emperor, might take the place which was right- 
fully his. 1 Two years later John actually attacked the city 
with Ottoman troops, but was repulsed. 2 

The overtures of Manuel for aid and money from Christian 
princes were received with little enthusiasm. On account of 
the schism in the Latin Church, Manuel could look for no 
papal support. Venice refused his offer to sell Lemnos. 3 
The time had passed when the Senate set even the slightest 
monetary value upon a Byzantine deed of sale to an Aegaean 
island. 

In 1395, at Serres, Bayezid held his first court as heir of 
the Caesars. He summoned before him Manuel and Theo- 
dore and John, the son of Andronicus. Theodore, who had 
been ruling in the Morea (Peloponnesus), sole remaining 
Byzantine theme, was charged with having encroached upon 
the rights of the lord of Monembasia. The few remaining 
Serbian princes were also present. Bayezid contemplated 
ridding himself altogether of the Byzantine imperial family. 
In fact, he ordered the death of all the Palaeologi. Ali pasha 
succeeded in putting off the execution long enough for 
Bayezid to change his mind. The sentence was revoked, 
but warning was given by cutting off the hands and putting 
out the eyes of several Byzantine dignitaries. The Palaeo- 
logi, and Constantinople, had been saved only by the inter- 
vention of a creature of Bayezid's, who did not want to see 
the imperial family perish and the imperial city fall because 
these ghosts of princes were a source of revenue to him ! 

The peril at Serres had been so real that the Byzantine 

and Serbian princes plotted immediately to throw off the 

Ottoman yoke, and swore to each other that they would 

never again answer a summons from Bayezid. The compact 

was sealed by the marriage of Irene, daughter of Constantine 

1 Due, 13, p. 50. 2 Muralt, ii. 753, No. 29. 

3 Seer. Cons. Bog., Ill, E 84. 



BAYEZID 



201 



Dragash, to Manuel. 1 But Dragash died shortly after the 
marriage, 2 and Vuk Brankovitch died three years later. 3 
They were the last of the Serbians of Dushan's following in 
Macedonia. The disaster of Nicopolis soon crushed the hopes 
of the conspirators. 

VI 

Urban VI, the first Roman pope of the Great Schism, did 
practically nothing against the Osmanlis. He sent , in 1388, 
two armed galleys for the defence of Constantinople, and 
issued letters broadcast promising indulgences to all who 
would take part in a crusade. 4 But he did not work for a 
league of the states which recognized him. His successor, 
Boniface IX, whose reign covered the same period as that 
of Bayezid, was too occupied in combating the Angevin 
party in Naples, and in trying to preserve intact the papal 
states and cities, to pay much attention to the Ottoman 
menace. 

In 1391, Boniface urged George Stracimir, who called him- 
self king of Rascia (Serbia), to conquer Durazzo from the 
' schismatics and commanded the Catholic archbishop of 
Antivari to prevent the Christians of Macedonia and Dal- 
matia from allying themselves with the Osmanlis. 5 Idle 
words these were, revealing at once the short-sighted policy 

1 Chalc, II, pp. 80-1 ; Phr., I. 13, pp. 57-8 ; 26, p. 82. 

2 Miklositch, Acta Serbica, COIV. Hammer, i. 341, calls this Constantine 
' fils de Twarko ', meaning Stephen Tvrtko, I suppose. But I cannot find 
that the Bosnian king had such a son, or any reason, if he had, why this 
son should have been at Serres. 

3 Ibid., CCXXIII. For the later kings of the dynasty which Vuk 
founded, see Picot's careful article in Columna lui Traianu, new ser., 
Jan.-Feb. 1883, p. 64 f. 

4 Epp. cur., ii. 64. 

5 Epp. cur., ii. 103-4. Urban VI in 1387 had written a letter from 
Lucca inciting the Frankish princes to a war against ' schismatics ' in 
Achaia. 



202 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



of Boniface and his bigotry. For the Osmanlis, in the spring 
of 1393, were threatening Durazzo. 1 With warring Christian 
sects, their success was certain. 

In Greece the interference of the Latin popes was becoming 
more and more bitterly resented. Ecclesiastics and laymen 
alike resented proselytizing and the invariable introduction 
of a bargaining clause in every appeal for western aid. In 
March 1393, Dorotheus, metropolitan of Athens and exarch 
of Greece, who had been justly charged by the Duke of 
Athens with wanting to introduce into his duchy the 
Osmanlis, was a fugitive at Constantinople. Tried on the 
charge brought against him by the Duke, a synod of eight 
bishops acquitted him. 2 This action was indicative of the 
feeling throughout the Eastern Church, — better the Osmanlis 
than the Franks with their Catholic missionaries. Even the 
changed attitude of Bayezid towards Christianity did little 
to modify this sentiment. 

Although France was supporting the Avignon papacy, 
Boniface wrote in 1394 to Charles VI, asking him to help 
Sigismund or at least to allow his subjects to fight under 
the Hungarian standards. 3 In the course of the same 
year he twice ordered a crusade to be preached. 4 This was, 
however, rather an attempt to take under his wing, and give 
sanction to, a secular movement to help Hungary than 
an initiative which had originated the movement. For 
most of Sigismund 's allies were adherents of the other 
papacy. 

At Avignon, Benedict XIII, a Spaniard, mounted the 
throne in 1394. His influence with the Duke of Burgundy, 
who dominated the insane French king, was almost as 
negligible as that of his Roman rival. 

1 Seer. Cons. Rog., iii, E 74. 

2 Miklositch-Miiller, Acta Oraeea, CCCCXXXV. 

3 Chalc., II, p. 75 ; Due, 13, p. 73. 

4 Chalc, loc. cit. ; Epp. cur., ii. 300-1, 311; iii. 261. 



BAYEZID 



203 



Philippe de Mezieres, who had taken up the work of 
Marino Sanudo, and gave his life to the promotion of a 
crusade, left Cyprus in 1378, and settled in Paris, where he 
preached and wrote impassioned appeals to Christendom to 
rescue the Holy Sepulchre. His ' Order of the Passion 
which was to furnish a race of fighters against the Moslem 
holders of Jerusalem, had replaced the celibate vow of the 
earlier orders by a vow of marital fidelity, so that ' defenders 
of the Holy Sepulchre ' might be propagated, and trained 
from infancy for their mission. The whole idea of Philippe 
de Mezieres was an anachronism. The age of the crusades 
had passed. After 1390 the new order fell into oblivion. 1 
Like Marino Sanudo, Philippe de Mezieres had actually con- 
tributed to the aggrandizement of the Osmanlis ; for he 
turned the minds of those who were moved by his appeals 
from the real menace of Islam to a quixotic and wholly 
useless dream. The crusades had only emphasized the 
axiom of history that Syria, including Palestine, must be 
held either through Mesopotamia or through Egypt. 

Against the Osmanlis as against the Moslems of the Holy 
Land, the Church was no longer able to move Europe. The 
Nicopolis crusade was undertaken and carried through 
by secular agencies. It had neither religious motive nor 
religious backing. 

The interest of Hungary in checking the progress of Otto- 
man conquest was hardly second to that of Venice and 
Genoa. To the two Italian republics, who had not hesitated 
to stake their very existence a decade before upon the mastery 
of the Aegaean Sea and the free passage of the Dardanelles, 
one would suppose that the battle of Kossova would have 
been a salutary warning, and that they would have seen the 
necessity of opposing the Osmanlis to the full extent of their 

1 Cf. Jorga, in Bill, de VEcole des Chartes, 2 e serie, 110 e fascic. ; Molinier, 
MSS. de P. de Mezieres, in Arch, de VOrient Latin, i. 335-64 ; Del. Leroulx, 
i. 201-8. 



204 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



resources. The archives of these cities, however, during the 
entire reign of Bayezid, reveal a record of double-dealing 
and insincere diplomacy which was as futile and disastrous 
as it was shameful. 

Immediately upon hearing the news of Kossova, the 
Venetian Senate sent to Andrea Bembo, who had been 
negotiating with Murad, a letter instructing him as to the 
course he should follow in view of the death of Murad. He 
was to seek out the son who had survived, or, if both sons 
were alive, to be very cautious until one son had killed or 
defeated the other. In the meantime, he was to make over- 
tures to both, telling each one, without letting the other 
know, that the Senate ' had heard of the death of his father, 
and on that account had great sorrow. For we have always 
regarded him as a most particular friend, and we loved him 
and his state. Likewise we have heard of his happy eleva- 
tion to the power and lordship of his country, concerning 
which we have been very happy, because, in like manner as 
we have sincerely loved the father, we love and are disposed 
to love the son and his dominion, and to regard him as a 
particular friend.' Then Bembo was to speak of the com- 
mercial privileges desired by the Senate, and to disclaim 
the action of the Venetian admiral, Pietro Zeno, who had 
attacked the galleys of Murad. 1 

Immediately upon hearing which son had become the 
successor of Murad, the Senate sent Francesco Quirini to 
Bayezid with gifts to secure the renewal of the commercial 
treaty concluded several years before with Murad. Bayezid 

1 ' Nostra dominatio audiverat de morte ipsius dom. Morati, de qua 
maximam displicentiam habuerat, quia semper eum habuimus in singularis- 
simum amicum, et dilexirnus eum et statum suum. Similiter audivimus 
de felici creatione sua ad imperium et dominium ipsius patris sui, de quo 
nos fuerimus valde letati, quia sicut sincere dilexirnus patrem, ita diligimus 
et diligere dispositi sumus filium et suum dominium et habere ipsum in 
singularem amicum ' . . . &c. : Misti, xli. 24, reprinted in full in Ljubic, 
iv. 269-70. 



BAYEZID 



205 



readily offered to protect Venetian commerce, but he gave 
no guarantee. 1 

The appearance of the Osmanlis on the Aegaean Sea, 
and their sacking of Chios, Negropont, 2 and Attica, greatly 
alarmed the Senate. Fear was expressed for the safety of 
the Venetian fortresses in Negropont and Crete. 3 All garri- 
sons were ordered, provisioned, and reinforced. 4 In 1393, 
forgetting their sincere love for Bayezid, the Senate decided 
to treat with Sigismund for an offensive alliance against the 
Osmanlis. 5 So it cannot be believed that the Venetians did 
not see the growing danger. 

In September of the next year they responded favourably, 
although vaguely, to a letter in which Sigismund notified 
them that in the coming springtime he would £ go against 
the Turks to their loss and destruction'. 6 But when, in 
May 1396, a Hungarian embassy arrived in Venice to 
announce the readiness for a forward movement, and to 
secure the promised aid, Venice pledged herself only to the 
extent of four galleys, and that on condition that Rhodes, 
Chios, and Mytilene would co-operate with the Venetians. 7 
A high-sounding letter was sent to Tommaso Monicego, 
ordering him to move against the Osmanlis ' for the preser- 
vation of the city of Constantinople and for the honour of 
the republic \ 8 Too weak and too inexperienced to with- 
stand the hardened mariners of Italy, the Osmanlis dis- 
appeared from the sea for the moment. Their navy was 
only six years old, and could not yet match itself against 
the gJiiaours. Monicego fought no battle, for there was no 

1 Ibid., xlii. 58-9 ; the treaty is in Commem., viii. 150. Cf. Romanin, 
iii. 330. 

2 Euboea is called Negropont, the Peloponnesus Morea, Lesbos Mytilene, 
while Crete is frequently called Candia and Chios Scio, in mediaeval and 
modern times. 3 Misti, xlii. 55. 4 Ibid., xliii. 156. 

5 Seer. Cons. Rog., iii. E 81. 

6 ' Ire contra dictos Turchos ad damnum et destructionem suam ' : ibid., 
p. 94, cited in Ljubic, iv. 335-6. 7 Misti, Ixiv. 140. 8 Ibid., lxiv. 156. 



206 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



enemy to oppose him. But he made no effort to hinder the 
passage of the Osmanlis from Asia to Europe and from 
Europe to Asia. The sincerity of the naval co-operation 
in the Nicopolis crusade is open to the gravest suspicion. 1 

While the Senate was putting off Sigismund with assur- 
ances and promises that never materialized, they continued 
to treat with Bayezid and Manuel. In September 1394, 
the Osmanlis appeared in the Adriatic at the mouth of the 
Boyana, and seized Venetian subjects there. The danger to 
Durazzo was imminent, for the Osmanlis were now masters 
of the valley of the Drin. When the Senate deliberated on 
measures for securing the release of the prisoners and for 
the defence of Durazzo, they decided to make representa- 
tions rather than threats to Bayezid. 2 He naturally paid no 
attention to the Venetians. They did not intend to apply 
force, so he continued the subjugation of Albania and 
Greece. 

To Manuel the Senate wrote a letter in 1394, recommend- 
ing him ' to trust in God, to trust in the measures which 
the Christian princes would know how to take, to write to 
the pope and to these (the Christian princes), promoting a 
general alliance '. 3 But one finds in the deliberations of the 
Senate no speech or motion or letter from which one could 
infer that they themselves had any hope whatever of the 
efficacy of the procedure suggested to Manuel. In fact, 
within six months, in spite of the imminence of the Hun- 
garian offensive campaign that was to 4 drive the Turks 
out of Europe ', the Senate actually decided to send ambas- 

1 We must reject the statement of Morosini, MS. Wiener Bibl., fol. 135 r°, 
that Bayezid ' entered in arms in the Strait of Romania with so many 
galleys that one could not navigate in the strait and doubt the opinion 
that Monicego, with his forty-four Venetian and C4enoese galleys, had to 
force the Bosphorus, and contributed powerfully ' a la destrucion del dito 
Turcho '. 2 Misti, xliii. 29. 

3 Ibid., xliii. 5: 'confidasse in Dio, confidasse nei provedimenti che 
saprebbero a fare i principi christiani, scrivesse al Papa e a questi promo- 
vendo una lega generale '. 



BAYEZID 



207 



sadors to Bayezid to urge upon him the advisability of an 
accord with the Byzantine emperor. 1 It was only because 
the crusade of Sigismund was already launched, and they 
realized the uselessness of it, that they gave up this question- 
able demarche, and discussed measures for the safety of the 
Venetian fleet, and for preventing Constantinople from falling 
into Bayezid's hands without coming into any open rupture 
with the Osmanlis. 2 Did Venice, while ostensibly co-operat- 
ing with the crusaders, fear that a victory at Nicopolis would 
bring about the hegemony of Hungary in the Balkan 
peninsula, and secretly wish for the success of the Osmanlis ? 

As for Genoa, no other policy was considered than that 
of outbidding Venice for Bayezid's favour. Fulsome con- 
gratulations upon his succession were sent to Bayezid. In 
the autumn oi 1390, a Genoese embassy appeared at Adria- 
nople to remind Bayezid of the traditional friendship of the 
Consult a for his father and grandfather. Their assurances 
were backed up by valuable gifts. 3 While cultivating the 
friendship of the Osmanlis, the Consulta levied a compulsory 
tax upon all the communes where they could enforce their 
authority for the purpose of increasing the Genoese fleets in 
the Aegaean Sea and at Constantinople. 4 A watchful eye 
was kept on the Venetians and the Osmanlis. Neither 
Sigismund nor Manuel received real aid from Genoa. 

For the necessary outside support and assistance in the 

crusade which appeared to him indispensable for the safety 

of Hungary, Sigismund had to look elsewhere than to the 

divided papacy, and to the republics of Venice and Genoa. 

Whether Sigismund's fears of the ability of the Osmanlis to 

destroy Hungary were well founded is open to question. 

But there is no doubt that his activity prevented the capture 

of Constantinople in the early years of the reign of Bayezid. 

1 Ibid., xliv. 108. 2 Ibid., xliv. 128. 3 Belgrano, pp. 152-3. 
4 Lib. iurium, aim. 1392, fol. 474, in Turin archives, printed in Bibl. de 
VEcole des Chartes (1857), 4 e serie, iii. 451-2. 



208 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



VII 

As early as 1384, the French Court was aware of the re- 
markable progress of the Ottoman conquest. The character 
and ambitions of Murad were presented to the boy-king 
Charles VI in a striking way. He was told that Murad, in 
a dream, had seen Apollon, one of his false gods, who offered 
him a crown of gold before which were prostrated thirteen 
princes of the Occident. 1 This childhood impression was 
revived in 1391, when Charles was at the zenith of his eman- 
cipation under the Marmousets. He received an embassy 
of pilgrims from the Holy Land, who brought news of a 
defeat they had experienced while fighting with the King 
of Hungary ' against the Turks of Lamorat Baxin ' . When 
Charles asked them about the genealogy and antecedents of 
the prince, whose name they confused with that of his father, 
they knew nothing of him except that he was ' a vassal of 
the King of Persia '. 

But of his character and ambitions they made a statement 
which we are justified in quoting, because it throws light 
upon the notions prevailing in the minds of the French 
aristocracy who went to their death at Nicopolis. ' He was ', 
said the pilgrims, - a man of wisdom and discretion, who 
feared God according to the superstitious traditions of the 
Turks . . . humane towards the conquered, because he op- 
pressed them very little with exactions, and did hot expel 
them from their lands so long as they were willing to promise 
allegiance under an annual tribute, however small. He kept 
his promises, and permitted them to live under their own laws. 
. . . His seal was so respected in his army that whoever saw 
it fell upon his knees. He had interpreters and spies in 
Europe to instruct him about the kings and their policies. 



1 Religieux de St.-Denis, ed. Bellaguet, i. 319-21. 



BAYEZID 



209 



He told the pilgrims that he would come to France after he had 
finished with Austria' 1 

The chronicler from whom this report is taken added that 
Charles was much excited by this threat. He was anxious 
to make peace with England, in order that he could accept 
the challenge of Bayezid, and go to fight him in single com- 
bat at the head of his army. But Charles, in the following 
year, so completely lost his mental balance that he could no 
longer maintain any personal power, and fell under the 
influence of the princes of the lilies. But his sympathies 
remained steadfastly attached to every scheme for fighting 
the Osmanlis. 

In the spring of 1395, the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy, 
uncles of the king, who had for the moment all the power 
of the French crown in their hands, received at Lyons am- 
bassadors from Sigismund, who came to demand aid against 
the Osmanlis. Philip of Burgundy was greatly interested 

; in this mission. It is extremely improbable that he had any 
interest whatever in the Christians of the Balkan peninsula, 
the aggrandizement of Hungary, or even the preservation of 
Constantinople from Moslem sacrilege. But, since Flanders, 
Artois, and the county of Burgundy had come to him through 
his wife on the death of Louis le Male, Philip had begun to 
dream of establishing a new kingdom in Europe. It was the 
dream which was to plunge France into the most bitter of 
her civil wars, to call forth Jeanne d'Arc from the seclusion 
of Domremy, and end in the death of his great-grandson 
under the walls of Nancy. 

Philip had every reason in the world to aid the project of 
Sigismund. Apart from the fact that his immediate hold 
over the insane king, Charles VI, would be strengthened by 

l the absence from France of the energetic scions of noble 

1 Chronicorum Karoli Sexti, ed. Bellaguet, i. 709-11. The relations of 
the ambassadors of Sigismund with the Duke of Burgundy and with 
Charles VI are found in Religieux de Saint-Denis. 

1736 O 



210 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



families, who, if successful in the struggle against Bayezid, 
might push on to the Holy Land and find permanent 
interests — or a grave — there, Sigismund was well worth 
cultivating. The elder brother of the king of Hungary, 
Wenceslaus, was Roman emperor, but insecure in his posi- 
tion. At that very moment, Wenceslaus was negotiating 
with Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti to create him Duke of 
Milan in exchange for his support. 1 Galeazzo was the 
father-in-law of Louis of Orleans, younger brother of the 
French king, and Philip's formidable rival. The future of 
the Valois of Burgundy demanded an entente with the 
German imperial family. As this could not be concluded 
with Wenceslaus, and as Wenceslaus might at any moment 
be deposed, it was policy for Philip of Burgundy to come 
into close contact with Sigismund, whose future in Bohemia 
and in the empire Philip foresaw. At the very least, by 
lending aid to Sigismund, Philip had an excellent chance of 
getting Luxemburg, which was essential to the consolidation 
of the new Burgundy in the Netherlands. 

As earnest of the aid which would be forthcoming the 
following year, the Duke of Burgundy allowed the Comte 
d'Eu to proceed immediately to Hungary with some nobles 
and six hundred horsemen. 2 After the Hungarian envoys 
had gone through the formality of an audience with the king 
at Paris, they returned to Sigismund bearing a letter in which 
Philip promised substantial aid in cavaliers and mercenaries, 
under the command of his own elder son, Jean Valois, 
Comte de Nevers. 

1 On September 13, 1395, in the presence of ambassadors from all parts 
of Christendom, and also ' del gran Turco, del Re de' Tartari, del gran 
Soldano, del gran Tamerlano e di molti altri Principi infedeli e ribelli 
alia Fede Christiana who were treated like Christians and lodged at the 
expense of ' il Signore di Milano Galeazzo was solemnly raised to ducal 
rank and invested with the Duchy of Milan by Wenceslaus : Andrea 
Gataro, in Muratori, xvii, col. 820. 

2 Memoires de Madame de Lussan, iii. 5. 



BAYEZID 



211 



From England, the Netherlands, Savoy, Lombardy, and 
all parts of Germany, Sigismund received assurances that 
the cream of chivalry would flock to his standards, and that 
he could rely upon Europe to back him in the expedition 
which was to drive Bayezid out of Europe. 

VIII 

The crusade which ended in the disaster of Nicopolis is 
one of the most interesting events of the close of the Middle 
Ages, not only by reason of the historical importance of 
those who took part in it, but also because it was the last 
great international enterprise of feudal chivalry. It is the 
end of an epoch in the history of Europe. So widespread 
was the interest in Sigismund's call to arms against the 
Osmanlis that there came to meet him at Buda in the spring 
of 1396 not only the French volunteers, but also scions of 
noble families from England, Scotland, Flanders, Lombardy, 
Savoy, Bohemia, and all parts of Germany and Austria. The 
English war in Normandy had ceased, Milan was supreme in 
northern Italy, and for the moment there was peace in the 
Holy Roman Empire. It was a favourable time to attract 
adventurers to unknown lands. 

This expedition furnishes the most absorbing pages in the 
last portion of Froissart ; 1 it is mentioned in more or less 
detail in a number of other French, Italian, German, and 
Latin chronicles. Several participants have left graphic 
accounts of the gathering of the chevaliers, the march down 
the Danube, the battle and its aftermath of massacre, the 
captivity and ransom of the prisoners. The archives of 
Dijon and Lille tell the cost of the fitting out of the French 
contingent and of the ransom of the prisoners. For this 

1 The references to Froissart which follow are given from vol. xv of 
Kervyn de Lettenhove's edition, and the references to Schiltberger from 
the English translation in the Hakluyt Society series, vol. Iviii, unless 
otherwise specified. 

O 2 



212 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



crowning event in Bayezid's career, we have more source 
material than for any episode of Ottoman history until the 
fall of Constantinople. 1 

The French chevaliers numbered about a thousand. They 
were accompanied by six or seven thousand attendants and 
mercenaries. They gathered at Dijon, under the command 
of Jean de Nevers, the oldest son of Duke Philip of Burgundy, 
and grandson of King John, who had been captured in the 
battle of Poitiers. He was only twenty-two, and had just 
won his knighthood. The fact, though, that he was heir 
to Burgundy, and a prince of the royal blood, gave him the 
command. Philip charged the Sieur de Coucy, one of the 
boldest and most experienced warriors in France, to have 
an eye on the boy, and to guide the expedition with his 
counsel. 2 

Prominent among the French chevaliers were Philippe 
d'Artois, Constable of France, Henri and Philippe de Bar, 
cousins of the king, the Sieur de Coucy, Guillaume de la 
Tremouille, Jacques Bourbon de Vienne, admiral of France 
and prince of the royal blood, Boucicaut, marshal of France, 
the Sieur de Saint-Pol, and three Flemish princes who were 
the brothers of Jean de Nevers's mother. The heir to the 
duchy of Bavaria was anxious to join the French chevaliers, 
but was restrained by the wise words of Duke Albert : 
' William, since you have the desire to travel and go to 
Hungary and Turkey, and carry arms against people and 
countries which have never done anything to us, and you 
have no reason for going there, except the vainglory of this 
world, let John of Burgundy and our cousins of France do 

1 See the sources and references for Mcopolis grouped in the classified 
bibliography. Although the citations in the text of my narrative are 
mostly from Froissart and Schiltberger, all chronicles and contemporary 
sources available have been used in the preparation of this section, especially 
Bellaguet's edition of Religieux de Saint-Denis, ii. 425-30, 483-522 (Bella- 
guet's notes, however, on these sections are very disappointing). 

2 Froissart, pp. 218, 221, 223. 



BAYEZID 



213 



their enterprises, and you do yours, and go into Friesland 
and conquer our inheritance . . . and in doing this I shall 
help you.' 1 

The chevaliers travelled through Germany and Bohemia, 
and were hospitably received by the Duke of Austria. ' On 
the way they spoke of Amorath-Bacquin 2 and admired little 
his power.' When they reached ' a city called Buda, the 
king made them a great reception and good cheer, and 
indeed he ought to have done so, for they had come far to see 
him and bear arms for him'. 3 At Buda they found the 
other chevaliers who had responded to the invitation of 
Sigismund, among whom were the Bastard of Savoy, 4 
Frederick of Hohenzollern, grand prior of the Teutonic 
Order, Philibert de Naillac, grand master of Rhodes, with 
a contingent of chevaliers of Saint-John, the Elector Pala- 
tine, and John, Burgrave of Niirnberg, ancestor of the House 

1 Ibid., pp. 227-8, 230, 394-8. A complete list of the chevaliers, com- 
piled from sources, is found in Buchon, and, in much more complete and 
accurate form, in Delaville Leroulx, ii. 78-86. 

2 Froissart, and other earlier writers, have several ways of designating 
Bayezid. Froissart calls him Amorath-Baquin (p. 216), Amorath (p. 226), 
le roy Basaach, dit V Amourath-Bacquin (p. 230), F Amourath-Bacquin many 
times, and FAmourath three times in one paragraph (p. 311). Chroniclers 
and writers of the fifteenth century were continually confusing Bayezid 
with Murad (cf. Cuspianus, Secundinus, Sylvius Aeneas, Donado da Lezze, 
Paolo Giovio, et al. ). From the different ways Froissart designates Bayezid, 
it is very clear that he is not mixing him with Murad, but that by ' dit 
F Amourath-Bacquin ' he means ' V emir-pacha '. The fact that he uses 
the definite article so frequently and says several times ' FAmourath ' is 
proof positive of this. His transcription of the title emir, and that of 
many other western writers, led later historians to think the chroniclers 
meant Murad ! It is merely a coincidence that the words are so similar. 
Froissart, however, would be capable of mistaking Murad for Bayezid. 
On p. 216 he calls Sigismund Henry, and on p. 334 Louis ! Olivier de la 
Marche (ed. Beaune et d'Arbuthnot), i. 83-4, speaks twice of ' Lamourath- 
bahy '. Here, too, there is not a confusion of Murad and Bayezid. He, 
like Froissart, means to say ' Famiral-pacha '. On ' amiral ' for ' emir ' 
see above, p. 163, n. 2. 

3 Froissart, pp. 230-1, 242. 

4 Donado da Lezze, p. 9. 



214 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



of Brandenburg. 1 A scholarly biographer of Henry IV of 
England has recorded that he, as Count of Lancaster, was 
one of the participants in the Nicopolis expedition. 2 This 
error has found its way into one, at least, of our most reliable 
modern historians. 3 Although the successor of Richard II 
was not, as a matter of fact, at Mcopolis, 4 the blood of the 
Nicopolis crusaders is in the veins of the British royal house, 
as in that of practically every ruling family of Europe. 

Sigismund claimed to have been assured by Bayezid that 
the Osmanlis would invade Hungary in the spring of 1396. 
When there were no signs of an Ottoman invasion, the 
crusaders decided that, as Bayezid did not come to seek 
them, they had best take advantage of the summer months 
to go and find the arch-enemy of Christendom. 5 Arrange- 
ments had been made with Mircea, voievode of Wallachia, 
to break with the Osmanlis and join the coalition. Manuel, 
who had been invited to co-operate with the invaders, 
prepared secretly to declare against Bayezid. 6 

According to the chronicles, the invasion of Bulgaria was 
rather a picnic than a serious military operation. This was 

1 Leunclavius, Hist. Musul. Turc, preface, p. 14, speaks of how grateful 
Sigismund was later for the services rendered to him personally by the 
Burgrave in the Nicopolis campaign, and that the friendship formed then 
led to the later advancement of the house of Brandenburg. 

2 Wylie, i. 6, 158, quoting Ducas, 13, and Venetian State Papers (Brown), 
i. 85. Ducas knew nothing of Nicopolis, while the Venetian reference is 
based on a misapprehension. 

3 Lavisse, Histoire de France, iv. 311 : 'on l'avait vu a la bataille de 
Nicopoli sur les bords de la Baltique avec les chevaliers teutoniquesS 
Lavisse has evidently mixed up the Nicopolis expedition with the earlier 
Prussian one in which Henry did take part. His statement on the same 
page that Henry IV took part in the Boucicaut expedition is another 
error. 

4 Conclusive proof of the whereabouts of Henry in the summer of 1396 
is found in the letter ' escript . . . le xx e jour d'augst '. This letter is in 
Arch. Nat., Paris, J. 644 : 35 11 . For the expeditions in which Henry did 
take part, when he was Henry of Derby, see vol. lii of the Camden Society, 
edited by Lucy Toulmin Smith, London, 1894, 4to. 

5 Froissart, p. 244. 6 Phr., I. 14, p. 59 ; Bonfinius, III. 2. 



BAYEZID 



215 



true, at least, for the western chevaliers, who had brought 
with them wine and women in plenty. Their baggage con- 
tained all the luxuries to which they were accustomed at 
home. The French auxiliaries travelled from Buda to the 
Danube by way of Transylvania and Wallachia, crossing the 
Carpathians through the pass between Brasso (Karlstadt) 
and Sinaia. 

The Hungarians, following the Danube, spread out into 
Serbia, pillaging and murdering the inoffensive Christian 
population more thoroughly than Ottoman akindjis would 
have done. 1 In spite of a lack of opposition, they persisted 
in acting as if they were in the enemy's country. Widin 
surrendered without a struggle, and Orsova after five days. 2 
In September, the armies joined before the fortress of Mco- 
polis, whose surrender to the Osmanlis three years before 
had marked the disappearance of Bulgarian independence. 
They were destined to go no farther. 3 

For sixteen days Sigismund and his allies encamped in 
front of Nicopolis without giving assault. 4 They had no 

1 Engel, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 468. According to the authority 
who has made the most exhaustive study of the Nicopolis expedition, 
Sigismund disposed of 120,000 men in all, including the western allies : 
Kiss, in A Nikdpolyi ulkozet, p. 266. Kiss's estimate is corroborated by 
the Cronica Dolfina, which says that Sigismund had one hundred thou- 
sand men under arms in 1394. Sanuto quotes this in Muratori, xxii, 
col. 762. Cf. also Hungarian Nat. Archives, Dipl. 8201, 8212, 8214, 
8493, 8541. 

2 Schiltberger, p. 2. 

3 Bruun, in his Geographische Anmerkungen zum Reisebuch von Schilt- 
berger (Sitz.-Ber. k. Bay. Akademie, 1869, ii. 271), tried to prove that the 
battle was fought, not at Nicopolis on the Danube, but near the ancient 
Nicopolis of Trajan's foundation. But in his notes to the English transla- 
tion of Schilt., Hakluyt, lviii. 108-9, he assents to the contention which 
Kanitz makes in Donau-Bulgarien, ii. 58-70, that the battle was near 
Nicopolis-on-the-Danube. An examination of the chronicles corroborates 
Kanitz' s hypothesis over against the ingenuous argument of Jirecek. 
Some historians have been so unmindful of geographical considerations 
as to put the battle at the ancient Nicopolis ad Haemum, of which Ortellius, 
p. 225, speaks. 4 Schiltberger, p. 2. 



216 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



idea of the whereabouts of Bayezid. It was believed 
among the French (whose ignorance of geography and of 
distances equalled ours of modern times) that Bayezid 
was in Egypt, gathering a great army of all the Moslem 
world to oppose the triumphant march of the crusaders. 
One reads in Froissart that Bayezid was ' in Cairo in Baby- 
lonia [sic] with the sultan to get men ', that he left the 
sultan there and rallied his forces at Alexaudria and Damas- 
cus, that ' under the command and prayers of the khalif 
of Bagdad and Asia Minor ', whose mandate went forth ' to 
Persia, to Media, and to Tarsus ', Bayezid received a ' mass 
of Saracens and miscreants and that in his army were 
' people of Tartary, Persia, Media, Syria, Alexandria, and of 
many far-off countries of the miscreants \ 1 

Sigismund made a speech to the chevaliers from western 
and central Europe, in which he declared : ' Let him come 
or not come, in the summer which will return, if it pleases 
God, we shall get through the kingdom of Armenia and shall 
pass the Bras Saint-George and shall go into Syria and shall 
get from the Saracens the gates of Jaffa and Beirut and 
several other [cities] to go down into Syria, and we shall go 
to conquer the city of Jerusalem and all the Holy Land. 
And if the Sultan, with all the strength he can muster, comes 
before us, we shall fight him, and there will be no going away 
without the battle, in God's pleasure.' Froissart naively 
adds immediately after his report of this speech : ' But it 
turned out very much in another way.' 2 

It certainly did. Bayezid, who had been directing the 
siege of Constantinople, knew no more about the khalif and 
the sultan and the ' far-off countries of the miscreants ' 
than did Froissart. Neither he nor his ancestors had ever 
had dealings with the Moslem princes of Asia. Persians, 

1 Froissart, pp. 251, 262-3, 310, 329. ' Miscreant of course, in its 
original sense. 

2 Ibid., p. 310. 



BAYEZID 217 

e Saracens ' and Egyptians were lacking in his army. He 
gathered together his trained warriors, called upon his 
Christian vassals for their quotas, and set forth over the 
well-known route to the Danube. From several recent 
campaigns, he and his soldiers were thoroughly familiar with 
the country through which they passed, and in which the 
people were less afraid of him than they were of the Christians 
who had come to deliver them. When, after two weeks' 
march, he pitched his camp near Nicopolis, he was simply 
returning to a place where twice before the Ottoman arms 
had been victorious. 

Sigismund was dismayed at the prompt appearance of 
Bayezid with an army which was reported to him in numbers 
varying from one hundred and twenty thousand to two 
hundred thousand. In spite of his brave words to the 
chevaliers, Sigismund knew the worth of the Osmanlis as 
fighting-men, and that they could not be brushed aside by 
a few impetuous cavalry charges. So he begged Jean de 
Nevers and his companions to consult with him, and to 
formulate a definite plan of action. He suggested, and won 
over to this opinion the Sieur de Coucy, who was the most 
experienced warrior among the chevaliers, that a reconnais- 
sance be made first of all to determine Bayezid's position 
and intentions. Then, if Bayezid was actually moving to 
the attack, or on the point of moving, it would be the part 
«of wisdom for the westerners to allow the foot-soldiers of 
Hungary and the Wallachians to sustain the first attack. 
The valiant horsemen and western mercenaries should form 
a second line, whether it be in attack or defence. 

The chevaliers were furious at this suggestion. Philippe 
d'Artois, Comte d'Eu and Grand Constable of France, who 
knew Sigismund best from longer association with him, sus- 
pected him of an attempt to rob the chevaliers of the glory 
of defeating Bayezid. ' Yes, yes,' he cried, ' the king of 
Hungary wants to have the flower of the day and the honour. 



218 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



We have the advance-guard, and already has he given it to 
us. So he wants to take it away from us and have the first 
battle. Whoever believes in this, I shall not . ' Then turning 
to the chevalier who carried his banner, he called out, 
' Forward banner, in the name of God and of Saint George, 
for they will see me to-day a good chevalier '. 1 This action 
was contagious. Without knowing where the enemy was, 
without thinking where or how far they were going, without 
waiting to agree upon a concerted action with the bulk of 
their army, the French, German, and English noblemen 
rushed forward to make the last charge of European chivalry 
against the followers of Mohammed. 

The outposts of Bayezid, taken by surprise, were cut down. 
The Osmanlis who surrendered were massacred without 
mercy. Imagining that they were winning a great victory, 
and that they were breaking through the only obstacle 
between them and the Holy Sepulchre, the chevaliers rode 
to death and disgrace. In the picturesque language of Rabbi 
Joseph, ' they said " Aha ! aha ! But their joy was 
quickly gone, for the horsemen of Bayezid and his hosts and 
chariots came against them, in battle array, like the moon 
when she is new.' 2 

The chevaliers had put all their strength of man and 
horse into the charge. Their swords ran blood. They 
thought the day was theirs, when suddenly they found 
themselves confronting the army of Bayezid. As was his 
invariable custom, Bayezid had sent out to meet the attack 
of the chevaliers, when he heard that they had com- 

1 Ibid., pp. 311-17 ; Relig. de St.-Denis, pp. 490-7. Sckiltberger, p. 3, 
attributes this initiative to Jean de Nevers, whom, like many other writers 
on Nicopolis, he calls, by anticipation, Duke of Burgundy. Cf. Donado 
da Lezze, p. 9, who says : ' II signor Carlo, prima Duca di Borgogna.' 
Also Morosini, p. 6. Sigismund is frequently spoken of as German emperor 
at the time of Nicopolis. Cf. Chalc, ed. Migne, col. 76 : ^yovfxepuv liyi- 

(Tfxovvhov 'P(Ofj.aL(ov (SaaiXecdS T€ kcu avTOKparopos. 

2 Rabbi Joseph, i. 252, 



BAYEZID 



219 



menced the battle, his worthless untrained levies to be cut 
down by the enemy and exhaust their strength. With 
deliberation he drew his trusted divisions in battle array in 
an advantageous position, which he had ample time to choose. 
His soldiers were intact and fresh. The Ottoman bowmen 
aimed their arrows at the horses of the chevaliers. Un- 
horsed and quickly surrounded by sixty thousand soldiers, 
there was nothing for the proudest warriors in Europe to do 
but surrender to the foe whom they had despised. 

As far as the chevaliers were concerned, the battle was 
over in three hours. Jacques Bourbon, admiral of France, 
lay on the field with the banner of Notre-Dame clasped 
tightly in his hands. Guy de la Tremouille, Philippe de Bar, 
and others of the noblest blood of France, Flanders, Bavaria, 
and Savoy were killed in the charge. But the greater part 
of the high-born auxiliaries of Sigismund were prisoners in 
the camp of Bayezid. So handsomely were they accoutred 
that the Osmanlis believed them all to be princes of the 
Occident, and saved them for Bayezid to determine their 
fate. 1 

When Sigismund learned that the chevaliers had dis- 
regarded his advice, and had already ridden forth to find 
the army of Bayezid, he was greatly worried, for he knew 
the tactics of Bayezid, and feared the worst. He said to the 
grand master of Rhodes, ' We shall lose the day through the 
great pride and folly of these French : if they had only 
believed me, we had forces in plenty to fight our enemies '. 2 

From a comparison of the chronicles, one does not get 
a clear idea of what happened after the failure of the assault 
of the chevaliers. A battle in which the bulk of the forces 

1 Froissart, pp. 313-16 ; Relig. de St. -Denis, pp. 490 f. ; Rabbi Joseph, 
p. 253 ; Schiltberger, p. 3 ; Seadeddin, i. 184 ; Neshri, in ZDMG., 
xv. 345-8. Cf. authorities cited in Bibliography. 

2 Froissart, p. 317. Hermann de Cilly and the Burgrave of Nurnberg 
are said by some authorities to have thrown themselves in front of Sigis- 
mund, and to have saved him and carried him off to the boat. 



220 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



on either side were engaged undoubtedly followed. But it 
is impossible to state whether Sigismund followed up the 
way opened for him through the Ottoman lines by the 
French charge, or whether the Hungarians and their auxili- 
aries were on the defensive. Froissart and Morosini infer 
that Sigismund did not attempt to fight after the failure 
of the chevaliers, and it was believed in western Europe that 
the disaster of Mcopolis was due to the failure of Sigismund 
to support the chevaliers rather than to their own folly. 
The Hungarians and their king were bitterly denounced 
by the French survivors. 1 On the other hand, Schiltberger, 
who took part in the battle, declares that the king of Hun- 
gary was advancing in force, and that Bayezid was preparing 
to retreat, when the Osmanlis received sudden and sub- 
stantial support from the kral of Serbia. 2 

The Serbians were so completely under Ottoman control 
after the battle of Kossova, that they made no attempt to 
throw off the yoke of Bayezid. 3 In Asia Minor as in the 
Balkan peninsula, against the Karamanians and Tartars as 
against the crusaders, at Nicopolis as at Angora, the Serbian 
auxiliaries were faithful supporters of Bayezid. Nicopolis 
was certainly won with the aid of the Christians of the 
Balkan peninsula. It was not only the Serbian reinforce- 
ments which won the day for the Osmanlis. As soon as 

1 The bitterness against and contempt for the Hungarians is expressed 
in the following verses: 

' Nichopoly, cite de payennie, 
Au temps la ou li sieges fut grans, 
Fut delaisses par orgueil et folie ; 
Car les Hongres qui furent sur les champs 
Avec leur roy, fuitis et recreans, 
Leur roy meisme enmainent par puissance, 
Sans assembler.' 

(Euvres inedites d'Eustache des Champs, ed. Tarbe, 1849, 
i. 166. 

2 Schiltberger calls him ' der hertzog auss der Sirifey, der genant 
despot ' : Bill, des Lit. Vereins (Tubingen), clxxii. 4. 

3 Cf. Miller, in Story of Nations Series, pp. 290-1. 



BAYEZID 221 

Mircea of Walla chia saw how the battle was going, he 
quickly withdrew from the field, and got his forces across 

! the Danube before the panic started. 

Whether the action of Mircea was actuated by treasonable 
motives or not is open to debate. He may have honestly 
believed that it was a case of sauve qui pent. If so, his 
action was not more reprehensible than that of Sigismund 
himself. The future Holy Roman Emperor, who was to 
play so important a part in the history of Europe during the 
early decades of the fifteenth century, forgot his bold words 
of the previous week : ' And if the Sultan, with all the 
strength he can muster, comes before us, we shall fight him, 
and there will be no going away without the battle, in God's 
pleasure.' Sigismund and the grand master of Rhodes 
hurried to the Danube, got away in a small boat, 1 and 
boarded one of the galleys of Monicego, the Venetian 
admiral. Abandoning his army and his allies to their fate, 
the king of Hungary sailed for home. He had the shame, if 
he felt it at all, when passing through the Dardanelles, of 

j seeing the chevaliers and other prisoners of Nicopolis 
paraded before his eyes. One of these prisoners wrote : 

1 ' The Osmanlis took us out of the tower of Gallipoli, and led 

j us to the sea, and one after the other they abused the king 
of Hungary as he passed, and mocked him, and called to 

[ him to come out of the boat and deliver his people : and 
this they did to make fun of him, and skirmished a long time 
with each other on the sea. But they did not do him any 
harm, and so he went away.' 2 

Sigismund went to Modon, and then back to Hungary. 
This was the king who had boasted that he would not only 

1 Belonging to the grand master of Rhodes : Froissart, p. 317. But 
Morosirii, p. 15, and others, say that he went directly on board Monicego's 
galley. It is a pity that Hammer, in his description of the battle of 

! Nicopolis, relied so much on such an unreliable third- hand authority as 
Abbe Vertot. Skentklaray, A dunai hajdhadak tortenete, says that Jean de 

; Vienne commanded the galleys. 2 Schiltberger, p. 6. 



222 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



turn the Osmanlis out of Europe, but that he had enough 
lances to support the sky, should it fall upon his army. 1 
Although his manhood had been put to the test, and had 
been found wanting, he was saved to play a great, if un- 
enviable, part in the closing events of the Middle Ages. 2 

After Sigismund's escape, his great army, which was to 
redeem the Holy Sepulchre, fled before the Osmanlis. Those 
who were not killed, or drowned in the Danube, retreated 
through Wallachia. Froissart describes graphically the hard- 
ships of the French, German, English, Scotch, Bohemian, 
and Flemish crusaders in their painful march across the Car- 
pathian Mountains. The chevaliers could secure a bare sus- 
tenance. Their pages and men-at-arms were stripped of their 
clothes and beaten by the peasants. It was not until they 
got into western Hungary that they felt themselves safe. 3 

On the day following the battle of Mcopolis, Bayezid rode 
from his camp to inspect the battle-field. 4 Orders had been 
given that the bodies of the nobles who had fallen be put in 
a place apart from the common dead, so that the identity of 
those who had lost their lives might be ascertained. An 
especial search for the body of Sigismund was ordered. The 
Hungarian king was not among the captives : it did not 

1 Bonftnius, one of the earliest Hungarian historians, recorded that 
Sigismund had boasted that he would not only turn the Osmanlis out of 
Europe, but also that with the army under his command, if the sky fell, 
it could be held up on their lances : Decades, ii. 403. 

2 ' Sigismund was cruel and sensual, perjured and frivolous, rapacious 
and dissolute, fierce and pusillanimous, a byword and object of horror 
to the Bohemians, hated and despised by the Germans, a warning to all 
rulers. His companion, John XXIII, lewd and murderous, a simonist 
and an infidel, was a true comrade for Sigismund in all evil deeds ' : 
Dr. Flajshans, in Mistr Jan Hus : quotation translated by Count Liitzow, 
John Hus and his Times, pp. 137-8. 

3 Froissart, pp. 330-1. 

4 But not until he ' regracioit les dieux et les deesses selon la loy ou il 
creoit et que les paiens croient ' : Froissart, p. 321. The ignorance among 
the western chroniclers of everything pertaining to the Osmanlis — or the 
wider circle of Mohammedan peoples — was appalling. 



BAYEZID 



223 



occur to Bayezid that he had fled. When Bayezid saw how 
heavy had been his casualties, and learned the story of the 
massacre of prisoners by the chevaliers after they had ridden 
through the Ottoman outposts, he could not control his 
anger. A general massacre of the prisoners was ordered. 

Only because Bayezid hoped for a great ransom for the 
grandson of the French king was Jean de Nevers saved. 
There was in the suite of the Comte de Nevers a Picard 
chevalier who knew a little Turkish. Through him Jean 
was able to communicate with Bayezid, and to save twenty- 
four chevaliers who would bring heavy ransom. Among 
these were the Comte d'Eu, the Comte de la Marche, the 
Sieur de Coucy, Henri de Bar, and Boucicaut. But they 
were all forced to stand beside Bayezid and watch the 
massacre of their companions. 

Because of his youth, for none under twenty years was 
killed, Schiltberger was spared to leave a description of this 
terrible massacre. ' Then I saw the lord Hannsen Greiff, 
who was a noble of Bavaria, and four others, bound with the 
same cord. When he saw the great revenge that was taking 
place, he cried with a loud voice, and consoled the horse- 
and foot-soldiers who were standing there to die. " Stand 
firm ", he said, " when our blood this day is spilt for the 
Christian faith, and we by God's help shall become the 
children of Heaven." He knelt, and was beheaded together 
with his companions. Blood was spilled from morning until 
vespers, and when the king's counsellors saw that so much 
blood was spilled and that still it did not stop, they rose and 
fell upon their knees before the king, and entreated him for 
the sake of God that he would forget his rage, that he might 
not draw down upon himself the vengeance of God, as enough 
blood was already spilled. He consented, and ordered that 
I they should stop, and that the rest of the people should be 
brought together, and from them he took his share, and left 
the rest to his people who had made them prisoners. The 



224 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



people that were killed on that day were reckoned at ten 
thousand men.' 1 

So ended the last crusade. 

IX 

Immediately after the battle, Bayezid sent part of his 
army across the Danube to hunt down the fugitives and to 
punish Mircea. This force was defeated by the Wallachians 
in the plain of Rovine, and withdrew into Bulgaria. 2 

Other columns mounted the Danube through the Iron 
Gates, retaking on the way the fortresses captured by the 
crusaders, and made a raid into Styria. Everywhere the 
akindjis carried fire and death. The country was laid waste. 
Peterwardein was burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians 
were carried off into slavery in Macedonia and Anatolia. 3 

This invasion of Hungary made a deep impression upon 
the Slavic and Teutonic races, who believed that it was the 
beginning of a Moslem conquest of central Europe. The 
flagellants and the dancing processions of the plague days of 
1348 and 1359 were revived. For a moment, even the Vene- 
tian Senate feared that Bayezid had led in person his army 
into Hungary, and was engaged in an aggressive movement 
that might bring the Osmanlis to the head of the Adriatic. 4 

1 Schiltberger, p. 5. Cf. Froissart, pp. 322-8 ; Belig. de St. -Denis ; 
Chronique de Boucicaut ; Chronique des 4 premiers Valois, ed. Luce, p. 326 ; 
and the other chronicles and secondary authorities given in Bibliography. 

2 Xenopol, in Hist, generate, iii. 882, whose writings furnish the most 
reliable and most accessible data for Rumanian history, allows his patriot- 
ism to get the better of his judgement when he writes that this unimportant 
skirmish was a complete defeat inflicted upon Bayezid, and that ' le Sultan 
court jusqu'a Adrinople ' ! Xenopol makes no attempt to explain the 
battle of Nicopolis, and Mircea's action in and after the battle. 

3 Schiltberger, p. 6. Chalc, II, pp. 76-80, who exaggerates the raid 
to the point of saying that Bayezid reached the environs of Buda. 

4 Seer. Cons. Bog., iii. 134-5. Mem. d'Olivier de leb Marche (ed. Beaune 
et d'Arbuthnot), i. 199-200, reads as if Bayezid had actually taken posses- 
sion of Hungary. 



BAYEZID 



225 



But Bayezid was not carried away by the ease of his 
victory. He let well enough alone. For the moment, he 
had absorbing interests in the ransom of his prisoners, the 
developments in the Greek peninsula, the question of Con- 
stantinople, and the temptation to licentious pleasures that 
had come to him with success. 

X 

Bayezid announced his victory from the battle-field to the 
Kadi of Brusa, and later, from Adrianople, to the Moslem 
princes of Asia. 1 To the Sultan of Egypt and other rulers 
he sent gifts of prisoners to corroborate his letters. 2 

The intercession of Jean de Nevers had saved the more 
illustrious of the surviving French chevaliers. They were 
taken to Brusa. While not treated royally, they were 
allowed to hunt, and were given opportunities to see the 
grandeur of Bayezid. 3 But they were not kept together 
long. For some months, the heir to the Duchy of Burgundy 
was separated from his companions, and could talk with them 
only by the special permission of Bayezid. Some of them 
were sent to Mikhalitch, where Philippe d'Artois, grand 
marshal of France, died. 4 Enguerran de Coucy, worn out 
with anxiety for his family and the disgrace that had come 

1 MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, pp. 61 f. (collection of 
Feridun). For wrong date, see Langles, in Acad, des Inscriptions, iv. 673-4. 

2 Schiltberger, p. 7, who would have been chosen himself for Egypt 
but for the fact that he had been wounded. 

3 Froissart, p. 341 ; Rabbi Joseph, p. 254. 

4 Froissart, p. 345. In xvi. 40, Froissart makes a mistake in saying 
that the body of the Comte d'Eu was ' en ung sarcus rapporte en France 
et ensevely en l'eglise Saint-Laurent d'Eu, et la gist moult honnourable- 
ment '. The tomb in St. Laurent is merely a memorial. Philippe was 
buried in the chapel of a monastery in Galata, where, seven years later, 
Clavijo, fol. 17 v°, saw his burial-spot, but unmarked. His tomb is 
described by Bulladius, who saw it in 1647, in his notes to Bonn ed. of 
Ducas, p. 560. Cf. Mordtmann, Beitroge zur osmanischen Epigraphik, I, 
in ZDMG. (1911), lxv. 103. 

1736 p 



226 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



to him at the close of his brilliant career, soon followed the 
Comte d'Artois to the grave. 

In the meantime, Jacques Helly was sent by Bayezid to 
Paris to communicate to the Duke of Burgundy and the other 
relatives of the captives the conditions for their ransom — 
two hundred thousand pieces of gold, delivered to Bayezid 
at Brusa. Froissart describes the feeling aroused at Paris 
by the first news of the disaster. The stories of the survivors 
were not believed, and the bearers of bad news narrowly 
escaped hanging or drowning. An order of the king's 
council forbade any man to mention Nicopolis. The anxiety 
of the families of the chevaliers was not set at rest until 
Jacques Helly reached Paris on Christmas night, three 
months after the battle. Only then was it known who had 
been saved for ransom. What was joy to some was a 
crushing blow to others. Not since the battle of Poitiers had 
such a calamity come to the noble families of France. There 
was great lamentation throughout the kingdom. Chief 
among the mourners was the Duchess of Burgundy, who had 
lost her three brothers, and whose son was in the hands of 
Bayezid. 1 

While Jacques Helly was in France, Marshal Boucicaut was 
given permission to go to Constantinople to try to raise the 
ransom. He spent the Lenten season of 1397 there without 
success. 2 The Duke of Burgundy resorted to every expedient 
to raise the enormous sum demanded by Bayezid. For the 
ransom of his son 'great taxes were laid upon all the kingdom, 
and a large amount of money was gathered and transported 
to Turkey, which was a great and irreparable loss V 3 It 
was not forgotten for many years. A decade later it was 
used as one of the indictments against the Due d* Orleans, 

1 Froissart, xv. 329, 332, 342 f.. 355-8 ; xvi. 16. 

2 Godefroy, Hist, de Boucicaut (1620 ed.). i. 16 : Ducas. p. 52. 

3 Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet (ed. Douet d'Arcq), i. 332-3 ; 
Froissart, xvi. 57-9. 



BAYEZID 



227 



who met his death through the man he had helped to 
ransom. 1 

When, a year after the battle of Nicopolis, the money was 
at last delivered to Bayezid through the intermediation of 
Gattilusio of Mytilene and the Genoese, Venetian, and 
Cypriote merchants who traded with the Osmanlis, Bayezid 
gave the chevaliers their liberty. To the Comte de Nevers, 
he said : ' John, I know well and am informed that you are 
in your country a great lord. You are young, and, in the 
future, I hope you will be able to recover, with your courage, 
from the shame of this misfortune which has come to you 
in your first knightly enterprise, and that, in the desire of 
getting rid of the reproach and recovering your honour, you 
will assemble your power to come against me and give me 
battle. If I were afraid of that, and wanted to, before your 
release I would make you swear upon your faith and religion 
that you would never bear arms against me, nor those who 
are in your company here. But no : neither upon you nor 
any other of those here will I impose this oath, because I 
desire, when you will have returned to your home and will 
have leisure, that you assemble your power and come against 
me. You will find me always ready to meet you and your 
people on the field of battle. And what I say to you, you 
can say in like manner to those to whom you will have the 
pleasure of speaking about it, because for this purpose was 
I born, to carry arms and always to conquer what is ahead 
of me.' 2 

It is not true, however, as one would suppose and as 
Froissart records, that c these lofty words were always 

1 Jean de Nevers, as Due de Bourgogne and leader of the faction against 
the king's brother, openly accepted the responsibility of the assassination 
of the Due d' Orleans. This was the beginning of the Burgundy- Armagnac 
civil war, which delivered France to the English until Jeanne d' Arc appeared 
to awaken the French to a feeling of nationality. 

2 Froissart, xvi. 47. For ransom, ibid., pp. 37-8, and Rabbi Joseph, 
i. 254 ; also Livre desfaicts of Boucicaut, passim. 

P 2 



228 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



remembered by Jean de Nevers and his companions so long 
as they lived '. The French chevaliers went to Rhodes, and 
then home by way of the Adriatic. The Comte de Nevers 
took to himself a title which he had not earned, unless one 
confuses folly with valour. To the end of his days, he was 
known as Jean sans Peur. He never burned with a desire 
to wipe out the disgrace of Mcopolis, but spent his whole 
life as a factional leader in the civil wars of France. After 
a career which continued as ingloriously as it had begun, he 
was stabbed to death on the Bridge of Montereau in 1420 — 
tardy vengeance for his own openly acknowledged instigation 
of the murder of the Due d' Orleans. 

XI 

There is recorded the capture of Thebes by the Turks 
in 1363, 1 and the surrender of Patras in Thessaly to the 
Osmanlis in 1381. 2 The first Ottoman army, however, 
to enter Greece went to the Morea in 1388, upon the 
invitation of Theodore Palaeologos, to support his waning 
power as despot against the indigenous Greeks and the 
Frankish lords. The Osmanlis under Evrenos carried devas- 
tation everywhere they went, and did little to help Theo- 
dore. 3 They were soon recalled by Murad to co-operate in 
the Kossova campaign. When Theodore was hard pressed, 
in 1391, by Amadeo of Savoy and the Venetians, he turned 
again to the Osmanlis. Once more Evrenos came to the 
Morea, and helped to destroy the coast towns. 4 

1 Raynaldus, ann. 1364, No. XXVIII. Jirecek, Gesch. der Bulg., p. 323, 
says that at this time ' Osmanen erschienen in Attika '. He has mistaken 
roving Turkish corsairs of Sarukhan or Aidin for the Osmanlis. It must 
have been these Turks who attacked Thebes. 

2 For the deliverance of the grand master of Rhodes, Jean Ferdinand 
d'Heredia : Ducange, viii. 296. 

3 Chron. Breve at end of Ducas, p. 516. 

4 Ibid. According to Finlay, iv. 233, he captured Akova. Cf. Muralt, 
ii. 741, citing Guichenon MS., and Ducange, viii. 39, 296. 



BAYEZID 



229 



After the famous council of Ottoman vassals at Serres, in 
1395, Theodore, who was one of the princes summoned 
by Bayezid to Serres, was compelled to sign the cession of 
Argos and Monembasia to the Osmanlis. He was then 
thrown into prison, and Bayezid contemplated having him 
assassinated. But before the cities could be delivered to the 
Ottoman emissaries, Theodore escaped, and declared the 
cession null and void. 1 The first impulse of Bayezid was to 
send an army upon the heels of Theodore. This punitive 
expedition was postponed on account of the activity of 
Sigismund, and the necessity of defending the northern 
frontiers against the Hungarians. 2 

In the spring of 1397, while Bayezid was superintending 
the construction of a mosque at Karaferia in Macedonia, he 
received a visit from the Greek bishop of Salona, who laid 
before him a formal accusation of adultery, sorcery, and 
oppression against Helena Cantacuzenos, who had been 
ruling the Duchy of Salona with her paramour after the death 
of her husband, Louis Fadrique. The bishop invited Bayezid 
to enter Greece, depicting to him the wonderful hunting he 
would have in a country full of game. 3 

The promise of good sport with the falcon was not needed. 
It had long been Bayezid's intention to extend his sovereignty 
into the Greek peninsula. He had against Theodore not 
only the old count from Serres, but also the complicity of 
the Morean despot in the Nicopolis crusade. At the head 
of his army, he set out upon the first Ottoman invasion of 
Greece. In Thessaly, Larissa, Pharsala, and other strong- 
holds surrendered without striking a blow. For thirty years 
the Greeks of Thessaly had felt that the Ottoman conquest 

1 Phr., I. 16, p. 62 ; 26, p. 83 ; Chalc, II, pp. 67-9. 

2 Muralt, under 1395 and 1397, gives the same expedition. From 
i, internal evidence of Byzantine historians, one might put the Morean 

expeditions in either or both of these years. But cf. Chron. Breve, p. 516, 
and the silence of the Ottoman historians on an expedition in 1395. 

3 Chalc, II, p. 67 ; Seadeddin, i. 192. 

i 



230 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



was inevitable. When Bayezid crossed the pass of Thermo- 
pylae without opposition, Helena hurried to meet hini. 
She offered her principality, her daughter, and herself to the 
conqueror. Bayezid did not want the duchess. She was 
set at liberty immediately. But the beautiful grand- 
daughter of John Cantacuzenos was sent to his harem. The 
duchy of Salona, in which was the shrine of Apollo, with all 
of Phocis, Doris, and Locris, was added to Thessaly, and 
made an Ottoman province. 1 

Bayezid by this time had tired of the campaign. He felt 
an irresistible call to return to the pleasures of the court . 
His military interests were beginning more and more to be 
centred upon an extension of his power in Asia Minor — the 
policy that was soon to prove his undoing. But there 
remained Theodore and the Morea to be dealt with. He 
left Yakub and Evrenos, with an army of fifty thousand, in 
charge of the invasion of the Peloponnesus. 

Yakub struck south to Cor on and Modon. The environs 
of Modon were pillaged and burned. He defeated Theodore 
at Megalopolis, and forced him to become a tributary of the 
Osmanlis. In the meantime, Evrenos had held in check the 
papal mercenaries at Corinth, and had then taken Argos by 
assault, with a terrible loss of life, and a booty of fourteen 
thousand male captives. Because the Venetians could so 
easily reinforce and reprovision it from the sea, the siege 
of Nauplia was abandoned. The two commanders, when 
October came, gave their soldiers licence to pillage wherever 
they could as a reward for their services, and afterwards 
withdrew to Macedonia. 2 

The population of the historic city of Argos was deported 
into Anatolia, and Moslem colonies settled in the north- 
eastern corner of the Peloponnesus. This was part of the 
general plan of Bayezid after Mcopolis. His successes in 

1 Chalc, II, p. 67; Seadeddin. i. 192. 

2 Chron. Brave., p. 516 ; Phr., I. 16, p. 62 ; Chalc, II, pp. 97-9. 



BAYEZID 



231 



Asia Minor had made possible, for the first time, a movement 
of an unmixed Turkish element from Anatolia into the 
Balkan peninsula. While these colonists were arriving in 
Argos, there was a similar immigration to Adrianople, Eski 
Zagora, Philippopolis, and Sofia. 1 

Bayezid is credited by the Ottoman chroniclers with the 
capture of the two great cities of Hellenism, Athens and 
Salonika. Nowhere else than in the Ottoman historians can 
one find a record of the acquisition of Athens in 1397 by the 
Osmanlis. If it were true, one would certainly find this 
event in the Venetian archives, for Venice was particularly 
interested in Athens at this time. 2 Had the Osmanlis 
entered Athens, would they have restored it to the Acciajoli 
family ? The fate of Argos in the same campaign makes 
this unlikely. Athens remained in Christian hands until 
after the fall of Constantinople. 3 

As for Salonika, one finds authority for its capture by 
the Osmanlis after the attempt of Manuel to retake Serres, 4 
after a four years' siege, in 1387, 5 and in 1391 by Bayezid 
himself. 6 But since there is neither record nor explanation 
of how the city returned to the Byzantines, even the tem- 
porary occupation of so rich and important a maritime city, 
and so strongly defended, 7 during the reigns of Murad and 
of Bayezid, is hardly possible. For in 1403 Salonika was 
sold by the Byzantines to the Venetians, 8 and was not 
captured by the Osmanlis until 1430. 

1 Seadeddin, i. 193. 

2 The Venetians seized Athens in 1395, and sent Antonio Contareno to 
act as governor. 

3 Hammer describes the capture of Athens in 1397 in i. 350, and again 
in 1456 in iii. 51. 

4 Gibbon and Hammer follow Chalcocondylas in this error. Cf. Berger 
de Xivrey, in Mem. de V Acad, des Inscr., vol. xix, partie 2, pp. 29-30. 

5 Seadeddin, i. 180. 6 Ducas, 13, p. 50 ; Chalc, II, p. 59 ; Idris. 

7 The land walls of Salonika, still standing, are eloquent proof of the 
difficulty which confronted their assailants before the days of cannon. 

8 Phr., I. 17, p. 64. 



232 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Even if we cannot give to Bayezid the honour of the 
acquisition of Athens and Salonika, or of the conquest of the 
Morea, his campaign of 1397 was the beginning of the sub- 
jugation of Greece. Important districts had been added to 
the empire, and a permanent foothold gained in the Morea. 
The maritime character of the peninsula, however, made 
impracticable its complete conquest, until the Osmanlis 
were able to hold their own against the Italians and Greeks 
upon the sea. 

XII 

The blockade of Constantinople, in spite of all the conces- 
sions that Manuel had made to Bayezid, 1 had become an 
active and pressing siege before the Nicopolis expedition. 
In 1394, Bayezid had given orders from Adrianople to pursue 
the siege vigorously. 2 But it was not until the spring of 1396 
that Bayezid contemplated seriously the taking of the city 
by assault. He was diverted by the coming of the crusaders 
to Nicopolis. After Sigismund and his allies had been de- 
feated, Bayezid returned to Constantinople and called upon 
Manuel to surrender the city. 

The Constantinopolitans, stunned by the disaster which 
had attended the Christian arms on the Danube, urged 
Manuel to yield, in order that they might be free from the 
calamities that would follow a successful assault. But 
Manuel had been cheered by the arrival of six hundred 
chevaliers and a small gift of money from France. He 
resisted his people, and gave no answer to Bayezid. 3 He 
married his eldest son John to the daughter of the Russian 
prince Vassili, whose dowry was in gold pieces. 4 An in- 

1 See p. 199. There is serious difference of opinion as to just when 
these concessions were made. 

2 Feridun collection, letter from Adrianople, ordering kadis to prepare 
for siege of Constantinople : Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds turc, No. 79, p. 60. 

3 Ducas, 14, p. 53 ; Canale, ii. 62. Leunclavius, Annales, p. 52, puts 
this in 1391/2. 

4 Karamzin (Russian ed. of 1819), v. 164. 



BAYEZID 



238 



vent ory was made of the treasures of St. Sophia. 1 Through 
the Patriarch, Manuel tried to get the Russian and Polish 
Christians interested in the fate of the seat of orthodoxy. 2 

From Europe came the usual promises of aid. It is a 
merciful dispensation of Providence that men ground their 
hopes upon desires rather than upon realities. Manuel was 
merely human when he continued to receive strength and 
inspiration from what experience should have taught him 
were will-o'-the-wisps. Henry of Lancaster was projecting 
a new crusade ; 3 but his energies were very soon directed 
towards a crown rather than a cross. The Due d' Orleans, 
in response to a letter from Manuel to King Charles VI, 
answered for his insane brother by promising to come in 
person to the relief of Constantinople. Almost immediately 
afterwards he accepted rich presents from Bayezid. 4 

Venice, in 1397, urged Manuel and the Genoese of Pera, 
' for the honour of Christianity ' and because the alternative 
' would be to the peril and shame of Christianity ', not to 
treat with Bayezid. This advice was weakened by a saving 
clause at the end of the letter to the effect that, if the Con- 
stantinopolitans and Perotes did treat with Bayezid, they 
should include Venice, for f it would be too risky for the 
Venetians to be at war alone with the Turks '. 5 Although 
Venice sent ten galleys to Constantinople, and Genoa five 
galleys, 6 the republics followed consistently their policy of 
flattering Bayezid, and trying to make him believe that their 
dispositions towards him were altogether friendly. 7 

At the time that he summoned Manuel to deliver Constan- 
tinople, Bayezid fortified the gulf of Mcomedia, and built 

1 Miklositch-Miiller, Acta Graeca, DCXXXVI. 

2 Ibid., DXIV, DXV, DXVI. 

3 Froissart, xvi. 132-3. 

4 Religieux de Saint-Denis, ii. 559-62, 564. 

5 Secreta Consilii Rogatorum, E iii. 138, 146, printed in Ljubic, iv. 404. 

6 Ibid., p. 137. 

7 Misti, xliv. 210, xlv. 443 ; Belgrano, Arch. Gen., 1396-1464, pp. 175 f. 



234 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



at Scutari the castle called Guzel Hissar. 1 About the same 
time, the castle of Anatoli Hissar was built at the mouth of 
the Sweet Waters of Asia, the narrowest point on the Bos- 
phorus. When Clavijo passed through the Bosphorus, in 
1403, he spoke of this castle as strongly built and strongly 
fortified, in prophetic contrast to the ruined Byzantine 
fortress directly opposite on the European shore. 2 

Perhaps it was because of the advice of Ali Pasha, who 
told him that the taking of Constantinople would bring upon 
him a really effective European intervention, or because he 
preferred to expend his energies in the Greek peninsula and 
in Asia Minor, that Bayezid did not carry out his threat to 
Manuel. These are the common explanations of the failure 
to follow up the victory of Mcopolis with the extinction of 
the Byzantine Empire. 3 As far as the Greeks were con- 
cerned, the inheritance of the Caesars was his. He had 
successfully defended against Europe what he had won. 
Constantinople could have been taken by assault. In fact, 
from his spies within the city, Bayezid knew that the in- 
habitants were favourable to surrender, and would probably 
force the hand of Manuel, if the Osmanlis made a show of be- 
ginning the asssault. Bayezid must have been deterred from 
this enterprise, however, by the realization of his inability 
to hold the city without having the mastery of the sea. 

1 Ducas, 14, p. 53 ; Chalc, II, p. 80 ; Skerefeddin, iv. 38. 

2 ' El Guirol castello de Grecia esta despoblado y destruydo y el dela 
Turquia esta poblado ' : Seville ed., 1582, fol. 17 v°. Busbecq, i. 131, 
wrote : ' stand two castles opposite each other, one in Europe and the 
other in Asia. . . . The former was held by the Turks a long time before 
the attack on Constantinople. ' Busbecq was, of course, misinformed, as 
Rumeli Hissar was built in 1452. It is still standing in excellent preserva- 
tion. Anatoli Hissar, of which only one tower remains intact, was built 
between 1392 and 1397. There is no way of determining the exact date. 
But Saladin, in Manuel de V Art Musulman, i. 482, displays his usual 
inaccuracy concerning facts of Ottoman history, when he gives 1420 as 
the date for Anatoli Hissar. 

3 Phr., I. 14, p. 60 ; Chalc, II. p. 83 ; Ducas, 14, p. 53. 



BAYEZID 



235 



One of Bayezid's chief claims to greatness as a statesman 
is the way in which he handled Venice and Genoa. At any 
time during his reign, the Italian republics could have cut 
him off from Asia if he were in Europe, or from Europe if he 
were in Asia. Bayezid was master of most of the Balkan 
peninsula and of half of Anatolia ; but he did not control 
the path from one portion of his empire to the other. Since 
he had come to the throne, Genoa had fallen under the in- 
fluence of France. There was a strong anti-Ottoman senti- 
ment in the Venetian Senate, which at any instant might 
crystallize into open hostility. 1 Europe was for the moment 
stirred over the fate of the Nicopolis crusaders. Bayezid 
knew that this was not the time to take Constantinople. 

Then, too, after the great victories of Kossova and 
Nicopolis, and his successful campaign against Kara mania, 
Bayezid allowed himself to succumb to the insidious tempta- 
tions that assail the warrior when he passes from the tent to 
the palace. It was not astonishing that the pleasures of the 
table and of the harem proved irresistible to him. Bayezid, 
who had the best qualities of his age, allowed himself to 
become debauched by indulgence in shameful and unspeak- 
able vices. His brilliant mental and physical qualities began 
to suffer the inevitable eclipse. His example was contagious. 
For, as the Osmanlis say, ' the fish begins to corrupt at the 
head 

XIII 

In April 1398, and again in March 1399, Boniface IX 
ordered to be preached throughout Christendom a crusade 
for the defence of Constantinople. 2 His appeals fell on deaf 
ears. Wenceslaus was approaching the end of his power 
in the empire, Richard of England was fighting for his 

1 Venice contemplated action against the Osmanlis with the aid of 
France, Hungary, and Genoa. Cf. Seer. Cons. Bog., E iii. 137-44. 

2 Epp., v. 26, 99, 293-5. 



236 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



throne, Florence was in a struggle with the Visconti, the 
Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Orleans were disputing 
the regency in France. Only Venice and Genoa were 
vitally interested in the fate of Constantinople. 

Because Genoa had put itself under the guardianship of 
the Duke of Orleans, brother of Charles VI of France, and 
son-in-law of Duke Giovanni Visconti of Milan, the interests 
of her Pera colony demanded some attention from the power- 
ful Valois and Visconti families. This made possible the 
sole response to the appeals of Manuel and the Pope, the 
expedition of Marshal Boucicaut. 

In the summer of 1399, a force of ten thousand Osmanlis, 
after coming into more or less open conflict with the Genoese 
off Galata, attempted to enter Constantinople. The de- 
fenders were few ; for the inhabitants, as at the time of the 
final siege in 1453, were more likely to be found in the 
bazaars than on the city walls. They had little desire to 
prolong a condition which was paralysing their business 
activities. Glavijo, who visited Constantinople four years 
later, was informed that the attack failed only because of 
the lack of skill and energy shown by the Osmanlis. 1 Until 
they had cannon to help them, the Osmanlis never displayed 
fighting ability in an assault upon fortifications. At this 
critical moment, aid arrived from Europe. 

Boucicaut was the only one of the prisoners of Mcopolis 
that accepted the challenge of Bayezid. He did not forget 
the biting words of the audience at Brusa at the time of their 
release. On June 26, 1399, with four ships and two armed 
galleys, he set sail from Aiguesmortes. His force of twelve 
hundred chevaliers and foot-soldiers had much more cohesion 
and experience than the volunteers who gathered round Jean 
de Nevers at Dijon three years before. He was joined at 
Tenedos by several Genoese and Venetian galleys. After a 



1 Edition of Seville, 1582, fol. 16 v°-17 r°. 



BAYEZID 



237 



victory in the Dardanelles over seventeen Ottoman galleys, 
the first recorded naval combat of the Osmanlis, Boucicaut 
reached Constantinople ' just in time to save the city '. He 
was received with great joy by Manuel, and given the rank 
of Grand Constable. 1 

For several weeks, Boucicaut and his followers spread 
terror among the Osmanlis in the Gulf of Nicomedia and the 
Bosphorus. The Ottoman sailors, no match for the Proven- 
gals and Italians, took to cover. An assault on Mcomedia 
failed, but the fearless marshal made several raids into the 
interior, 2 and against the Ottoman settlements on the shores 
of the Marmora and gulfs of Mcomedia and Mudania. His 
one notable success was against Riva, near the Black Sea 
entrance of the Bosphorus, on the Asiatic shore. 3 After the 
castle had been stormed, and the garrison put to the sword, 
Boucicaut attained the objective of his raid. In the mouth 
of the river Riva, from which the town takes its name, were 
hidden the Ottoman galleys and smaller vessels, which had 
taken refuge there when Boucicaut first appeared in the 
Golden Horn. All the Ottoman shipping was destroyed 
by fire. 

In order to remove the danger to which Constantinople 
was subjected by the presence of John Palaeologos, son of 
Andronicus, at Silivria, constantly intriguing with the 
Osmanlis, Boucicaut urged Manuel to become reconciled 

1 My account of this expedition is taken from MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, 
fonds fr., No. 11432, Livre des faicts du bon messire Jean le Maingre, dit 
Bouciquaut. For printed editions, see Bibliography. 

2 The chronicler makes the most astonishing assertions as to these raids, 
saying that the chevaliers reached Ak- Serai' ! He evidently had no idea 
of local geography. I have been unable to identify several of the places 
mentioned. 

3 I have walked in one day from Riva to a point on the Bosphorus 
not many miles above Constantinople. When one reads the history of 
the Osmanlis in the country of their origin, the fact that from the very 
beginning of their history they were practically within sight of the imperial 
city is vividly impressed upon one. 



238 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



with his nephew. He went himself — it was less than a clay's 
sail — to fetch John to Constantinople. 1 

This intervention of Boucicaut in the quarrels of the 
Palaeologi was more helpful than his military aid. The ex- 
peditions in the neighbourhood accomplished little against 
Bayezid. The chronicler of Boucicaut would have been 
astonished had he known that Bayezid considered the 
exploits of Boucicaut's chevaliers and sailors of too little 
importance to notice. Bayezid cared only that the Italian 
republics did not come out openly against him, and lend to 
the crusaders the powerful and decisive aid which they could 
have given. The enterprise of Boucicaut demonstrated, 
however, the impotence of the Osmanlis on sea, and how 
easily a united effort of Christendom, or of Venice and Genoa 
alone, could have limited the activities of Bayezid to either 
Europe or Asia. 

When John had been installed as co-emperor, Boucicaut 
pointed out to Manuel that his force was exhausted, and that 
he would have to return to France to find recruits. Accord- 
ing to some authorities, this action was due to the inability or 
unwillingness of Manuel to pay the adventurers of Boucicaut 
for their services in his behalf. 2 Men of their kidney were 
not righting for fun or for a cause, and there was no booty to 
be had from Ottoman sailors and fishermen. Before he left 
Constantinople, Boucicaut secured the consent of Venice, 
Genoa, and the chevaliers of Rhodes to his suggestion that 
Manuel do homage to Charles VI for his empire. This honour 

1 The Byzantine historians give little attention to Boucicaut, and are 
in contradiction with his chronicler on this point. Phr., 15, p. 61, says 
that John, who had been in the court of Bayezid, fled to his uncle because 
he had been slandered to Bayezid, and was afraid for his life ; and Chalc, 
II, p. 84, that it was John who commanded the 10,000 Osmanlis against 
the city, and that Manuel shared the throne with him in order to save 
the city. Muralt, ii. 762, is a year in advance of the actual date. 

2 Chron. de Saint- Denis and Juvenal d'Ursins. But these are really the 
same source, according to Lacabane, Bibl. de VEcole des Chartes, ii. 62. 



BAYEZID 



239 



the advisers of the French monarch refused to accept. They 
did not want the king of France bound by the obligation of 
protecting a vassal whose position was so precarious. 

Boucicaut did not return. His restless energy found outlet 
later in Cyprus, where, as French governor of Genoa, he 
forced the Cypriotes to raise the siege of Famagusta, 1 and in 
pillaging the Syrian ports, where his adventurers did far 
more damage to the Italian merchants than to the Saracens. 2 
Even had he returned to Constantinople, and with the 
highest motives personally, his followers would certainly 
have done the Constantinopolitans more harm than good, as 
had been the case with the Catalans, and, when money was 
not forthcoming, have ended by being in open conflict with 
those of whom they were posing as the defenders. 

XIV 

It was a bitter humiliation for Manuel to share the imperial 
throne with the nephew whom he hated and distrusted. 
With him, the case of John was one of ' like father, like son ', 
and certainly John had never given the emperor any cause 
to think that he was more patriotic, more loyal than Andro- 
nicus. But there was a strong party in the city in favour 
of John, and his association in governing Constantinople 
would remove the pretext of righting a wrong, which Bayezid 
had so skilfully used to interfere in the politics of what was 
now no more than a city empire. 

When France refused to receive him as a vassal, Manuel 
decided upon a voyage in person to solicit the intervention 
of Europe. In spite of his misgivings, he felt that this was 
the only way of salvation left. His own sons were too young 
to raise to the purple, and Theodore had his hands full in 
the Morea. There was nothing to do but to leave the govern- 
ment in John's care. 

1 Foglieta and Stella, in Muralt, ii. 778, No. 61. 

2 Sanudo, in Muratori, xxii. pp. 794-8. 



240 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



On December 10, 1399, Manuel embarked on a Venetian 
galley to make his supreme appeal to Europe. He stopped 
at Modon to leave the empress and his sons with Theodore. 
The despot of the Morea was opposed to the project. He told 
the emperor how the chevaliers of Rhodes, in conjunction 
with the Pope, were trying to get possession of the last theme 
of the empire, and that this scheme would have been suc- 
cessful had it not been for the Greek hatred and fear of the 
Catholic Church. He declared that Manuel, like their father, 
was embarking upon a hopeless voyage. Not only that, 
but he would run a risk of losing his empire entirely by 
leaving it in charge of John, who was more friendly to 
Bayezid and the Osmanlis than to his own family and race. 1 

Manuel would listen to no remonstrances, to no arguments. 
He said that his position was like that of Esther before she 
went in to the king : ' If I perish, I perish.' With that 
optimism which was one of his most redeeming traits, 
Manuel bade farewell to his family, and set out for Venice. 

In the only city of Europe that could rival his own 
capital in splendour, he received a reception worthy of the 
cause for which he had come. The Senate, as usual, pro- 
mised much. But they had by this time become thoroughly 
won over to the policy of quod vi armorum potest fieri, fiat 
arte et sagacitate, to quote the words of a contemporary 
record in their archives. 2 At Padua, Vicenza, and Milan, 
Manuel received an imperial ovation. Giovanni Visconti, 
shocked at the wretched appearance of the emperor's suite, 
gave him money to be used for apparel fitting to the successor 
of Constantine and his companions. 3 

There was no attempt to arrange a conference with 

1 Chalc, II, pp. 83-4; Ducas, 14, pp. 54-6. For Rhodes and the 
Pope in the Morea, Phr., I. 16, p. 63 ; Bosio, ii. 154. 

2 September 10, 1400, in Misti, xlv. 33. 

3 Livre des faicts, fol. 53 r°-55 r°, and Wylie, pp. 159-65. Wylie has 
collated admirably the sources on Manuel's visit. 



BAYEZID 



241 



! Boniface IX. Manuel, at this stage of his career, could not 
i play the hypocrite so easily as his father had done. In fact, 
j his orthodoxy was beyond suspicion. He did not hesitate 
in Paris to celebrate high mass according to the eastern rite, 
1 and never allowed the reunion of the churches to be the 
basis of his solicitations. In 1399, Boniface IX wrote a long 
burning letter to the Bishop of Chalcedon, his nuncio in 
Hungary, ordering him to preach and cause to be preached a 
crusade against the Osmanlis for the relief of Constantinople. 1 
In 1400, he had ordered a crusade, with increase of indul- 
gences. 2 But, when the Byzantine Emperor came to Italy, 
' Boniface seemed to be more interested in the Kingdom of 
Naples than in the Kingdom of God. 

From contemporary records, the reception of Manuel 
Palaeologos in France and in England was all that the 
proudest and most important sovereign of Christendom could 
wish for. This shadow of an emperor, who ten years before 
had been a retainer at the court of Bayezid too insignificant 
to be bidden to the emir's table, and who was not even un- 
disputed ruler of a single city, was treated by Charles VI and 
Henry IV as if he actually held the dominions entrusted by 
Constantine to his successors. This was especially true in 
England, where barons and peasants, in spite of the crusades, 
were still uncouth and ignorant. To them the East stood 
for a superior civilization, to which they must bow. There 
was a glamour in the name of Constantinople and in Manuel's 
imperial title. Perhaps, even if they had realized the straits 
to which Manuel was reduced, it would have been the same ; 
for it was not to the intrinsic worth or power of the man, but 
to the ten centuries of glory which he represented, that they 
did homage. The cry of ave imperator had outlived the 
empire. 

Manuel did not appreciate this. Because his optimism 

1 Text is published in Theiner, ii. 170-2. 

2 Epp., v. 300-2 ; vi. 92. 
1736 q 



242 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



could not grasp the difference between what costs and what 
does not cost, he allowed himself to be cradled with false 
hopes for two years. 

Henry IV had personally great sympathy with the mission 
of Manuel ; for in Africa he had borne arms against the 
Moslems with the cross upon his breast, and, until he suc- 
ceeded Richard II, it had always been his dream to lead 
a crusade. He understood the peril of Constantinople, and 
in a letter from Westminster, in January, 1401, he called the 
attention of the Archbishop of Canterbury to the necessity 
of helping Manuel, in order that Constantinople might not 
be lost, and authorized a collection in all the churches of his 
realm. 1 But Henry was not secure upon his throne. In 
France, the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans were still 
struggling for the power that the insane king was unable 
to wield. 

Manuel waited two years in western Europe. While he 
was making his heart sick with deferred hope, the great 
events that were to change the personal fortune of Bayezid, 
if not that of his family and his race, were shaping them- 
selves in the East. It was a Moslem prince who was to 
afford a respite to Constantinople. 

After Manuel left for the west, only the small force 
of chevaliers under Chateaumorand, who had remained 
behind from the crusaders of Boucicaut, saved Constanti- 
nople. The inhabitants of the city were so hungry that 
they slipped over the walls by cords, and surrendered 
themselves to the Osmanlis. John did nothing. There was 
no money in the imperial treasury. The crusaders got their 

1 ' Cum Dom. summus Pontifex advertens quod perfidus ille Baysetus 
Princeps Turchorum, manu potenti et brachio extento in Christianum 
Populum maxima feritate extitit debachatus ad Extermiiiium Civitatis 
Constantinopolitanae et universitatis Populi Christiani nisi eius nephanda 
propositio resistatur, omnes et singulos qui, pro Liberatione et Subsidione 
Manuelis Imp. Cpni et dictae Civitatis suae, Manus adiutrices porrexerint 
. . .' etc. : Rymer, vol. iii, part 4, pp. 195-6. 



BAYEZID 



243 



own provisions by raids on the Asiatic shore of the Bos- 
phorus, and by intercepting galleys. After the shock of the 
fall of Sivas, Bayezid realized that he must expend the best 
of his force and energy in solidifying his conquests in Europe 
and Asia, and in raising a larger army to combat Timur, if 
he threatened again to invade Anatolia. 

Although the siege was not pushed with vigour, the city 
was on the point of yielding. The miserable John made a 
treaty to give up the city, should Bayezid beat Timur. 1 
Even the patriarch Matthew was supposed to have an under- 
standing with Bayezid to retain his position if the city were 
taken. In a proclamation, which vividly depicted the misery 
of the city, afflicted by six years of siege and famine, Matthew 
urged the inhabitants to repent of their crimes, and defended 
himself from the charge of having treated with Bayezid. 2 

Not only against Constantinople was Bayezid preparing 
the final blow. In the Morea, the Greeks feared for 
the safety of Modon, where Manuel had left his family. 3 
Since 1399, the Venetian Senate had been alarmed by the 
gradual Ottoman conquest of Albania, and finally for the 
safety of Corfu, because the Osmanlis had appeared in force 
in the Adriatic. 4 

In the early spring of 1402, Ottoman activities ceased 
in the Balkan peninsula, and every soldier that could be 
mustered — Christian as well as Moslem — was hurried into 
Asia Minor ; for a greater than Djenghiz Khan was march- 
ing westward. 

XV 

When the Tartars first saw iron, and their strongest 
warriors failed to bend it, they thought there must be a 

1 Clavijo, who visited Constantinople the following year, reports this, 
fol. 7 v°. 2 MiHositch-Miiller, Acta, DCXXVI. 

3 Strikingly shown in letter of April 20, 1402 : Cane. Seer., i. 58. 

4 Misti, xlv. 19-23, 25-6, 29-30, 35, 87; xlvi. 37. Several of these 
are published in Ljubic, iv. 579, 590. 

Q2 



244 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



substance under the surface. So they called it timur, which 
means something stuffed or filled. 1 It soon became a custom 
to name their great leaders Timur. But even among 
primitive peoples the qualities of leadership have not 
necessarily included purely physical strength. Many 
Samsons among the Tartars received the distinction of 
being called Iron. None of them made an indelible mark 
upon the history of the world, save the great Timur, who 
had his left arm and left leg partially paralysed. 2 At the 
height of his career, when his hordes marched against 
Bagdad, he was too weak to sit upon a horse, and was carried 
in a litter. 3 

Timur claimed descent from the grand vizier of Djagatai, 
son and successor of Djenghiz Khan. He came to the throne 
of Khorassan, with residence at Samarkand, in 1369. In 
thirty years, while Murad and Bayezid were winning an 
empire in the Balkan peninsula, Timur became master of 
the greater part of the Moslem world. Persia, Armenia, the 
upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the steppes 
between the Caspian and Black Seas, Russia from the Volga 
to the Don and Dnieper, Mesopotamia, the coasts of the 
Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and western and northern 
India was his path of conquest. 

After he had captured Sivas, Bayezid had not been able to 
curb the altogether natural impulse that led him into the 
valley of the Euphrates. In his way stood KararYussuf, 
a Turcoman prince of Kharput, who was to be, after Timur 's 
death, the founder of the famous dynasty of the Black 

1 Knoelle, in Journal R. A. S. (1822), xiv. 125; Noldeke, in ZDMG. 
(1859), xiii. 185, n. 6. 

2 ' Toutesfoiz il a la main senestre et pie senestre comme impotent et 
ne s'en puet aidier, car il a les nerfs coppez ' : Dominican Friar, p. 463. 
' Infirmus, ut dicitur, a cingulo infra ' : Stella, in Muratori, vol. xvii, 
col. 1194. Cf. Sherefeddin, i. 55, 381. The English corruption Tamerlane 
is from Timurlenk, the latter syllable signifying lameness. 

3 Sherefeddin, ii. 222. 



BAYEZID 



245 



Sheep. 1 In 1399, Bayezid had put his son Soleiman, assisted 
by several of his ablest generals, in charge of an advance 
movement to the east. Sivas was the base of operations. 

Kara-Yussuf, who had a claim upon Timur's protection 
because he had guided him on his first expedition into 
Armenia, appealed to the Tartar court. Before Timur could 
remonstrate, Kara-Yussuf was captured by the Osmanlis. 
When Timur learned this, his anger was for the first time 
directed specifically against Bayezid. There were old com- 
plaints against Bayezid. The refugee emirs had not lived 
at his court for years without impressing upon Timur their 
woes and the injustice that had been done to them. But 
Timur was busy with other plans and other conquests. 
Bayezid's former activities had not directly touched him. 

In his memoirs, Timur records that he tried first to bring 
Bayezid to reason. ' I wrote to him a letter of which this 
is the substance : Praise to God, master of heaven and 
earth, who has submitted to my authority several of the 
seven climates and who has allowed the potentates and 
masters of the world to bend their neck under my yoke. 
God have mercy upon his humble servant, who knows the 
limits which are prescribed for him and who does not cross 
them by a single step. All the world knows your origin, and 
it is not fitting for a man of your extraction to advance the 
foot of pride ; for you will be able to throw yourself into the 
abyss of affliction and of misfortune : resist the suggestions 
of miserable counsellors. . . . Refrain from opening to con- 
fusion and to evils the door of your empire. Send me Kara- 
Yussuf : if not, by the coming together of our two armies all 
that is hidden under the veil of destiny will be uncovered 
to you.' 2 

1 There is an excellent account of the dynasties of the Black and White 
Sheep, with list, following Mirkhand, in Teixera, ii. 24-39, 69-70. For 
the later activities of Kara-Yussuf, Teixera, ii, 355 ; de Guignes, iii. 302. 

2 Langles translation, p. 260. 



246 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Instead of paying attention to this letter, Bayezid 
deliberately committed another overt act by summoning 
Taharten, emir of Erzindjian, whom he knew to be a vassal 
of Timur, to appear at the Ottoman court, bringing his 
treasures with him ! When Timur again remonstrated with 
Bayezid and reminded him of his duty ' gently and like a 
friend ', Bayezid responded by summoning Timur to appear 
before him, and threatening to deprive him of his harem if he 
refused to come. In order to express his contempt for the 
Tartar conqueror, Bayezid placed his own name first in letters 
of gold, and Timur's name underneath in small black letters. 1 

Why Bayezid took this tack in dealing with Timur is 
inexplicable. It is impossible to believe that he under- 
rated the power of Timur. One can only suppose that his 
informants and advisers, to whom Timur alluded in the 
first warning to Bayezid, urged upon the Ottoman emir the 
improbability of a Tartar invasion of Asia Minor ; for, even 
after the terrible lesson of 1400, when Bayezid had two years 
of respite, he took no steps to placate Timur or to prepare 
adequately against an invasion. He went on blindly to his 
doom, and displayed none of the consummate diplomatic 
and military skill that had made the first eight years of 
his reign among the most brilliant of all Ottoman history. 

When Timur saw that Bayezid would not even treat with 
him, he took the field immediately. Soleiman sent an appeal 
to Bayezid, who was in Thessaly. 2 There was no response. 
With feverish haste, Soleiman attempted to put into con- 
dition the defences of Sivas, whose strong walls had been ad- 
mirably constructed by the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin Kaikobad 

1 Ibid., pp. 258-62 ; Sherefeddin, iii. 255-62 ; Clavijo de Gonzales, 
fol. 25 r°-26 v°. 

2 Chalcocondylas and Raynaldus are wrong in calling him Ertogrul, and in 
stating that he was killed in the subsequent siege. Sherefeddin, iii. 267, calls 
him Mustafa, and Schiltberger, p. 18, Mohammed. That it was Soleiman 
is proved by the agreement of the Ottoman historians with Arabshah, p. 124, 
and with Clavijo, fol. 26 r°, whose ' Musulman Tchelebi ' is Soleiman. 



BAYEZID 



247 




248 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



one hundred and sixty years before. 1 He then went boldly 
forth to meet the Tartars, but, when he realized that his 
twenty thousand horsemen could not hold their own against 
Timur, he withdrew to the north-west, abandoning the city 
to its fate. 2 

It took Timur eighteen days of incessant attack to weaken 
the defences of Sivas. The walls were sapped, and piles 
driven under them, which were smeared with pitch and set 
on fire. Only after several of the towers had fallen did the 
garrison agree to surrender upon Timur 's promise that their 
lives should be spared and the whole city preserved. As far 
as the Moslems were concerned, this promise was partially 
fulfilled. They were allowed to pay for their freedom. The 
city, however, was pillaged and burned, and its Christian 
inhabitants were sold into slavery. Three or four thousand 
Armenian horsemen, who had been bravest and most stub- 
born in the defence, were buried alive in the moats. 3 

The destruction of Sivas was in August, 1400. 4 The con- 
duct of Timur after this victory lends colour to the suppo- 
sition that it was not at all in his mind to subdue Asia Minor 
and overthrow the Ottoman Empire. He had come not to 
conquer, but merely to give Bayezid a salutary lesson. In- 
stead of continuing his westward march, Timur withdrew to 
the Euphrates, and spent the next eighteen months in the 

1 Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, vol. ii, fol. 1776. 

2 Clavijo, fol. 26 r° ; Arabshah, p. 125. 

3 Clavijo, fol. 26 v°-27 r° ; Arabshah ; p. 125 ; Sherefeddin, iii. 267-9 ; 
Dominican Friar, p. 264 ; Schiltberger, p. 18. Schiltberger says 21 days, 
and 5,000 horsemen buried, and 9,000 virgins carried off by the Tartars. 

4 It is impossible to understand why Muralt, with all the authorities he 
had at hand, places the taking of Sivas in 1395 : Chronographie Byzantine, 
ii. 753, No. 26. The contemporary authorities cited above establish the 
date. Cf. also letter from Crete, in Jorga, Notes a servir, &c, i. 106, n. 3. 
There is a full discussion of the proper dating of the Ottoman aggression 
against Sivas, Caesarea, and Erzindjian, and the probability of two Otto- 
man campaigns, one before and one after Nicopolis, in Bruun's note to 
the Hakluyt edition of Schiltberger, pp. 121-2. 



BAYEZID 



249 



famous campaigns that ended in the destruction of Damascus 
and Bagdad. 

XVI 

In the winter of 1401-2, fresh from his triumphs in Syria 
and Mesopotamia, Timur paused for several months on the 
confines of Asia Minor. He had not yet made up his mind 
to attack Bayezid. 

Through a Dominican friar, who had been trying to con- 
vert him, he wrote to Charles VI of France, whom he believed 
to be the most powerful king of the Occident, making to 
him a proposal for sharing the world, such as no European 
sovereign had put before him again until Alexander met 
Napoleon on the raft at Tilsit. 1 There was also an exchange 
of gifts and embassies with Genoa. The Genoese ambas- 
sador pointed out to Timur the necessity of destroying 
Bayezid. When the Tartar embassy went to Pera, the 
standard of Timur was flown in its honour from the Galata 
tower. 2 Even the distant king of Castile had two ambas- 
sadors in the camp of Timur, who were privileged to witness 
the battle of Angora from the Tartar side. 3 

The fall of Sivas was the first set-back of Bayezid 's career. 
It came to him as a heavy blow, if w T e are to believe the 
Ottoman chroniclers. But it did not result in spurring him 
on to immediate military and diplomatic effort, as such 
a calamity would certainly have done in the early days of his 
reign. He had become a voluptuary, debauched mentally 
and physically. His pride and self-confidence had increased 
in inverse ratio to his ability to make good his arrogant 
assumptions. 

1 The letters exchanged between Charles VI and Timur are preserved 
in the French archives. The Turkish text of these letters, with Latin 
translation, is published by Charriere, introd., i. 118-19. 

2 Stella, in Muratori, xvii. 1194. 

3 'En la qual batalla se acaescieron Payo de Soto Mayor e Hernan 
Sanchez de Palacuelos Embaxadores ' : Clavijo, fol. 1 r°, col. 2. 



250 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Negotiations were reopened between the two great 
sovereigns of Islam. The letters became more menacing 
on the part of Timur and more insulting on the part of 
Bayezid. 1 Timur 's earlier admiration for Bayezid as cham- 
pion of the Prophet against the infidels, and his earlier reluc- 
tance to make war against a nation of his own faith, had 
disappeared in the course of his last conquests. The fire at 
Damascus was one indication of Timur's religious indiffer- 
ence : his willingness to treat with Christian Europe was 
another. At last determined to humble Bayezid, Timur 
brought his huge army into camp near Sivas. He did not, 
however, definitely decide upon the invasion of Ottoman 
territory until he heard that Bayezid was starting for Tokat. 

To strike at Bayezid directly was impracticable, owing to 
the hardships that his large army would encounter in travers- 
ing the thickly wooded and mountainous country between 
him and the region in which his spies reported the Ottoman 
army to be. He followed the valley of the Halys to Caesarea. 
By keeping to the water-courses his army was enabled to 
live off the land. It was just harvest time, and the soldiers 
gathered in all the grain in the valley of the Halys and its 
tributaries. It took six days to get to Caesarea, and four 
days more to reach Kirsheir. In the meantime, the advance 
guard of the Osmanlis had fallen back from Tokat and 
Amassia to Angora. By a reconnaissance from Kirsheir, 
Timur learned that the bulk of the Ottoman forces were at 
Angora. Three days more brought him to the Ottoman 
outposts. 2 

1 Letters of Timur and Bayezid in Arabic and Persian in Feridun 
collection, MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, ancien fonds turc, pp. 65-91. Cf. 
Langles, in Notices et Extraits, iv. 674, for list and dates of these. Sheref- 
eddin, iii. 396-416. 

2 Sherefeddin, iv. 1-6. For description of route from Sivas to Angora, 
Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, ii. fols. 1803-4. Timur's own account of his 
march and the battle of Angora is very brief : ' Je pris moi-meme le 
chemin d'Ancouriah. Bayezid, suivi de 400,000 hommes, tant cavaliers 



BAYEZID 



251 



There was no further parley. Timur saw in Bayezid an 
enemy that must be crushed. He had every confidence in 
his star. Bayezid had hardly recovered from the awakening 
which came when he realized that Timur was actually 
marching against him. His resourcefulness, his coolness, his 
marvellous judgement had left him. His soldiers were ex- 
hausted by forced marches in the hot midsummer sun, for 
it was the last week of July. 1 He could have withdrawn for 
several days to the mountains to recuperate, and let Timur 
do the seeking. Then Timur would have expended his 
strength in an attack upon Angora under the broiling sun. 
Timur could not have left Angora uncaptured behind him, 
or have moved westward in pursuit of the Osmanlis without 
waiting to replenish his food supply. But Bayezid, eager 
and lacking in self-control, as men sometimes are from the 
presentiment of disaster rather than the confidence of suc- 
cess, decided upon an immediate battle. This was just what 
Timur wanted. 

Bayezid's second mistake was in putting his Tartar allies 
in the first line. He did this in accordance with the estab- 
lished Ottoman tactics, that the enemy be allowed to ex- 
pend his strength upon the untrained rabble, and to reach 
the second line exhausted. But he had not taken into con- 
sideration the fact that these Tartars were kin to his enemy, 

que fantassins, vint a ma rencontre ; on livra la bataille, et je la gagnai. 
Ce Prince vaincu fut pris par mes troupes, et amene en ma presence. 
Enfin . . . je retournai victorieux a Samarcande ' : Langles trans., p. 264. 

1 A great deal has been written about the date of Angora, but all 
authorities agree in putting it between July 20 and July 28, 1402, Cf. 
Art de verifier les Dates, i. 193; Silvestre de Sacy, in Memoires de VAca- 
demie des Inscriptions, vi. 488-95 ; Moranville, in Bihl. de VEcole des 
Chartes, lv. 437-8. A few early western writers have given 1397 and 1403, 
while Petits de la Croix, in his French translation of Sherefeddin, is a decade 
too late in all his dates. The latter part of July 1402 is fixed by all 
contemporary authorities on this battle. Abu'l-Mahasin, in his history 
of the reign of the Egyptian sultan Barkok, states that the greater part 
of Bayezid's army perished by thirst before his capture. 



252 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

and could easiest desert when placed in front. 1 A third mis- 
take was in taking the offensive rather than waiting for 
Timur to attack ; 2 for Bayezid had the advantage in being 
able to choose his position. From Nicopolis to Plevna, 
Tchataldja and Gallipoli, the Osmanlis have always shown 
their fighting qualities best in a defensive action. 

There was nothing the matter with Bayezid's army. Like 
the empire he had been building, it was composed of all 
the Moslem and Christian elements of Asia Minor and the 
Balkan peninsula. With the exception of the Tartars, they 
were loyal to Bayezid, and had become accustomed to 
fighting together with a discipline and bravery fully equal to, 
if not superior to, that of Timur 's veteran warriors from 
central Asia. The right wing was under Stephen Lazare- 
vitch, brother-in-law and faithful friend of Bayezid. ' In ad- 
dition to Serbian horsemen, Stephen's command contained 
the other European contingents, Moslem as well as Christian. 3 
In the left wing were the troops of Anatolia, led by Soleiman 
Tchelebi, Bayezid's eldest son. The emir himself was in 
the centre, surrounded by his janissaries and his three sons, 
Mustafa, Isa, and Musa. To Mohammed, whose reliability 
and judgement Bayezid esteemed second only to Soleiman's 
among his sons, was entrusted the rear guard. 4 

Elephants were used on both sides. Timur's first line 
threw balls of Greek fire into the midst of the archers who 
were covering the Ottoman advance. The desertion of the 

1 On the nationality of the Tartars who betrayed Bayezid at Angora, 
see the latter part of the note of Bruun on the ' White Tartars ', in the 
Hakluyt ed. of Schiltberger, pp. 114-17. 

2 From the account of the Dominican Friar, pp. 458-9, it seems clear 
that Bayezid was the aggressor until after Soleiman's command had been 
cut to pieces. 

3 Sherefeddin, iv. 8-12 ; Dominican Friar, p. 458. 

4 Afterwards Mohammed I. Many western writers have confused him 
with his nickname of Kiritchelebi (Girigilibi in Rabbi Joseph, i. 257, and 
a variety of spellings in other early writers), and made him thus his own 
father, to account for the later Sultan Mohammed. 



BAYEZID 



253 



Tartar auxiliaries, who formed a quarter or more of Bayezid's 
total strength, decided the battle before the fighting really 
started. 1 When Bayezid saw that he could not prevent the 
Tartars from going over to Timur, he ordered the left wing to 
advance to the attack. 

Fifteen thousand men fell in a vain effort to pierce the 
Tartar lines. The slaughter was so great that Soleiman was 
unable to rally his forces. 2 When they broke and fled, the 
offensive movement of the Osmanlis was at an end. Bayezid, 
now on the defensive, was driven back step by step. His 
retreat was cut off. With his bodyguard and the refugees 
from other battalions, he made a gallant fight upon a small 
hill, holding off the enemy for hours. 3 Long after nightfall, 
when the main forces of Timur's army, who had been pur- 
suing the Osmanlis, returned to the scene of victory, they 
learned that the Ottoman sovereign was still fighting on 
the hill. There was no more hope for Bayezid. The last 
of the defenders were overwhelmed. ' The Thunderbolt 
continued to wield a heavy battle-ax. As a starving wolf 
scatters a flock of sheep, he scattered the enemy. Each 
blow of his redoubtable ax struck in such a way that there 
was no need of a second blow.' 4 At last, as he tried to 

1 In this battle I have used Sherefeddin, Arabshah, Dominican Friar, 
in Bibl. de VEcole des Charles, lv. 437-68, Schiltberger, Clavijo, and the 
invaluable letters in Marino Sanuto, Muratori, xxii. 794-7. The authorities 
for Angora and Timur are classified in the bibliography below. 

2 Sherefeddin, iv. 15, says the carnage in this battle was seven times 
greater than in any of Timur's previous victories. The Dominican Friar, 
p. 459, puts the Ottoman losses at 40,000. 

3 Schiltberger, p. 21, says that he retreated to this hill with 1,000 
horsemen. Hammer is in error in saying that Bayezid 6 resisted like 
a hero at the head of his ten thousand janissaries with whom he had occupied 
the slope of a hill ' : ii. 91. There were never as many as ten thousand 
janissaries enrolled in the Ottoman army until a century after Bayezid's 
death. See above, p. 119. In oriental historians numbers are almost 
invariably exaggerated at least tenfold. 

4 Solak-zade, p. 63. Sherefeddin and Arabshah bear witness to Bayezid's 
personal courage. 



254 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



withdraw over the hill, he was overpowered, 1 his hands were 
bound behind his back, and he was sent to Timur's tent. 

With Bayezid, his son Musa and several of his highest 
officials, one of whom was Timurtash, were taken prisoners. 
Mustafa disappeared. Soleiman. Mohammed, and Isa suc- 
ceeded in escaping. 2 

The battle of Angora is memorable in Ottoman annals as 
the only crushing defeat experienced by the Osmanlis in the 
first three centuries of their history, and as the one instance 
where a sovereign of the house of Osman has been captured. 
But it cannot be placed among the memorable conflicts 
that have changed the course of history ; for it did not 
affect the fortunes of the nation that won or of the nation 
that lost . It was not like Kossova and Nicopolis. 

XVII 

Bayezid was brought before his conqueror at midnight, 
when Timur was seeking relaxation from the strain of the 
combat in his favourite game of chess with his son, Shah- 
Rokh. Bayezid had lost nothing of his haughty spirit, and 
did not try to win the good graces of Timur. He was never 
more the sovereign than in this moment of humiliation. 
So impressed was Timur with the manner and bearing of his 
prisoner, that he accorded him every honour due to his rank. 

But this spirit of generosity quickly passed. Whether 
it was because Bayezid tried to escape or that Timur 
feared an attempt at rescue as he marched farther into 
Ottoman territory, Timur's attitude soon changed. To break 
Bayezid's spirit he began to mock him and treat him with 

1 The Ottoman historians explain the capture of Bayezid by the fact that 
he was unhorsed. Some say that he was mounted on an inexperienced 
horse. A great deal was written about the battle of Angora at a much 
later date, but, as in describing the battles of Kossova and Nicopolis, 
I have limited myself to contemporary sources. 

2 Mustafa's fate was never cleared up. Mohammed and Isa tied naked, 
according to the Dominican Friar, p. 459. 



BAYEZID 



255 



contempt. He ordered him to be put in chains at night, 
and to be carried on the march in a litter with bars, which 
was nothing less than a cage. 1 At Brusa, Bayezid's harem 

1 I am unable to agree with Alberi, Rel. Ven. Ambasc, 3rd ser., vol. i, 
preface viii., ' Secondo migliori testimonialize deve rigettarsi per falsa la 
tradizione', and Bruun, Notes to Hakluyt ed. of Schiltberger, p. 21 n., 
' We are forced to conclude, after Hammer's searching inquiries, that there is 
no truth whatever in the story of Bayezid having been confined by Timur 
in an iron cage '. Hammer's arguments, ii. 96-101, do not seem to me at all 
convincing. From the philological point of view, they have been refuted 
by Weil, Gescli. der Chalifen, ii. 92. From the historical point of view, 
there is just as strong evidence for as against the litter with bars, which 
could hardly have been any different from a cage. If one argues that 
Timur did not subject his prisoner to this indignity, and advances that the 
cage was really nothing more than a closed litter, such as was used for 
ladies of the imperial harem, he is merely substituting one indignity for 
another. From the character of Bayezid, one would infer that the humilia- 
tion of being shut up like a lion in a cage would have been less than that of 
being put into a harem litter like a woman, for whom the conqueror had 
contempt rather than fear. There is no mention of the iron cage in Schilt- 
berger, Clavijo, and the Dominican Friar. But their silence signifies 
nothing. They are excellent witnesses for the battle of Angora itself, but 
knew little or nothing of what happened in Asia Minor after Angora. One 
might just as well argue from Schiltberger' s silence that Timur did not 
capture Smyrna ! Nor does Sherefeddin mention the humiliation of 
Bayezid, and the iron cage. But the story is given in Arabshah, p. 210, 
who must be reckoned with as a contemporary source. If, as de Salaberry, 
iv. 200-1, claims, the iron cage story was inserted in Arabshah by his 
Ottoman editor and translator, Nazmi-zade, it only goes to show that the 
careful Ottoman students of his time believed the story. The Ottoman 
historians, who are without exception too late to be regarded as sources, 
and who had reasons for making the degradation of the Ottoman sovereign 
as slight as possible, show their knowledge of the early and contemporary 
character of this record by trying to controvert it, and prove that Bayezid 
was carried on a litter rather than in a cage, e. g. Seaddedin, i. 230. 
That the common tradition among the Osmanlis, outside of the court 
chroniclers who were compelled to uphold at all costs the dignity of the 
house of Osman, was in favour of the cage story is proved conclusively 
by Ali Muhieddin, Migne ed., col. 597, who is earlier than Seadeddin, 
and by Evliya effendi, i. 29-30 ; ii. 21-22, who gives the story just 
as we find it in Arabshah and the western writers. Sagredo, who 
follows Spandugino, vigorously defends the cage story as opposed to 
the litter of the Ottoman court chroniclers, and says that Bayezid died 
from striking his head against the bars of his cage, pp. 25-6. In Lonicerus, 
fol. 12 v°, is a picture of the cage. It is mentioned by Guazzo, fol. 275 v° ; 



256 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



was taken from him. It has been recorded that Timur went 
so far as to use his unfortunate rival as a foot stool for mount- 
ing his horse and at the table, and that Bayezid was com- 
pelled to witness the degradation of his wife, the Serbian 
princess Despina. who in a state of nudity served the Tartar 
conqueror with wine at his f easts. 1 

This disgraceful treatment, coupled with the fact that his 
sons made no attempt to bring another army to fight for 
their father's freedom or even to ransom him, at last broke 
the spirit of Bayezid. For nine months he had been held 
up to ridicule in the Tartar army. He had seen his harem 
violated. He had seen Timur pass with ease from one 
portion of the Ottoman possessions in Asia to another. 
Smyrna, which he had never been able to attack, fell 
before the Tartars. The Turkish emirs whom he had dis- 
possessed were settled again in their states. When Bayezid 
learned that he was to be taken to Konia, and then to 
Samarkand, his mind gave way. He died of apoplexy at Ak 
Sheir. 2 Timur allowed Musa to take his father's body to 
Brusa for burial. 3 He had by this time lost interest in the 
Osmanlis and Asia Minor, and was dreaming of new fields of 
conquest. 

Donato da Lezze, p. 10 ; Paolo Giovio ; Geuffry, p. 283 ; Campana, 
fol. 8 v° ; Egnatius, p. 30 ; Rabbi Joseph, i. 256 ; Sanuto, in Muratori, 
xxii. 791 ; Bonincontrius, col. 88 ; Formanti ; and Timur's early western 
biographer, Perondino, p. 31, who, fifty years before Seadeddin, wrote that 
Timur compelled Bayezid's wife Despina to wait nude upon^him and his 
guests at table. The story is also found in Ducas, chapter 26. 

1 Perondino, p. 31 ; Sagredo, p. 26 ; Campana, fol. 8 v° ; Raynaldus 
and Spandugino ; Lettres tfun Solitaire turc, i. 106-7. Exposure of women 
was a common symbol of conquest among the Mongols. It was a formal 
ceremony at the sack of Pekin and Djenghiz Khan's sack of Samarkand. 

2 Many authorities declare that Bayezid committed suicide by striking 
his head against the bars of his cage, being unable to support the sight 
of his wife's disgrace. The humiliation to which Despina was subjected was 
often given in later times by the Osmanlis themselves as a reason why the 
house of Osman does not contract marriages. See above, p. 183, and note. 

3 Sherefeddin, iv. 65-7; Chalc, III, pp. 162-5; Due. 17, pp. 77-8; 
Phr., I. 26, p. 85 ; and the Ottoman historians. 



BAYEZID 



257 



Bayezid died a victim not £ to his destiny as the Ottoman 
historians put it, but to his vices, and to his abandonment of 
the policy of his predecessors, that assimilation should keep 
pace with territorial aggrandizement. There never need 
have been an Angora. Timur had no inclination to invade 
the Ottoman dominions. Bayezid goaded him into it. Even 
if the test of an Angora had been necessary, Bayezid would 
have sustained it and weathered the Tartar storm, had he 
been the same man he was at Nicopolis. In facing a Tartar 
invasion, the advantage was all on Bayezid's side. He 
failed because his mental and physical faculties, which 
rivalled, if they did not surpass, those of any man of his 
age, had become impaired by a life of debauchery. 

XVIII 

After the victory at Angora, the Tartar hordes swept 
across Asia Minor. Timur sent his grandson, Mohammed - 
Sultan, in pursuit of Soleiman, who succeeded in escaping 
from Brusa just as the Tartar horsemen arrived at the gates 
of the city. The Tartars stabled their horses in the mosques, 
while the city was ransacked for its treasures and its young 
girls. Fire followed pillage. 1 The sons of Alaeddin of 
Karamania were set free, and Bayezid's wives and daughters, 
with one exception, were sent to Timur, who had established 
his residence at Kutayia. 

In the search for Soleiman, of whose movements he was in 

I ignorance, Mohammed-Sultan sent soldiers north to Gemlik 
and Nicaea, and west to Mikhalitch and Karasi. These 
cities were pillaged, and their inhabitants reduced to slavery. 

1 The Dominican Friar says that the Jews of Brusa sent a delegation 
of rabbis to inform Mohammed-Sultan that their religion was the same 
as his. He answered that their law was a good one, and that they should 
assemble all their people in the chief synagogue. He promised that no 
harm would come to them. When the Tartars entered the city, they 
sealed fast the doors of this synagogue, and set fire to it. 

1736 R 



258 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



When Mohammed-Sultan learned that Soleiman had escaped 
to Europe, he sent an embassy to him demanding uncon- 
ditional surrender. There was no reply. The question of 
invading Europe was referred to Timur. In the meantime, 
the advance guard of the Tartars devastated the country 
which was the cradle of the Ottoman race, while their com- 
mander celebrated at Yeni Sheir his marriage to the eldest 
daughter of Bayezid. Thus were united the families of 
Timur and his vanquished foe. 1 

Mohammed-Sultan went into winter quarters at Magnesia. 2 
Timur left Kutayia in charge of Shah-Rokh, and moved 
on to Ephesus. He recalled the columns which had been 
devastating western Asia Minor, and concentrated his forces 
against Smyrna. What Bayezid had been unable to accom- 
plish in seven years, Timur did in two weeks. 3 The assault of 
Smyrna was carried on with unceasing energy, and every pos- 
sible measure was taken to bring it to a speedy conclusion. 
The walls were undermined, and bridges built out over the 
water in order that an attack might be made from the side 
of the sea. When the fortress which crowns the hill behind 
the city was entered from the land side, the chevaliers of 
Rhodes fought their way down to their galleys. With lance 
and sword and oar they beat off the despairing inhabitants 
who would have swamped their boats. All except a thou- 
sand succeeded in escaping. These were decapitated, and 
of their heads Timur built a pyramid to commemorate his 
victory. 4 

Timur returned to Ephesus. As he approached the city, 
children came out to meet him, singing songs to appease 

1 Sherefeddin, iv. 37-48 ; Due, 16, pp. 66-7. 

2 Seadeddin, i. 235. 

3 Sherefeddin, iv. 47, 52. 

4 Accounts of the capture of Smyrna : Sherefeddin, iv. 47-53 ; Chalc. , III, 
p. 161 ; Due, 18, p. 78 ; Hadji Khalfa, DjiJmnnuma, fol. 1949 ; Arabshah, 
ii. 24. For date, see.M. de Ste. Croix, in Acad, des Inscriptions, 2 e serie, 
ii. 566, 569. 



BAYEZID 



259 



i his wrath. ' What is this noise ? ' he asked. When his 
attendants told him, he ordered his horsemen to ride over 
the children. They were trampled to death. 1 

Smyrna fell in December, 1402. Timur spent the rest of 
the winter in Ephesus. He destroyed the work of Bayezid 
in Asia Minor by restoring to the deposed emirs or their 
heirs the emirates of Karamania, Tekke, Menteshe, Sarukhan, 
Ai'din, Kastemuni, and Erzindjian. When he saw that the 
sons of Bayezid were ready to quarrel about the succession 
of their father, he began to treat with Isa, Musa and Mo- 
hammed, encouraging in each the hope of recognition as sole 
heir. To Soleiman he sent a diploma, investing him with 
I the Ottoman possessions in Europe as Tartar vassal. 2 

Timur enjoyed the position he had won of arbiter of the 
destinies of the Ottoman Empire. The princes of Europe 
were now seeking his favour more insistently than before 
Angora. Henry IV of England wrote to him most cordially, 
and expressed the hope that he would be converted and 
become the champion of Christianity. 3 

Manuel Palaeologos, who had learned from the Venetian 
Senate the news of Bayezid's defeat at Angora, hurried 
home from Europe. 4 He banished John to Lemnos, ex- 
pelled the Ottoman colonists from Constantinople, and 
closed their tribunal. 5 To Timur he sent an embassy offering 
to acknowledge his suzerainty, and expressing his willingness 
to pay to him the tribute that had been given to Bayezid. 

1 Ali Muhieddin, Leuncl. trans., in Migne, Patr. Graec, clix., 596. Schilt- 
berger, p. 27, relates a similar massacre of children after the capture of 
Ispahan. 

2 Ducas, 18, p. 79. 

3 ' Would that the day might dawn in which your Highness would 
profess the religion of Christ, and stand up in power as the champion of 
the Christian Church against the enemies of the cross.' In the London 

! archives, however, this passage, while legible, is cancelled. So it may not 
! have gone in the copy of the letter sent to Timur. Cf. Wylie's Henry IV, 
i. 316 and n. 4. 

4 Misti, xlvi. 47. 5 Ducas, 18, p. 78 ; Phr., I, 15, p. 62. 



260 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



But when Timur responded with an order to prepare a fleet 
to help the Tartar hordes to pass into Europe, Manuel was 
seized with panic. Smyrna had just fallen, and he felt that 
a similar fate was now reserved for Constantinople. An 
ambassador was sent to Rome and Venice to implore the 
immediate aid of the Vatican and the Senate. 1 

Timur, however, had become tired of Asia Minor and the 
western campaign. He had no constructive policy. He 
never attempted to organize his conquests into a world 
empire. Like the earlier conquerors of his race, Timur was 
a raider. Satiety came with destruction and victory, that 
is, satiety for the particular conquest in which he was en- 
gaged. So he turned his back on Constantinople and the 
glittering possibilities of a European invasion. He wanted 
to return to Samarkand to enjoy the fruits of his victories. 
Perhaps his character was only the reflection of that of his 
followers. 

The march had hardly started when Bayezid died at Ak 
Sheir, in March, 1403. From this moment Timur forgot all 
about the Osmanlis. After a brief sojourn at Konia, he left 
Asia Minor. Within two years he died of fever while on his 
way to conquer China. 2 

XIX 

After Angora the Ottoman army could have been annihi- 
lated ; for Timur sent his victorious Tartars hot upon the 
heels of the refugees. Not only did they follow Soleiman to 
the Sea of Marmora, and the divisions which had retreated 
to the Bosphorus, but they pursued closely the main body of 

1 Phr., loc. cit. ; Innocent VII, Epp., I 212-13. 

2 Wylie, i. 321, says Timur died February 19, 1405, on authority of 
Schiltberger. But this date is in Bruun's note, p. 133, and not in Schilt- 
berger's narrative. According to Clavijo, fol. 57 r°, Timur died November 
18, 1404, while Arabshah, p. 248, says ' 17 Sagban, 807 ', which would be 
in February 1405. For his abandonment of Asia Minor, Chalc, III, 
p. 182 ; Due, 17, p. 76 ; Sherefeddin, iv. 88-95. 



BAYEZID 



261 



the army, which, to the number of possibly forty thousand, 
had fled along the customary line of march to the Darda- 
nelles. 1 There Greeks and Latins vied in helping the refu- 
gees to cross. 2 A Venetian eye-witness of the crossing of 
the Bosphorus wrote that the Venetians in good faith offered 
to join with the Genoese in refusing to transport the Osmanlis 
who were crowded upon the Asiatic shore. But the Genoese 
started secretly to ferry them over to Europe, with the aid 
of the Greeks. Then the Venetians, fearing to lose favour 
with the Osmanlis, started in to help. 3 This testimony is 
corroborated by Clavijo, who visited Constantinople in the 
following year. He adds that Timur was disgusted with 
j the way the Greeks and Latins failed to co-operate with him 
in destroying the Ottoman army. 4 

The astonishing fact is then clearly demonstrated that 
Greeks, Venetians, and Genoese made no effort to take 
advantage of their great opportunity. Nor did they, during 
the ten years of civil war that followed the death of 
Bayezid, make any move, in concert or separately, to drive 
the Osmanlis out of Europe. When it was not yet certain 
what Timur would do in regard to Asia Minor, or even 
whether he would invade Europe, 5 the Venetians and 
Genoese established with Soleiman at Adrianople the same 
friendly relations that they had been so careful to maintain 

1 Stella, in Muratori, xvii. 1195. 

2 Sanuto, in Muratori, xxii. 791, quoting an eye-witness. 

3 Gerardo Sagredo, quoted by Sanuto, ibid., p. 796. He admits that 
this action was foolish and ruinous. 

4 ' El Emperador de Constantinopola e los Genoueses de la ciudad do 
Pera, en lugar de tener lo que con el Tamurbec auian puesto, dexaron 
passar los Turcos de la Grecia en la Turquia e desque fuera vencido aqueste 
Turco passauan ellos mismos a los Turcos con sus fustes de la Turquia 
en la Grecia de los que venian fuyendo, e por esta ocasion tenia mala 
voluntad el Tamurbec a los Christianos de que se fallaron mal los de sa 
tierra.' Clavijo, fols. 26 v°-27 r°. 

5 ' Qui s'ensuivra Dieu le sache. Temir Bey tout seul scet son propos 
et non aultre qui vive ' : Dominican Friar, p. 459. 



262 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



with his father, and fought each other in the Bosphorus. 
Pope Boniface was straining every nerve to help Ladislas of 
Sicily to win the crown of Hungary against Sigismund, 1 who, 
alone of the princes of Europe, had his hands been free, 
might have contested the Balkan peninsula with the warring 
factions of the Osmanlis. 

The decade of civil war among the sons of Bayezid 
passed without interference from the outside world, and 
without a single uprising on the part of the subjugated 
Balkan Christians. The house of Osman, although divided 
against itself, did stand. In 1413, Mohammed I, triumphing 
over his brothers, became sole sovereign of the Osmanlis. 
The crisis was over, and the career of conquest, interrupted 
for the moment by Timur, was resumed. 

Mcopolis had proved that the Osmanlis could hold against 
Europe what they had won. Angora had proved that they 
were too firmly rooted in the Balkan peninsula and in north- 
western Asia Minor, as an indigenous race and as a nation, 
to be destroyed by the misfortunes of their dynasty. Since 
the test of possession is ability to hold, in foul weather as 
well as in fair, who can deny that the Osmanlis under Bayezid 
had inherited the Byzantine Empire ? 

1 Epp., vii. 144-60. 



APPENDIX A 



TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIGIN 
OF THE OSMANLIS AND THEIR EMPIRE 

What has been said in this book on the origin of Ottoman power 
and the foundation of the empire is so different from statements 
which have found acceptance up to this time, that I am under the 
obligation to justify my position by a more technical discussion, 
and by a fuller citation of authorities, than has been given in 
Chapter I. I shall deal with these misconceptions singly. 

1. That Osman was a prince of illustrious birth. 

Chalcocondylas is responsible for the first and widest diffusion 
of this error in western Europe. He claims that Osman is the 
great-grandson of Duzalp, ' chief of the Oghuzes ' ; grandson of 
Oguzalp, who, aspiring to succeed his father, reached ' in a brief 
time the highest fame in Asia ' ; and son of Ertogrul, who, in 
1298, 1 with his fleet, devastated the Peloponnesus, Euboea, and 
Attika. 2 Closely allied to the account of Chalcocondylas is that 
of Hussein Hezarfenn. 3 According to Ali Muhieddin, 4 Seadeddin, 5 

1 The dates given under the Latin columns in Chalcocondylas are almost 
invariably wrong and are responsible for much of the confusion of European 
historians in the matter of chronology. Chalcocondylas himself is full of 
mistakes, and knew very little about the history of Byzantium and the 
Osmanlis in the fourteenth century. But he is not as bad as his Latin 
translator, whom the historians have followed. In order to trace some of 
the errors, I collated the Greek text of Chalcocondylas with the Latin 
translation through the first two books of his history, which cover the period 
1300-1403. The glosses and the inexact translations are many. For 
example of glosses, in I. c. 4 B, ' quos Tartaros nominant ' after Scythis ; 
I. c. 7 C, ' Orthogulus adhibitus in colloquium at beginning of third sen- 
tence ; I. c. 10 C, ' ex tribus, Orchanes nomine after ' films eius natu 
minimus ' ; I. c. 12 C, ' circiter viginti duo ' in the sentence ' Orchanes cum 
regnasset annos mortem obiit '. For a very unfaithful translation compare 
Latin with Greek original in I. c. 27, the end of A and beginning of B. 
In I. c. 28 C !£ ml rpiaKovra is translated 'triginta septem' ! The letters 
cited refer to column position in Migne edition. 

2 Chalcocondylas (in Migne), I. 6, p. 22. 

3 Trans. Petits de la Croix, ii. 287-9. 

4 Annates Turcici, in Migne, Pair. Graec, clix. 579. 

5 Bratutti trans., i. 4. 



264 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and Hadji Khalfa, 1 the grandfather of Osman was Soleiman Shah, 
prince or bey of Mahan in the Khorassan, who was compelled to 
leave his country at the approach of Djenghiz Khan, and lived 
seven years in Armenia. As he was returning home, he was 
drowned in the Euphrates. Two of his sons, Ertogrul and Dun- 
dar, turned back into Asia Minor, and were, through the kindness 
of the Seljuk Sultan, Alaeddin I, given a residence near Angora, 
and, later, on the confines of Bithynia. Neshri places the time 
of residence in Armenia as 170 years, and declares that Soleiman 
Shah was leader of 50,000 families. 2 Practically all of the 
European historians who have written later than the publication 
in Europe of Chalcocondylas, Ali and Seadeddin have followed 
closely these authorities. 3 

The western writers, whose works appeared before the trans- 
lation and publication of the eastern historians, or who followed 
earlier western authorities, are either vague or uncertain con- 
cerning the parentage of Osman, 4 or give an entirely different 
story of the rise of his family. He is supposed to be the son of 
a Tartar shepherd, called Zich, 5 who rises to fame at the court of 
Alaeddin I by defeating in single combat a Greek cavalier that 
had killed many of the favourites of the Seljuk Sultan. 6 Accord- 
ing to others, who give nearly the same story, the name of Osman' s 
father is ' the madman Delis, a shepherd '. 7 For his success in 
killing the Greek, the Sultan rewards him with the castle of 

1 Chronological Tables, Italian trans, of Carli Rinaldo. 

2 Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenldndischen Gesellschaft, xiii. 188-9. 

3 For editions, translators and dates of publication, see Bibliography. 

4 Egnatius, cited by Cuspianus, 12, says : ' Ottomannus obscuro loco et 
parentibus agrariis natus '. Nicolaus Euboicus, Saguntinus Episcopus, 
Sylvius Aeneas, and Andreas a Lacuna say that Osman, of obscure begin- 
nings, arose through oppressing neighbours, Moslem as well as Christian. 
Ab. Ortellius says, ' Tam Graecis quam Turcis repugnantibus \ cited by 
Leunclavius, Pandectes, 99. Bosio, ii. 37, declares, 'Osman first came out 
of Persia Similar vagueness in Haeniger ; Geuffroi, 266 ; Sagredo ; 
Manutio, 3 ; Cuspianus, 11, 42 ; Barletius, in Lonicerus, iii. folios 231-2 ; 
Vanell, 356 ; Cervarius ; Richer, 11. 

5 De Sacy, in Notices et Extraits, xi. 56, foot-note 1, in his discussion of the 
text of a treaty between Genoese of Kaffa and Janko : Lord of Solkat, where 
this word also occurs, suggests that it is an altered form of ' sheik '. 

6 Formanti : Donado da Lezze, 4 ; Paulo Giovio, Ven. ed. of 1541, 3 ; 
Vertot, ii. 97 ; Rabbi Joseph, ii. 505 ; Guazzo, 257 vo ; Ortellius in Leun- 
clavius, Pandectes, 99 ; Lonicerus, 10 ; Spandugino, 182-4. Also Evliya 
effendi, i. 27. 

7 ' II Pazzo Delis, pecoraio ', Spandugino, 184. Leunclavius, Pandectes, 
103, says that Alaeddin poisoned Delis. 



APPENDIX A 



265 



Ottomanzich, which is often confused with Sugut, and is claimed 
to be the origin of Osman's name. 1 By another story, which is 
asserted to be the invention of Mohammed II, who thus wanted 
to legitimatize in the eyes of the world his claim to the 
throne of the Caesars, Osman is the descendant of a certain 
Isaac Comnenus, a member of the imperial Byzantine family, 
who fled to the court of the Seljuks of Konia, and became 
a Moslem. 2 

In this, as in the discussion of other misconceptions which 
follow, we are not at all justified in throwing out categorically the 
testimony of the early western writers every time that they 
conflict with the eastern authorities, or in ignoring them entirely, 
as Hammer, Zinkeisen, and J orga have done. We must remember 
that Chalcocondylas and all the Ottoman historians are very late, 
that they cite no sources upon which to base their assertions or 
inferences, and that they write with the intention to please, and 
under the necessity of pleasing, the Ottoman court, at a time when 
its rulers had become so powerful that they could not brook the 
recording of an humble origin for their royal house. The ex- 
travagant descriptions of Seadeddin, for example, when he speaks 
of Osman's court, and his expressions such as ' laying his petition 
humbly at the feet of his royal master &c, seem much out of 
place in a narrative about primitive and exceedingly plain and 
simple people. The western writers claim to have sources for 
information which are as early and as good as those of Ali and 
Seadeddin. Some of them certainly had. 3 We cannot claim for 
these writers that their stories be accepted as fact. But we can 
claim that they be accepted as an honest reflection of late fifteenth- 
and early sixteenth-century opinion concerning the founder of 
the Ottoman royal house — opinion derived from stories which 
were current in Constantinople at that time, and which, for 

1 Formanti ; Donado da Lezze, 4 ; Cuspianus, 48 ; ibid., Ant. ed., 6 ; 
Spandugino, in Sansovino (ed. 1654), 243 ; Egnatius, 28. Also travels of 
Busbecq, Eng. ed., i. 137, and the Ottoman Evliya, ii. 95. 

2 This story in full in Formanti, 2-3 ; Vertot, ii. 97-8 ; Spandugino, 183. 
Leunclavius, in Pandectes, 103, says that Nicetas Choniates mentions such 
a renegade Comnenus, but calls him Isaac. 

3 The author of Tractatus de ritibus, who was a slave captured by Murad II, 
for example. Also Spandugino, a native of Constantinople, and relative of 
the Cantacuzenos and Notaras families. Also Donado da Lezze. See the 
prefaces of editions of Charles Schefer, of Spandugino ; and of Professor 
Ursu, of Donado da Lezze. 



266 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

lack of definite history, were circulated among the Osmanlis 
themselves up to a very much later period. 1 

The later western historians have taken, without critical 
examination, the Ottoman accounts of the origin of their royal 
family, as they have of the relationship with the Seljuks of Konia, 
practically at their face value. But it is not hard to prove a good 
case against the Ottoman historians. 

The story of Soleiman Shah, prince of Mahan and leader 
of 50,000 families, living and ruling in the neighbourhood of 
Erzerum between 1224 and 1232, is very easy to disprove. The 
name of Mahan is often given to two cities, Dinewer and Neha- 
wend. 2 It is rather the designation of a plain in which these 
two cities lay. In 1229, Sultan Djelaleddin, after his defeat by 
the Mongols at Mughan, passed the winter in the plain of Mahan. 
A certain Izzeddin was lord of the fortress there. He had been 
rebellious some years before, but was ' now serving Djelaleddin 
devoutly '. 3 In the history of Djelaleddin, I find absolutely no 
mention of a Soleiman Shah in connexion with Mahan or any other 
place in that region. With 50,000 families, Soleiman Shah would 
have been a factor in Armenia between 1224 and 1232. For that 
is precisely the time when Djelaleddin, Sultan of Kharesm, his 
logical suzerain or his enemy, was struggling with the Seljuks of 
Konia in that very region ! In 1229, Djelaleddin was at Erzindjian, 
and ravaged the whole country. 4 At the same time, a cousin 
of Alaeddin I, a very powerful ruler, Rokneddin, was lord of 
Erzerum, and was strong enough to be at enmity at the same 
time with Djelaleddin' s invading army and with Alaeddin of 
Konia. 5 Other Arabic historians, and the Seljuk historian of 
this period, confirm the history of Mohammed-en-Nesawi in its 
leading points, but they, no more than the historian of Djelal- 
eddin, make any mention whatever of a Soleiman Shah, or 
of an Ertogrul. 6 Nor is Soleiman Shah and his family mentioned 

1 Evliya effendi, a learned member of the Moslem Ulema of Constanti- 
nople, who travelled widely in the seventeenth century in the Ottoman 
Empire, is continually making statements which show that he had a very 
hazy notion of early Ottoman history. This is true also of Hadji Khalfa, 
the famous bibliographer, in his Djihannuma, a work which I have tested 
and found incomplete and unreliable both in its geographical and historical 
information about the region which gave birth to Osman and his tribe. 

2 Houdas, p. 374, foot-note 1. 3 Mohammed en Nesawi, p. 374. 
4 Ibid., 394. 5 Ibid., 209, 328. 

6 Shehabeddin, 230-9, 263-72, 289-91, in describing Khorassan, Armenia, 



APPENDIX A 



267 



in any of the Arabic genealogies prior to the seventeenth century, 
although these exist in great numbers. 1 There is only one 
Ottoman genealogy prior to the tables of Hadji Khalfa. 2 

The best authority on the western Turks, the late Leon Cahun, 
conservator of the Mazarine Library in Paris, declares that the 
Turkish tribes of the time of the purported Soleiman Shah and 
Ertogrul had no family ties. They knew no rank other than that 
of a man higher up in the army. In inheritance, the younger son 
got the land, and the older sons the movable possessions of the 
father. There were no family names ; there are none to this day. 
The Turks who came into Asia Minor were without name or 
family. They wandered far and sold their services to get 
established family ties. 3 

There is one more testimony concerning the humble origin of 
the Ottoman royal house. The different historians of the rela- 
tions between Timur and Bayezid I all speak of the taunt flung 
by Timur at Bayezid concerning the Ottoman ruler's lack of 
royal ancestors. 4 Bayezid never made any response to this taunt, 
and confined his boasting, which was by no means of a modest 
sort, to his own and his father's achievements, and to his power 
as a European ruler. 

We cannot establish the ancestry of Osman. It is altogether 
probable that he had none of note, but was what Americans would 
call ' a self-made man '. 

and the strife between Djelaleddin and Alaeddin, makes no mention 
of Soleiman Shah or Ertogrul, or of a formidable invasion such as 50,000 
families, under one ruler, would certainly have been regarded. Nor is 
there mention of the 50,000 and their leader in Ibn-Bibi, Seljuk chronicler 
of this period. 

1 Hadji Khalfa, in index of his Bibliography, hi. folios 133-5, speaks of 
more than sixty Arabic genealogies known to him, but in his chronological 
tables he cites none of them for early Ottoman genealogy. 

2 Dourar-al-Oihman, ' the precious pearls touching the original source 
of the Ottoman house ', by Ibn Ali Mohammed-al-Biwy. No date or indi- 
cation of contents. Hadji Khalfa in Bictionnaire bibliographique, Paris 
MS., i. folio 867. 

3 Introduction a Vhistoire d'Asie : Turcs et Mongols, passim. 

4 There is a letter of this sort to Bayezid, quoted in Timur's Institutes. 
Also a letter, given by Sherefeddin, iii. 259-63, near the beginning of which 
he says : ' But you whose true origin ends in a Turcoman sailor, as all 
the world knows.' 



268 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



2. That Osman began his career as a vassal of Alaeddin 
III, Sultan of Iconium, upon whose death, in or about 

1300, OSMAN AND NINE OTHER TURKISH PRINCES DIVIDED THE 
INHERITANCE OF THE SELJUCIDES ; THAT OSMAN PROVED MORE 
POWERFUL THAN THE OTHER PRINCES, AND FOUNDED AN EMPIRE 
UPON THE RUINS OF THE SELJUCIDE EMPIRE. 

When I call this statement, in its entirety, a misconception, 
I realize that I am attacking the idea of the founding of the 
Ottoman Empire which has been voiced by the most eminent 
historians and has an accepted and unquestioned place in text- 
books and encyclopaedias, and in general histories. 

In a French translation of Chalcocondylas, published in 1662, 
under the woodcut of Osman, we find these four lines : 

' De simple Capitaine en des Pays deserts, 
Pres du grand Saladin la Fortune m' attire ; 
Et la de ses debris je fonde cet Empire, 
Qui menace aujourd'huy d'engloutir l'Univers.' 

I quote this verse because it seems to me to express concisely 
the commonly accepted idea of the foundation of the Ottoman 
Empire, as I find it written everywhere. Hammer, whose 
eighteen volumes contain a wealth of material upon the Ottoman 
Empire not elsewhere to be found, and who shows remarkable 
erudition as well as care and critical powers, perpetuates the 
tales about Ertogrul and Osman and the court of Konia. He 
makes the categorical statement, ' The empire of the Seljuks 
broke up, and on its ruins arose that of Osman'. 1 Creasy has 
popularized the opinion of Hammer in the English-speaking 
world. 2 Lane-Poole, who has written the only general history of 
the Ottoman Empire in English in our generation, has tacitly 
accepted the common tradition. 3 Zinkeisen and J orga, the onty 
later historians whose names can be coupled for scholarly work 
with that of Hammer, are most unsatisfactory in their failure to 
take up critically the Ottoman traditions of the early days of the 

1 ' L' empire des Seljucides s'ecroula, et sur ses ruines surgit celui 
d'Osman,' Hammer, i. 83. 

2 i. 7-13. 

3 In the Story of the Nations Series. This book does not do credit to the 
name of the great scholar whom Orientalists and numismatists universally 
honour. 



APPENDIX A 



269 



Empire. 1 Leunclavius, the sole writer in Western Europe before 
Hammer, whose work might be called ' scientific ', discusses ex- 
haustively and compares critically all authorities existing at his 
time (1590) on most minute points of early Ottoman history, but 
is almost silent on the grave inconsistencies and contradictions 
arising from the question of the relation between the Osmanlis 
and the Seljuks of Konia. 2 There is the same silence in Cantemir 
and his translators. 3 The latest Ottoman historian says : 
' Osman's military and political career naturally divides itself 
into two parts, that in which he was vassal of Alaeddin, and that 
in which he became sultan.' 4 An Oriental whose work has en- 
joyed great vogue in France declares : ' Osman pursued through 
every obstacle the realization of his plan, which consisted in 
founding upon the ruins of the Seljuk Empire a great, free, and 
independent state.' 5 

I find one German scholar who, briefly touching upon the 
foundation of Osman's power, rejects or ignores the connexion 
with the Seljuks of Konia ; but he goes further afield, and makes 
the astonishing statement that Osman conquered Bagdad, 
allowed the Khalifs only spiritual power, called himself Sultan, 
and became master of the Moslem world, thereby connecting the 
Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia with the Mameluke conquest 
of Egypt, and attributing it all to Osman ! 6 

If we had good ground for rejecting the princely origin of 
Osman, our justification for impugning and discarding the con- 
nexion of Osman with the Seljuks of Konia is stronger still. 

Kai Kobad Alaeddin, the only Sultan to whom the name of 



1 In the Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, Werk 15 (1840-63) and Werk 37 
(1908-13). 

2 Leunclavius, Pandectes. This work will be found in all large libraries, 
because it is reprinted in volume 159 of Migne's Patrologia Graeca Latine, 
715-922. 

3 For translations of Cantemir, see Bibliography. The Rumanian trans- 
lator, Dr. Hodosiu, has reprinted the notes of the various editors of Cante- 
mir, which makes his edition the most valuable. 

4 Youssouf Fehmi, Histoire de la Turquie, Paris, 1908, p. 11. 

5 Halii Ganem, Les Sultans ottomans, Paris, 1901, i. 24. 

6 ' Osman verband sich mit der Leibwache in Bagdad, eroberte die 
Stadt, setzte sich auf den Thron, wodurch er der Beherrscher aller Muham- 
medaner wurde, und liess dem Chalifen nur die nichts bedeutende geistliche 
Oberhoheit in Bagdad ; er nannte sich Sultan, d. h. Herrscher, und starb 
729 (1328 n. Chr.).' Prof. F. Wiistenfeld, Geschichte der Tiirken, &c, 
Leipzig, 1899, pp. 15-16. 



270 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Alaeddin is given by common consent, 1 died in 1236. 2 He was 
succeeded by Ka'i Khosrew II, Giazzeddin, or Ghizatheddin, who 
was Sultan at the time of the great Mongol invasion of Asia 
Minor. In the spring of 1243, Erzerum was sacked without 
having received any help from Konia. Some months only after 
this event did Kai Khosrew move. He was defeated at Mughan, 
near Erzindjian, in a decisive battle, 3 and fled to Angora, abandon- 
ing his baggage. Erzindjian fell next. Then Kai Khosrew with- 
drew to Sivas, and from that city sent an embassy to the Mongols, 
making his submission and promising an annual tribute of four 
hundred thousand pieces of silver. The Mongol armies pene- 
trated as far as Smyrna. Everywhere submission was complete, 
although no effort was made to provide a new government for 
the conquered regions in the western part of the peninsula. The 
Emperor of Trebizond became a vassal of the Mongols. 4 

The battle of Mughan cost the Seljuk Empire its independence. 5 
After 1246, when Kai Khosrew died, the situation of the Seljuks 
of Konia is depicted by Shehabeddin in these words : c The 
princes of the family of Seljuk kept only the title of sovereign, 
without having any authority or any power. There was left 
to them only that which concerned their own person and their 
houses, the insignia of royalty, and sufficient money for expenses 
of an indispensable necessity. The power belonged to Tartar 
governors, who managed everything without opposition. It was 
in the name of the princes of the family of Djenghiz Khan that 

1 Reineccius thought that this name must be common to all the Sultans 
of Konia. It does not appear for others than Kai Kobad II in the Arabic 
genealogies. Leunclavius is so confused by the discrepancy here that he 
concludes that the Ottoman historians must have given the name indis- 
criminately to all the Sultans ! (Pandectes, 106). Hadji Khalfa, Djihan- 
numa, folio 1790, speaking of Amassia, says that its fortress was repaired 
by ' Sultan Alaeddin the Seljucide '. It is typically Ottoman to be vague 
about names as well as about dates. Hadji Khalfa frequently speaks of an 
Ottoman Sultan, whose name is duplicated, without any following ordinal. 
There is often no clue in the context to identify the Sultan to whom he 
refers. 

2 As the year of the Hegira began in June in 1240, there is the alternative 
of reckoning the Christian era a year later during the middle period of this 
century. But I have not thought necessary to indicate this alternative 
each time. 

3 Villain, book VI, c. 32, in Muratori, xiii, col. 175, describes this battle; 
also Vie de Saint Louis, by Le Nain de Tillemont (ed. Gaulle), iii. 4. 

4 Abulfeda ; Howorth, iii. 47. 

5 This is the opinion of two of the ablest modern scholars, Heyd, i. 534, 
and Sarre, p. 41. 



APPENDIX A 



271 



the public prayer was made, and that gold and silver money was 
struck. 1 When the dynasty of the Seljucides had arrived at the 
last degree of weakness . . . races of Turks seized a large part of 
these countries. . . . The Turks recognized the pre-eminence of 
the prince of Kermian.' 2 There is not a word of any possible 
Ottoman supremacy even in his own day, fifty years later. 
Every source on the latter half of the thirteenth century which 
I have consulted corroborates the testimony of Shehabeddin. 3 
I have space to give only a few of the facts which I have gathered 
concerning the fortunes of the Sultans of Konia during the period 
1246-1300, when Ertogrul and Osman are pictured by the 
Ottoman historians, and by the European historians who have 
followed them, as basking in the sunshine of Seljuk imperial 
favour. 

After the death of Ka'i Khosrew, the empire was divided be- 
tween his three sons, who, however, seemed to rule in common as 
vassals of the Mongols, for their names were asserted to appear 
together on coins in 1249. 4 During the decade after the conquest, 
the Mongols overran western Asia Minor. We read that Sultan 
Rokneddin went with the Mongol general, Ba'ichu, into winter 
quarters in Bithynia, 5 and that Ba'ichu received orders from 
Khulagu Khan in 1257 to pillage the entire Seljuk dominions. 
In 1264, Abulfeda gives Rum, with its capital as Konia, among 
the provinces ruled by Khulagu. 6 Bibars, Sultan of Egypt, 
succeeded in occupying Konia for a brief time in 1276. 7 In 1278, 
Abaka Khan opened negotiations with Haython, king of Little 
Armenia, with the view of making him Sultan of Rum. In 1282, 

1 I can find no record of coins to controvert this statement. Lane- 
Poole, Mohammedan Coins in the Bodleian Library, 41, gives only one coin 
of the Bodleian collection after 641 of the Hegira, and to this he assigns 
the date a.h. 663 with a question mark. 

2 MS. Bib. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, 583, folio 144 r° and v°. 

3 The lists of coins in I. Ghalib Edhem's Monnaies turcomanes also bear 
eloquent testimony to the disappearance of Seljuk vassal dynasties during 
this period. 

4 I have not heard of such a coin existing to-day, but make the statement 
on the strength of Abulfaradj, Chronicon Syr., 527-8. 

5 Abulfaradj, ibid., 542-3 ; Howorth, iii. 69. 

6 Abulfeda, v. 15-16, under date of a. h. 662. Villain" (in Muratori, xiii), 
VII. c. 40, column 261-2, describes how Abaka Khan chased the Saracens 
(sic) from ' Turchia', and also the 'Re d'Erminia', who "lascio a' Tartari 
la Turchia '. 

7 Huart, Souvenirs de voyage, 164, speaks of the battle, but does not 
mention occupation of Konia. 



272 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Bibars, writing to Ahmed Khan, says : ' At this moment Kon- 
ghuratai ' (a Mongol general) £ is in the land of Rum, which is 
subject to you and pays you taxes.' 1 In 1283, Ghizatheddin, who 
was ruling with the merest semblance of royalty in Konia, was 
deposed by Ahmed Khan, exiled to Erzindjian, and replaced by 
Masud. There was anarchy everywhere in Asia Minor at this time. 2 
The distinguished French Orientalist, M. Huart, who studied in 
Konia itself the inscriptions of the Seljuk Sultans, could find 
nothing after this period to indicate that the two final sultans who 
followed Ghizatheddin were more than playthings of the Mongols. 3 

The testimony of Marco Polo is most precious to us here. When 
he passed through this country in 1271 he says that Konia, Sivas, 
Caesarea and many other cities of ' Turquemanie ' were subject 
to the Tartars, who imposed their rule there. 4 It was his im- 
pression that the Turcomans were subject to local rulers, and 
responded to no central authority. 

The last days of the Seljuks are most obscure. Masud ruled 
until 1296, when he was deposed by Ahmed Khan. For two 
years there was no ruler. Whether Firamurs ever ruled is a 
matter of doubt. 5 The last Sultan is generally given as Kai 
Kobad, who remained Sultan for four or ten years. 6 However, 
there was no Sultan actually ruling as sovereign in Konia either 
in 1290 or in 1300. Neither Masud nor Kai Kobad could have 

1 Abulfaradj, Chronicon Arab., 365-7 ; d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols, 
ii. 570-80 ; Howorth, iii. 295. 

2 Howorth, iii. 315. 3 Konia, Ville des Derviches tmirneurs, 177. 

4 ' lis sont souspost au Tartar de Levant, qui y met sa seigneurie.' 
Edition of Pauthier, 37. For status of this country at the beginning of 
the thirteenth century, see Clironique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Tresorier 
(ed. Mas-Latrie, Paris, 1871), pp. 377, 381. 

5 Hadji Khalfa naively solves this doubt by rolling Masud and Kai 
Kobad into one and the same person, Djihannuma, folio 1752 bis. 

6 There is no way of reaching certainty on this point. Rasmussen, 
Annates Islamici, pp. 34-8, reflects the confusion which attended the 
scholar of the early nineteenth century who wanted to make a chronological 
table of the later Seljuk Sultans. The two best modern tables are to be 
found in Sarre and Huart, scholars who became interested in the Seljuk 
problem through their archaeological travels in Asia Minor. The best 
account of the Seljuks is that of Houtsma in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
It is to be regretted that Professor Houtsma has not published the French 
translation of Ibn Bibi, which he promised in his introduction to the 4th 
volume of the Leyden series of Seljuk texts. Three years ago, Professor 
Sir William Ramsay, who knows Konia better than any European scholar, 
told me that he felt there was rich reward for the research student in the 
Seljuk period. The history of the Seljuks of Konia has yet to be written. 



APPENDIX A 



273 



given Osman feudal rights or a charter of independence. There 
was no dissolution of the Seljuk Empire in 1300. In all except 
mere name, it had become extinct before Osman was born. 

The Mongol conquerors never extended their political system 
to western Asia Minor. But, from 1246 to 1278, the Anatolians, 
Moslem and Christian alike, were in constant terror of the Mongol 
hordes. After 1276, the Mongols were too occupied with the 
Mamelukes of Egypt, and with the dissensions arising in the 
eastern part of their great empire, to pay much attention to the 
remote Turkish tribes of Rum. During the last quarter of the 
thirteenth century, there was no change in the status quo of the 
Seljuks at Konia that affected in any way the fortunes of these 
tribes. We can explain their rise into independent principalities, 
not by the disappearance of the Seljuk Sultans, but by the diver- 
sion of Mongol energy to other quarters. 

Among early western writers there was great divergency of 
opinion about the number of the ' Seljuk heirs '. I have found 
them represented as one, 1 three, 2 four, 3 five, 4 and seven. 5 Pachy- 
meres, if we can trust the text of the Bonn edition, 6 is the earliest 
writer to mention the traditional number of ten. 7 When the 
Seljuk Empire fell before the Mongols, it had no heirs in Asia 
Minor. During the latter half of the thirteenth century and the 
first quarter of the fourteenth century (1250-1325) an innumer- 
able number of village chieftains endeavoured to form states. 
There were many more than ten. The states which existed at 
the beginning of the reign of Orkhan I have put into another 
appendix. 8 

There is no record of Osman having attacked his Turkish 
neighbours. The testimony of the best Ottoman authorities 
is categorical on this point. ' Orkhan extended his father's 

1 Osman was the sole heir according to Boeder : also Donado da Lezze, 4. 

2 ' Osman, Karaman, and Assam. Karaman retired to Syria and Assam 
to Persia. The house of Osman always persecuted the descendants of 
these two latter.' Geuffroi, 267. Also Cuspianus, 11, and Haeniger. 

3 Spandugino, Lonicerus, and Egnatius. 

4 Mignot, 33. 

5 Tractatus de moribus ; Vanell, i. 351-2 ; Sagredo ; Cervarius ; Cus- 
pianus, 46. 

6 The historian must use the Bonn editions with caution. There are 
frequent glosses in the Latin translations of Byzantine texts. See foot-note 
on p. 263. 

7 Pachymeres, ii. 589. 

8 See Appendix B, which is really a continuation of this argument. 
1736 g 



274 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



dominions very little to the south : not at all towards the east. 
Murad's activities in Asia Minor were the least successful part 
of his career, and were by no means permanent. Sherefeddin 
AH, whom we may regard as the best contemporary source for 
the end of the fourteenth century, states explicitly : ' Bayezid 
reduced under his dominion a large portion of the country of 
Rum, that is to say, the provinces of Aidin, of Menteshe, of 
Kermian and of Karamania, a thing which his ancestors had never 
been able to bring to an end.' 1 

In view of the facts of the case, it is strange that the idea of 
Osman as the powerful heir of the Seljuks, who mastered the 
other aspirants to that honour, has had such a long lease of life 
through centuries. Many of the early writers made Osman 
master of all Asia Minor. 2 It is commonly recorded that he 
captured Sivas. 3 One writer placed in that city his capital. 4 
Another credited him with the capture of Konia. 5 Misinforma- 
tion of this sort was given to Charles VI of France by returning 
pilgrims, 6 and, a century and a quarter later,* to Frances I. 7 The 
early idea of the Osmanlis as an Asiatic people, of large numbers, 8 
who conquered Asia Minor and then overthrew the Byzantine 
Empire, 9 has persisted to this day. One of the sanest Ottoman 
writers of modern times, who has brought wide knowledge and 
judgement to bear upon the history of the Ottoman army, is 
led astray by this misconception. He says, 1 It was the Arabic 
and Persian states that the Ottoman Empire had to fight before 

1 Vie de Timour, iii. 255. 

2 ' Osman possessed all Anatolia, which he called Osmania : he came to 
be called Lord of Asia Minor,' Formanti, 4 ; ' Osman made himself master 
of all Anatolia without any difficulty,' Spandugino ; ' Osman seized Cap- 
padocia, Galatia, and Bithynia,' Cuspianus, 10 ; ' master of Syria as well as 
of Asia Minor,' Donado da Lezze, 5. 

3 Formanti ; Geuffroy ; Donado ; Cuspianus ; Giovio Paulo ; Richer ; 
Guazzo, 257 v°. 

4 Rabbi Joseph, ii. 505. 5 Mignot, 33. 

6 Chronique de Saint-Denis (Ed. Soc. Hist, de France), i. 319, 709. 

7 Richer, whom I have already quoted in Chapter I. 

8 ' Cette nation nombreuse, pleine de confiance dans ses forces, et brulant 
du desir de soumettre a sa domination toute la chretiente, avait quitte les 
confins de Perse.' Chronique de Saint-Denys, i. 709. 

9 ' Quod cum ante complures annos florens illud Orientis imperium ever- 
terit et in Occidentis non exigua spacia invaserit, atque oppresserit quod 
reliquum nobis factum est, omni vi suo intolerabile iugum ditionemque 
redigere studet.' Domini de la Vue, Disputatio de hello turcico, bound in 
with Camerarius, p. 94, in Bibl. Nat., Paris, Imprimes, no. J 860. 



APPENDIX A 



275 



any other '. So it is natural that he should be puzzled by finding 
in the military museum at Constantinople early Ottoman weapons 
on Byzantine and European models. He explains this by saying 
that these weapons were not used by the Osmanlis, but must have 
been captured, for the Osmanlis, naturally, would use Persian 
and Arabic models ! 1 

But Colonel Djevad is not more in error than the two greatest 
French authorities on Ottoman architecture. Saladin, in his 
summary of Ottoman history, instructs his readers as follows : 
' Alaeddin III, conquered by the Mongols, abandoned the 
sovereignty to Osman. . . . When the Osmanlis penetrated into 
Anatolia ... in proportion to the extension westward of the Otto- 
man Empire, we shall see the influence of Byzantine architecture 
increase. . . . Little by little, as the Turks approached Con- 
stantinople, this impregnation of the influence of Byzantium had 
an increasingly greater importance in the development of Otto- 
man art.' 2 This misconception of the origin of the Osmanlis 
leads him to state : ' It is then indispensable to study the Seljuk 
monuments of Konia, which have necessarily served as models to 
the first Ottoman monuments.' 3 From his premisses, Saladin has 
argued rightly. But his historical facts are wrong. Even if they 
were not, his conclusion could still be proved wrong. The refuta- 
tion of his statement exists in the two earliest Ottoman buildings, 
the school and the kitchen for the poor at Nicaea, the date of 
whose construction Seadeddin places in 1331. 4 Both of these 
are typically Byzantine. In Brusa there is no Ottoman building 
of the Seljuk type which can be proved to have been constructed 
prior to Mohammed I (1413-21). 5 Parvillee, to whom the whole 
world owes a debt of gratitude for his able reconstruction of the 

1 Col. Djevad bey, 192-3. 

2 H. Saladin, Manuel de V architecture musulmane, 437-40. 

3 Ibid., 437. On p. 479, Saladin makes another curious statement to the 
effect that in 1300 the Osmanlis employed architects who had fortified the 
Seljuk strongholds. I have never been able to find in my reading or from 
observation of Ottoman constructions any authority for such an assertion. 

4 i. 50. The medresse is, as Seadeddin says, to the right after you enter 
the Yeni Shelr gate. The imaret is near the Yeshil Djami, which is the 
oldest Ottoman mosque extant, dating from 1378. The imam of the 
Yeshil Djami told me that the imaret was built by Osman's wife, Mal- 
khatun. According to Seadeddin, however, Malkhatun died before Osman ! 

5 Parvillee, p. 6, says that the Oulou-Djami, which is attributed to 
Murad I in Brusa by popular consent, was not finished until the reign of 
Mahomet I. 

S 2 



276 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



precious historic monuments of Brusa, starts his scholarly work 
on Ottoman architecture in the fifteenth century with these 
words : ' Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Seljuk 
Empire disappeared. On its ruins arose that of Osman.' He 
not only follows Hammer : he uses his very words ! 1 From the 
historical point of view, I maintain that the Byzantine influence 
was an indissoluble factor in the evolution of Ottoman architecture 
from the very beginning. In this I am supported, from the 
expert architect's point of view, by the two German autho- 
rities on this subject. 2 The Seljuk, Arab, and Persian influences 
entered in at a considerably later period. 

There exists in tradition and in law an intimate connexion 
between the House of Osman and the Grand Tchelebi of Konia. 
This has been pointed to as a confirmation of the hypothesis that 
the Ottoman sovereigns derived their authority originally from 
the Seljuks of Rum. I do not deny the force of tradition. In the 
absence of early records, the beginning of this comiexion must 
remain a moot question. But the evidence from outside sources 
makes reasonable my doubt as to the existence of this connexion 
before- the reign of Mohammed I or Murad I. 

There are two other arguments which might be adduced in this 
appendix, the questions of Osman's title as an independent ruler, 
and of the chieftainship as an elective office among the Turkish 
tribes. But both of these have already been discussed in the text 
and the foot-notes of the chapter on Orkhan. 

1 Cf. preface of Parvillee ; and Hammer, i. 83. 

2 W. Liibcke, Geschichte der Architektur (6te Auflage), i. 425 ; Franz- 
Pasha, Die Baukunst des Islams (third volume of part 2 of Handbiicher 
der Architektur), 52, 67. 



APPENDIX B 



THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR DURING 
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 

In order to support the contention of this book, that the 
Ottoman Empire was founded (in the durable sense of that 
word) upon the ruins of the Byzantine Empire as it existed at 
the time of Osman (1300), and gained its power and prestige in 
the Balkan peninsula rather than in Asia Minor, there must be 
set forth, as far as it is possible to do so within the limits of an 
appendix, an expose of the extent and power of the other emirates 
of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century. Such a review is 
useful, not only to prove the argument, but also to enable the 
reader to follow intelligently the development of Ottoman power ; 
for there are difficulties attendant upon the writing and the 
reading of a history where the geographical names are unfamiliar. 
The writer is faced with the dilemma of making his work meaning- 
less or uninteresting : meaningless if he fails to enlighten his 
readers as to the places and peoples whom he mentions ; unin- 
teresting if he interrupts his narrative with technical, encyclo- 
paedic explanations. 

A special map accompanies this appendix. The list of emirates 
contains after each name a number in brackets, which refers to 
the map. As in almost all cases the geographical limits are 
vague, the general position only of each emirate can be given. 
To put in definite boundary lines would be mere conjecture. 
Then, too, at different times during the fourteenth century, inde- 
pendent emirates overlapped each other. Sometimes they were 
confined to single cities or villages. 

In preparing this appendix, I am indebted to several modern 
scholars whose work is most suggestive. 1 But I believe that this 

1 Mas-Latrie, Tresor de Chronologic, and papers pn commercial relation- 
ship between Cyprus and Asia Minor in Biol, de VEcole des Charles ; Lane- 
Poole, ' Successors of the Seljuks in Asia Minor,' Journ. Royal Asiatic Soc, 
1882, new series, xiv. 773-80 (Lane-Poole did not avail himself of the 
precious indications in Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin, but trusted alto- 
gether to Gibb's translation of Seadeddin's unreliable chronology. Seaded- 
din did not have access to as good source-material as Lane-Poole himself !) ; 
Clement Huart, ' Epigraphie arabe d'Asie Mineure,' Revue semitique, 1894-5. 



278 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 




APPENDIX B 



279 



is the first attempt to compare the Asiatic possessions of Osman, 
Orkhan, Murad, and Bayezid with those of their Turkish, rivals 
for the purpose of illustrating the slow growth of the Ottoman 
Empire in Asia Minor, and the first time that contemporary 
sources have been drawn upon for this purpose. 

From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, we are able to 
reconstruct the political status of Asia Minor, in a general way, 
from the narratives of pilgrims and the experiences of the Cru- 
saders. From the beginning of the fifteenth century on to the 
present day, we have a wealth of sources for the history of Asia 
Minor in the writings of European travellers, which are valuable 
not only for their geographical indications and their observations 
on the life of the people, but also for their testimony in corrobo- 
rating or disproving the statements of Oriental historians, who 
are so often lacking in precision and verisimilitude. For the 
fourteenth century, however, reliable European sources are 
lacking. 

This lacuna is filled by the travel records of two Moslems of 
more than ordinary intelligence and powers of observation. 

The long-lost manuscript of the travels of Ibn-Batutah was one 
of those important finds that made the French occupation of 
Algeria so memorable an event in the annals of the advancement 
of learning. Its translation into French in 1843 made accessible 
for the first time a contemporary source of the highest value for 
the political and social life of the whole Moslem world during the 
first half of the fourteenth century. For Ibn Batutah travelled 
from his home in Morocco to the confines of China. He lived 
a while in each country that he visited, and wrote from the sympa- 
thetic and understanding point of view of a member of the Moslem 
clergy. Ibn Batutah visited Asia Minor between 1330 and 1340. 1 

Shehabeddin was an Arabic writer from Damascus, 2 who died 
in 1349. He wrote a voluminous work of twenty volumes, called 

1 Muralt, in the bibliography of his Chronographie Byzantine, puts Ibn 
Batutah at 1320. There can be no doubt about this being an error, for 
when Ibn Batutah visited the Ottoman domains, Orkhan was ruling, and 
Nicaea had been captured. I put 1340 as latter limit, because Ibn Batutah 
speaks of some places captured by Orkhan before 1340 as being still inde- 
pendent. 

2 Quatremere, in Notices et Extraits, xiii. 152-3, cannot reach a definite 
conclusion as to whether Shehabeddin is from Damascus, Marash, or 
Morocco. But I find that Hadji Khalfa, Diet. Bill, Paris MS., fol. 1832, 
under no. 10874, records him as a ' writer of Damascus'. 



280 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

Footpaths of the Eyes in the Kingdoms of Different Countries. 1 He 
was a contemporary of Ibn Batutah. Shehabeddin did not enjoy 
the advantage of visiting personalty the many emirates of western 
Asia Minor, as did Ibn Batutah ; but he states that he has 
based his record of these countries upon the eye-witness informa- 
tion furnished to him by word of mouth by Sheik Haidar of Sir 
Hissar. 2 The agreement between Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin 
on the state of affairs in Asia Minor during the first half of the 
fourteenth century is so general that one can claim for their 
statements,, which are, in large part, the basis of this appendix, 
most substantial grounding. 

The other sources are the Byzantine historians, the chronicler 
of the Catalans, the Catalan Map of 1375, 3 the annalist of Trebi- 
zond, the points of contact with the Cypriotes, the chevaliers of 
Rhodes, the Italian traders, the Osinanlis and the Mongols and 
Tartars. For a few of the emirates there are coins extant. In- 
scriptions on public edifices, such as mosques, pious foundations, 
baths and fountains, are unfortunately lacking, not only for the 
history of the Turkish emirates but for the Osmanlis as well. 4 

In the list that follows, twenty-six of the emirates existed 
during the reign of Orkhan. between the years 1330 and 1350. 
They are mentioned either by Ibn Batutah or by Shehabeddin, 
in most cases by both, as independent in their day. The others 
are either earlier or later than Orkhan's reign, and comprise 
a portion of earlier emirates, from which they had become de- 
tached. After the Turkish emirates, given alphabetically, are 
placed the non-Turkish independent states in Asia Minor. 



Adalia : see Satalia 
Adana (1) 

Afion Kara Hissar : see 

Karasar 
Aidin (2) 
Akbara (3) 
Akridur (4) 



Akserai (5) 
Aksheir (6) 
Alaia (7) 

Altoluogo : see Ayasoluk 
Angora (8) 

Armenia : see Little Ar- 
menia (44) 



1 Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe 2325. For Quatreinere trans, see 
Bibliography. 

2 Ibid., fol. 123 v°. 

3 Notices et Extraits, xiv, partie 2, to face p. 77. 

4 See discussion of source-material in Bibliography. 



APPENDIX B 



281 



Arzendjian : see Erzindjian 
Attaleia : see Satalia 
Ayasoluk (9) 
Balikesri (10) 

Berkeri (Birgui, Berki) : see 

Ai'din 
Borlu (11) 
Brusa (12) 
Caesarea (13) 

Cilicia : see Little Armenia (44) 

and Adana (1) 
Daouas : see Tawas 
Denizli (14) 
Djanik : see Kaouia 
Egherdir : see Akridur 
Ephesus : see Ayasoluk 
Erzindjian (15) 
Fukeh (16) 

Germian : see Kermian 
Gul Hissar (17) 
Guzel Hissar : see Aidin 
Halik (Halicarnassus) : see 

Fukeh 
Hamid (18) 
Iakshi (19) 
Ionia : see Aidin 
Kaiseriya : see Caesarea 
Kandelore : see Alai'a 
Kaouia (20) 
Karamania (21) 
Karasar (22) 
Karasi (23) 
Kastemuni (24) 
Keredeh (25) 
Kermasti (26) 
Kermian (27) 
Konia : see Karamania 
Kul Hissar : see Gul Hissar 
Kutayia : see Kermian 



Ladik (Laodicea) : see Denizli 

Larenda : see Karamania 

Limnia (28) 

Lydia : see Sarukhan 

Magnesia : see Sarukhan 

Marash (29) 

Marmora (30) 

Menteshe (31) 

Milas : see Fukeh 

Miletus : see Palatchia 

Mikhalitch (32) 

Nazlu (33) 

Nicaea (34) 

Palatchia (35) 

Pamphylia : see Tekke 

Pergama : see Karasi 

Sarukhan (36) 

Satalia (37) 

Sinope (38) 

Sis : see Adana 

Sivas (39) 

Sulkadir : see Marash 
Tawas (40) 
Tekke (41) 

Theologos : see Ayasoluk 
Tokat (42) 
Tralles : see Aidin 
Ulubad (Lopadion) (43) 
Little Armenia (44) 
Trebizond (45) 
Phocaea (46) 
Smyrna (47) 

Byzantine possessions (48) 
Cypriote possessions (49) 
Mongol and Tartar possessions 
(50) 

Rhodian possessions (51) 
Egyptian possessions (52) 
Catalan possessions (53) 



282 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



The material that can be gathered about these Turkish emir- 
ates, the two independent Christian states, and the spheres of 
influence of outside Christian and Moslem states in Asia Minor 
in the fourteenth century, would make a book in itself. In this 
appendix I desire to give only enough to indicate the relative 
strength and vitality of each state. It must be borne in mind 
that my object is not to write the history of these emirates, or of 
Asia Minor as a whole, during the fourteenth century, but to 
demonstrate how little of Asia Minor was really incorporated in 
the Ottoman possessions at the time that, and during the thirty years 
after, the capital of the new empire was established in Adrianople. 

Ad ana (1) 

In the Taurus Mountains, on the northern limits of Lesser 
Armenia, and to the south-east of Karamania, the Turcoman 
tribes through whom Marco Polo passed seemed to him to enjoy 
an independent existence. Up to the time of Murad I, they 
formed no state, but between 1373 and 1375 the family of 
Ramazan took the chieftainship. When the Mamelukes des- 
troyed the Armenian kingdom (1375), the Ben-Ramazan dynasty 
established itself at Adana, on the Sarus, in the fertile Cilician 
plain. 1 The Ben-Ramazan emirs managed to keep from being 
absorbed either by the Karamanians or the Egyptians. After 
the complete subjugation of Karamania by the Osmanlis, they 
submitted to Selim I about 1510, under the stipulation, however, 
that the emir, Piri pasha, should hold office for life as vali of 
Adana and Sis. Sis was frequently coupled with Adana in the 
title of the Ben-Ramazan. 

1 If one asks why Adana and Marash are included in this resume, it must 
be remembered that these are regions which might legitimately be included 
in Asia Minor as a portion of the latter Konia Seljuk dominions which we 
are discussing. In the division of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, 
Cilicia is given under Diocesis Oriens rather than under Diocesis Asiana 
with the rest of Asia Minor. To regard Cilicia as belonging to Syria was 
common up to the days of Mehemet Ali. Ibn Khaldun, Notices et Extraits, 
xix. lere partie, p. 143, speaks of Adana as being ' at the extremity of 
Syria while Cilicia is included in Syria in Abdul Ali Bakri's description of 
Africa, Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe no. 2218, p. 103. Both the Latin and 
Orthodox Churches made Cilicia depend ecclesiastically upon Antioch : cf . 
Le Quien, Oriens Christianus, ii. col. 869, iii. col. 1181. But, in modern 
times, we have come to regard this region as a portion of Asia Minor. 



APPENDIX B 



283 



A ID IN (2) 

Aidin comprised the greater part of Ionia, with a portion of 
Lydia, if we take its boundaries to be those of the present 
vilayet of the same name. It comprised, at the time of its 
greatest extent, Smyrna, Ephesus, and Tralles. Smyrna was 
captured by the crusaders in 1344. Ephesus was at times inde- 
pendent under the name of Ayasoluk. Tralles, called Guzel 
Hissar, and sometimes also Birgui or Berki, was the capital of 
Aidin in the time of Orkhan. Later, Ayasoluk, and, last of all, 
Tira, were the successive capitals. 

The emirate was founded by Aidin, a contemporary of Osman, 
who was succeeded by his son Mohammed about 1330. Ibn 
Batutah regarded Mohammed as a very powerful prince, who 
was especially strong on the sea. His eldest son, Omar, who 
succeeded him in 1341, met death in an unsuccessful attempt to 
recapture Smyrna in 1348. His relations with Cantacuzenos are 
given in the chapter on Orkhan. Isaac, fourth of the line, reigned 
from 1348, until he was dispossessed by Bayezid in 1390. He 
died in exile at Nicaea. His sons, Isaac II and Omar II, were 
placed again on the throne in 1403. The line of Aidin became 
extinct soon after. A usurper, Djuneid, Ottoman governor of 
Smyrna, managed to keep the power until he was assassinated 
in 1425. It was not until then that Aidin definitely passed into 
the hands of the Osmanlis. 

After the death of Aidin, the founder of the dynasty, the terri- 
tory of the emirate seems to have suffered some diminution, 
aside from the loss of Smyrna. One of the sons, Soleiman, 
married a daughter of Orkhan, while another, Khidr, ruled inde- 
pendently at Ayasoluk, which was lost for a time to Rhodes 
twenty years later. Under Omar, the Turks of Aidin were very 
active in the Aegaean Sea, and made large invasions of Thrace 
and Macedonia in 1333 and 1334. They co-operated with the 
Genoese of Phocaea against the Greeks and the Osmanlis, and 
were at times allied with the emirates of Sarukhan and Menteshe, 
with whom they are frequently mixed by the Byzantine historians. 
The western historians almost invariably gave credit to the 
Osmanlis for the maritime exploits of these emirates during the 
fourteenth century. 1 

1 Shehabeddin, 339, 369 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 295-310 ; Cant. ii. 28, 



284 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Akbara (3) 

At some time before 1340, a certain Demir Khan, son of Karasai, 
emir of Pergama, ruled in Akbara, whose location is given by 
Shehabeddin as ' south of Brusa and Sinope, and north of Mount 
Kasis '. This emirate was probably destroyed by Orkhan in the 
expedition of 1339-40. It was a region along the borders of 
Mysia and Phrygia, which had been able to resist the encroach- 
ments of Kermian owing to the mountainous character of the 
country. 1 

Akridur (4) 

This city was at the south end of the lake of the same name 
(to-day called Egherdir), and was within the limits of the emirate 
of Hamid. But, like Nazlu, it had frequently a wholly indepen- 
dent existence, and both Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, as well 
as other writers, mention its emirs as if independent of the emir 
of Hamid, and these rulers are given from the families of Tekke 
and Hamid. The Osmanlis first reached the northern end of 
Lake Egherdir in 1379, and incorporated Akridur about 1390. 2 

Akserai (5) 

This is the ancient Archelaiis, and is three days north-east of 
Konia on the road to Ka'isariya (Caesarea). In the time of Ibn 
Batutah, it was one of the most beautiful and most solidly built 
cities of Asia Minor, and was ruled by the emir Artin, possibly an 
Armenian, who was vassal of the Mongol ruler of Persia. Later, 
Ak Serai was incorporated in Karamania, to which it belonged 
at the time that the Osmanlis, under Bayezid, first entered it. 3 

Aksheir (6) 

Aksheir, between Kutayia and Konia, belonged alternately to 
Kermian and Karamania — perhaps at times it recognized the 
suzerainty of the emir of Hamid. Its position made it a border 

pp. 470-3 ; 25, p. 455, hi 192 ; C4reg. xvi. 6, p. 834 ; Ducas, 7, pp. 29-30 ; 
18, p. 79; Schhimberger, Numismatique de V Orient latin, 481-5; for 
Venice's share in crusade against Smyrna, Romanin, iii. 147 ; for complete 
list of princes, Karabeck, in Numismatische Zeitschrift, Vienna, 1877, ix. 207. 

1 Shehabeddin, 365. 

2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 267. Shehabeddin, 360, gives Akridur under Hamid. 

3 Ibn Batutah, ii. 285. 



APPENDIX B 



285 



city, prey to the changing fortunes of the Osmanlis and Kara- 
manlis for thirty years. In 1377, when Murad compelled the 
emir of Hamid to sell a portion of his dominions, he regarded 
Aksheir as having been in Hamid. It was, however, at that time 
practically independent, using the rival pretensions of the emirs 
to the east, west, and south as a means of preserving a precarious 
autonomy. 1 

Alaia (7) 

This city was sometimes called Kandelore, a corruption of its 
ancient name Coracesium. Its fortunate position at the east 
side of the Gulf of Adalia enabled it to play an important part 
in the commercial history of the eastern Mediterranean for 
a century and a half. In the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehab- 
eddin, Yussuf, brother of the emir of Karamania, was its ruler. 
During the fourteenth century Alaia was more or less dependent 
upon Karamania, but sometimes upon Tekke. For many years 
it paid tribute to Cyprus, and negotiated its affairs independently 
of both Karamania and Tekke. In 1444 its prince, Latif, 
meditated a raid upon Cyprus, from which he was deterred only 
by the defeat of the Egyptians before Rhodes. In 1450 Latif con- 
cluded a treaty of peace with the Cypriotes through the medium 
of Rhodes. His successor, Arslan bey, got help from Cyprus 
against Mohammed II. Alaia was subdued by the Osmanlis only 
in 1472. 2 

Angora (8) 

The history of Angora during the first half of the fourteenth 
century is obscure. It depended upon none of the emirates 
which arose after the break-up of the Seljuk Empire of Konia. 
Throughout Phrygia there were small village chieftains, such as 
Osman had been at Sugut. Angora may have acknowledged 
Kermian for a short period, but the proprietors of that region 
resisted the efforts of Karamania to incorporate them. The 
fortress of Angora was captured at the beginning of the reign of 
Murad, but it was not until Bayezid broke the power of Kermian 

1 Leunclavius, Ann., v. 40 ; Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1769 ; 
Sarre, 21. Cf. struggles between Murad and Bayezid and the Karamanlis, 
pp. 165-7, 187-90 above. 

2 Bosio, ii. 221-2, 237-8 ; Mas-Latrie, Hist, de Chijpre, iii. 175, 335. 
Cf. authorities for Karamania, Tekke, and Satalia, and Bill, de VEcole des 
Chartes, 2 e serie, i. 326, 328, 498, 505 ; ii. 138-41. 



286 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



and Karamania that the country round about the city became 
ottomanized. 1 

Ayasoluk (9) 

This is the Ottoman corruption of Altoluogo, the Genoese name 
for the Byzantine Theologos (ay to? OeoXoyos — St. John) which 
occupied nearly the same site as the ancient Ephesus. This city 
has caused much confusion to writers. It was captured from 
the Greeks by Sasan, who ruled there as its first Turkish emir in 
1308. 2 Later it seems to have fallen into the hands of Aidin, and 
became the principal commercial city of his flourishing emirate. 
The emir's coins were for a time struck there, but later when 
Guzel Hissar (Tralles) was capital of Ai'din, Ayasoluk was practi- 
cally independent under a younger brother of Mohammed, and 
uncle of Omar. In 1365 the chevaliers of Rhodes had evidently 
made a serious attempt to cut into the hinterland of Aidin from 
Smyrna, for they struck coins at Ayasoluk. Its later history 
is that of Aidin and Palatchia. Timur directed the operations 
against Smyrna from Ephesus in December 1402. 3 

Balikesri (10) 

This city is to the south-west of Brusa, on the road to Pergama. 
It would naturally be included in the emirate of Karasi, but had 
an independent sovereign, Demir-Khan, when Ibn Batutah 
visited it. It was annexed by the Osmanlis after the deposition 
of the emir of Balikesri. The exact date of this acquisition can- 
not be determined. 4 

Boklu (11) 

An inland district south-west of Kastemuni and north of Angora, 
possibly the same as Boli, where Ali, a son of Soleiman padishah, 

1 Not in 1354 by Soleiman, as Cant. iv. 37, p. 284, infers. Hadji Khalfa, 
Djihannuma, fol. 1852-6. 

2 Pachymeres, vii. 13, p. 589. 

3 How does Schlumberger reconcile the continuance of Ayasoluk, or 
Ephesus, as capital of Aidin with the Rhodian conquest ? Cf. Wood, 
Discoveries at Ephesus, pp. 12, 183, for coins which prove that the chevaliers 
held the city in 1365. Cf. Palatchia, for treaty made by Venice with an 
independent prince here in 1403. Ibn Batutah states expressly that Guzel 
Hissar, or Birgui, was the capital of Aidin. 

4 Ibn Batutah, ii. 317. Evliya effendi, ii. 19, distinguishes between 
Balikesri and Karasi in his enumeration of the conquests of Orkhan. 



APPENDIX B 



287 



of Kastemuni and Sinope, ruled as independent sovereign between 
1330 and 1340. 1 

Brusa (12) 

The descriptions of Orkhan's realm, which to Ibn Batutah and 
Shehabeddin was the emirate of Brusa, as it was seen through 
the eyes of his contemporaries, have been cited in the text of this 
book. Until the end of the reign of Murad, the Ottoman posses- 
sions were small enough to be distinguished under the name of 
Brusa, where the Osmanlis established an emirate at the death 
of Osman. 

Caesarea (13) 

This important city, in the east of Asia Minor, on the confines 
of Armenia, was during the first half of the fourteenth century 
under the control of the Mongols, and, for a very few years, 
acknowledged the overlordship of Karamania. But, for the 
thirty years coincident with the reign of Murad, it had emirs of 
its own, as had Tokat and Sivas. For we know that Burhaneddin, 
through whose misfortunes Bayezid became involved with Timur, 
had been kadi of the emir of Caesarea, on whose death he divided 
' with two other emirs ' his dominions. Caesarea fell into the 
power of the Osmanlis between 1392 and 1398. 2 

Denizli (14) 

This emirate was on the site of Laodicea on the Lycus, and was 
called Ladik by the Arabs, and Denizli, or Denizlu, by the Turks. 
Mount Cadmus and Hieropolis were also within its limits. It was 
at the upper end of the Maeander Valley, bounded on the west and 
north by Aidin, and on the south by Menteshe and Tawas. In 
the fourteenth century, the city of its emir was probably on the 
Maeander and not on the Lycus. Shehabeddin compared the 
gardens of Ladik, or Denizli, to those of Damascus. No higher 
praise could have come from his lips. We know nothing of its 
later history. About 1350 it was probably absorbed by Aidin or 
Menteshe. 3 

1 Ibn Batutah, ii. 340. 2 Sherefeddin, hi. 256 ; Howorth, iii. 749. 

3 Shehabeddin, 338, 358, 366 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 275, 277 ; Reclus, Geog. 
univ., ix. 633, 645 ; Baedeker, Kleinasien, 2. Aufl., 390. Mas-Latrie, 
Tresor de Chronologic, makes an error in extending the northern boundary 
of Denizli, which he calls Thingizlu, to the emirate of Marmora. 



288 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Erzindjian (15) 

Erzindjian, like Erzerum, was subject to the Mongols in the 
early part of the reign of Orkhan. There was a prince named 
A'inabey ruling there in 1348, however, who, with two generals 
of Hamid, attacked Trebizond. 1 Coins were struck in the name 
of Alaeddin of Karamania in Erzindjian in the decade following 
1350. But coins of Mohammed Artin, emir of Erzindjian, were 
struck there about 1360. 2 Bayezid pushed his conquests a day 
beyond Erzindjian to the castle of Kemath. He did not, how- 
ever, conquer Erzindjian ; for we have its emir, a vassal of 
Timur, appealing to his overlord for aid, when Bayezid summoned 
him to appear at Angora, bringing the treasures of his dependencies 
with him. His authority extended to and included Erzerum 
about 1400. 3 

Fukeh (16) 

Ibn Batutah calls this country Milas. There were in fact 
two cities, Eukeh and Milas, under one sovereign at the time of 
Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin. As Milas was near the site of 
Halicarnassus, or on that site, and was sometimes called Halik, 
the geographical position of this emirate, on the coast opposite 
Cos, is immediately grasped. It was dependent, in a certain 
sense, upon Menteshe, and was later absorbed by Menteshe. 
Orkhan was the emir about 1330. Some years later, Shehabeddin 
estimated that the emir of Fukeh had fifty cities and ten thousand 
horsemen. The last vestige of the independence of Fukeh was 
destroyed by the Rhodians with whom they were continually in 
conflict, and who got a foothold on the mainland and built a 
castle at Halik in 1399. 4 

Gul Hissar (17) 

At the time of Ibn Batutah, Mohammed Tchelebi, brother of 
the emir of Akridur, was established here on the border of Pam- 
phylia and Caria, between Satalia and the Maeander River. 5 

1 Panaretos, 13. 

2 Lane-Poole, Mohammedan Coins in British Museum, 21-4, 35 ; ibid., 
Mohammedan Coins in Bodleian Library, 12. 

3 Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1119 ; Sherefeddin, iii. 257. 

4 Ibn Batutah, ii. 279 ; Shehabeddin, 370 ; Bosio, ii. 4. 

5 Ibn Batutah, ii. 270. 



APPENDIX B 



289 



The fact that in such a position an independent prince could 
maintain himself as late as 1330 — perhaps later — demonstrates 
that the emirates of Tekke, Menteshe, and Hamid must have 
been of very slow growth, like that of Brusa, and that these 
Turkish emirs who were rivals of the house of Osman evolved 
slowly, just as the Osmanlis did. The fiction of a tenfold 
division of the Seljuk dominions becomes very apparent when we 
consider the position of Gul Hissar (often called Kul Hissar), 
Ala'ia, Tawas, and Fukeh — to cite instances only from the south- 
western corner of Asia Minor. 

Hamid (18) 

This emirate, of very late development in comparison with 
those of Sarukhan and Aidin, was formed by the absorption of 
a number of little states — each hardly more than a village. The 
emir of Hamid started by incorporating Akridur and Nazlu. 
During the last decade of the reign of Orkhan, Hamid grew 
rapidly, until it extended from Akshei'r to the western end of the 
Taurus. It was entirely an inland emirate, and had little chance 
of resisting the Osmanlis under Murad. The last emir willed his 
dominions to Murad in 1381, but the country had to be conquered 
step by step. Bayezid made it an Ottoman province in 1391. 1 

Iakshi (19) 

A small emirate north-west of Sarukhan, on the sea-coast 
opposite Mitylene. It is mentioned only by Shehabeddin, and 
for the purpose of fixing the boundaries of Sarukhan. 2 

Kaottia (20) 

This is the modern Djanik, on the Black Sea between Samsun 
and Sinope. It had an independent line of four emirs, and 
probably maintained its independence until after the Ottoman 
conquest of Kastemuni. 3 

Karamania (21) 

Until after the campaign of 1386, Karamania was a ar more 
powerful emirate in Asia Minor than that of the Osmanlis. The 

1 Ibn Batutah, ii. 267 ; Hammer, xvii. 98 ; Sarre, 21. See also under 
Akridur, and Nazlu. 2 Shehabeddin, 339. 

3 Shehabeddin, 363 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 326-9 ; Hammer, xvii. 99. 

1736 T 



290 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Karamanlis were the actual successors of the Seljuks, and main- 
tained themselves in Konia. While the Osmanlis were confined 
to a very small corner of Anatolia, the Karamanian dominions 
extended from the Euphrates and the Amanus to the Gulf of 
Adalia, on both slopes of the Taurus. Except in the maritime 
emirates of the Aegaean Sea, the Karamanlis and their emir were 
the great power in the peninsula of Asia Minor. Their indepen- 
dence was not broken by Bayezid, for they recovered their former 
glory after the intervention of Timur, and successfully withstood 
Mohammed I, Murad II, and Mohammed II. As in the latter half 
of the fourteenth century, the Karamanian emirs of the first half 
of the fifteenth century were allied by marriage with the house of 
Osman, but refused to do homage to the Ottoman sovereigns. 1 

Limits of space prevent mentioning here the many grounds 
upon which the Karamanians were able to and did keep their 
independence in the face of both Constantinople and Cairo. It 
was only at the end of the fifteenth century that we find the fiction 
of the Karamanian vassalage to the Osmanlis and of the connexion 
between the Seljuks and the Osmanlis appearing in the Ottoman 
chronicles, which on this count are, as I have pointed out else- 
where, wholly unreliable. It is astonishing that their version of 
the rise of the Osmanlis in Asia Minor has been accepted for so 
many centuries by western historians. 2 

Karasar (22) 

An abbreviation of Kara Hissar. This is probably the modern 
Afion Kara Hissar, a picturesque town between Eski Shei'r and 
Konia on southern limit of the emirate of Kermian, of which its 

1 ' Ledit Karaman haioit fort le Grant Turc, dont il exist la sceur.' Ber- 
trandon de la Broquiere, Schefer ed., 120. Bertrandon visited the court of 
the emir of Konia in 1443 with a Cypriote ambassador. 

2 In time of Osman and Orkhan, Nicolay, 148-9 ; Howorth, iii. 428 ; 
Byzantine historians in Stritter, iii. 1092 ; Anon., Hist, de Oeorgie, i. 642 ; 
Shehabeddin, 346, 375; Ibn Batutah, ii. 284 (calls them emirs of Larenda) ; 
Hammer, i. 262 fol. ; Rasmussen, 116 ; Feridun letters, Bibl. Nat., fonds 
turc, no. 79, p. 1. In time of Murad and Bayezid, Feridun letters, ibid., 
pp. 18-20, 30, 33-4, and references in text of this book. For fifteenth 
century, from re-establishment by Timur, Sherefeddin, iv. 33 ; Bertrandon 
de, la Broquiere, 118-20 ; Mas-Latrie, Hist, de Chypre, iii. 3 ; Bibl. de 
VEcole des Charles, 2 e serie, i. 326, 510 ; ii. 138 ; Sanuto, in Muratori, xxii. 
962. For coins, Lane-Poole, Bodleian Collection, 12 ; British Museum, 
21-6. The power of Karamaniain the fifteenth century will be discussed 
in a later volume 



APPENDIX B 



291 



prince was a vassal. Its importance was in its location at the 
junction point of the roads from the north-west and west into 
Karamania. 

Karasi (23) 

The emirate which lay between the possessions of Orkhan and 
Sarukhan was called, after the founder of its dynasty, Karasi. 
Its capital was Pergama. There is a discrepancy between the 
accounts of Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, the forming making 
Pergama subject to Balikesri, and the latter giving Balikesri as 
independent. Ottoman historians make Balikesri the northern- 
most city of the emirate of Karasi. The limits of Karasi, outside 
of the immediate vicinity of Pergama, cannot be determined. 
There were several small independent emirates in the hinterland 
' of the lower end of the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. 
The emir of Karasi was an ally of Ai'din and Sarukhan in the first 
coalition formed to combat the growing power of the Osmanlis. 
Karasi was the first emirate to be destroyed by the Osmanlis, 
and the only one of importance incorporated under Orkhan. 
This was because it lay nearest to the Ottoman emirate. 1 

Kastemuni (24) 

This emirate, at its zenith, comprised practically all of the 
ancient Roman province of Paphlagonia. It was formed by Ali 
Omar bey, who started as lord of the inland city of Kastemuni, and 
whose son Abdullah, in the lifetime of Osman, drove Ghazi Tche- 
lebi from Sinope. The emirate had many vicissitudes and 
changes in dynasty. In the time of Ibn Batutah, Soleiman 
padishah was the sovereign, and had extended his rule from 
Heraclea on the Black Sea coast almost to Trebizond. His son 
1 1 Ali ruled at Borlu, and another son Ibrahim Shah, who succeeded 
Soleiman, contested Samsun with the emperor of Trebizond. 
Ibrahim was the younger son, and was designated as his successor 
I by Soleiman. Under the third dynasty of Kastemuni, the ben- 
, Isfendiar, the emirate was at the height of its power. Its fleets 
swept the Black Sea, and did much harm to the Greeks of Trebi- 
j zond and the Genoese of Kaffa. Kaouia was absorbed, and its 
eastern boundaries included Osmandjik. The emirs of Menteshe 
and Ai'din took refuge here, and the refusal of the emir of Kaste- 

1 Shehabeddin, 350, 357, 372. Cf. Hertzberg, 471. 
T 2 



292 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



muni, Bayezid, to give them up, led to the invasion of 1392. 
Bayezid and the fugitive princes fled to Timur, who restored 
them after the battle of Angora. Isfendiar, son of Bayezid, 
managed to retain Sinope, and a large portion of the interior, for 
thirty years. He was father-in-law of the Ottoman sultan, 
Murad II. When Clavijo visited Sinope in 1404 Isfendiar had 
forty thousand men to put in the field against the Osmanlis. It 
was not until after the fall of Constantinople that Kastemuni 
finally lost its independence. 1 As the history of this emirate is 
involved with that of Sinope, see also below under Sinope. 

Keredeh (25) 

This was a small emirate, sometimes called also Kerdeleh, 
between Kastemuni and Boli, which was absorbed by the Os- 
manlis in the latter part of the reign of Orkhan. It was already 
in danger of Ottoman aggression when Ibn Batutah visited it on 
his way from Brusa to Kastemuni. 2 

Kermasti (26) 

On the Adranos River, one day south of Mikhalitch, and two 
days west of Brusa, this city was conquered by Orkhan in his 
first campaign after the fall of Nicomedia. 3 

Kermian (27) 

Kermian, or Guermian, took its name from a Turcoman chief 
who held Kutayia about 1300. It was the earliest definite 
emirate which arose in western Asia Minor after the dissolution 
of the Seljuk Empire. Shehabeddin wrote : ' Turkish tribes 
seized the greater part of the Seljuk possessions. The Turks 
recognized the pre-eminence of the emir of Kermian.' The great 
fortress which still crowns the hill of Kutayia is supposed to have 
been erected by Kermian. 4 Kermian' s son Ali became master 
of all of Phrygia, possibly at one time including Angora in his 
emirate. Orkhan wrote to Ali as equal to equal, and gave him 

1 Shehabeddin, 361 ; lbn Batutah, ii. 343-7 ; Bibl. de VEcole des Chartes, 
2 e serie, i. 325 ; Hammer, i. 90, 309-11 ; Clavijo, 20 v°. 

2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 339. 

3 Ashikpashazade, Vatican MS., 33. 

4 Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, 617, 1807-9. It is curious that Hadji 
Khalfa does not mention the famous potteries of Kutayia. 



APPENDIX B 



293 



the title of * emir of Anatolia ' , 1 Ali had forty thousand horse- 
men and seven hundred castles and villages. He was the equal 
of the emir of Karamania and more powerful than Orkhan. 

Kermian was the first of the larger emirates to feel the change 
which the successes in the Balkan peninsula had made in the 
fortune of the Osmanlis. A granddaughter of the older Ali, 
and great-granddaughter of Kermian, was married to Bayezid, 
and Murad compelled the emir of Kermian to cede the north- 
western portion of his estates as his daughter's dot. When 
Bayezid made his first campaign against Karamania he annexed 
the remainder of Kermian. The emir, his brother-in-law Yakub, 
fled to Timur, and was restored. The Osmanlis definitely in- 
corporated Kermian in their empire in the second decade of the 
fifteenth century. 2 

Limnia (28) 

A small emirate in the mountains between Trebizond and 
Erzindjian, whose emir, Tasheddin, married the daughter of the 
emperor of Trebizond in 1379. In 1386, Tasheddin could put an 
army of twelve thousand men into the field. There were several 
other very small Turkish emirates around Trebizond. Not 
enough, however, is known of them to make it worth while to 
mention them. 3 

Marash (29) 

An independent emirate was established here after the fall of 
the Lusignans in Cilicia, which was also known by the name of 
the founder of the dynasty, Sulkadir. It maintained its inde- 
pendence against the Karamanians, Egyptians, and Osmanlis 
until 1515, when its last prince fell in a battle with Selim. 4 

Marmora (30) 

An emirate on the borders of the Sea of Marmora, between 
Cyzicus and the Dardanelles, which had struggles and alliances 

1 Persian letter in collection of Feridun, Bibl. Nat., fonds turc no. 79, 
p. 18. 

2 Shehabeddin, Paris MS., fonds arabe no. 583, fol. 144 r°-v° ; Ibn 
Batutah, ii. 270-1 ; Hammer, ii. 133, xvii. 98 ; Schefer, preface to his 
edition of Bertrandon de la Broquiere, IxL For expedition of Bayezid 
against, Phr. i. 26, p. 82 ; Ducas, 18-19 ; Chalc. ii, pp. 64-6. 

3 Panaretos, 49, 52. 4 Hammer, v. 28. 



294 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



with the Catalans, Byzantines, and Turks of Balikesri. It be- 
came a vassal state of Karasi, and was ruled from Pergama. 
After the destruction of Karasi, its territory was shared by the 
Catalans of Bigha and by Orkhan. 1 

Menteshe (31) 

Like Hamid, Menteshe was of late formation. The chief who 
gave his name to this emirate was a contemporary of Orkhan, 
and was sometimes known by the same name. He was allied by 
marriage to Soleiman, son of A'idin, through whom he gained the 
former possessions of A'idin south of the Maeander River. The 
emirate probably started at Mughla, and did not have much 
importance until it had absorbed Tawas and most of Fukeh. 
The emir of Menteshe possessed great influence during the latter 
part of Orkhan' s reign and the reign of Murad, and, like Aidin 
and Sarukhan, the Turks of Menteshe, through their trading, 
were more in contact with the outside world than were the 
Osmanlis. Their port, known to the Venetians as Palatchia, 
was the ancient Miletus. The emirate of Menteshe suffered 
decline in the latter days of Murad' s reign through the Venetian 
usurpation at Palatchia. At the time of Bayezid's invasion, the 
emir fled to Sinope and then to Timur. The emirate was restored 
by Timur, and was not definitely incorporated in the Ottoman 
empire until the reign of Murad II. 2 (See Fukeh, Palatchia, and 
Tawas.) 

MlKHALITCH (32) 

This was one day west of Brusa and a day south of Mudania. 
After the fall of Brusa, Turkish or Byzantine rulers maintained 
themselves in Mikhalitch until the expedition of Orkhan against 
Karasi. After that it became Ottoman. 3 Some of the prisoners 
held for ransom after Nicopolis were detained in Mikhalitch, and 
one of the most illustrious of them died there. 4 

1 Shehabeddin, 358, 366. In speaking of the propinquity of Denizli 
and Marmora, one wonders if Mas-Latrie has not confused the Scamander 
and Maeander rivers. Both of these rivers are called Menderes in Turkish. 

2 Its last emir died without issue in 1425. M. de Ste. Croix, in Acad, des 
Inscriptions, nouv. serie, ii. 569-75 ; Hammer, i. 300-1, xvii. 98 ; Ducas, 18, 
p. 79 ; Lane-Poole, Coins in British Museum, 33-4. 

3 Mordtmann, in Zeitschrift d. m. 0., lxv (1911), p. 105. 

4 See above, p. 225. 



APPENDIX B 



295 



Nazlu (33) 

This was a small emirate east of Denizli, which was absorbed 
by Hamid about 1350. 1 

Nicaea (34) 

Shehabeddin says that Nicaea Was the centre of an emirate 
whose ruler possessed eight cities, thirty fortresses and an army 
of eight thousand horsemen. The emir was Ali, a brother and 
neighbour of Sarukhan. I have been unable to identify this 
place. 2 

Palatchia (35) 

Like Ayasoluk in relation to Aidin, Palatchia, the ancient 
Miletus, in relation to Menteshe was at times independent, 
and at times the capital and seaport of the emirate. Clavijo 
confused Palatchia with Ayasoluk, and claimed that Timur 
summered (he means wintered) there. In another place he speaks 
of having travelled with a brother of Alamanoglu, brother of the 
emir of Altoluogo and Palatchia. 3 When Menteshe had his capital 
at Mughla, there was undoubtedly another emir at Palatchia, who 
might also have been the man spoken of above as emir of Fukeh. 
But there can be no certainty on this point. Venice, from 1345 
to 1405 — and later — was interested in Palatchia, and had a 
consul and large commercial interests there. Different negotia- 
tions and treaties, in which the Osmanlis do not figure, attest the 
interest of Venice, and the independence — at least from the 
Osmanlis — of Palatchia throughout the fourteenth century. 4 
Cyprus and Rhodes at times tried to get the supremacy of 
Palatchia. 5 

Sarukhan (36) 

Sarukhan was throughout the fourteenth century an emirate 
of far more importance than its rather restricted territory would 
seem to indicate. This was largely on account of the high 
qualities of its rulers and the daring of its sailors. It extended 
from the Gulf of Smyrna on the south to the Aegaean coast 

1 Shehabeddin, 360. 2 Shehabeddin, 367. 

3 Clavijo, fol. 6 v°, 60 v°. 

4 Mas-Latrie, in Bibl. de VEcole des Charter, 5 e serie, v. 219-31, quoting 
Pacta, vi. 129 v°, and Commem., ii. 231, iii. 374. 

5 Cf. St. Pierre de Thomas, in Bollandist Coll. 



296 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



opposite Mitylene on the north, and was wedged in between 
Aidin and Karasi. The hinterland was indefinite, and did not 
matter much as the Turks of Sarukhan were first and last mariners. 
They were the most important factor in the triple alliance against 
Orkhan in 1329 and 1336. After the Ottoman occupation of 
Pergama, and the disappearance of Karasi, they held the Osmanlis 
back for a hundred years (with the exception of the few years of 
Bayezid's invasion). They were frequently in alliance with the 
Genoese of Phocaea and the Byzantines, and hired out as mer- 
cenaries and for transporting troops and food to Christian and 
Moslem alike. The long lease of life which Philadelphia enjoyed 
as a city of the Byzantine Empire is witness of their friendly 
relations with the Greeks throughout the reigns of Osman, Orkhan, 
and Murad. 1 Magnesia was capital of this emirate. It was not 
destroyed until Smyrna fell into the hands of the Osmanlis in 
1425. 2 

Sat alia (37) 

Satalia is listed as an emirate separately from Tekke for the 
same reason that Ayasoluk is given separately from Aidin, 
Palatchia separately from Menteshe, and Sinope separately from 
Kastemuni. It began and ended as a separate and independent 
emirate, with its own lord. Its history is treated below under 
Tekke. The modern name of Satalia is Adalia, from Attaleia, 
and gives its name to the gulf on the southern coast of Asia 
Minor. Nicolay has confused Satalia with Ayas, the ancient 
Issos. 3 

Sinope (38) 

An emirate was founded about 1307 in Sinope by the last 
descendant of the Seljuks of Rum, who was known as Ghazi 

1 The currency of Byzantine money among the maritime emirates of 
Asia Minor demonstrates this. See Makrisi, 7, and Stickel, in Zeitschrift 
der deutschen morgenldndischen Gesellschaft, viii. 837-9. 

2 Shehabeddin, 339, 360, 368-9 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 313 ; Commemor., ii. 
231 ; Greg. xi. 2, p. 530 ; xv. 5, p. 763 ; Cant. ii. 29-30, pp. 480-4 ; 
iii. 96, pp. 591-6 ; Ducas, 18, p. 79 ; Hadji Khalfa, Djihannuma, fol. 1820 ; 
for relations of Genoese and Byzantines with, Sauli, i. 256-7 ; for coins, 
Schlumberger, 479-81 ; Lane-Poole, Bodleian, 12 ; British Museum, 31-2. 

3 ' Aussi y est Satalie, situee en rivages maritimes de Cilicie : d'ou a 
prins son nom le Goulphe de Satalie, anciennement appele Issa : et a pre- 
sent la Iasse et en cest endroit Alexandre vainquit Daire . . . ' Nicolay, 148. 
This passage, which shows Adalia confused with Adana, would have helped 
Bruun in his note on p. 123 of the Hakluyt edition of Schiltberger. 



APPENDIX B 297 

Tchelebi 1 who in 1313, in co-operation with the Greeks of 
Trebizond, attacked Kaffa. But in 1318 we find the Turks of 
Sinope burning almost all of the city of Trebizond, and in 1323 
massacring the Genoese colony in their own city. Soon after this 
the emir of Kastemuni conquered Sinope. 2 The Turks of Sinope 
were to the Black Sea what those of Sarukhan were to the Aegaean. 
In 1361 they nearly captured Kaffa. 3 Their later history is that 
of Kastemuni. 

Sivas (39) 

The history of Sivas between the time of the Mongol with- 
drawal and the aggression of the Osmanlis is not knoAvn. But 
that it must have had independent princes can be inferred from 
the story of how Kadi Burhaneddin came to rule there (cf . above 
under Caesarea). Its disastrous conquest by the Osmanlis, and 
then by Timur, has been told in the chapter on Bayezid's reign. 

Tawas (40) 

This was a maritime emirate extending east into Lycia and 
west as far as the mainland opposite Rhodes. It was the only 
one of the early emirates to possess islands. Its pirates were true 
descendants of those whom Pompey opposed, and were continu- 
ally in conflict with the Rhodians and Cypriotes. Tawas was 
absorbed by Tekke and Menteshe, but not before 1340. 4 

Tekke (41) 

Tekke grew up into a powerful emirate in Pamphylia and 
Lycia. Its expansion to the north was stopped by the Taurus, 
and to the west by Alaiia and Karamania. Tawas, which it later 
absorbed, Menteshe, Rhodes, and Cyprus were its other great 
rivals. Its history is centred around the city of Adalia, then 

1 In Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. fonds turc no. 62, there is a marginal note in 
Armand's handwriting which terminates thus : ' La dynastie des Seljuks 
de Rum finit en la personne de Kai Kobad, fils de Feramorg, fils de Kai 
Kaous le 14 e qui aye regne qui fut extermine lui et toute sa race par Ga- 
zankhan.' This view was taken by several Orientalists of Armand's day, 
but there is good authority for Ghazi Tchelebi's ancestry. 

2 Fallmerayer, Originalberichte, ii. 15, 319 ; Stella, cited by Muralt, ii. 
533 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 343. 

3 Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 663. 

4 Shehabeddin, 359 ; Ibn Batutah, ii. 277. 



298 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



called Satalia, in which there were merchants of the larger Italian 
cities. Adalia was taken from the emirs of Tekke in 1361, but 
they regained it when the Genoese were threatening Famagusta 
in 1373. The Osmanhs, under Murad, crossed the Taurus by 
way of Sparta, into Tekke. but failed to capture Adalia. It 
remained independent until 1450 - 1 

Tokat (42) 

This city was either under the Mongols or independent through- 
out the fourteenth century. Its fortunes were similar to those 
of Caesarea and Sivas. 

Ulubad (43) 

This city, between Bithynia and Mysia. was conquered by 
Osman. and then lost. It came again into the power of the 
Osmanlis in Orkhairs campaign of 1339. A relative or ally of 
Andronicus III lived there. 2 

INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN STATES 

There were two Christian states in Asia Minor during the 
fourteenth century. 

Little Armenia (44), so called to distinguish it from the 
classical Armenia of the upper Euphrates valley and the moun- 
tains between Asia Minor and the Azerbaidjan, was a portion of 
Cilieia in the south-eastern corner of Anatolia, south of the 
Taurus mountains. A dynasty of Armenian kings, who had suc- 
cessfully held off the Seljuks of Konia. and had maintained its 
position in the fourteenth century by siding with the Mongols 
and Tartars against the Egyptians, was overthrown between 1360 
and 1374 in three invasions by the Egyptians, who made Tarsus 
their frontier fortress. 3 Ahmed ben Ramazan, however, in 

1 Shehabeddin. 371 ; Ibn Batutah. 258-9. 265 ; Bustron. Chronique de 
Cliypre, 296 ; Mas-Latrie, Tresor, col. 1802 ; Matteo Villani, in Muratori. 
xiv, col. 662 ; Urban V, Epp. seer., i. 161 : Rasniussen, 45 ; Schiltberger, 
19. (I cannot agree with Bruun that Adana is meant, for there is no reason 
to believe that the Osmanlis crossed the Taurus into Cilieia for more than 
one hundred years after the events Schiltberger was describing. See 
above, p. 296, n. 3.) 2 See note for Mikhalitch. 

3 Weil, iv. 504-624 ; Herd, passim under Tarsus, Lajazzo. Adana. and 
Alexandretta ; Mas-Latrie. BiU. de V Ecole des diaries, vi. 310-11 ; Le 
Xain de Tillemont (ed. Gaulle), iii. 9 ; iv. 459 ; Abulfaradj. Ghron. Syr.. 
572 ; Bertrandon de la Broquiere (ed. Schefer), introd., Iv. 90-1. 



APPENDIX B 



299 



1379 established a Turkish emirate at Adana, which survived 
throughout the fifteenth century. The Osmanlis were masters 
of a portion of Hungary before their power was felt in 
Cilicia. 

Trebizond (45), in the north-eastern corner of the peninsula, in 
the country where Mithridates in his kingdom of Pontus had 
defied the Romans, came into no contact with the Osmanlis 
during the century. Nor was it the object of aggression on the 
part of Timur. 1 It resisted successfully, with its Greek and Laze 
population, on land and sea, the attacks of the Turks of its 
hinterland and of Sinope. 

TERRITORIES DEPENDING ON OUTSIDE STATES 

At the mouth of the Gulf of Smyrna, on the northern pro- 
montory, was the Genoese self-governing colony of Phocaea (46), 
of which much has been said in the chapter on the reign of 
Orkhan. Phocaea had many vicissitudes, but maintained its 
independence as a Latin colony throughout the fourteenth 
century, and knew how to turn aside the possible aggression of 
Timur. It was never even temporarily dependent upon the 
Osmanlis. 2 

Smyrna (47) was wrested from the emir of Aiidin by the cru- 
saders of 1344, and, for the rest of the fourteenth century was 
a Christian city, independent of the Osmanlis and the Turkish 
emirs alike. It was Timur who brought it again under Moslem 
control. But it did not pass to the Osmanlis for many years 
after this reconquest. 

The Byzantines, after they had been driven out of Bithynia 
and Mysia, managed to maintain Philadelphia (48), through 
their friendship with Sarukhan, until the end of Murad's 
reign. 

The Cypriotes (49) exercised a powerful influence in the 
southern portions of Asia Minor throughout the fourteenth 
century. As we have seen, they held Adalia for some years. In 
1360, the emirs of southern Anatolia were so divided and opposed 
to each other, and needed so greatly the help of Cyprus against 

1 Finlay, iv. 386-92 ; Panaretos, passim. 

2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 314 ; Cant. ii. 13, pp. 388-90 ; Phr. i. 8, p. 37 ; Greg, 
xi. 9, p. 554 ; Sauli, i. 256-7. See also in text of this book under Orkhan. 



300 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



the Kararuanians, whom they feared much more than the 
Osnianlis, that they became for many years tributary to Cyprus. 1 
The Cypriotes were also interested in Cilicia. 

In 1327, the year after Osman's death, the power of the 
Mongols (50) reached for a few years the Mediterranean. After 
Bahadur Khan's death, in 1335, the Mongol Empire was divided 
up. Suzerainty in Asia Minor fell to the Sultan of Irak (Persia), 
who, until Timur's coming, fought with the Karamanians for 
some of the most important cities of eastern Anatolia. When 
Ibn Bat utah went through the peninsula, Erzerum, Erzindjian, 
Sivas, Caesarea, Amassia, Nigdeh, and Ak Serai were ' cities of 
the Sultan '. 2 

The chevaliers of Rhodes (51) did not come into Asia Minor 
until 1310, when they won from the Turks and Greeks the island 
which was to give them their most commonly used name. They 
were continually in conflict with Tawas, Alaia. Adalia. Tekke, 
Menteshe, Fukeh, and Aidin. But they never came into contact 
with the Osmanlis until after the fall of Constantinople. On 
the mainland, the chevaliers helped to take Smyrna in 1344, and 
defended it against the Turks for sixty years. They wrested 
Ayasoluk from Aidin for a while about 1365. Several times they 
gained a foothold in Fukeh and Menteshe, and in the last year 
of the century established a fortress at Halik (Halicarnassus) . 3 

The Mamelukes of Egypt (52) were not only interested in 
Cilicia, and held that country from 1360 to 1379, and at other 
times, but also invaded Karamania on different occasions. 
They reached Konia at the end of the thirteenth century, the 
beginning of the fifteenth century, and again, under Ibrahim 
pasha, twice in the third decade of the nineteenth century. 
During the reign of Murad I, the Egyptians called Cilicia up to 
the Taurus Bab-el-Mulk, the Royal Gateway. Konia was entered 

1 Matteo Villani, in Muratori, xiv. 650, under spring of 1360, says : 
' E per tante guerre e divisioni de' Turchi gli paesi loro erano rotti e in 
grande tribulazione. E per questa cagione i Greci havieno minore per- 
secuzione da loro. E piii cio fu materia al Re di Cipro di fare rimpresa 
sopra loro con honore e vittoria grande.' Mas-Latrie, in Bibl. de VEcoJe 
des Charles. 2 e serie, ii. 122-3, says that the Karainanian army was defeated 
before Gorhigos in 1361, and that Cyprus, then at the height of its power, 
was able to impose tribute on the emirs of Asia Minor. 

2 Ibn Batutah, ii. 288-95. 

3 See above under Smyrna, Aidin, Menteshe, Fukeh, and Tawas. Also 
in text of book, p. 44. 



APPENDIX B 



301 



by an Egyptian Sultan in 1418. The Karamanians of that day, 
who, according to the Ottoman historians, were vassals of the 
Osmanlis, had no interest in or fear of Mohammed I. They were 
engaged in a civil war which led to Egyptian intervention. 1 If 
Konia and the rest of Karamania was under the Osmanlis, why 
was there not Ottoman intervention in the quarrel between 
Mohammed and Ali for the Karamanian throne ? 

Last of all, the Catalans (53), whose history is given in the 
chapter on Osman, did not all leave Asia Minor with the ' Grand 
Company ' . Throughout the reign of Orkhan the principality 
established at Cyzicus left its traces in the Marmora and Darda- 
nelles coast and hinterland. Nothing more strikingly illustrates 
the lack of Ottoman activity in Asia Minor during Orkhan' s day, 
even at the very threshold of Bithynia, than the fact that he left 
the Catalans in possession of Bigha at his death. Murad, in 1363, 
although his presence was urgently needed on the Maritza to 
defend his new conquest of Adrianople against a Serbian invasion, 
was compelled to delay for months to eject the Catalans from 
Bigha. 2 

CONCLUSION 

Orkhan' s emirate, then, was but one of more than thirty inde- 
pendent states which existed in Asia Minor during the decade from 
1330 to 1340. During his lifetime, and the lifetime of his father 
Osman, the other better-known emirates had been slowly forming 
by the absorption of small independent villages and cities. 
Although several of the emirates that have been given above were 
ephemeral, and some of them duplicated practically the same 
territory at different periods in the fourteenth century, others, 
such as Aidin, Kermian, Karamania, Sarukhan, and Tekke, were 
far more powerful in Asia Minor than Orkhan or than Murad. 
That Bayezid had not crushed the life out of the larger emirates 
is proved by the ease with which they were revived by Timur, 
and by their survival during the first half of the fifteenth century. 

Karamania, for one, remained powerful and flourishing long 
after the political life of the Balkan states had become extinct. 
Karamania demanded one hundred years of strenuous effort on 
the part of the conquerors of the Byzantine Empire before it 

1 Cf. Weil, iv. passim. 2 See above, p. 123. 



302 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



could be subjugated. The Osmanlis crossed the Balkans more 
than a century before they crossed the Taurus. 
This expose was written in order to show : 

1. That Osman fell heir to no part of the Seljuk dominions ; 

2. That the Seljuks had many more heirs than the traditional 
ten ; 

3. That Osman and Orkhan carved their state out of the rem- 
nants of the Byzantine possessions along the upper end of the 
Sea of Marmora and in the Valley of the Sangarius — a very small 
portion indeed of Asia Minor ; 

4. That Murad, the wonderful conqueror of the Balkan 
peninsula, was only one of several rulers in Asia Minor, and not 
the most powerful of these, and that there were large portions of 
Asia Minor with which neither he nor his successor Bayezid came 
into contact at all ; 

5. That neither Bayezid, with his tremendous prestige in 
Europe, nor his brilliant successors of the fifteenth century, 
gained undisputed possession of Asia Minor. The Osmanlis were 
not masters of Asia Minor until long after their inheritance of 
the Byzantine Empire was regarded in Europe as a, fait accompli. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



I. Approximate Dates in the Legendary Period. 

II. Important Events in the First Century of Ottoman History. 

III. Progress of Ottoman Congress under the First Four Sovereigns. 

IV. Comparative Table of Rulers. 

V. The Fourteenth Century in Byzantine History. 

VI. Relations between Venice and Genoa and the Levant from 
1300 to 1403. 

VII. The Popes and the Moslem Menace in the Fourteenth Century. 



I. THE LEGENDARY PERIOD 

1219 — Soleiman Shah, with 50,000 nomad Turkish families, 
settles in neighbourhood of Erzindjian. 

1224 — Soleiman Shah is drowned in the Euphrates. Erto- 
grul and Dundar, two of his sons, settle near 
Angora. 

1230-40 — Ertogrul establishes himself in the valley of the Kara 

Su, north-west of Kutayia. 
1259 — Osman is born at Sugut. 

1289 — Ertogrul dies. 

Osman captures Karadja Hissar and Biledjik. 

1290 — Osman kills his uncle Dundar. 

1290-9 — Osman, having extended his possessions westward, 
founds an emirate, and takes up his residence at 
Yeni Shei'r. 



II. IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE FIRST 
CENTURY OF OTTOMAN HISTORY 

1299 — Osman, Turkish emir in the valley of the Kara Su, 
makes Yeni Sheir, between Brusa and Nicaea, his 
residence. 

1301 — Osman defeats the Byzantine heterarch Muzalon at 

Baphaeon, near Nicomedia. 
1308 — Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, is occupied. 

Ak Hissar and Tricocca are captured. 



304 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



1317 — Investment of Brusa begins. 

1326 — Brusa surrenders. Osman hears the news on his 

death-bed at Yeni Sheir. 
1329 — Byzantines under Andronicus III are defeated at 
Pelecanon (Maltepe). 
Nicaea surrenders. 
1333 — Alaeddin pasha, brother of Orkhan and first vizier,dies. 

Death of Bahadur Khan removes the Mongol menace. 

1337 or 1338 — Nicomedia surrenders. 

1338 — Karasi, first of the Turkish emirates to be absorbed, 

is incorporated in Orkhan' s state, 
c. 1338 — Osmanlis reach the Bosphorus at Hai'dar Pasha. 
1343 — Empress Anna makes overtures to Orkhan for aid 

against Cantacuzenos. 

1345 — Orkhan accepts proposal of alliance with Cantacu- 

zenos. 

First Osmanlis cross to Europe to fight for Canta- 
cuzenos against Anna. 

1346 — Orkhan marries Theodora, granddaughter of the 

Bulgarian czar and daughter of Cantacuzenos, 
who is besieging Constantinople with Ottoman aid. 

1348 — The 'Black Death' ravages Europe. 

1349 — Cantacuzenos calls again upon Orkhan for aid. 

Twenty thousand Ottoman horsemen are sent to 
help in preventing Salonika from falling into 
Serbian hands. 

c. 1351 — First convention between Orkhan and the Genoese. 

1353 — Soleiman pasha, Orkhan's elder son, in response to 

the third appeal of Cantacuzenos for Ottoman aid, 
brings an army into Thrace, helps in the recapture 
of Adrianople, and defeats the Serbians at De- 
motika. For this aid, a fortress on the European 
shore of the Dardanelles, probably Tzympe, is 
given to Orkhan. 

1354 — An earthquake, which damaged the walls of Galli- 

poli, enables the Osmanlis of Soleiman pasha to 
capture the city. Orkhan refuses to give up 
Gallipoli, breaks with Cantacuzenos, and orders 
the Osmanlis in the Hellespont to extend their 
conquest in the direction of Constantinople. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



305 



c. 1357 — Demotika and Tchorlu are captured for the first 
time by the Osmanlis under Soleiman pasha. 

1358 — Soleiman pasha dies from the fall of a horse at 

Bulair. 

1359 — Orkhan dies, and is succeeded by Murad. 
1360-1 — Conquest of Thrace. 

1361 — Second serious ' Black Death ' plague in Europe. 
c. 1362 — Murad creates corps of ' janissaries '. 

1362 (1363) — John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to 

recognize Murad's conquests in Thrace, and to 
give him military aid against the Turkish emirs 
of Asia Minor. 

1363 — Serbian and Hungarian crusaders are defeated on 

the banks of the Maritza. 
Murad takes up his residence in Demotika. 

1365 — Ragusa makes commercial treaty with Osmanlis, 

promising tribute. 

1366 — Adrianople becomes the first capital of the Ottoman 

Empire. 

Amadeo of Savoy's crusade ; captures Gallipoli, 
but soon abandons it again. 
1369 — Capture of Yamboli forces Sisman of Bulgaria to 
become, like the Byzantine Emperor, a vassal of 
Murad. 

1371 — Battle of Samakov gives the Osmanlis control of 

the passes into the Plain of Sofia. 
Battle of Cernomen opens up Macedonia to the 
Ottoman conquest. 

1372 — Moslem colonization of Macedonia, at Drama, Ka- 

valla, Serres, and Veles, gives the Osmanlis a 
position of preponderance in the Balkan peninsula. 

1373 — John Palaeologos, failing to receive aid from the West, 

becomes Ottoman vassal. 

1374 — Unsuccessful conspiracy of Manuel to recover Serres 

causes Ottoman siege of Salonika. 

1379 — John and Manuel agree to increase their tribute of 
gold and soldiers, and to surrender Philadelphia, 
the last Byzantine possession in Asia, for Ottoman 
aid in ousting Andronicus IV from Constantinople. 

1384 — Osmanlis aid Thomas in besieging Janina. 

| 1736 U 



306 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 

1385 — First Ottoman invasion of Albania. 

Battle of Savra destroys Balsa's power. 
Osmanlis occupy Sofia. 

1386 — Osmanlis capture Croia and Scutari, but return these 

fortresses to prince of Zenta. 
The fall of Nish makes Lazar of Serbia Ottoman 
vassal. 

1387 — Genoa concludes formal treaty with Murad. 

Murad, with army containing Greek, Serbian and 
Bulgarian contingents, defeats Alaeddin of Kara- 
mania at Konia, but has to withdraw without 
tangible results. 

1388 — Venice concludes commercial treaty with Murad. 

1388 — Osmanlis are defeated by Serbians and Bosnians at 

Plochnik, thus preventing invasion of Bosnia. 
League of Serbians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Wallach- 

ians, and Albanians formed against the Osmanlis. 
First Ottoman army enters Greece upon invitation 

of Theodore Palaeologos to fight against the Franks. 

1389 — Osmanlis destroy Serbian independence at Kossova. 

Murad is assassinated on the battle-field. Bayezid 
succeeds to the throne, and has his brother Yakub 
strangled. 

BAYEZID (1389-1403). 

1387 — Bayezid marries sister of Stephen, son of Lazar, and 
makes Serbians his allies. 

1390 — First Ottoman naval expedition makes raid on Chios, 

Negropont, and Attika. 
First Ottoman raids into Hungary. 

1391 — Second invasion of Karamania, followed by siege 

of Konia, results in cession by Alaeddin of north- 
western portion of Karamania. 
First Ottoman siege of Constantinople. 

1392 — First defensive campaign against Sigismund is fought 

in Bulgaria. Hearing that Timurtash had been 
defeated by Karamanlis, Bayezid transports army 
to Asia, and destroys Alaeddin' s army at AkTcha'i. 
The Osmanlis are now the dominant race in Asia 
Minor. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



307 



1394 — Osmanlis first appear in the Adriatic at the mouth 

of the Boy ana. 

1395 — Bayezid summons Ottoman vassals to his court at 

Serres. 

Ottoman siege of Constantinople becomes pressing. 

1396 — Crusade of Western chivalry, co-operating with 

Sigismund of Hungary, meets with disaster at 
Nicopolis in Bulgaria. 
Ottoman invaders of Wallachia are defeated at 
Rovine, but in raids into Hungary Peterwardein 
is burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians carried 
off into captivity. 

1397 — First Ottoman invasion of Greece. In the Pelopon- 

nesus, Argos is taken by assault. 
After defeat at Megalopolis, Theodore becomes Otto- 
man vassal. 

1397-9 — Movement of Moslem Anatolian population into the 
Balkan peninsula. 

1398 — Osmanlis and Serbians make destructive raid on 

Bosnia. 

1400 — Timur captures and destroys Sivas. 

1402 — Timur defeats and makes prisoner Bayezid at Angora, 

overruns Asia Minor, occupies Brusa, and takes 
Smyrna from the Christians by storm. 

1403 — Timur withdraws to Samarkand. 

Bayezid, still a prisoner, dies on the homeward march 
at Ak Shei'r. His sons dispute the succession. 

III. PROGRESS OF OTTOMAN CONQUEST UNDER 
THE FIRST FOUR SOVEREIGNS 

Osman (1299-1326) 

Osman, local chieftain at Sugut, has extended his 
conquests from the valley of the Kara Su westward 
to Yeni Shei'r. 
Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, becomes 

first Ottoman maritime possession. 
Ak Hissar, at the entrance to plain of Nicomedia, 
and Tricocca, which ensured land communication 
between Nicaea and Nicomedia, are captured, 
u 2 



1299 — 
1308 — 



308 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



1308-16 — Sovereignty is extended over the peninsula between 
the Gulf of Mcomedia and the Black Sea, almost 
up to the Bosphorus. 

1317 — Fortresses are erected near gates of Brusa. 

1326 — Brusa surrenders. 

Orkhan (1326-59) 
1329 — Occupies Nicaea. 

1330-8 — Conquest of shores of Gulf of Nicomedia up to Scutari 

on the Bosphorus. 
1334-8 — Conquest of emirate of Karasi. 
1337-8 — Occupies Nicomedia. 

c. 1339 — Acquires Mikhalitch, Ulubad, and Kermasti. 

1353 — Cantacuzenos cedes fortress on European shore of 

Hellespont. 

1354 — Gallipoli is occupied. 

1354-8 — The Osmanlis occupy the Thracian, Chersonese, and 
the European shore of the Sea of Marmora as far 
as Rodosto. Demotika is captured, and Constan- 
tinople cut off from Adrianople by the occupation 
of Tchorlu. 

Mttrad (1359-89) 

1360 — Captures Angora and suppresses independence of 

village chieftains between Eski Sheir and Angora. 
1360-1 — Conquers Thrace from the Maritza River to the Black 
Sea, including Adrianople. 

1361 — Lalashahin captures Philippopolis. 
c. 1362 — Creation of the corps of janissaries. 

1362 or 1363 — John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to 

recognize Murad's conquest of Thrace, and to give 
him military aid against the emirs of Asia Minor. 
1366-9 — Conquest of Maritza Valley up to the Rhodope Moun- 
tains, and of Bulgaria, up to the main Balkan range. 

1370- 1 — Occupies the fortresses and passes in the Rhodope 

and Rilo ranges. 

1371- 2 — Conquers Macedonia up to the Vardar River. 

c. 1376 — Portion of emirate of Kermian, including Kutayia, 
is annexed as dot of the emir's daughter, in mar- 
riage arranged with Bayezid. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



309 



1377 — Emir of Hamid sells to Murad territories between 

Tekke, Kermian, and Karamania. The acquisition 
of Ak Shei'r brings the Osmanlis to the frontier of 
Karamania. 

1378 — Conquers Tekke, except Adalia and Alaya. 

1380 — Conquers Macedonia, west of the Vardar. Prilep 
and Monastir become Ottoman frontier fortresses. 

1385 — Occupies Okhrida. 

Plain of Sofia and upper valley of the Struma River 
are conquered. 

1386 — Valleys of the Morava and Nisava are conquered, 

and Nish falls. 

1388 — Invasion of northern Bulgaria reduces Sisman to 
more humiliating vassalage. The Osmanlis retain 
the fortresses of Shuman and Nicopolis. 

Bayezid (1389-1403) 

1391 — Captures Adalia, first Ottoman seaport on the 
Mediterranean. 
Ak Sheir and Ak Serai ceded by Karamania. 

1393 — Bulgaria, to the Danube, becomes Ottoman territory. 

1393-5 — Conquers Samsun, Caesarea, and Sivas, and annexes 
emirate of Kastemuni. 

1397 — Conquers Thessaly, Doris, Locris, and the north- 
eastern corner of the Peloponnesus. 

1398-9 — Gradually occupies Southern Albania and a part of 
Epirus. 

IV. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF RULERS 
Byzantine Empire 1 
The Palaeologi 
Andronictts II (the Old), 1282-1328. 
Michael IX (co-emperor), 1295-1320. 
Andronicus III (the Young), 1328-41, 

by whose second wife, Anna of Savoy, was born 

1 The ordinals following the names of Byzantine emperors are a cause of 
confusion, as there is no universal agreement as to the method of numbering. 
Some historians count by sovereigns of the same family bearing a particular 
name (i. e. John I Palaeologos and John II Palaeologos), while others number 
by the imperial line as a whole (i. e. John V Palaeologos, John VI Cantacuzenos, 
John VII Palaeologos). I have used the second system. 



310 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



John V, 1341-91, 

whose three sons were : 
Andronicus IV (co-emperor), 1355-? 
Manuel II, 1391-1425. 
Theodore, despot of the Morea, 1359-. 

The son of Andronicus IV was 
John VII (co-emperor), 1399-1403. 

The Cantacuzeni 
John VI, regent, 1341-7, 
co-emperor, 1347-55, 

two of whose daughters married Orkhan and John V, 
and whose son was 
Matthew, co-emperor, 1355-6. 

Hungary 

Louis the Great, 1342-82 (King of Poland, 1370-82). 
His two daughters were : 

Hedwig, to whom fell the crown of Poland, and who married 
Jagello of Lithuania, who became King of Poland under the 
Christian name of Ladislas V. 
Mary, to whom fell the crown of Hungary, 1382-92. 

Mary married 

Sigismund of Luxemburg in 1386, who became sole ruler of 
Hungary after Mary's death, and, later, Holy Roman 
Emperor. 

Holy Roman Empire 
House of Luxemburg 
Charles IV (I as King of Bohemia), 1355-78. 

His two sons were : 
Wenceslaus, who succeeded to the imperial crown on the death 
of his father and was deposed in 1400 ; 
and Sigismund, King of Hungary, who was elected emperor 
in 1410. 

France 

Philippe IV, le Bel, 1285-1314, and his sons 

Louis X, Philippe V, and Charles IV, last of the Capetians, 

1314-28. 
Philippe VI Valois, 1328-50. 
Jean, 1350-64. 
Charles V, 1365-80. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



311 



Charles VI, 1380-1422. 

Philippe de Bourgogne, son of King Jean, and father of Jean 
de Nevers, and Louis d' Orleans, second son of Charles V, 
were vying with each other for the control of their insane 
nephew and brother, Charles VI, during the reign of Bayezid. 

England 

Edward I, 1270-1307. 
Edward II, 1307-27. 
Edward III, 1327-77 

(took the title of King of France in 1339). 
Richard III, 1377-99. 

Deposed in 1399, and succeeded by 
Henry IV (of Lancaster). 

V. THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY IN BYZANTINE 
HISTORY 

1300 — The emir of Menteshe invades Rhodes. 

1301 — First Byzantine defeat at hands of Osmanlis at 

Baphaeon. 

1302 — Michael IX takes command of Slavic mercenaries 

in Asia Minor : they force him to allow their 
return to Europe. 
Roger de Flor arrives at Constantinople with eight 
thousand Catalans, and is married to a niece of 
Andronicus. 

1303 — Catalans sack the island of Chios. 

1305 — Death of Ghazan Khan frustrates Byzantine hopes of 
a Mongol attack upon the emirs of Asia Minor. 
Catalans compel the emir of Karamania to lift the 
siege of Philadelphia, but quarrel with Greeks and 
Slavic mercenaries. Roger exacts title of ' Caesar ' 
from Andronicus, and is later assassinated by 
Michael IX at Adriancple. 

1306-9 — Catalan ' Grand Company ' forms state at Gallipoli. 

1310 — Catalans leave for Greece, and set up military 

democracy in Athens. 
The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem capture 
Rhodes. 

1311 — The emir of Menteshe fails in attempt to recapture 

Rhodes. 



312 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



1311-14 — Turkish freebooter Halil defies the Emperor in the 
Thracian Chersonese, and is finally defeated with 
the help of the Serbians. 

1317 — Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomaedia begin to be menaced. 

1326 — Brusa falls. Andronicus III, on his wedding trip 
from Constantinople to Demotika, is set upon and 
wounded by raiding Turks. 

1327-8 — Andronicus III plots to oust his grandfather, who, in 
turn, invites Serbians to attack young Andronicus 
in the rear ; young Andronicus besieges army 
of his grandfather and Serbians at Serres, and 
captures Salonika. Old Andronicus calls upon 
Bulgarians, but before their aid arrives, young 
Andronicus succeeds in entering Constantinople 
and deposing his grandfather. 

1329 — Andronicus III is defeated at Pelecanon by Orkhan 
in an attempt to relieve Nicaea. Nicaea sur- 
renders. 

Andronicus III, at Phocaea, tries to incite emirs of 
Aidin and Sarukhan to attack Orkhan. 

1333 — Turks of Sarukhan make a raid on Macedonia, while 

their vessels enter the Sea of Marmora and seize 
Rodosto. 

1334 — Andronicus is compelled to send army to save 

Salonika from raiding Turks. 

1336 — Andronicus asks Turkish emirs to help him in siege 

of Genoese at Phocaea. 

1337 or 1338 — Nicomedia and the last Byzantine possessions 

in north-western corner of Asia Minor are con- 
quered by the Osmanlis. 

1340 — Stephen Dushan crosses the Vardar, captures Serres, 

and crowns himself there as ' master of almost all 
the Roman Empire '. 

1341 — After death of Andronicus III, Catacuzenos crowns 

himself at Demotika. 

1342 — Civil war between Cantacuzenos and widow and son 

of Andronicus III, during which both sides make 
overtures to Osmanlis, Serbians, and Bulgarians. 
1345 — Cantacuzenos receives aid from Orkhan, and pays for 
it by marrying his daughter to the Ottoman emir. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 313 



1347 — Dushan crowns himself Emperor of Constantinople. 

Agreement between John Cantacuzenos and John 

Palaeologos to share Byzantine throne. 
Black Death plague reaches Constantinople ' 
1349 — Cantacuzenos calls Osmanlis into Europe again to 

save Salonika from the Serbians. 
1349-53 — Civil war between Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos. 
Palaeologos flees to Tenedos. 

1353 — The Osmanlis, who had been helping Cantacuzenos 

against Palaeologos, capture Gallipoli, and invade 
Thrace. 

1354 — Cantacuzenos, having vainly appealed to the Pope, 

Venice, Bulgaria, and Serbia to aid him against the 
Osmanlis, is deposed by popular revolution in 
Constantinople, and becomes a monk. 
John Palaeologos recalled from exile. 

1355 — Dushan dies on his way to attack Constantinople. 
1354-8 — Palaeologos succeeds finally in subduing Cantacu- 
zenos' son Matthew. 

1358 — While Osmanlis are advancing in Thrace, John V, at 
command of Orkhan, is besieging Phocaea. 

1361 — Adrianople and Philippopolis captured by the Os- 
manlis. 

1363 — John V signs treaty of vassalage to Murad. 

1366 — John V journeys to Buda to enlist aid of Louis of 

Hungary, and on return journey is made prisoner 

by Sisman in Bulgaria. 

1373 — John V, seeing that his visit to Rome and his appeals 

to western princes are of no avail, recognizes Murad 
as his suzerain, promises to do military service in 
Murad' s army, and gives his son Manuel as hostage. 
Thrace and Macedonia are practically lost, and the 
Byzantine Empire has become merely the city 
state of Constantinople. 

1374 — As the result of a rebellion undertaken by Andronicus 

together with the son of Murad against the two 
fathers, John V consents to deprive his son 
Andronicus of his sight, and shuts him up in 
the Tower of Anemas. 
1375-89 — Civil war between John and Manuel and Andronicus, 



314 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



in which Venice, Genoa, and Osmanlis play a de- 
cisive part. John and Manuel purchase Ottoman 
aid at the price of giving up Philadelphia, the last 
Byzantine possession in Asia Minor. 
1391 — Manuel, serving as vassal in Ottoman army, is 
threatened with loss of eyes, if Emperor John does 
not demolish the towers on the walls of Constanti- 
nople, which he has rebuilt. He obeys and dies 
soon after. Manuel escapes from Brusa upon 
learning of his father's death. His flight is fol- 
lowed by the first Ottoman siege of Constanti- 
nople. 

1396 — Bayezid contemplates taking Constantinople by 

assault, but is deterred by arrival of crusaders in 
Hungary. 

1397 — Siege of Constantinople is renewed, after Nicopolis. 
1399 — Crusade of Boucicaut helps Byzantines temporarily. 
1400-2 — Manuel, having made peace with his nephew John, 

sails for Italy and spends two years in fruitless 
endeavour to get aid from western princes. 

1401 — John makes treaty to give up Constantinople, if 

Bayezid should win from Timur. 

1402 — After Bayezid' s defeat at Angora, Manuel returns 

to Constantinople. 
John is banished to Lemnos, and Ottoman colonists 
expelled from Constantinople. Overtures are 
made to Timur. 

1403 — Manuel recognizes Soleiman as successor of Bayezid, 

and renews treaty with him. 



VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN VENICE AND GENOA 
AND THE LEVANT FROM 1300 TO 1403 

1328 — Venetian sovereignty of Negropont is menaced by 
Turkish pirates. 

1344 — Venice aids Cyprus and Rhodes in the capture of 
Smyrna. 

1345-50 — Dushan negotiates frequently with Venice for aid in 
capturing Constantinople. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



315 



1351-3 — War between Venice and Genoa. Sea power of 
Genoa is broken at battle of Lojera. Genoese 
are assisted by Orkhan. 

1355 — Matteo Venier and Marino Faleri warn the Senate 
that the Byzantine Empire must inevitably be- 
come the booty of the Osmanlis, unless Venice 
gets ahead of them. 

1361 — Venetian Senate make overtures to John V for 
alliance against Murad,but withdraw when they see 
the rapid success of Murad's campaign in Thrace. 

1370-1 — Venice and Greece are engaged in a struggle for 
economic supremacy in Cyprus. 

1375 — John V gives Tenedos to the Venetians. The 
Genoese come into conflict with the Venetians 
over economic privileges at Constantinople. 

1379-81 — Venice and Genoa go to war over the question of 
Tenedos and the Byzantine succession to the 
throne. In the Peace of Turin, it is provided that 
Tenedos remain unfortified, and that Andronicus IV 
be recognized the heir to John V. 

1386 — Genoese make treaty with Byzantines. 

1387 — Genoese make commercial treaty with Osmanlis. 

1388 — Venetians make commercial treaty with Osmanlis. 

1389 — Venice and Genoa renew treaties with Bayezid. 
1393 — Venice decides to treat with Sigismund of Hungarj^ 

for defensive alliance against Osmanlis. 

1396 — Venetian aid in Nicopolis crusade is half-hearted. 

1397 — Venice urges Genoese of Pera not to treat with 

Bayezid, and makes accord with Genoa to aid 
Byzantines. 

1401 — Venice and Genoa engaged in another sea struggle for 

supremacy in the Levant. 

1402 — Both Venetians and Genoese aid Osmanlis, fleeing 

from Timur after Angora, to cross into Europe. 
They renew their treaties with Osmanlis, recog- 
nizing Soleiman as Bayezid's successor. 



316 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



VII. THE POPES AND THE MOSLEM MENACE 
IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 

1306 — Clement V exhorts the Venetians to co-operate with 

Charles de Valois in the reconquest of Constanti- 
nople. 

1307 — Clement V urges Charles II of Naples to re-conquer 

Constantinople, but his interest is diverted by a 
project of a crusade to support Cyprus and 
Cilician Armenia against the Egyptians. 

1309 — Papal court transferred from Rome to Avignon. 

1310 — Clement V encourages Knights of St. John to drive 

both Greeks and Turks out of Rhodes. 
1327 — John XXII does not respond to appeal of Andro- 
nicus II to aid Byzantium against the Turks. 

1333 — Similar unsuccessful overture is made by Andro- 

nicus III. 

1334 — Papal effort to form crusade against Turks results 

in the capture of Smyrna. 
1347 — Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin Emperors, 
makes agreement with Clement VI to conquer 
Constantinople. 
At the same time appeals are received at Rome from 
Cantacuzenos for union of western princes against 
Osmanlis. 

1349, 1350, 1353 — Cantacuzenos makes three more overtures to 
Clement VI and Innocent VI. 

1352 — Inhabitants of Philadelphia appeal to Pope for aid, 
promising return to Roman communion. 

1363 — Urban V on Holy Friday gives the cross to several 
princes of the Occident. 

1366 — Urged by Urban, Amadeo of Savoy sails for the 
crusade against the Osmanlis. He spends his 
efforts in releasing John V from the Bulgarians, 
and abandons the Byzantines when they refuse to 
return to the Roman Church. Urban writes to 
Louis of Hungary to put off his crusade until the 
union of the Churches is accomplished. 
Urban V denounces the traffic of the Italian Re- 
publics with Moslems 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 



317 



1369 — Emperor J ohn V, at Rome, abjures errors of Ortho- 
dox Church, and receives from Pope letters, recom- 
mending that Christian princes come to his aid. 

1371 — Gregory XI makes appeal to Christian nations to 

co-operate with Genoa in saving the last Christians 
of the Holy Land. 

1372 — Gregory urges Louis of Hungary to resist the Os- 

manlis before they advance farther into Europe, 
and orders a crusade to be preached in Hungary, 
Poland, and Dalmatia. 

1373 — Gregory, receiving the last envoy from John V, bursts 

into tears, and says that he will save Constanti- 
nople, if only the Byzantine Emperor will cause his 
people to renounce their heresies and return to the 
Roman Church. 
1378 — The Great Schism. 

1388 — Urban VI sends two armed galleys for the defence 
of Constantinople, but is unsuccessful in raising 
crusade. 

1391 — Boniface IX stirs up trouble between Latin and 
Greek Christians in the Balkan peninsula. 

1398 and 1399 — Boniface IX orders crusade to be preached 

throughout Christendom for the defence of Con- 
stantinople. 

1399 — Boucicaut, the only one to respond, goes to the aid 

of Constantinople. 

1402 — Smyrna is lost to Timur. 

1403 — The strife between rival Popes, Benedict XIII and 

Boniface IX, makes impossible a papal effort to 
take advantage of the civil strife between the 
sons of Bayezid, after Timur' s abandonment of his 
conquests in Asia Minor. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I. CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY 

NOTE 

The Classified Bibliography contains only the names of authors. 
Following the classification, the books and editions are given in 
detail under the authors' names in alphabetical order. 

I shall be grateful for corrections and amplifications. The work 
on this bibliography has been done largely in the Bibliotheque 
Nationale, Paris, and I have been handicapped by the lack of a 
complete catalogue. 

No attempt whatever has been made to follow a definite system 
of spelling of Oriental and Slavic names, for arbitrary changes in 
spelling on my part would confuse the reader who desires to find in 
a library catalogue the authors given. I have retained the spelling 
(except in rare instances where there were divergencies in different 
editions of the same book) of the author's name as given by himself 
or by his editor or publisher. As far as the letter ' G ', I have made 
the spelling conform to that of the General Catalogue of the Biblio- 
theque Nationale. Beyond ' G ', there is, as yet, no norm. 

Bibliographers of Printed Books. 

Apponyi ; Auboyneau ; Boeder ; Chevalier ; Dherbelot de Molain- 
ville ; Eichhorn ; Fabricius ; Fevret ; Fitzclarence ; Fraehn ; 
Franke ; Hadji Khalfa ; Halle ; Houtsma et al. ; Oesterly ; 
Omont ; Pogodin ; Potthast ; Welter ; Zenker. 

Bibliographers of Oriental MSS. 

Ahlwardt ; Ali Hilmi ; Apponyi ; Auboyneau ; Blochet ; Browne ; 
Cusa ; De Goeje ; De Jong ; Derenbourg ; Dorn ; Dozy ; 
Fevret ; Fliigel ; Hadji Khalfa ; Karamianz ; Lampros ; Pertsch ; 
Eieu ; Rosen ; Schefer ; Slane ; Smirnow ; Sprenger ; Welter. 

Numismatists. 

Blau ; Djevdet ; Engel ; Friedlander ; Ghalib ; Karabacek ; Lane- 
Poole ; Lavoix ; Makrisi ; Pinder ; Schlumberger ; Serrure ; 
Stickel. 



320 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Chronographers. 

Aladdin Ali ; Arabantinos ; Assemanus ; Hadji Khalfa ; Knaus ; 
Loeb ; Mas Latrie ; Mullach ; Miiller ; Muralt ; Kasmussen ; 
Strzygowski ; Wiistenfeld ; Chronicon Breve (in Ducas). 

Collections of Contemporary Records. 

Ottoman : Feridun, Collection of. 

The authenticity of the documents in this collection cannot be definitely 
established. 

Byzantine : Dieterich ; Miklositch ; Miiller ; Predelli ; Sathas. 

Hungarian, Slavic, and Ragusan : Danicic ; Fejer ; Gelcic ; 
Jorga ; Ljubic ; Makusev ; Miklositch ; Miltitz ; Miiller ; 
Noradounghian ; Racki ; Safarik (Schaffarik) ; Sathas ; Thal- 
loczy ; Theiner ; Wenzel. (See also under Kossova and Nicopolis.) 

Venetian : Alberi ; Brown ; Fejer ; Jorga ; Ljubic ; Makusev ; 
Miklositch ; Minotto ; Miiller ; Noiret ; Noradounghian ; Pre- 
delli ; Racki ; Romanin ; Rymer ; Safarik ; Sathas ; Testa ; 
Thomas. 

Papal (Avignon and Rome) : Baluze ; Bosquet ; Dudik ; Jorga ; 
Romanin ; Theiner ; Werunski. 

The literature about the individual popes, and the collections of docu- 
ments published, registers, letters, etc., are so numerous, that I cannot 
include even a selection here. The reader is referred to Chevalier's 
Repertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Age, where, under each pope, 
will be found the most complete and most recent bibliographical references. 

Genoese (including Pera Colony) : Belgrano ; Jorga ; Miklo- 
sitch ; Miiller ; Noradounghian ; Olivieri ; Predelli ; Testa. 
Other Italian Cities : Jorga ; Miiller. 

French : Boislisle ; Bongars ; Bouchon ; Charriere ; Delaville 
Leroulx ; Dorez ; Gamier ; Jorga ; Kunstmann ; Leuridan ; 
Lot ; Molinier ; Moranville ; Potansque ; Raimboult ; Ronciere ; 
Tarbe. 

English : Rymer. 

Contemporary Chronicles. 

Byzantine : Cantacuzenos ; Nicephoros Gregoras ; Pachymeres ; 
Panaretos (for Trebizond). 

Catalan : Moncada ; Muntaner. (See also Frenzel.) 

French : Enguerran de Monstrelet ; Eustache des Champs ; 
Froissart ; Gilles ; Marche ; Nangis ; Ursins ; Wavrin ; Anon. : 
Cronicorum Karoli Sexti ; Chronique du due Loys de Bourbon ; 
Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis ; Chronique des quatre 
premiers Valois ; Livre des faicts de Jean le Maingre, dit 
Bouciquaut ; Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis (serviteur de 
Gui de Blois). (See also under the Editors : Bellaguet ; Geraud; 
Godefroy ; Kervyn de Lettenhove ; Lacabane ; Lemaitre.) 

Hebrew : Joseph ben Joshua. 

Morea : Chronique de Moree ; Breve Chronicon (see Ducas). 
Oriental : Aboulpharadji ; Hayton. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



321 



Rumanian : Urechi. 

Savoy : Anon. Anciennes Chroniques. 

Servian : Abbey of Tronosho ; Chronicle of Pek. 

Venice : Bonincontrius ; Caroldo ; Guazzo ; Villani (3). 

Venetian Archives (History and Guides to). 

Alberi ; Baschet ; Cecchetti ; Mas Latrie ; Toderini. 

The archives for the fourteenth century are listed in the Alphabetical 
Bibliography. 

Travellers and Geographers. (Those in italics are contemporary 
or nearly contemporary.) 
Asia Minor : Abulfeda ; Ainsworth ; Baedeker ; Belon ; Ber- 
geron ; Bertrandon de la Broquiere ; Bruun ; Busbecq ; Char- 
din ; Cholet ; Cuinet ; Edrisi ; Evlia Tchelebi ; Fresne- 
Canaye ; Ghillebert de Launoy ; Hadji Khalfa ; Hellert ; 
Houzeau ; Huart ; Huber ; Ibn Batutah ; Macarius ; Mande- 
ville ; Marco Polo ; Michelant ; Mostras ; Naumann ; Nicolay ; 
Ortellius ; Ramsay ; Rennell ; Sarre ; Schiltberger ; Seiff ; 
Shehabeddin ; Sidi Ali Ibn Hussein ; Tavernier ; Tchihatcheff ; 
Texeira ; Texier ; Tremeaux ; Vivien de St. Martin. 
Ibn Batutah is the best contemporary authority. 

Constantinople and Balkan Peninsula : Abulfeda ; Baede- 
ker ; Belgrano ; Belon ; Bergeron ; Boue ; Bruun ; Busbecq ; 
Clavijo ; Hadji Khalfa ; Hammer ; Hellert ; Huber ; Jirecek ; 
Macarius ; Manutio ; Miklositch ; Mostras ; Nicolay ; Oli- 
vieri ; Ortellius ; Sathas ; Schiltberger ; Sefert ; Sidi Ali Ibn 
Hussein ; Tafel ; Tozer. 

Clavijo is the best contemporary authority for Constantinople in the 
latter part of the reign of Bayezid. 

I have listed only those whose works I have referred to, or who seem 
to me to have intimate, direct bearing on the subject. Many others, 
however, could be consulted to advantage. See Potthast, Bibliotheca 
Historica Medii Aevi, ii. 1734-5. 

Seljuk Historians. 

Ahmed Ibn Yusuf ; Houtsma (editor) ; Ibn-Bibi ; Mirkhond 
(Mirkhwand). 

Early Arabic, Persian, and Armenian Historians. 

Ahmed Ibn Yusuf ; Ahmed Ibn Yahia ; Hayton ; Ibn al Tik- 
taka ; Ibn Khaldun ; Khondemir ; Makrisi ; Mirkhond (Mirkh- 
wand) ; Mohammed-en-Nesawi ; Reshideddin ; Texeira ; Anon. 
Derbend Name. 

Ottoman Historians and Chroniclers. 

Abdul Aziz ; Ahmed Jaudat ; Alaeddin Ali (Ibn Kadi Said) ; 
Ali (Mustafa Ibn Ahmed) ; Ashik-pasha-zade (Ahmed Ibn 
Yahia); Atha ; Ayas Pasha ; Djelaleddin, Mustapha ; Djema- 
leddin ; Djemaleddin-al-Kifty ; Djevad bey, Ahmed ; Fehmi ; 
Feridun, Collection of ; Geropoldi, Antonio (trans.) ; Hadji 

1736 X 



322 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Klialfa ; Hezarfenn, Hussein ; Ibn Ali Mohammed Al-Biwy ; 
Idris, Mevlana (of Bitlis) ; Kheirullah ; Kourbaddinmakky ; 
Mohammed Ferid bey ; Moukhlis Abderrahman ; Mustafa ; 
Nedim ; Neshri ; Nichandji pasha Mehmet ; Said ; Seadeddin ; 
Tahir-Zade ; Anon. Mira-ari-tarihh. 

No authenticated Ottoman records exist for the fourteenth century. 
The nearest writers to events are Ashik-pasha-zade, Idris, Mouklis 
Abderrahman and Neshri. The historian enjoying the greatest reputa- 
tion for authority is Seadeddin. 

Western writers on Ottoman Empire before 1600. 

Adelman ; Aenaeus Sylvius ; Alhard ; Aretinus (Leonardo Bruni) ; 
Augustinus Caelius ; Aventinus ; Bertellus ; Boeder ; Bongars ; 
Busbequius ; Cambini ; Canierarius ; Campana ; Cervarius ; 
Chytraeus ; Clavijo ; Corregiaio ; Cousin (Cognatus) ; Crusius ; 
Cuspianus ; Donado da Lezze ; Drechsler ; Egnatius ; Foglietta ; 
Foscarini ; Geufiraeus ; Giorgievitz ; Giovio ; Gycaud (ed.) ; 
Hoeniger ; Konstantynowicz ; Lonicerus ; Menavino ; Mont- 
albanus ; Pfeiffer ; Podesta ; Postellus ; Eamus ; Eeusner ; 
Richer ; Sabellicus ; Sansovino ; Schiltberger ; Secundums ; 
Spandugino ; Traut ; Anon. Series Imp. Turc. and Tractatus 
de ritu et moribus Turc. 

Most of the early western books are in Latin, but the authors are Greek, 
Italian, French, German, Spanish, Austrian, and Polish. The majority of 
them are as early as, if not earlier than, the first Ottoman chroniclers. 

Clavijo and Schiltberger are contemporary and eye-witness authorities 
for the reign of Bayezid. Konstantynowicz' s book claims to be the memoirs 
of a janissary in the reign of Murad II. 

Busbequius, Donado da Lezze, Geuffraeus, Giorgievitz, Menavino, 
Spandugino, and the author of Tractatus de ritu gained their information 
first-hand from living in Turkey. 

General Western Ottoman Historians (seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries). 

Cantemir (a Eumanian) ; De la Porte ; Du Verdier ; Febvre ; 
Formanti ; Gibbon ; Knolles ; Mignot ; Ohsson ; Petits de la 
Croix ; Ricaut ; Sagredo ; Schulz ; Servi ; Vanel. 

General Western Ottoman Historians (nineteenth century). 

Castellan ; Collas ; Creasy ; Draseke ; Ebeling ; Errante ; Fehmi 
(a Turk) ; Ganem (a Syrian) ; Hammer ; Hertzberg ; Jon- 
quiere ; Jorga ; Jouannin ; La Garde de Dieu ; Lamartine ; 
Lane-Poole ; Lavallee ; Liidemann ; Pambaud ; Salaberry, de ; 
Wirth ; Wiistenfeld ; Zinkeisen. 

Hammer and Zinkeisen wrote the exhaustive and authoritative histories 
of the nineteenth century. The splendid work of Professor Jorga, of the 
University of Bucarest, belongs to our own twentieth century, and is the 
most important contribution of contemporary scholarship to the history 
of the Balkan peninsula under Ottoman domination. But none of these 
three authoritative historians pays particular attention to the actual 
foundation of the Ottoman Empire. Draseke and Rainbaud have only 
touched upon the problems involved in reconstructing the fourteenth- 
century period. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



323 



Mongol and Tartar History. 

Aboul-Ghazi-Bahadour ; Bonaparte ; Bretschneider ; Cahun ; 
Chavannes ; Dorn ; Erdmann ; Guignes ; Hammer ; Hirth ; 
He-worth ; Khondemir ; Mohammed en Newasi ; Beshideddin; 
Vambery ; Wolff. 

Byzantine Empire and Frankish and Italian Greece. 

Ameilhon ; Arabantinos ; Berger de Xivrey ; Byzantine His- 
torians (see under Alphabetical Bibliography , on p. 367) ; Curtius ; 
Djelal ; Ducange ; Finlay ; Florinsky ; Gibbon ; Gregorovius ; 
Hammer ; Hase ; Hertzberg ; Hody ; Hopf ; Kampouroglou ; 
Karamzin ; Lampros ; Liidemann ; Migne ; Miller ; Moncada ; 
Moniferratos ; Mullack ; Miiller ; Muntaner ; Niebuhr ; Papar- 
regopoulos ; Parisot ; Bodd ; Sathas ; Stritter ; Tafel ; Tozer. 
(See also Slavs of Balkan Peninsula.) 

Collections of Byzantine writers. 

Bonn (Niebuhr) ; Migne ; Paris (Louvre) and Venice. 

Historians and Chroniclers of Rumania. 

Cantemir ; Costin ; Hasdeu ; Miller ; Picot ; Urechi ; Xenopol. 
Costin and Urechi are nearest the events. 

Slavs of Balkan Peninsula. 

Borchgrave ; Danicic ; Dlugosz ; Drinov ; Engel ; Florinsky ; 
Guerin-Songeon ; Jirecek ; Kallay ; Kanitz ; Konstantynowicz ; 
Miller ; Orbini ; Pray ; Pucic ; Baic ; Banke ; Safafik (Schaf- 
farik); Thalloczy. (See also under Kossova and Nicopolis.) 
No contemporary writers. 

Hungary (including biographers of Sigismund). 
Acsady ; Aschbach ; Beckmann ; Bonfinius ; Engel ; Fessler ; 
Furnhaber ; Fvaknoi ; Kern ; Kupelwieser ; Levee ; Mae- 
lath ; Maurer ; Por ; Pray ; Sambucus ; Schoenherr ; 
Schwandtner ; Szalay ; Szentklaray ; Szilagyi ; Theiner ; 
Thurocz ; Vambery ; Wenzel. (See also under Kossova and 
Nicopolis.) 

Venice. 

Agostini ; Barbaro ; Bembo ; Berchet ; Bonincontrius ; Care- 
sino ; Caroldo ; Cicogna ; Dandolo ; Daru ; Guazzo ; Hazlitt ; 
Hodgson ; Mas Latrie ; Bomanin ; Sanuto ; Sismondi ; Villani; 
Anon. Cronica Dolfina. 

Genoa. 

Belgrano ; Canale ; Giustiniani ; Sauli ; Sismondi ; Stella. 

Other Italian cities. 

Cambiano ; Datta ; Gattaro ; Guichenon ; Miiller ; Sismondi ; 
Anon. Anciennes Chroniques de Savoye and Monumenta Pisana. 

X 2 



324 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Collections of Italian writers. 

Muratori ; Tartini. 

Rhodes. 

Bosio ; Caoursin ; Vertot. 

Cyprus. 

Bustron ; Macairas ; Mas Latrie. 
Papal Archives, Guide to Brom. 

Papal relations and Crusades against Turks. 

Baluze ; Bernino ; Boislisle ; Bongars ; Bosio ; Bosquet ; Caour- 
sin ; Cribellus ; Datta ; Delavilie Leroulx ; Dozy ; Draseke ; 
Eubel ; Jorga ; Kunstmann ; Lardito ; Lot ; Le Quien ; Mas 
Latrie ; Mezieres ; Molinier ; Paris ; Petrarca ; Postansque ; 
Raimboult; Eaynaldus; Sanudo; Stewart; Theiner; Thomas; 
Torez ; Wylie. 
See note above under Collections of Contemporary Papal Records. 

Kossova. 

Avril ; Mijatovitch ; Novakovitck ; Pavitch. 
Nicopolis. 

Brauner ; Froissart ; Kiss ; Koehler ; Rez ; Schiltberger ; 
Szentklaray ; Anon. Relation . . . par un serviteur de Gui de Blois. 

Relating to Timur. 

Abderrezzah ; Arabshah ; Clavijo ; Hay ton ; Hussein Abu 
Halib ; Langles ; Mexia ; Mezdob ; Moranville ; Nazmi Zade ; 
Perondino ; Sherefeddin ; Silvestre de Sacy ; White ; Anon. 
Dominican Friar and Memoirs of Tamerlane. 

Arabshah, Clavijo, Sherefeddin, the Dominican friar and the Memoirs 
(possibly) are contemporary. 

Art and Architecture. 

Djelal; Franz; Karabacek; Kuhnel; Lavoix; Migeon; Parvillee; 
Saladin. 

Literature and Languages and Oriental Ethnology. 

Alberi ; Aristov ; Dethier ; Dieterici ; Donner ; Dufresne ; 
Fejer ; Huart ; Jacob ; Koelle ; Krumbacher ; Kunos ; Lilien- 
cron ; Miklositch ; Mordtmann ; Mullach ; Nemeth ; Pavitch ; 
Remusat ; Toderini ; Vambery. (See also under Kossova and 
Nicopolis.) 

Commercial History. 

Charriere ; Cornet ; Delaville Leroulx ; Depping ; Heyd ; Jorga ; 
Mas Latrie ; Pigeonneau ; Schanz ; Tafel. 

Black Death. 

Co vino ; Hecker. 

Covino is a contemporary. 



II. ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 



Abderrezzah. Hist, de Schah-Roch, des autres enfants de Tamerlan 
et des princes fours descendants. Trans, by A. Galland. Bibl. 
Nat., fonds fr. 6084-5. Same, with variations, 6088-9. 

Abdul Aziz. Razoat-ul-Ebrar. History of Ottoman Empire from 
foundation to Sultan Ibrahim. Turkish. Unpublished and un- 
translated. 

Aboulfeda. 1. Geographic d* Aboulfeda, trad, de l'arabe en francais, 
et accomp. par notes, par M. Eeinaud et M. Stanislas Guyard. 
Paris, Impr. Nat., 1848-83. 3 vols. 4to. 

In his Diet. Bibl., under no. 3472, fol. 552-3, Hadji Khalfa gives list of 
Aboulfeda's sources. 

2. Aboulfedae Annates Muslemici, arabice et latine, opera et 
studiis Jo. Jacobi Reiskii. Leipzig, 1754, 4to. Copenhagen, 
1789-94. 5 vols. 4to (ed. J. G. C. Adler). Pocock MS. trans, 
into Latin by J. Gagnier, Oxford, 1722. 

Aboul-Ghazi-Bahadour-Khan. Histoire des Mongols et des Tar- 
tares, ed. et trad, par Baron Desmaisons. Petrograd, 1871-4. 
2 vols. 8vo. Latin trans, by C. M . Fraehn, with Tartar text. 
Kasan, 1825, folio. French trans. Leyden, 1726, 12mo. German 
trans. Gottingen, 1780, 8vo, by Dr. Dan. Gottlieb Messerschmid, 
English trans, by Col. Miles, London, 1838, 8vo. 

Aboulpharadji, Gregorius. 1. Syriac Chronicle, trans, into Latin 
by Bruns and Kersch. Leipzig, 1789. 2 vols. 4to. 

This edition contains a continuation by an anonymous author from 
1286 to 1297, which is most valuable for end of Seljuks of Konia. 
2. The author trans, his work into Arabic, which was published 
from Bodleian MS. with Latin trans, by Edward Pocock, Oxford, 
1663-72. 2 vols. 4to. Trans, from Latin into German, Leipzig, 
1783-5. 2 vols. 8vo. 

Aboul Youssouf Ibn Taghry. Elmanhal essafy. MS., Bibl. Nat., 
Paris, fonds arabe, 748. 

Used by Ch. Schefer in establishing relations between Bayezid and 
Sultan Barkuk of Egypt. 

Abul Fallah Fumeni. See Dorn. 

Adelman or Adelmansfelden. De origine, ordine et militari dis- 

ciplina magni Turcae. Date and place missing. Fol. 
Adler, J. G. C. Editor of Abulfeda. 

Aehrenfeld, Mosig von. German trans, of Safari'k, P. J. 
Aenaeas, Sylvius (Pope Pius II). Opera quae extant omnia. Basel, 

various editions. Fol. 
Agostini, Giovanni. Istoria degli scrittori veneziani. Venice, 

1752-4. 2 vols. 4to. 



326 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Ahlwardt, Wilhelm. Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften der 
k. Bibliothek zu Berlin. Berlin, 1887-94. 6 vols. 4to. Also 
edited Ibn al Tiktaki and Ahmed Ibn Yahia. 

Ahmed Ibn Yusuf (Abul Abbas). Chapters 45 to 53 of his Uni- 
versal History, which deal with Karamanlis, Seljuks, and Osmanlis, 
translated by Rasmussen, in Annates Islamismi, pp. 61-134. 

Ahmed Ibn Mousa (Al Khayali). Religion ou theologie des Turcs. 
Trad. anon. 2nd ed. Brussels, 1704, 12mo. 

Ahmed Ibn Yahia. See Ashik-pasha-zade. 

Ahmed Ibn Yahia (Al Baladouri). Arabic text of chronicle from 
Petermann MS. no. 633, of Berlin, edited and published by W. Ahl- 
wardt. Leipzig, 1883, 8vo. 

Ahmed Jaudat. Considerations sur Vhistoire ottomane. Bibl. de 
l'Ecole des lang. viv. orientales, 2 e serie, vol. ix. Paris, 1886, 
8vo. 

Ahmed Mohammed, Sheik. Ed. Calcutta edition of Arabskah. 
Ainsworth, W. F. Travels and Researches in Asia Minor. London, 

1842. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Aladdin Ali Ibn Kadi Said. Abridged Chronology of Ottoman 

Hist. Untranslated. See Hadji Khalfa, Diet. Bibl., no. 7754, 

fol. 1326. 

Alberi, Eugenic Relazioni degli Ambasciatori veneti al senato nel 
secolo XVI, raccolte et pubbl. da Eugenio Alberi. Florence, 
1839-63. 15 vols. 8vo. 

Ottoman Empire, 3 vols., 1840, 1844, 1855. Does not go back to our 
period. But there is an excellent glossary of Turkish words in the intro- 
duction to vol. i. 

Alhard, Hermann Kummen. De imperio turcico discursus acade- 
micus. Ed. tertia, Hanover, 1689. 

In Bibl. Nat., Paris, this book is bound with the Reiske ed. of Drechsler, 
nd is wrongly attributed to Andrea Bosio on the title-page. 

Ali (Mustafa Ibn Ahmed) or Muhieddin. Kunhu'l-Akhbar. 
Chronicle of Ottoman History up to Mohammed the Conqueror. 
Text published Constantinople without date. German trans, 
(from MS. brought to Emperor Ferdinand by Beck in 1551) by 
Johannes Gaudier. Latin trans, by Leunclavius and J. B. Podesta. 
Italian trans, by Geropoldi, Venice, 1686. See these four names. 

Zenker, in his Bibl. Orientalis, Leipzig, 1846-61, wrongly calls Leun- 
clavius a translation of Seadeddin, which has led into error Jorga, the 
latest historian of the Ottoman Empire. See his Gesch. d. osm. Reiches, 
i. 150, note 1 (Gotha, 1908). 

Ali Ben Shemseddin. See Dorn 

Ali efT. Hilmi Al Daghestani. Catalogue in Arabic of Turkish and 
Persian books in the Khedivial Library. Cairo, 1888. 2 vols. 8vo. 

Ameilhon, H. P. Histoire du Bas-Em/pire. Cont. by Lebeau, Chas. 
Tomes xviii-xxi. Paris, 1835-6. 4 vols. fol. Tomes xxii-xxix. 
Paris, 1781-1817. 8 vols. 12mo. 

Apponyi, Graf Alex. Ungarn betreffende, im Ausland gedruckte 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



327 



Bilcher und Flugschriften, gesammelt unci besckrieben, Vols, i 
and ii, up to 1720. Munich, 1903. 
Ed. limited to 125 copies. 
I ArABANTINOS, PaNAGIOTIS. Xpovoypacfila rr}<S 'Hiretpov. Athens, 

1856-7. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Arabshah, Ahmed. Portrait du Gran Tamerlan avec la suite de son 
histoire. Trad, de l'arabe par Pierre Vattier. Paris, 1658, 4to. 
Arabic text, ed. Jacob Golius, Leyden, 1636, 4to. Also from 
collation of four MSS. by Sheik Ahmed Mohammed, Calcutta, 
1812, 8vo. 2nd ed., 1818, la. 8vo. Latin trans, by S. H. Manger, 
Leovardiae, 1767-72. 3 vols. sin. 4to. 

Slane in Notices et Extraits, l re partie, vol. xix, introd. lxxxviii, warns 
against trans, of Manger, and also his Arabic reprint. 

Turkish trans, by Nazmi Zade, Tarikh Timuri ghiurgian. 
Constantinople, 1729, 4to. 
Arbaumont, d\ Ed., in collab. with Beaune, of Olivier de la 
Marche. 

Arcq, Douel d'. Editor of Enguerran de Monstrelet. 

Aretinus (Leonardo Bruni). Libellus de temporibus suis. Venice, 

1475, 4to. 2nd ed., 1485. 
Aristov. Bemerkungen uber die ethnischen Bestandteile der turkischen 

Stamme und Volkerschaften. Petrograd, 1897. 
Armain, M. MS. trans, in French of Hadji Khalfa's Djihannuma. 
Arnold of Lttbeck. Continued Chronicle of Helmoldus. 
Arnold, T. W. Editor of Encyclopedie de V Islam. See Houtsma 

et al. 

Aschbach, Joseph. Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds. Hamburg, 1838- 
45. 4 vols. 8vo. 

Ashik-pasha-zade, Ahmed Ibn Yahia. Tarikhi-Ashik-pasha-zade. 
Vatican MS. 

Dervish Ahmed cites the book of sheik Yakhshi ibn Elias, imam of 
Orkhan. He writes in reign of Bayezid I. This is the nearest approach 
extant to an Ottoman source for the 14th cent. See no. 6 under Hammer. 
Assemani, J. S. Kalendaria ecclesiae universae . . . ecclesiarum 

orientis et occidentis. Borne, 1755. 6 vols. 4to. 
Auboyneau, G-. (in collab. with Fevret, A.). Essai de Bibliographie 
pour servir a V histoire de V Empire Ottoman : limes turcs, livres 
imprimes a Constantinople, et livres Strangers a la Turquie, mais 
pouvant servir a son histoire. Paris, 1911, fol., la. 8vo. 

Of this work, planned to be an exhaustive Ottoman bibliography, only 
the first fasciculus, on Religion, Mceurs et Coutumes, has appeared. 
M. Auboyneau died in 1911. I have been unable to ascertain if M. Fevret 
intends to continue the work, for he is mobilised in the French army at 
present. 

Augustinus Caelius (Curio). Sarracenicae historiae libri tres. . . . 

Frankfort, 1596, fol. 
Aventinus, Iohannes. Liber in quo causae miseriarum, quibus 
Christiana resp. premitur, indicantur, Turcicaeque saevitiae repri- 
mendae ratio declaratur. In Lonicerus, vol. i. 



328 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



A veil, Adolphe de. La Bataille de Kossova, Paris, 1868, 12mo. 
Ayas Pasha. Hist, des princes de la dynastie ottomane, precedee oVun 

abrege de VMst. des Selj. et des souverains du fays de Karaman. . . . 

17th cent. MS., no. 1021, Schefer col. 

Baeca, Gaspar de. Spanish trans, of Paulo Giovio's account of 
Timur in Clavijo. 

Baedeker, Karl, editor. Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, Klein- \ 

asien, Archipel und Cypern. Mit 18 Karten, 50 Planen und 15 

Grundrissen. 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1914, 12mo. 
Baiocensis, Petrus. Chronicon (1350-92). Basel, 1512, fol. 
Baluze, Etienne. Vitae paparum Avinionensium ab 1305 ad 1394. 

Paris, 1693. 2 vols. 4to. 

2nd volume contains documents. 
Barbaro, Francesco. On efforts of Venetians vs. Osmanlis before 

capture of Constantinople, see Agostini, ii. 107-8. 
Baronius, Caesar. For Annates Eccl., see Eaynaldus. 
Baschet, Armand. 1. Les Archives de Venise. Paris, 1857, la. 8vo. 

Amplified edition of same, Paris, 1870, 8vo. 

2. Histoire de la Chancellerie secrete (de Venise). Paris, 1870, 

8vo. 

Bassett, P. Editor of Encyclopedic de VIslam. See Houtsma et al. 

Bassianato, Francisco. Latin trans, of Paulo Giovio. 

Beale, T. An Oriental Biographical Dictionary. New edition, 

revised and enlarged by H. Keene. London, 1894, la. 8vo. 
Beaune. Ed., in collab. with d'Arbaumont, of Les Memoires 

d' Olivier de la Marche. 
Beckmann, G. Der Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds gegen die werdende 

Weltmacht der Osmanen, 1392-1437. Gotha, 1902, 8vo. 
Bekker, Immanuel. Editor of Chalcocondylas and Pachymeres in 

Bonn edition. 
Belfour, F. C. English trans, of Macarius. 

Belgrano, L. T. Documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera. pp. 97- 
336, 931-1004 ; appendix with engravings and map of Pera ; in 
vol. xiii of Atti della Societa ligure di Storia patria. Genoa, 
1877-84. 2 vols. la. 8vo. 

Bellaguet. Editor of Chron. du Religieux de Saint-Denis. 

Belli, Costi. Italian trans, of Ricaut. 

Belon, Pierre. Les Observations de plusieurs singularitez et choses 

. . . en Grece, Asie, . . . etc., redigees en 3 livres. Paris, 1553, sm.4to. 
In second partis : ' Les mceurs et f aeons de vivre en Grece et en Turquie.' 
Bembo, Cardinal Pietro. Historiae Venetiae libri XII. Aldine ed., 

Venice, 1551, fol. Numerous other ed., also Italian trans. 
Berchet, Guglielmo. La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia. Extract 

from Bolletino consolare, vol. ii. Florence, 1865, 8vo. Also 

editor of Marino Sanuto the Younger's Diarii. 
Berger de Xivrey. ' La vie et les ouvrages de Temp. Manuel 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



329 



Paleologue.' In Mem. de VAcad. des Inscriptions, vol. xix, 
partie 2, pp. 1-301. Paris, 1853, 4to. 
Based on Bibl. Nat., fonds grec, no. 3041. 
Bergeron, Pierre, ed. Voyages faits principalement en Asie dans 
les XII e , XIII e , XIV e et XVe siecles. The Hague, 1735. 2 vols. 4to. 
Benjamin de Tudelle, Jean de Plan-Carpin, Pere Ascelin, Guillaume de 
Rubruquius, Marco Polo, Hayton, Jean de Mandeville, &c. 

Bernino, Domenico. Memorie historiche de cid cine hanno operato 
li summi pontefici nelle guerre contro i Turclii fino alV anno 1684. 
Rome, 1685, 8vo. 

Starts with Urban V, 1362. 

Bertellus, Petrus. Imperatorum Osmanidarum Historia. Vicenza , 
1699. 

' Paulus Iovius ne comparandus quidem ad hunc.' Boeder, p. 103. 
Bertrandon de la Broquiere. Le voyage d'outremer, 1422-33, 

ed. par C. Schefer. Paris, 1892, la. 8vo. 
Blau, 0. Die orientalischen Miinzen des Museums der k. hist.- 

arch. Gesellschaft zu Odessa. Odessa, 1876, 4to. 
Blochet, B. Cat. des MSS. orientaux Schefer. Paris, 1900. Cat. 

des MSS. orientaux Decourdemarche, Paris, 1909. 
Boecler, Jo. Henry. Commentarius Historico-Politicus de Rebus 
Turcicis. . . . Buda, 1717, 16mo. 

In bibliography gives 317 titles of books on Turkey publ. up to 1704, 
but no oriental titles, and no MSS. 

Boislisle, de. ' Pro jet de Croisade du premier due de Bourbon.' 

In Bulletin de la Soc. d'hist. de France for 1872. 
Bojnicic, Ivan. German trans, of Klaie. 

Bonaparte, Prince Roland. Documents de Vepoque mongole des 

13 e et 14 e siecles. (Documents lithographed'.) Paris, 1895, la. fol 
Boner, Jerome. German trans, of Bonfinius. 
Bonfinius, Antonius. Rerum Hungaricarum Decades Quatuor (373- 

1495). Basel, 1568, fol. Hanover, 1606, fol. German trans, by 

Jerome Boner, Basel, 1545, fol. 
Bongars, Jacques (editor). Gesta Dei per Francos, sive orientalium 

expeditionum historia 1095-1420. Hanover, 1611. 2 vols. fol. 
Bonincontrius, Laurentius. Annates ab 1360 ad 1458. In Mura- 

tori, xxi. 1-162. Milan, 1732, fol v 
Borchgrave, Emile de. ' Kemp. Etienne Douchan de Serbie et 

la peninsule balkanique au xiv e siecle.' In Bulletin de VAcad. 

royale de Belgique, 8 e serie, viii. 261-92, 416-45. Brussels, 1884, 

8vo. 

Bosio, Iacomo. DeW istoria delta . . . religione . . . e militia di 

S. Giovanni Gierosolimitano. Rome, 1594-1602. 3 vols. fol. 

Other editions, Rome, 1621 ; Rome and Naples, 1629-34 ; of 

vol. iii, Rome, 1676, and Naples, 1695. 
Vol. ii, from 1292 to 1522. 
Bosquet, Francois. Pontificum Romanorum Avigniensium historia 

ab 1305 ad 1394. Paris, 1632, 8vo. (Documented.) 



330 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Bouche-Leclerq, A. French trans, of Curtius. 
Boucicaut, Marechal de. See Anon., Lime des faicts. 
Boue, Ami. 1. Turquie d' Europe. Paris, 1840. 4 vols. 8vo. 

2. Recueil d'itineraires dans la Turquie d'Europe. Vienna, 

1854. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Bratutti, Vicente. Italian trans, of Seadeddin. 
Brauner, Alois. Die Schlacht bei Nicopolis. Breslau, 1876, 8vo. 
Bretschneider, E. 1. Notes on Chinese Mediaeval Travellers to the 

West. Shanghai, 1875, 8vo. 
2. Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, fragments 

towards the knowledge of the geography and history of central 

and western Asia from the 13th to the 17th cent. (In Triibner's 

Oriental series.) London, 1888. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Briot. French trans, of Eicaut. 

Brom, Gisbert. Guide aux Archives du Vatican. 2nd ed. Pome, 
1911, la. 8vo. 

Brown, Pawdon L. Calendar of State Papers . . . in archives and 

collections of Venice, and in other libraries of northern Italy. 

London, 1864. Vols, i (1202-1509), xx, la. 8vo. 
Browne, E. G. Cambridge Oriental MSS. Cat., Cambridge, 1900. 

Handlist of Gibb Col. of Turkish Boohs, ibid., 1906. 
Bruns, P. J. Latin trans, of Abulfaradj in collab. with Kersch. 
Bruun, Philipp. 1. Constantinople, ses sanctuaires et ses reliques au 

comm. du XV e siecle. Extraits du voyage de Clavijo. Trans. 

from Spanish. Odessa, 1883, 8vo. 

2. ' Geogr. Bemerkungen zu Schiltbergers Reisen.' In Sitzungs- 

berichte der k. Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., 1869, Munich, vol. ii. 

These notes, translated into English and revised, are given in Telfer's 
trans, of Schiltberger. 

Buchon, J. A. C. Editor of Froissart ; Ducange ; and anon., Lime 

des faicts de Bouciquaut. French trans, of Muntaner. 
Bury, J. B. Editor of Gibbon. 

Busbecq, Ogier Ghiselen de. 1. A. G. Busbequii omnia quae 
extant. Leyden, 1633, fol. 

2. Epistolae Turcicae. Amsterdam, Elzevir, 1660, 12mo. 

3. Life and Letters of, ed. by C. T. Forster and F. H. B. Danniell. 
London, 1881. 2 vols. 8vo. 

4. De re militari adversus Turcas instituenda consilium. In 
Folieta, pp. 25-76. 

Bustron, Florio. Cronica (1191-1489). Island of Cyprus. In 
Italian. Ed. by Comte de Mas Latrie, in Melanges historiques, 
v. 1-532. Paris, 1886, 8vo. Also in Sathas, Bibl. graeca medii 
aevi, vol. ii. Venice, 1873, la. 8vo. 

Cabasilas, S. Editor of Martin Crusius. 

Cahun, Leon. Introduction a Vhistoire de VAsie : Turcs et Mongols. 
Paris, 1896, 8vo. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



331 



Cambiano, Giuseppe. ' Historico discorso.' In Mon. Hist. Patria 
Scriptorum, i. 930-1421. 

Excellent for relations of Piedmont with the Levant up to 1560. 
Cambini, Andrea. Commentario delta origine de* Turchi et imperio 
delta casa ottomanna. Florence, 1527, 12mo (2nd ed. s. L, 1537). 
Also published in Sansovino, pp. 141-81. 
| Camerarius, Joachimus. De rebus turcicis commentarii duo accura- 

tissimi, a filiis . . . collecti ac editi. Frankfort, 1598, fol. 
I Campana, Cesare. Compendio historico . . . con un sommario del- 
V origine de' Turchi, e vite di tutti i prencipi di casa ottomanna . . . 
Venice, 1597, 8vo. 
! Canale, Michel Giuseppe. Nuova istoria delta repubblica di Genova. 

Florence, 1858-64. 4 vols. 16mo. 
Cantacuzenos, John. See under Byzantine Historians. 
' Cantemir, Demetrius. Istoria impcriului Ottomanu. Rumanian 
trans, from Latin, by Joseph Hodosiu. Bucharest, 1876. 2 vols, 
la. 8vo. Eng. trans, from orig. MS. by N. Tindal, London, 1734, 
2 vols. 4to. French trans., Paris, 1734 ; German, Hamburg, 
1735. 

Caoursin, Guillaume. Historia . . . von Rhodis. . . . Strassburg, 
1513, fol. Also found in his Opera, Ulm, 1496, fol. Anon. English 
trans, under title : History of Turkish Wars with Rhodians, Vene- 
tians, &c. . . . written by Will Caoursin and Khodja Afendy, 
a Turk. London, 1683, 8vo. 
J Caresino, Raphael. Continued Dandolo's Cronica in Muratori, 
vol. xii. 

Carli, Gio. Rinaldo. Italian trans, of Hadji Khalfa's Chrono- 
logical Tables. 

Caroldo, Giovanni Giacomo. Chronique venetienne. Bibl. Nat., 
Paris, MS. anc. fonds, 9959-63. Extracts from years 1362-4 are 
printed in Bibl. de VEcole des Chartes (1873), xxxiv. 68-72. 

Castellan, A. L. Moeurs, usages, costumes des Othomans et abrege 
de leur histoire. Paris, 1812. 6 vols., 18mo. 

Cecchetti, B. Collaborator with T. Toderini. 

Cervarius, Ludovicus. De Turcarum Origine, Moribus et Rebus 
Gestis commentarii. Florence, 1590, 8vo. 

CHALCOCONDYLAS, LAONICUS. AaovUov X<x\kokov8vXov 'AOrjvatov 

d7ro8etcts IcrropLwv SeW Greek-Latin editions, see Byz. Hist, at 
end of bibliography. French trans, by Blaise de Vigenaire. Paris, 
1662. 2 vols. fol. Latin trans, by C. Clauser and recension by 
I. Bekker (for Bonn edition). 

I have found the Latin trans, very incorrect in many places : there 
are frequent glosses. (See Appendix A, first footnote.) 

Champs, Eustache des. CEuvres inedites de . . ed. by Tarbe. 
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Chardin, Jean. Voyage en Perse et autres lieux de VOrient. Amster- 
dam, 1711. 10 vols. 12mo. 

Charriere, Ernest. Negociations de la France dans le Levant, ou 



332 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Correspondances, memoir es et actes diplomatiques des ambass. de 
France a Constantino fie, . . . Venise, Raguse, &c. Paris, 1848-60. 
4 vols. 4to. 

Chauvin, Victor. French trans, of Dozy's Essay on Islam. 
Chavannes, Edouard. Documents sur les Tou-hioue occidentaux. 

With map showing disposition of Turkish tribes of Central Asia. 

Petrograd, 1903, 4to. 
Chazaud, P. P. Editor of Chronique du due Loys de Bourbon. 
Chevalier, Ulysse. Repertoire des sources historiques du Moyen 

Age. (Nouvelle edition, augmentee.) Paris, 1905-7. 2 vols. 

la. 8vo. 

Most complete reference work in existence for bibliography of 14th 
Century Popes. 

Cholet, Comte Armand-Pierre. Voyage en Turquie d'Asie. With 

map. Paris, 1892, 8vo. 
Chytraeus, David. 1. Historia ecclesiarum in Graecia. Francfort, 

1583, fol. 

2. Narratio belli cyprii inter Venetos et Turcas. In Foglietta, 
pp. 96-111. 

Cicogna, E. A. Storia dei Dogi di Venezia. 3rd ed. Venice, 1867. 
2 vols. fol. 

Clauser, C. Latin trans, of Chalcocondylas. 

Clavijo, Ruy Gonzales de. 1. Historia del gran Tamerlan, e 
itinerario y enarracion del Viage de la Embaxada que Gonzalez le 
Jiizo, por mandada del muy poderoso Sefwr Rey Don Henrique el 
Tercero de Castilla. Seville, 1582, fol. Madrid, 1782 ; 4to. 
English trans., by Clements P. Markham, in Hakluyt series, 
London, 1859, 4to. Russian trans., by L. Sreznavski, Petrograd, 
1881, 8vo. 

2. Extracts from above, describing Constantinople in 1403, 
translated into French with notes by Bruun, Philip, under whom 
it is listed. 
Cognatus. See Cousin. 

Collas, Louis. Histoire de VEmpire Ottoman. Paris, 1862, 16mo. 

Republished 1880, 1898. Fourth edition, revised by E. Driault, 

Paris, 1913, 32mo. 
Colotendi. French trans, of Texeira. 

Corregiaio, Don Marco U. Delia vera maniera del vincere il Turco. 

Padova, 1571, 12mo. 
Cournand, Abbe. French trans, of Abbe Toderini. 
Cousin, Gilbert. Gilberti Cognati Chronicon Sultanorum et prin- 

cipum Turciae serie continua usque ad Solymannum magnum. 

Frankfort, 1558, 8vo. 

Best consulted in vol. i, pp. 399 f., of Opera in 3 tomos digesta, Basel, 
1562, fol. 

Covino, Symon de. Bibl. Nat., Paris, MSS., fonds latin 8369-70 : 
contemporary account of the Black Death of 1348 by a Paris 
physician, mostly in form of a hexameter poem. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



333 



Ckeasy, Sir Edward S. History of the Ottoman Turks. New ed. 
London, 1877, 12mo. 

This abridgement of von Hammer has no historical value. It contains, 
however, an admirable chapter by Creasy himself on the legislation of 
Mohammed II. 

Cribellus, Leodrisius. De expeditions Pii papae II in Turcas 
libri duo. In Muratori, xxiii. 21-80. 
From MS. in secret archives. 
Crusius, Martin. Turco-Graeciae libri octo . . . quibus Graecorum 
status sub imperio Turcico in politia et ecclesia . . . describitur 
. . . Edidit S. Cabasilas. Basel, 1584, fol. 

Book I contains political hist, of Constantinople from 1391 to 1578. 
Cuinet, Vital. La Turquie d'Asie. Paris, 1890-5. 4 vols. la. 8vo. 
i Curtius, Ernest. Griechische Geschichte. 6th ed. Berlin, 1887-9, 
3 vols. 8vo. French trans, of 5th ed., by A. Bouche-Leclercq, 
Paris, 1883-4. 5 vols. 8vo. Greek trans, by S. P. Lampros, 
Athens, 1898-1901. (B^Aio^/o? Mapao-Xij.) 6 vols. 8vo. 
The last volume, in all editions, covers our period. 
Cusa, S. Ex codicum orient, qui in R. Bibl. Panormi asservantur 

catalogo. Panorma, 1878, 8vo. 
Cuspianus, Johannes. 1. De Turcarum origine, religione et tyran- 
nide. Leyden, 1654, 12mo (1st ed., Antwerp, 1541, fol.). 

2. Oratio protreptica : qua Christiani ad helium Turcicum exci- 
tantur. 1527. In Camerarius, fol. ed. of Frankfort, 1598. 
Czinar, M. Index to Fejer's Codex Diplomaticus. 

Dandolo, Andrea. Cronica. (Venetian history from earliest times 

to 1339. Continued by Kaphael Caresino up to 1388.) In 

Muratori, xii. 1-524. 
Danicic, Gjuro. Rjecih iz knizevnich starina srpskich (Dictionary 

of the minor Old Servian Chronicles). Belgrade, 1863-4. 3 vols. 

8vo. 

Daniell, F. H. B. Collab. with Forster in editing and trans 
Busbecq. 

Daru, Pierre Antoine. Histoire de Venise. Paris, 1819. 7 vols. 
8vo. 

Datta, P. Spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI conte di Savoia. 

Turin, 1826, 8vo. 
Davy, Major William. English trans, of Prof. White's ed. of 

Persian text of Timor's memoirs. 
Dawson. English trans, of Nicolay's Voyages. 
Defremery, Charles. Editor of Mirkhond's Hist, of Sidtans of 

Kharesm ; and French trans, of Khondemir and Ibn Batutah. 
De Goeje, M. J., and De Jong, P. Catalogus codicum orient 

Bibl. Acad. Lugduno-Batavae. Leyden, 1865. 3 vols. 8vo. 
De la Porte, Abbe (?). Tableau de FEmp. ottoman, oil on trouve 

tout ce qui concerne la religion, la milice, le gouv. civil, et les 

grandes charges et dignites de 1' Empire. Frankfort, 1757, 12mo. 



334 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Delaville Leroulx, J. La France en Orient au Xiv e siecle. 

Paris, 1868. 2 vols. 8vo. 

Vol. ii contains ' pieces justificatives ' and admirable bibliography. 
Depping, J.-B. Ilistoire du commerce entre le Levant et V Europe 

depuis les Croisades jusqu'd la fondation d' Amerique. Paris, 1830. 

2 vols. 8vo. 

Derenbourg, Hartwig. Jjes manuscrits arabes de VEscurial. 

Paris, 1884. (Uncompleted.) 
Deschamps, Eustache. CEuvres inedites d'Eustache Deschamps. 

Ed. par P. Tarbe. Keims, 1849, 2 vols. 8vo. 

Volume i. 164-6 contains the remarkable ballads on the battle of 
Nicopolis. 

Desmaisons, Baron. Trans, into French and edited Abul-Ghazi. 
Dethier, P. -A. (in collab. with Mordtmann). Epigraphie von Byzanz 

und Konstantinopel (up to 1453). Vienna, 1864, 4to. 
Dherbelot de Molainville. Bibliotheque orientale. Paris, 1697, 

fol. 

Dieterich, Karl. Byzantinische Quellen zur Lander- und Vblker- 
hunde (5.-15. Jhd.). Leipzig, 1912. 2 vols. 4to. 

Selections, translated into German. In our field, at least, not well 
chosen, and of little value to the serious student. 

Dieterici, Friedrich Heinrich. Chrestomathie ottomane, precedee 
de tableaux grammaticaux et suivie d'un glossaire turco-francais. 
Berlin, 1854, 8vo. 

Diez, H. F. von. German trans, of Sidi-Ali. 

Djelal, Ess ad. Constantinople de Byzance a Stamboul : traduit 
du turc par Pauteur. Paris, 1909, la. 8vo. 

Very unsatisfactory from historical and archaeological point of view 
for early Ottoman and Byzantine periods : but the second part gives an 
interesting study of Ottoman architecture of the post-conquest period. 

Djelaleddin, Mustapha. Les Turcs anciens et modernes. Con- 
stantinople, 1869, 8vo. 

Djemaleddin. Osmanli Tarihh. (Ott. hist, with bibliographical 
notice of the Ottoman historians.) Constantinople, 1896, 8vo. 

Djemaleddin-al-Kifty. MS. of Seljuk hist, up to 1245 in Konia. 
Kasan MS., no. 155. 

Djevad bey, Ahmed (Colonel). Stat militaire ottoman, depuis la 
fondation de VEmp. jusqu'd nos jours . . . Trans, into^ French by 
Georges Macrides. Only volume which has appeared is : Le Corps 
des Janissaires depuis sa creation jusqu'a sa suppression. Con- 
stantinople, 1882, 8vo. With album 4to containing 311 pictures 
and designs. 

Col. Djevad is the only writer who has used the oldest documents in 
the Ottoman Ministry of War. 

Djevdet, Effendi. 'Coup d'oeil sur les monnaies. musulmanes.' 
Trans, from Turkish by Barbier de Meynard in Journal asiatique 
for 1862, p. 183. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



335 



Djuvara, T. J. Cent projets de partage de la Turquie, 1281-1913. 
Paris, 1913, 8vo. 

Dlugosz, Johann. Historiae polonicae libri XII. Ed. by J. G. 
Krauss, with extra book, also in Latin, containing extracts from 
other early Polish writers. Leipzig, 1711-12. 2 vols. fol. 
Dochez, Louis. French trans., abridged, of Hammer. 
Domenichi, Ludovico. Italian trans, of Giorgievitz. 
Donado da Lezze. Historia turchesca. (1300-1514.) Edited, with 
notes in Rumanian, by Dr. I. Ursu. Bucharest, 1909, 8vo. 

This is a collation of two MSS., Bibl. Nat., fonds ital. 1238, and Arch. 
Nat. Fr., Aff. etrangeres, Turquie, no. 2, fol. 410-517. 

Donner, 0. Sur Vorigine de V alphabet turc. In the Suomalais- 
Ugrilaisen Seuran Aikakanskirja (Journal of the Finno-Ougrian 
Society), xiv. Helsingfors, 1896, 8vo. 
Dorez, Leon. Editor of fragments of Sanudo the Elder in con- 
junction with Ronciere, and translator into French of Morosini's 
Cronica. 

Dorn, B. 1. Muhammedanische Quellen zur Geschichte der sudlichen 
Kustenlander des Kaspischen Meeres. Shireddin, Ali ben Shem- 
seddin and Abul Fallah Fumeni, trans, and annotated by Dr. Dorn. 
4th volume contains short stories of Khans by Persian, Arabic, 
and Turkish writers. Petrograd and Leipzig, 1850-8. 4 vols. 8vo. 

2. Die Sammlung von morgenl. HSS. zu St. Petersburg. (In- 
cluding Kasan MSS.) Petrograd, 1866, 8vo. 
Dozy, Reinhart P. A. 1. Essai sur Vhist. de VIslamisme. Trans, 
from Dutch by Victor Chauvin. Leyden, 1879, 8vo. 

2. Cat. Cod. orient. Bibl. Acad. Lugd. Batav. Leyden, 1851-77. 
6 vols. 8vo. 

Draeseke, J. 1. 'Michel VII's attempt to reunite the Churches.' 
Zeitschrift fur wissensch. Theologie, 1891. 

2. ' Der Uebergang der Osmanen nach Europa im XIV. Jahr- 
hundert.' In Neues Jahrbuch fur das klassische Altertum, xxxi, 
p. 7, fol. 

Drechsler, Wolfgang. Chronicon Saracenicum et Turcicum. With 
additions by Reiskius and Bosio. Leipzig, 1689, 8vo. The 
original Chronicon is printed in Sansovino, i. 207-17, and in 
Augustinus Caelius, pp. 73-90. 
Drinov, M. S. The origin of the Bulgarians and the commencement 

of their history. (In Bulgarian.) Philippopolis, 1839, 8vo. 
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ed. par Buchon, Paris, 1826. 2 vols. 8vo. 

2. Histoire de Constantinople sous les emp. frangais. Paris, 
1659, fol. 

Ducas, Johannes. See under Byz. Historians. 
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Geschichte, von 1308-1604. In Archivfur Oest. Gesch., xv, 185 f. 
Dufresne, C. Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae graecitatis, 
Paris, 1682, 2 vols. fol. Leyden, 1688. 2 vols. fol. 



336 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Du Pont, Mile. Editor of Wavrin's Chronique a" Engleterre. 

Du Verdier, Gilbert Saulnier. Histoire generate des Turcs. With 

Sultans' portraits. Paris, 1653. 2 vols. 12mo ; 3rd ed. 1662. Paris, 

1665. 3 vols. 12mo. Lyon, 1682. 3 vols. 12mo. Ital. trans. 

by Ferdinando Servi, with additions from 1647 to 1662. Venice, 

1662, 4to. 

Ebeling, Fried. Wilhelm. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in 

Europa. Leipzig, 1854, 8vo. 
Eckhardt, Franz. German trans, of Thalloczy, L. 
Edrisi, Mohammed (Sherif). Geographic, traduite par A. Jaubert, 
Paris, 1836-40. 2 vols. 4to. Latin trans, by Gabriel Sionita and 
John Hesronita. Paris, 1619, 4to. 

Arabic title : ' The jewels touching the division of the countries.' Hadji 
Khalfa, no. 12734, fol. 2142-3, says this work was composed for Roger 
of Sicily. 

Eonatius, Jo. Baptista. Be origine Turcarum. Paris, 1539, 
12mo. 

Eichhorn, J. G. Repertorium fur biblisclie und morgenlandische 

Litteratur. Leipzig, 1777-86. 9 vols. 8vo. 
Engel, Arthur (in collaboration with Raymond Serrure). Traite 

de numismatique du moyen age. Paris, 1891-1905. 3 vols., 

la. 8vo. 

Vol. iii contains for our period coins of Balkan States, pp. 1399-1427; 
of Byz. Emp. and Trebizond, pp. 1408-9 ; and of emirates of Asia Minor, 
pp. 1421-2. 

Engel, Johann Christian von. 1. Geschichte des Ungrischen Reichs 
und seiner Nebenldnder. Halle, 1797-1804. 5 vols. 4to. I. 
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Staatskunde und Gesch. von Dalmatien, Croatien und Slawonien 
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der Moldau und Walachey (2 vols., 1804). 

2. Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa. Vienna, 1807, 8vo. 
Enguerran de Monstrelet. Chronique. Ed. by Douel d'Arcq. 

(Vol. i.) Paris, 1857, 8vo. 
Erdmann, Franz von. Temudschin der unerschutterliche. Life of 
Djenghiz Khan. Leipzig, 1862, 8vo. 

Pp. 172-84 contain translation of Resheddin, giving account of tribes 
of Asia at accession of D. K., which Erdmann had previously published 
as a trans, at Kasan, 1841. 

Errante, Vincenzo. Storia deW Impero osmano. Rome, 1882-3. 
2 vols. 16mo. 

Eubel, Conrad. Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi, sive Summorum 
pontificum, . . . cardinalium, ecclesiarum antistitum series, ab anno 
1198 ad annum 1431 perducta. Regensburg, 1898, 1901. 2 vols. 
4to. 

Eustache Deschamps. (Euvres inedites. Vol. i. Ed. by Tarbe, 
Paris, 1849, 8vo. 



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337 



Evlia Tchelebi. 1. Muntakhabat. Extracts from his voyages 
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2. SiyyahNameh. Constantinople, various editions. Narratives 
of Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Trans, by Joseph von 
Hammer. London, 1834-50. 2 vols. 4to. 

1 

Fabricius, J. A. Bibliotheca latina mediae et infimae aetatis. 

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Fallmerayer, Jakob P. Editor of Michel Panaretos. 
Febvre, Michele. Teatro della Turchia, dove si rappresentano i 

disordini di essa, il genio, la natura et i costumi di 14 nazioni che 

P habitano . . . Milan, 1681, 4to. Venice, 1684, 4to. French 

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Fehmi, Youssouf. Histoire de la Turquie. Paris, 1909, 8vo. 
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gariae. Buda, 1829-44. 43 vols. 8vo. Chron. tables by K. Knaus, 

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3. A Kunok eredete. (The Cumani.) Pest, 1850, 8vo. 

4. Editor of Pray's Commentarii. 

Feridun, Collection of. Letters and answers of Ottoman Sultans 

to eastern monarchs and to their own subjects. Paris, MS. anc. 

fonds turc, Bibl. Nat., 79. Printed in Constantinople, 1847, 

2 vols. fol. For list of letters, with description of contents, see 

Langles, in Notices et Extraits, v. 668-9. , 
Fessler, Ignaz Aurelius. Geschichte von Ungarn. German trans. 

from Hungarian by Ernest Klein. 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1867-83. 

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Finlay, George. History of Greece from the Conquest by the 

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Fiorini, Vittorio. Editor of new edition of Muratori. 
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the Archiv zur Kunde osterreichischer Geschichtsquellen, 1849. 
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al-Koutoub. (A catalogue ol Arabic, Persian and Turkish books 

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1736 Y 



338 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Flugel, Gustav. 1. Die arab., pers. und tilrh. Handschriften der 

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Fc-glietta, Uberto. 1. De causis magnitudinis Imperii Turcici. 

Leipzig, 1594, 12mo. (1st ed., Rome, 1574.) 

2. Historia Genuensium libri XII. Genoa, 1585, 4to. 
Fc-rmanti, Neriolava. Raccolta delle historie delle vite degV impera- 

tori ottomani sino a Mehemet IV regnante . . . Venice, 1684, 4to. 
Forster, C. T. Ed. and trans. Busbecq in collab. with Daniell. 
Fc-scarini, Ludovico. Writings against the Turks found in Agostini, 

i. 65-107. 

Fracassetti, J. Editor of Petrarch's Letters : Italian trans, of 

the Senilium. 

Fraehn, C. 1. Indications hibl. relatives . . . a la litt. historico- 

geograph. des Arabes, des Persans et des Turcs. Petrograd, 1845, 

Svo (Russian and French in parallel columns). 
2. Fraehn was the first editor of Abul-Ghazi. 
France., Sebastian. German trans, of anon. Tractatus de ritu et 

moribus Turearum. 
Franke, 0. Beitrage aus chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der 

Tiirkvolker und Skythen Zentralasiens. In Abhandlungen der K. 

preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1904, 4to. 
Franz pasha, Julius. Die Baukunst des Islam. 3rd vol. of 3rd part 

of the Handbuch der Architektur. Darmstadt, 1887, la. 8vo. 
Frenzel, C. Ramon Muntaner. Berlin, 1852, Svo. Halle, 1854, 

la. Svo. 

Fresne-Canaye. Voyage du Levant. Edited by H. Hauser. Paris, 
1897, 4to. 

Friedlander, Julius (in collab. with Pinder). Beitrage zur alteren 

Milnzkunde. Berlin, 1851. 
Froissart. Chroniques. 1. J. A. C. Buchon, ed. Paris, 1835. 

3 vols. 8vo. 

2. Luce, S., ed. up to 1377. Paris, 1869-82. 8 vols. 8vo. 
Continued and finished by Gaston Raynaud. Paris, 1884-99. 
3 vols. 8vo. 

3. Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed. Bruxelles, 1870-77. 25 vols. 
8vo. Vol. xv (1871), 1393-6 ; vol. xvi (1872), 1397-1400. 

Gagnier, J. Latin trans, of Pocock MS. of Abulfeda. 

Gall and, Antoine. Translations in MS. in Bibl. Nat., Paris, of 

Seadeddin, of Mirkhond's Hist, of Djenghiz Khan, and of Abder- 

rezzah (2 separate translations). 
Ganem, Halil. Les Sultans ottomans. Paris, 1901. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Garnier, J. Chambre de comptes de Bourgogne, in ' Inventaire- 

Sommaire des archives departementales. Cote-d'Or, arch, civ.' 

Dijon, 1878. 

Gataro, Andrea. Historia Padovana, 1311-1506. In Muratori, 
xvii. 1-944. 



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339 



Gaudier, Johannes. German trans, of Ali Muhieddin. 

Gelcic, Joseph. 1. Monumenta Ragusina. Libri reformationum 
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xxix. Agram, 1897, 4to. 

2. Collab. with Thalloczy in Relat. Ragus. cum regno Hung. 

Geraud, Hercule, Ed. Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis 
de 1113 a 1300. Paris, 1843, 8vo. 

Geropoldi, Antonio. Bilancia historico- politico delV impero otto- 
mano, &c. Venice, 1686, 4to. Contains : Annali de' Sultani 
Osmanidi scritti dal Gran Cancellier Ali : portati da C/poli al- 
1' imp. Ferdinando 1' anno 1551 da Girolamo Bek da Leopoldstorf : 
Per ordine di Cesare tradotti in tedesco da Giovanni Gaudier 
Interprete Cesareo, in Latino da Giovanni Leunclavio, etc. Corretti 
poi, e confrontati con nuovi MSS. dalP Auttore. 

This is Ali Muhieddin. See under Ali (Mustafa Ibn Ahmed) above, and 
note accompanying. Also under Zenker. 

Geuffraeus, Antonius (or Geuffroy). (Cheval. de S. Jean de 
Jerusalem.) Briefve description de la court du Grant Turc et ung 
sommaire du regne des Othmans . . . Paris, 1543, 4to. (Reprinted 
in Schefer's ed. of Spandugino.) Latin trans, by W. Godelevoeus 
in Hisloria Belli Cyprii and in Petro Bizara, Bellum Pannonicum, 
Basel, 1573, 1578, 1596. German trans, by Nicolaus H. von Tauber, 
Basel, same dates. English trans, by R. Grafton, London, 1546. 
Italian trans., Florence, 1551. 

Ghalib, Ismail. Imperial Museum : Catalogue of old Moslem 
coins. (In Turkish.) Constantinople, 1894, 8vo. 

Ghillebert de Lannoy. (Euvres de , Voyageur, diplomate et 

moraliste . . . recueillies et publiees par Ch. Potvin. Notes geogr. 
et carte par J.-C. Houzeau. Louvain, 1878, 8vo. 

Gibbon, Edward. Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Ed. 
J. B. Bury. London, 1896-1900. 7 vols. 8vo. 

Giorgievitz, Bartolomeo. 1. Prophetia de maometani et altre cose 
turchesche. Trans, by L. Domenichi. Florence, 1548, 12mo. 

2. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Italian trans., in Lonicerus, vol. i. 

3. De origine imperii Turcarum eorumgue administ. et disciplina. 
Wittenberg, 1560, fol. Reprinted 1562. Also in Lonicerus, vol. i. 
Trans, into Dutch, 1544. (For editions, see Hauser ed. of Fresne- 
Canaye, p. 318.) 

Giovio, Paolo. 1. Commentario delle cose de 9 Turchi . . . Addressed 
to Emperor Charles V. Rome, 1535 ; Venice, 1540 ; in Sansovino, 
pp. 226-45. 

2. Origo Turcici imperii, vitae omnium Turc. imperatorum, ordo 
ac disciplina Turcarum militiae exactissime conscripta. Ex Italico 
Latinus factus Francisco Bassianate interprete. Paris, 1539, 12mo. 

3. Vida del Gran Tamerlan. Spanish trans, by Gaspar de Baeca, 
in Clavijo. 

Giustiniani, Agostino. Annali delta repubblica di Genova. Genoa, 
1537, fol. Modern edition, Genoa, 1855. 2 vols. 8vo. 

Y 2 



340 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Godefroy, Theodore. Editor of Jean d'Ursins and of Le Livre 

des faits de Boucicaut. 
Godelevoeus, W. Latin trans, of Geuffraeus. 
Goesanus. See Ramus, Johannes. 

Golius, Jacob. Editor of Elzevir edition of text of Arabshah. 
Gonzales. See Clavijo. 

Gregoras, Nicephoros. See under Byzantine Historians, p. 367. 
Gregorovius, Ferdinand. Geschichte der Stadt Athen im Mittel- 

alter, von der Zeit Justinian' 's bis zur turh. Eroberung. Stuttgart, 

1889. 2 vols. la. 8vo. Greek trans., with notes, by Lampros, 

S. P., Athens, 1904. 2 vols. 8vo. (In JB t^XioO^ Mavao-A^.) 
Greiffenhag, Andre Muller. Latin trans, of Hayton. 
Grigorieff. French trans, of Khondemir. 
Guazzo, Marco. Cronica. Venice, 1553, fol. 
Guerin-Songeon. Histoire de la Bulgarie depuis ses origines jusqu' a 

nos jours (485-1913). Paris, 1913, 8vo. 
Guichenon, S. Histoire genealogique de la royale maison de Savoy e 

(999-1643). Lyons, 1660, 3 vols. 4to. 
Guignes, Joseph de. Histoire generate des Huns, des Turcs et des 

Mongols. Paris, 1756-8. 5 vols. 4to. 
Guyard, Stanislas. Collab. with Reinaud in French trans, of 

Abulfeda. 

Gycaud, B. (publisher). La Genealogie du Grand-Turc, . . . avec 
Vorigine des princes, &c. Lyon, 1570, fol. 

Hadji Khalfa, Mustafa Ibn Abdallah, Kiatib Tchelebi. 1. 
Djihannuma (mirror of the world). A Universal geography, but 
does not include Europe. Uses 19 Arabic sources, but principally 
Abulfeda. Printed in Turkish, Constantinople, 1732, fol. Latin 
trans, in MS. by Mathias Norberg, at Lund, Sweden (see Toderini, 
iii. 135). French trans, in MS. by M. Armain, in Bibl. Nat., Paris, 
fonds francais, nouv. acq., nos. 888-9, with exhaustive index, 
and splendid introduction on life and work of Hadji Khalfa. 

2. Geography of Balkan peninsula, trans, by Hammer under 
title Rumeli und Bosna, Vienna, 1812. 

3. Kitab Kyachfaddyunoun an atamy alkontoub alfounoun : The 
Clearing of doubts concerning the names of books and sciences. 
A bibliographical dictionary, in Arabic, containing 13,494 titles, 
and referring to 25,614 works. Latin trans, from Vienna, Paris, 
and Berlin MSS. by Gustavus Fliigel. London, 1835-42. 3 vols. 
4to. French trans, in MS. in Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, 4462-4, 
by Petits de la Croix, 3 vols. la. fol., with minute index. M. de la 
Croix rightly boasted of his work that it was ' traduit, recueilly 
et redige avec grand travail, et grande assiduite et exactitude '. 
Arabic original in parallel columns. 

4. Tuhfatu'l-Kibar fi Esfari'l-Bihar. History of . the Maritime 
Wars of the Osmanlis. Publ. at Constantinople, with 7 maps, 
1729, fol. A French translation of this printed edition by La 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



341 



Kocque is in the Ley den Library, MSS. orientaux, no. 1599. It 
is called : ' Histoire des conquetes des Ottomans sur les Chretiens 
tant dans la mer Noire que dans la mer Mediterranee avec les 
noms des places et les circonstances des victoires.' First part 
trans, into English by James Mitchell. London, 1831, 4to. 

5. Takvimi-Tevarikh. Chronological Hist., in Turkish, Persian, 
and Arabic. Constantinople, 1733, fol. Italian trans, by Pinaldo 
Carli, Venice, 1697, 4to. 

Zenker, following Reiske, regards Carli' s trans, as incorrect and unfaith- 
ful. But Toderini, iii. 145, vigorously defends Carli from this charge. 
Hadji Khalfa, in Diet. Bibl., no. 3474, fol. 553, calls this work of his ' the 
erection of histories ', and describes how he compiled it. 

Halle, J. Hungarica et Turcica . . . betreffende Bucher und HSS., &c. 
Kat. XXXV. Munich, 1907. 
169 titles before 1550 listed. 

Hammer, Joseph von. 1. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs. Pest, 
1827-34. 10 vols. 8vo. French trans, by Hellert, in collab. with 
author. Paris, 1843. 18 vols. 8vo and atlas, la. fol. French 
abridged trans, by Dochez, Paris, 1844. 3 vols,, la. 8vo. Also 
Italian trans, by Antonelli, Venice, 1829. Concise English 
abridgment by Creasy. 

2. Trans, of Hadji Khalfa's geography of Balkans under title : 
Rumeli und Bosna. 

3. English trans, of Evlia Tchelebi's voyages. 

4. Geschichte der Goldenen Horde. Buda-Pest, 1840. 

5. De byzantinae historiae ultimis scriptoribus ex historia Os- 
manica elucidandis. In Commentationes of Kon. Akademie der 
Wiss., Gottingen, 1823-7. 

6. Study on Ahmed-ibn-Yahia-ibn-Ashik pasha, in Journ. 
asiatique, vol. iv. 

Hartmann, R. Editor of Encyclopedic de VIslam. See Houtsma 
et al. 

Hasdeu. Istoria critica a rominilor. Bucharest, 1875, 8vo. 

Hase, C. B. See Manuel II Palaeologos. 

Hauser, H. Editor of Fresne-Canaye's Voyage. 

Hayton, Frere Jehan. 1. Le Lime des merveilles et des royaumes. 
Illuminated MS. Bibl. Nat., fonds fr., no. 2810 reserve. A trans, 
into French by Nicolas Salcon, who received the story from the 
author's own mouth. Les Fleurs des histoires de la terre dorient 
compillees far frere Hayton . . . cousin du Boy Darmenie, par le 
commandement du Rape. La premiere partie contient la sit. des 
royaulmes dorient environ 1300. Paris, 1475, 4to. Also in Bergeron. 

2. Historia Tartar mum. In MS. Leyden, fonds latin, no. 66 ; 
Oxford, cod. Ashmol., no. 342. 

Hazlitt, Wm. C. The Venetian Republic . New eel. London, 1900. 
2 vols. 8vo. 

Hecker, J. F. K. Der schwarze Tod im llten Jahrhundert. Berlin, 
1832. 



342 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Helleet, J. J. Trans, into French and edited Hammer. Made 

atlas to go with his translation. 
Helmoldus of Buzovia. Chronica Slavorum, sea Annates. Edited 
by Reiner Reineccius. Frankfort, 1581, fol. 

All except first two books written by Arnold of Liibeck. About Slavs 
of central Europe in relation to Holy Roman Empire. Helmoldus' s 
chronicle ends 1150. 

Hertzberg, Gustav Ferdinand. Geschickte der Byzantiner und des 
Osmanischen Reiches bis gegen Ende des 16ten J ahrhunderts. Berlin, 
1883, 8vo. 

Hesronita, John. Latin trans, of Edrisi in collab. with Gabriel 
Sionita. 

Heyd, Wilhelm. 1. Beitrage zur Geschickte des Levant ehandets im 
14. Jahrh., in Festschrift zur 4. Sacular-Feier der Universitat 
zu Tubingen. 

2. Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter, Stuttgart, 1879. 
2 vols. 8vo. French trans, by Furcy-Raynaud, Paris, 1885-6. 
2 vols. la. 8vo. 

Hezarfenn, Hussein. Kanounname. Dated 1673. MS. col. I. L. 0. 
St. Petersburg, no. 10. French trans, by Petits de la Croix, under 
title ' 33tat general de l'Emp. ott., par un solitaire Turc '. Paris, 
1695. 3 vols. 12mo. 

Petits de la Croix does not give Hezarfenn as author, but I find in 
M. de la Croix's MS. index to Hadji Khalfa's bibliographical lexicon, in the 
Bibl. Nat., Paris, in vol. iii, fol. 186, in his own handwriting, the statement 
that Hezarfenn is the ' solitaire Turc '. 

Hirth, F. China and the Roman Orient : researches into their 
ancient and mediaeval relations as represented in old Chinese 
records. Leipzig and Munich, 1885, 8vo. 

Hodgson, Francis C. Venice in the 13th and 14th Centuries. 
London, 1910, 12mo. 

Hodosiu, Joseph. Rumanian translator of Cantemir. 

Hody, H. De Graecis illustrious. London, 1742. 

Hoeniger, Nicholaus von Koenigshofen. Der turckischen His- 
torien und wahrhajften Geschichten, Thaten, Handtlungen, Krieg, 
Schlachten, Sieg, Belagerungen und Eroberung zu Wasser und zu 
Landt alter Staetten, etc. . . . bis auff das JaJir 1578. Basel, 
1578, fol. 

For 16th cent, in history, but reflects German ideas of the Osmanlis 
and their origin. The author calls the Prophet Mohammed ' eyn Engel 
des Teufels \ 

Holmes, George. Editor of 3rd ed. of Rymer. 
Hopf, K. 1. Griechenland im Mittelalter und der Neuzeit. Parts 85 
and 86 of Ersch and Gruber's Allgemeine EncyMopadie. Leipzig, 
1870. 2 vols. 4to. 

A marvel of erudition, but marred by poor printing and lack of index. 
2. Les Giustiniani, dynastes de Chios. Trans, into French by 
E. A. Vlasto. Paris, 1888, 12mo. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



343 



3 Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten, in Sitzungsberichte der 
Wiener AJcademie, xxxii. Vienna, 1859, 8vo. 

4. Chroniques greco-romanes. Berlin, 1873, la. 8vo. 
Houdas, 0. Ed. and trans. Mohammed-en-Nesawi. 
Houtsma, Th. 1. Editor of Seljuk texts, including Ibn Bibi. 

2. Article on Seljuks in Encycl. Britan. 

This has hardly been changed in the new edition, so reference to 9th ed. 
is satisfactory. 

3. Editor, in collaboration with Basset, Arnold and Hartmann, 
of new Encyclopedic de VIslam. 

Houtsma, Bassett, Arnold, Hartmann, Editors. Encyclopedic de 
VIslam. Dictionnaire geographique, ethnographique et biogra- 
phique des peuples musulmans, publie avec le concours des 
principaux orientalistes, par Th. Houtsma, R. Bassett, T. W. 
Arnold et R. Hartmann. Leyden, 4to. Vol. i (a-d) appeared 
in 1913. 

Houzeau, J.-C. Notes geogr. and map for Ghillebert de Lannoy's 
Voyage. 

Howorth, Henry H. History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 

19th Century. London, 1876-88. 4 vols. 8vo. (Lacks index.) 
Huart, Clement. 1. Konia : la ville des Derviches Tourneurs. 

Paris, 1897, 8vo. ^ 

2. Paper on ' fipigraphie arabe d'Asie Mineure ', in the Revue 

semitique, Paris, 1895, 8vo. 
Huber, Major R. Map of Ottoman Empire, with administrative 

divisions and military routes. Constantinople, 1901. 
Hussein (un solitaire Turc). See Hezarfenn. 

Hussein Abu Halib. Persian trans, of Mongol or Turkish MS. 
found in the Yemen, which purported to contain the autobio- 
graphical memoirs of Timur. See under Anonymous, p. 366 ad fin. 

Ibn al Tiktaka. History of the Islamic Empire (in Arabic). Ed. 

by W. Ahlwardt. Gotha, 1860, 8vo. 
Ibn Ali Mohammed Al-Biwy. Dourar-al-Othman. ' The precious 
pearls touching the source and origin of the Ottoman House.' 
Hadji Khalfa, in Diet. Bill., fol. 867. 

This is the only Ottoman genealogy mentioned by Hadji Khalfa, although 
he gives more than sixty Arabic titles of genealogies. 

Ibn Batoutah (Abu Abdullah). Arabic text of Voyages, edited 
and translated into French by C. Defremery and B. R. Sanguinetti. 
Paris, 1853-9. 4 vols. 4to. 

Vol. ii, 1854, pp. 255-353, gives Voyage through Asia Minor. 

Ibn Bibi (Nasreddin Yahia). Seljuh-Name. Persian original lost. 
An abridgement, in Persian, of the original is no. 1185 of the 
Schefer MSS. in the Bibi. Nat., Paris, and has been edited and 
published by Th. Houtsma, in his Recueil de Textes relatifsa Vhist. 
des Selj., vol. iv, Leyden, 1892. 8vo. M. Schefer translated several 



344 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



chapters of this MS. into French in Bibl. de VEcole des langues 
viv. orientates, serie 3, vol. v, Paris, 1889, 8vo. Turkish transla- 
tion, as contained in Warner MS. 419, Leyden, and MS. turc 92, 
Bibl. Nat., Paris, edited by Houtsma in Recueil above cited, 
vol. iii, Leyden, 1891, 8vo. M. Houtsma promised a French 
translation, but it has never been forthcoming. 

This is the work of which Noldeke speaks in Zeitschrift der D. M. G., 
xiii. 176 (1859), as an unidentified work by an Ottoman historian of the 
reign of Murad II. As a matter of fact it is merely a translation, and was 
not written by an Osmanli. 

Ibn Khaldoun. Universal History. The Prolegomena, Arabic 
text, are edited by Quatremere in Notices et Extraits, vol. xvi (1858), 
and translated by Baron de Slane in vol. xvii (1859). German 
abridged trans, by Thornberg in Nova acta Reg. Soc, vol. xii, 
Leipzig, 1844. 

Idris, Mevlana (of Bitlis). Hesht-Bihisht. The Eight Heavens. 

One of the two earliest extant Ottoman histories. Written in Persian 
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of Idris, but also to his wonderful imagery, for Seadeddin has copied him 
copiously and, in fact, embodied many literal translations of Idris in his 
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Jacob, Georg. Tilrkische Bibliothek. Folk-stories. Berlin, 1904-5. 
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Jaubert, A. M. Editor of Mirkhond's Djenghiz Khan ; and French 

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2. Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Konstantinopel , und die 
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348 



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350 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



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352 



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Nichandji pasha, Mehmet (the Little). Brief Hist, of Ott. Emp. up 
to 1560. In MS. Col. I. L. 0., Petrograd. 

Nicolay, Nicolas de. Les guatre Limes des navigations et peregrina- 
tions orientales. Lyon, 1567, fol. German trans., Niirnberg, 1572 ; 
Italian, Antwerp, 1576 ; ibid., Venice, 1580 ; English, by Dawson, 
London, 1585 ; Dutch, c. 1590. 

Niebuhe, B. G. Editor of Corpus Script. Hist. Byzantinae. 

Nikiou, Jean de. Chronique, trad, francaise du texte ethiopien, 
par H. Zotenberg. Notices et Extraits, vol. xxiv, l re partie, pp. 343- 
587. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



353 



Noiret, Hippolyte. Documents inedits pour servir a Vhist. de la 
domination venetienne en Crete de 1380 al485, tires des Arch. ven. 
Paris, 1892, 8vo. 
Noldeke, Th. German trans, of portions of Neshri. 
Noradounghian, Gabriel. Recueil d'actes international de la 
Sublime Porte avec les Puissances etrangeres. Tome i, 1300-1789. 
Paris, 1879, 8vo. 

In Turkey there are no Archives d'etat before the 17th cent. From 
1307 to 1534 in this volume the editor merely refers to other books. His 
compilation is of no value until 1535 for furnishing source material for 
Ottoman History. 

Norberg, Matthias. Latin trans, of Hadji Khalfa's Djihannuma. 
Novakovitch, Stojan. Kosova, Srbske narodne pjesme o boju na 

Kosova. Belgrade, 1871, 8vo ; also Agram, 1872, and Belgrade, 

1876. 

Attempt to bring fragments of folksong into one narrative of battle 
of Kossova. 

Oesterly, Hermann. Wegweiser durch die Literatur der Urkunden- 

sammlungen. Berlin, 1882. 2 vols. la. 8vo. 
Ohsson, Ignace Mouradja d'. 1. Tableau general de V Empire 
ottoman. Paris, 1788-1824. 7 vols. 8vo. 

This work, interrupted by the Revolution and the author's death, was 
completed, after d'Ohsson's notes, by his son Charles. Vols, v-vii appeared 
in 1824. 

2. Histoire des Mongols depuis Ghengiz Khan jusgu'a Timour 
Bey. Amsterdam, 1852. 4 vols. 8vo. 
Oksza, Theodore d\ Editor and French trans, of Konstantyno- 
wicz. 

Olivieri, A. Carte e chronache manoscritte per la storia genovese 
esistenti nella bibl. della R. Universita ligure. Genoa, 1855, 8vo. 

Omont, Henri. Documents sur Vimprimerie a Constantinople au 
XVHI e siecle. In the Revue des Bibliotheques, Paris, July- 
September, 1895. 

Orbini, Dom Mauro. II Regno degli Slavi, hoggi corrottamente detti 
Schiavoni. Pesaro, 1601, fol. 

Ortellius, Abrahamus. 1. Synonymia Geographica. . . . Antwerp, 
1578, 4to. 

2. Theatrum orbis terrarum. Antwerp, 1579, la. fol. 

3. Thesaurus geographicus . . . nomina, &c. Antwerp, 1587, fol. 

Pachymeres. See under Byzantine Historians, p. 367. 

Pagano, C. Belle imprese e del dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia. 

Genoa, 1846, 8vo. 
Palaeologos, Manuel. Dialogi XXVI cum Persa quodam de 

Christianae religionis veritate. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds grec, 

no. 1253. 

C. B. Hase, in Notices et Extraits, vol. viii, 2 e partie, pp. 309-82, gives 
interesting critical account of this MS., with Greek text and Latin trans. 

1736 Z 



354 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



of first two dialogues. The dialogues were with a Moslem Hodja, probably 
in 1390, when Man. Pal. was serving in the Ottoman army at Angora. 

Most valuable description of Bayezid's court and eloquent testimony 
to the humiliation of the Byzantine imperial family. 

For other works of M. Palaeologos, see Migne, Patrologia Graeca, clvi. 
82-580. 

PANARETOS, MlCHAIL. Tlepl roiv rrjs TpaTvz^ovvTos /?ao-iAewv rtov 
McyaXwv Kofxvrjvwv. Chronological account of Trebizond (1204- 
1386), with a continuation to 1424. 

Edited by J. F. Tafel, in the Opuscula of Eusthasius of Thessalonika, 
pp. 362-70, Frankfort, 1832, 4to. Also by Fallmerayer, in Abhandlung 
der k. Bayerischen Akad. der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1844, 8vo. 

PAPARREGOPOULOS, K. 'l<TTOpia tov 'EWtjvlkov edvovs airo tG>v 

ap^aLordroiv xpovoov ^XP L T ^ )V vetoTepw. Athens, 1865—74. 5 vols. 

8vo. 4th edition, revised by P. Karolides, Athens, 1903. 
Paris, P. (In collab. with Abbe Lebeuf.) ' La Vie et les Voyages 

de Philippe de Mezieres.' Mem. de VAcademie des Inscriptions, 

nouv. serie, vol. xv, l re partie, pp. 359-98. 
Partsot, Val. Cantacuzene, homme d'etat et historien, ou examen 

critique comparatif des ' Memoires ' de J. C. et des sources contem- 

poraines. Paris, 1845, 8vo. 
Parvillee. Architecture et decoration turques au XV e siecle. With 

preface by Viollet-le-Duc. Paris, 1874, la. fol. 

It was Parvillee who, under Ahmed Vewfik pasha, restored the monu- 
ments of Brusa. 

Pauthier, M. G. Editor of Marco Polo. 

Pavitch, A. Narodne Pjesme o boju na Kosova, 1389. In Mem. 
of the Acad, of Sciences and Arts of Agram. Agram, 1877, 8vo. 
A critical essay on the national songs of the Servians, followed by 
a narrative in verse, combining the songs which deal with Kossova. 

Perondino, Pietro (Pratense). Magni Tamerlanis Scytharum im- 
peratoris vita. Florence, 1553, fol. ; Basel, 1556, fol. 

Pertsch, Wilhelm. Verzeichniss der tiirJcischen Hss. der h. Bibl. 
zu Berlin. Berlin, 1899. 

Petits de la Croix. 1. Abrege de Vhist. ottomane. Paris, 1768. 
2 vols. 12mo. 

2. French trans, of Hussein Hezarfenn. 

3. French trans, in MS. of Hadji Khalfa's lexicon under title 
Dictionnaire bibliographique. In the Bibl. Nat., Paris. 

4. French trans, of Sherefeddin's hist, of Timur. 
Petrarca, Francesco. Epistolae de rebus familiaribus et variae . . . 

Stud, et cura J. Fracassetti. Florence, 1859-63. 3 vols. 8vo. 
Italian trans, of Senilium by the same author. Florence, 1869-70. 
2 vols. 12mo. 

Pfeiffer, David. Imperatores Turcici, Libellus de Vita, Progressu 
et rebus gestis principum . . . Basel, before 1550, 12mo. Re- 
printed under title Imperatores Ottomannici, Basel and Wittenberg, 
1587, 8vo. 

Eulogy of Ottoman sultans in verse. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 355 

Phrantzes, George. See under Byz. Historians. 
Picot, Emile. 1. Editor and French trans, of Urechi's Kumanian 
chronicle. 

2. Genealogie de lafamille Brankovitch y in Columna lui Traianu, 
new series, 4th year, Jan.-Feb. 1883, pp. 64 f. Bucharest, 8vo. 

Pigeonneau, Henri. Histoire du commerce de la France. Vol. i. 
Paris, 1885, 8vo. 

Pinder, M. Collab. with Friedlander in numismatic work. 

Pocock, Edward. Editor and English translator of Abulfaradji. 

Podesta, Jo. Baptista. 1. Trans, from the Turkish De gestis 
Tamerlanis. 

2. Translatae Turcicae Chronicae. Pars prima, continens ori- 
ginem Ottomanicae stirpis, undecimque eiusdem stirpis Impera- 
torum gesta, iuxta traditionem Turcarum. Omnia a praenominato 
authore ex originali Turcico in Latinam, Italicam et G-ermanicam 
linguam translata. Niirnberg, 1672, fol. But only into Latin. 

A trans, from cliff. MSS. of Ali. But Bratutti's trans, of Seadeddin 
has been used for interpolations and corrections or additions. 

Pogodin, P. Ubersicht der Quellen zur Geschichte der Belagerung von 
Byzanz durch die Tiirken. Journal of the Ministry of Public 
Instruction, St. Petersburg, August 1889. 

Polo, Marco. See Marco Polo. 

Por, A. (in collab. with G. Schonherr.) Volume covering period 
1301-1429 in Szilagyi's A Magyar Nemzet Tortenete. (History of 
the Hungarian Nation.) Budapest, 1895, la. 8vo. 

Possinus, Petrus, S. J. Notes to Pachymeres. 
, Postansque, A. De libro secretorum fidelium crucis. (For Marino 
Sanudo.) Montpellier, 1854, 8vo. 

Postellus, Guillaume. 1. De la Republique des Turcz . . . exfosant 
la maniere de lever et nourir ceulx dont on en guerre se serft, avec 
son origine, estatz, Revenu et Domeyne, en brief. Dedie a Francois 
Premier. Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. fonds fr., no. 6073. (Written 
c. 1520.) Published : Poitiers, 1560, 8vo. 

2. De originibus Gentium Orientalium, maxime Turcarum. Basel, 
1540, 8vo. 

This Latin text differs from 1, so I have listed it as a separate work. 
Potthast, A. Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi. Berlin, 1896. 
2 vols. 4to. 

Vol. ii. 1647-1735 contains a very suggestive (but not thorough) Quellen- 
kunde fur die Geschichte der europaischen Staaten wahrend des Mittelalters. 

Potvin, Charles. Editor of Ghillebert de Lannoy. 
Pray, George. 1. Annates regum Hungariae, ab an. 997 ad an. 1564 
deducti. Vienna, 1754-74. 5 vols. 8vo. (Vol. ii, 1301-1457.) 

2. Commentarii historici de Bosniae, Serviae ac Bulgariae, turn 
Valachiae, Moldaviae ac Bessarabiae, cum regno Hungariae nexu. 
Edited, with documents, by G. Fejer. Buda, 1837, 8vo. 
Predelli, Biccardo. 1. (In collaboration with Thomas.) Diplo- 

Z 2 



356 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



matarium Veneto-Levantinum, sive acta et diplomata res Venetas, 
Graecas atque Levantinas illustrantia a 1300 ad 1454. Venice, 1880, 
1899. 2 vols. 4to. 

2. Editor of I libri commemoriali delta republica di Venezia 
regesti. Vols. 1-3 (1081-1375), in Monumenti storici delta deput. 
Veneta, series I, Venice, 1876, 8vo. 
Pucic, Medo. Spomenitzi Srbshi od 1395 do 1423. Belgrade, 1859. 

Quatremere, Etienne. French trans, of Shehabeddin, Makrisi, 
and Eeshideddin (unfinished). Editor of the Prolegomena of Ibn 
Khaldun. 

Racki, Francis. Documenta historiae Croatiae periodum antiquam 

illustrantia, Agram, 1877. 
Raic. Hist, variorum Slavorum, imprimis Bulgarorum, Chrobatorum 

et Serborum. Bnda, 1823. 
Raimboult, Maurice. ' Les dessous d'un traite d' alliance en 1350.' 
Bulletin historique et philologique, Paris, 1902. 

Notice on two documents : 1. Latin text of project of treaty between 
Pope, Cyprus, Venice, and Rhodes, of which Mas Latrie, Hist, de Cliypre, 
ii. 217, published the text after Commemoriali, vols, iv and v. 2. Un- 
published Provencal text of letter which set forth in detail difficulties of 
getting this treaty signed, from MS. in Arch, des Bouches-du-Khone, 
Fonds de Malte, liasse 86. 

Rambaud, Alfred. ' L'Europe du Sud-Est : Fin de 1' Empire grec. — 
Fondation de l'Empire ottoman (1282-1181).' In Lavisse et 
Rambaud, Histoire generale. iii. 789-868. Paris, 1891, la. 8vo. 

Ramsay, Sir W. M. Historical Geography of Asia Minor, with 
5 maps. London, 1890, la. 8vo. 

Ramus, Johannes (Goesanus). Be Rebus Turcicis libri tres. Lou- 
vain, 1553, 12mo. The first book of the three is by Secundinus. 

Ranke, Leopold von. History of Servia and the Servian Revolution. 
Trans, by Mrs. A. Keen. London, 1858, 16mo. 

First chapter contains an illuminating resume of relations between 
Byzantium and Serbia in middle of 14th cent. 

Rasmussen, Janus Lassen. Annates islamismi, sive tabulae syn- 
chronistochronologicae Chaliforum et regum orientis et occidentis.. 
Copenhagen, 1825, sm. Ito. Contains, pp. 61-131, trans, of 
Ahmed ben Yussuf, Historia Turcarum, Karamanorum, SelgiuJcu- 
darum, Asiae Minoris, &c. 
Raynaldus, Odericus. Annates ecclesiastici . . . Baronii . . . ab 
anno 1198. Tomes xiii-xxi. Rome, 1616-77. 9 vols. fol. Lucca, 
1746-56. 15 vols. fol. 

There have been so many editions, abridgements, and translations of 
the Annates that I have given my references to this work under the year, 
so that any edition might be consulted. 

Raynaud, Gaston. Editor of Froissart, and, with Michelant. of 
the Jerusalem Itineraries. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



357 



Raynaud, Furcy. French trans, of Heyd's Levantehandelsge- 
schichte. 

Reinaud, J. T. French trans, of Abulfeda. 

Reineccius, Reiner. Editor of Helmoldus and Arnold of Liibeck. 

Reiske, Jo. Jacob. Latin trans, of Abulfeda and Chronological 
Tables of Hadji Khalfa ; editor of Drechsler. 

Remusat, Abel. Recherches sur les langues tartares. Paris, 1820, 4to. 

Rennell, J. Treatise of the Comparative Geography of Western Asia. 
Vol. i. Asia Minor. London, 1831,, 8vo. 

Reshideddin, Fadhl Allah. Djami ut Tevarikh. Hist, of the 
Mongols of Persia. Quatremere trans, into French the first part, 
Paris, 1836, la. fol. Erdmann trans, into German the review of 
the various tribes of Asia at accession of Djenghiz Khan, with 
account of their origin. Kasan, 1841. In his German life of 
Timur, pp. 172-84, Erdmann practically repeats this portion 
verbatim. 

The earlier portion of Abul-Ghaziis practically an abridgement of Reshid. 
Reusner, Nicholas. Epistolarum Turcicarum variorum et diver- 
sorum authorum libri XIV. Frankfort, 1598-9. 4 vols. 4to. 

' in quibus Epistolae de rebus Turcicis surninorum pontificum, impera- 
torum, regum, principum ... ad nostra tempora leguntur.' 
Rez, Peter von. Lament for defeat of Nicopolis, in Liliencron. 
Ricaut, Paul. A History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire 
containing the Political maxims of the Turks, their religion, &c. 
5th ed. London, 1682, fol. 6th ed., ibid., 1693. 2 vols. 8vo. 
French trans, by Briot. Amsterdam, 1678, 16mo ; 1696, sm. 8vo, 
with 16 engravings. Italian trans, by Costi Belli. 2nd ed. Venice, 
1673, 4to. 

Richer, Christopher. De rebus Turcarum ad Franciscum Gallorum 
regem Christianissimum. Paris, 1540, 8vo. (Liber I. De origine 
Turcarum et Ottomanni imperio. Liber III. De Tamerlanis et 
Part hi rebus gestis.) 

Ricoldus. See my note to Anon. De ritu et moribus Turcarum. 

Rieu, C. P. H. 1. Catalogue of Persian MSS. in British Museum. 
London, 1879-83. 3 vols. 

2. Supplement to above. London, 1895. 

3. Catalogue of Turkish MSS. in the British Museum. London, 
1888. 

Rodd, Sir Rennell. The Princes of Achaia and the Chronicles of 
Morea : a Study of Greece in the Middle Ages. London, 1907. 
2 vols. 8vo. 

Excellent map of mediaeval Greece. 

Romanin, Samuele. Storia documentata di Venezia. Venice, 1853-61. 
10 vols. 8vo. 

For attempts of Venice in 14th cent, to league Christians against the 
Turks, vols, iii and iv. 
Ronciere. Editor, in collab. with Dorez, of fragments of Marino 
Sanudo. 



358 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Rosen, Baron Victor. 1. Notices sommaires des MSS. arabes du 

Musee asiatique. Petrograd, 1881. 

2. Remarques sur les MSS. orientaux de la col. de Marsigli 

a Bologna. Paris, 1884, 4to. 
Rymer, Thomas. Foedera, conventiones, liter ac . . . acta publica inter 

reges Angliae et alios . . . ab 1101 . . . ad nostra . . . tempora. 

Editio tertia. Revised from original MSS. in Tower of London, 

by George Holmes. London, 1739-45. 12 vols., la. fol. 

Sabellicus, Antonius, In Lonicerus, fol. 105-12. 
Safarik, Ivan. 1. Elenchus actorum spectantium ad historiam Ser- 
borum et reliquorum Slavorum meridionalium . . . c x uae in archivo 
Venetiarum reperiuntur. Belgrade, 1858, 4to. 
The notes are in Servian, but with Latin translation. 
2. Acta archivii Veneti spectantia ad historiam Serborum. 
Belgrade, 1860. 

Saearik, Paul Joseph. Slovanshe Starozitnosti. Prague, 1837, 4to. 
Trans, under title Slawische Altertkiimer by Moses von Aehrenf eld, 
with notes by Heinrich Wuttke. Leipzig, 1843-4. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Sagredo, Giovanni. Memorie istoriche de' monarchi ottomani. 
Venice, 1676, fol. ; 1688, 4to. 

The first of modern writers who, though acquainted with Ottoman 
' sources ', deliberately prefers to follow the Byzantine writers who were 
contemporary. 

Sagundino, Nicholas. See Secundinus. 

Said. Ghulcheni-Mearif. Hist, of Ott. Emp. from foundation to 

1774. In 2 vols. 
Salaberry, de. Hist, de VEmp. ott. depuis sa fondation jusqu' a . . , 

1792. Avec des pieces justificatives. Paris, 1813. 4 vols. 8vo. 
Saladin, H. Manuel d'Art musulman. Vol. i. V architecture. 

Paris, 1907, 8vo. 
Salcon, Nicolas. French trans, of Hayton. 
Sambucus, Joannes (of Tirnovo). Reges Ungariae ab anno 401-1567 
, uersibus descripti. In Bonfinius, fol. 891-6. 

Sanginetti, B. R. French trans., in collab. with Ch. Defremery, 
of Ibn Batutah. 

Sansovino, Francesco. 1. Gli annali turcheschi o vero vita de* 
principi della casa athomana. First edition. Venice, 1568, 4to. 
Edition from which I quote is Venice, 1573, 4to. 

2. Historia universale delV origine et imperio de' Turchi, nella 
quale si contengono la origine, etc., de' Turchi. Venice, 1654. 
2 vols., la. 8vo. 

A collection of various writers on the Ottoman Empire. 
Sanuto, Marino (Torsello). 1. Memorial to King of France 
urging crusade, 1321. Written in French. In Bongars, Gesta 
Dei per Francos, ii. 5. 

2. Letters published by Dorez and Ronciere in Bibl. de VEcole 
des Chartes (1895), lvi. 34-44. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



359 



3. Secreta fidelium criicis. In Bongars, vol. ii. See also thesis 
of Postansque, and study by Kunstmann. Four books, written 
between 1306 and 1321, urging a crusade. Book III trans, into 
English by Aubrey Stewart, in Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, 
vol. xii, London, 1896, 8vo. 
Sanuto, Maeino (the Younger). 1. Vite de' Duchi di Venezia. 
(1121-93.) In Muratori, xxii. 399-1252. 

2. Diarii. Ed. by Gugl. Berchet. Venice, 1877-1900. 56 vols. 
4to. 

I have given the younger Sanuto's work here, because he is so often 
confused with the elder. 

Sarre, Friedrich. Reise in Kleinasien, Sommer 1895. Forschungen 
zur seldjuJcischen Kunst und Geographic des Landes. 76 Tafeln. 
Map by Kiepert, Berlin, 1896, la. 8vo. 

Sathas, C. N. 1. Documents inedits relatifs a Vhist. de la Grece au 
moyen age {1400-1500). Paris, 1880-1. 2 vols. 4to. Maps of 
Crete, the Aegean, and Sea of Marmora in 15th cent. I. contains 
Cane. Secreta, 208 doc, from 1402 to 1500 ; II. Misti, 549 doc, 
from 1400 to 1412. 

2. TovpKOKpaTovfxevT] 'EAAas. Athens, 1869. 

3. Edited and trans., in collab. with Miller, the Cyprus chronicle 
of Macairas. 

4. Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi. 6 vols. I— III, Venice, 1872-3 ; 
IV-VI, Paris, 1874-7. 

Sauli, Luigi. Delia colonia Genovesi in Galata. Turin, 1831. 
2 vols. 8vo. 

The valuable information in these volumes is practically without dater, 
and there is no index. 

Schaefarik, Janko. See Safafik, Ivan, 

Schefer, Charles. French trans, of portion of Ibn Bibi. Editor, 
with copious notes, of Bertrandon de la Broquiere, Spandugino, 
and a portion of Geufiraeus. His collection of oriental MSS. has 
recently enriched the Bibliotheque Nationale. The catalogue of 
his library, published in 1903 by H. Welter, Paris, is an addition 
to the bibliography of Oriental history, geography, and philology. 

Schiltberger, Johannes. Gefangenschaft in der Turckey. Frank- 
fort, 1557, 4to. Best modern German edition is : Ed. by K. Fr. 
Neumann under title Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger. Munich, 
1859, 8vo. (Hammer used earlier reprint of Munich MS., Reise 
in den Orient, Munich, 1813.) English trans, by J. Buchan Telfer, 
R.N., with notes by Prof. P. Bruun of Odessa, published by the 
Hakluyt Society, London, 1879, 8vo, under title The Bondage and 
Travels of J ohann Schiltberger. 

Schlumberger, G. Numismatique de VOrient latin. Paris, 1878, 
4to. 

Schmitt, John, Editor. The chronicle of Morea. To XpovtKov tov 
Mopeoos. (From the Copenhagen and Paris MSS.) London, 
1904, 8vo. 



360 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Schonherr, G. Collab., with P6r, A., in the latest authoritative 
Hungarian history covering the 14th century. 

pp. 478-90 : Monnaies d' Imitation a l^gendes latines frappees par les 
princes ou emirs turcomans du Saroukhan, d'A'idin, et de Mentesche. 

Schulz, C. G. Geschichte des osmanischen Reichs. Leipzig, 1772, 
8vo. 

Schwandtner, J. G., editor. Serif tores rerum Hungaricarum veteres 

ac genuini. Tomus i. Vienna, 1746, fol. 
Schwicker, J. H. German trans, of Kallay. 
Seadeddin, Mohammed Ben Hassan (Khodja Effendi). Tajul- 

Tevarikh. The Crown of Histories. Constantinople, 1862. 2 vols. 

4to. Of this most celebrated Ottoman historian, whose chronicle 

covers from the origin of the family, there are translations as 

follows : 

1. Bratutti, Vicenzo. Cronica delV origine e progressi delta 
casa ottomana, composta da Saldino Turco. Parte prima, Osman- 
Mohammed I, Vienna, 1649, 12mo. Parte secunda, Murad II and 
Mohammed II, Madrid, 1652. 

Hammer uses this translation. 

2. Kollar, A. P. Seadeddini annates Tureiei usque ad Murad II. 
Turcice et Latine cura Ad. Fr. Kollar a Kerestan. Vienna, 1755 fol. 

3. Seaman, Wm. The Reign of Suttan Orkhan, translated from 
Hodja effendi. London, 1652, 8vo. 

4. History of the Turkish war with Rhodians, Venetians, Egyptians, 
Persians and other nations, written by Will Caoursin and Khodja 
Afendy, a Turk. London, 1683, 8vo. 

This is an anon, trans, of Caoursin's Historia Rhodi and Seadeddin's 
recital of the siege of Rhodes under Mohammed II. 

5. Gall and, Antoine. Ilistoire ottomane, ecrite par Saadud-din 
Mehemed Hassan, plus connu chez les Turcs sous le nom de Cogia 
Efendi, mise en frangois par Antoine Galland, Professeur et Lecteur 
royal en langue arabe. A translation in MS. of Bibl. Nat., Paris, 
fonds turc, 64. Vol. i, up to Murad II, is lacking. Vol. ii is in 
the Bibl. Nat. under fonds fr., 6074. A third volume, fonds fr., 
6075, contains Bayezid II and Selim I. 

Zinkeisen used this translation. But Jorga, i. 150, n. 1, is in error in 
believing that Zinkeisen had access to complete trans. This has been 
lacking since 18th cent. The whole comment of Jorga is confusing. He 
mixes Seadeddin with Neshri, and follows Zenker's erroneous statement 
that Leunclavius's Annali is a trans, of Seadeddin. 

6. The story of the capture of Constantinople by Mohammed 
has been translated into French by Garcin de Tassy, Paris, 1826, 
and by Michaud, in his Bibl. des Croisades, vol. iii ; into English 
by Gibb, Glasgow, 1879 ; and, in part, into German by Krause, 

I Die Eroberungen von Konstantinopel im XIII. und XV. J ahrhundert, 
I Halle, 1870, 8vo. 

Seaman, William. English translator of portion of Seadeddin. 
Secundinus, Nicolaus. Liber de familia Autumanarum ad Eneam, 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



361 



Senarum episcopum. Fol. 133-41 of MS. Latin 414 of K. Bibl., 
Munich. Published as Liber I in Johannes Ramus, which see. 
This letter, written to Aenaeas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, from 
Naples, is one of the first western accounts of the Osmanlis. In the 
title-page of ' De rebus Turcicis ', printed 1553, Secundinus is called 
' vetustissimo autore '. 

Sefert, M. La Dalmatie, y compris , . . Patras, Athenes. Manuel 
de voyageur avec 88 gravures et 32 cartes et plans. Guide illustre 
Hartleben, no. 64. Vienna and Leipzig, 1912, 12mo. 

Seiff, J. Beisen in der asiatischen Turhei. Leipzig, 1875. 

Servi, Ferdinando. Compendium Historiae Turcicae. Venice, 1689. 
This is a trans, into Latin, then Italian, of Du Verdier. Some 
bibliographers have treated this as an original work. 

Shehabeddin, Abul Abbas Ahmed. Mesaleh al absar fi memaleh 
alamsar. Footpaths of the eyes in the Kingdoms of the different 
Countries. Existing fragments, which include Asia Minor, trans, 
into French by Quatremere, in Notices et Extraits, xiii. 152-384, 
from MS. in Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, no. 2325. 

Quatremere in discussing whether S. is from Damascus, Marash or 
Morocco, has overlooked Hadji Khalfa, Lex. Bibl., no. 10874, fol. 1832, 
who unhesitatingly calls him ' ecrivain de Damas '. 

Sherefeddin Ali (Yezdi). Zefer Name. But MS. in Bibl. Nat., 
Paris, reads Kitabi fatih namehi Emir Timour (a Life of Timur 
by his own secretary). Trans, into Turkish by Mohammed ben 
al Agemi. Trans, into French by Petits de la Croix, under title 
Histoire de Timourbec, connu sous le nom du Gran Tamerlan, 
empereur des Mongols et Tartares. Paris, 1722. 4 vols. 12mo. 
No index. Another edition of same, Delft, 1723. 4 vols. 8vo. 
Muralt, in the bibliography of his Chronographie byzantine, has fallen 
into the error of identifying Sherefeddin with Arabshah. 

Shireddin. See Dorn. 

Sidarouss, S. Les Patriarcats dans V Empire Ottoman et speciale- 

ment en Sgypte. Paris, 1907, la. 8vo. 
Sidi Ali Ibn Hussein (Khatib Koumi). The Mirror of the Countries. 

Narration of Voyages. German trans, of Diez, trans, into French by 

Moris, with foreword on life and times of Sidi Ali. Paris, 1827, 8vo. 
Silvestre de Sacy, A. I. French trans, of Makrisi's Numismatics. 

Editor of letter of Dominican Friar. See note under Moranville, 

Henri de. 

Sionita, Gabriel. Latin trans, of Edrisi in collab. with John 
Hesronita. 

Sismondi, J. C. L. Sismonde de. Histoire des republiques italiennes 
du moyen age. Paris, 1809. 8 vols. 12mo. New ed., Paris, 1840. 
10 vols. 8vo. 

Slane, Gr. de. 1. Catalogue des bibliotheques de Constantinople. In 
MS. Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, no. 4474. 

2. Cat. des MSS. arabes de la Bibl. Nat., Paris. 2 vols., 1883 
and 1895. Still in MS. 

3. Trans, into French Ibn Khaldun's Prolegomena. 



362 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Smirnow, W. D. Collections scientifiques de l'Inst. des Langues 
orientales du Ministere des afL etrang. Vol. viii, Manuscrits turcs. 
Petrograd, 1897, 8vo. 

Solakzade. Hist. Ott. Emp. from beginning to Soleiman II, in 

1 vol. 

Spandugino, Teodoro. I commentari di Teo. Spandugino Canta- 
cusino, gentiVhuomo Constantinopolitano. Costumi e leggi de y 
Turchi : origine de' Prencipi Turchi. Lucca, 1550. Florence, 
1551. Also in Sansovino, pp. 107-36, 182-206. Charles Schefer 
has published and edited an early French MS. trans, of above : 
Petit traicte de V origine des Turcqz. Paris, 1896, 8vo. 

Excellent for erudite display of bibliographical knowledge, but Schefer's 
comments on chronicle are disappointing, and his chronology is inaccurate. 

Spiegel. See Jo. Gaudier. 

Sprenger, A. See Fitzclarence, George. 

Sreznavski, L. Russian trans, of Clavijo. 

Stella, Giorgio. Annates Genuenses . (1298-1409.) Continued by 
' Frater Johannes ' to 1435. In Muratori, xvii. 947-1318. 

Stewart, Aubrey. English trans, of portion of Secreta fidelium 
cruris of Marino Sanuto (Torsello). 

Stewart, Charles. English trans, of anon. Memoirs of Timur. 

Stritter, J. G. Memoriae populorum, olim ad Danubium, Pontum 
Euxinum, paludem Maeotidem, Caucasum, mare Caspium et inde 
magis ad septentriones incolentium, e scriptoribus Byzantinis erutae 
et digestae. Petrograd, 1779. 4 vols. 4to. 

Numerous writers have gone to Stritter, and quoted from him, in citing 
Byzantine writers of 13th and 14th cent. 

Strzygowski, Josef. Die Calendarbilder des Chronographen vom 

Jahre 354, mit 30 Tafeln. Berlin, 1888, 4to. 
Szalay, Ladislas. GeschicMe Ungarns. Trans, from Hungarian 

by Heinrich Wogerer. Buda-Pest, 1866-9. 3 vols. 8vo. 
Szilagyi, Alexander. Editor of A Magyar Nemzet Tbrtenete. 

Tafel, G. L. F. 1. De Via Egnatia. Tubingen, 1842. 

2. Symbola critica ad geographiam Byzantinam spectantia. 
K. Bayer. Akademie, vol. v. 

3. Editor of Panaretos. 

4. Urkunden zur alteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der 
Republik Venedig. Vienna, 1856. (In collab. with Thomas, G. M.) 

Tahir-Zade, Ahmed Aga. Tarikhi-Aga. Constantinople, 1876. 

5 vols. 8vo. General Hist, of Ott. Emp. from foundation. 
Tarbe, P. Editor of Eustache Deschamps. 

Tartini, J. M., ed. Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. Florence, 1748-70. 

2 vols. la. fol. (A supplement to Muratori : codices of Lauren- 
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Tauber, Nicholas von. German trans, of GeufTraeus. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 363 

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Thomas, G. M. 1. Collab. with Tafel in compilation of Urkunden 
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Toderini was chaplain to the Bailie of Venice at Constantinople from 
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2. Editor of 1877 edition of Finlay. 



364 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



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Tudelle, Benjamin de. In Bergeron. 

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Urechi, Gregoire. Chronique de Moldavie, depuis le milieu du 

XIV e siecle jusqu'a 1594. Texte roumain en caracteres slavons. 

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Vambery, Hermann. 1. Alt-osmanische Sprachstudien. Levclen, 
1901, 8vo. 

2. Hungary. ' Story of Nations ' series. London, 1898, 8vo. 

3. Geschichte Bocharas oder Transoxaniens. Stuttgart, 1872. 
Vanel. Abrege nouveau de Vhistoire gen. des Turcs . . . depuis leur 

etablissement jusqu'a present. Avec les Portraits des Empereurs 
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Van Gaver, Jules. Collab. with Jouannin. 

Vattier, Pierre. French trans, of Arabshah. 

Vertot, Abbe. Histoire des chevaliers de Saint- Jean. Amsterdam, 

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Villani, Giovanni. Historia universalis (in Italian). Muratori, 

xiii. 1-1002. 

Villani died of the plague in 1348. 
Villani, Matteo, and his son Filippo. Historia ah 1348 ad 1365. 

A continuation of the Historia universalis. (Also in Italian.) 

Muratori, xiv. 1-770. 

A most valuable contemporary record for first conquests of Murad I 
in Europe. 

Vivien de Saint-Martin, Louis. Description historique et geogr. de 

VAsie Mineure. Paris, 1852. 2 vols. 8vo. 
Vlasto, E.-A. Trans, into French portion of Hopf which relates 

to Giustiniani family of Chios. 
Vullers, J. A. Latin trans, of Mirkhond. 

Wavrin, Jean de. Les Chronicques d'Engleterre. Edited by Mile. 

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Werunski, E. Excerpta ex registris dementis VI et Innocentii VI 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 



365 



White, Joseph. Editor of Clarendon Press (1783) Persian text of 

Timur's memoirs. 
Wirth, A. Geschichte der Tilrken. 2nd ed. Stuttgart, 1913, 12mo. 
Wogerer, H. German trans, of Szalay. 
Wolff. Geschichte der Mongolen. Breslau, 1872. 
Wright, J. Editor of Mandeville. 

Wustenfeld, Ferdinand. 1. V ergleichungs-T abellen der muham- 
medanischen und christlichen Zeitrechnung, nach dem ersten Tage 
jedes muham. Monats berechnet und im Auftrage und auf Kosten 
der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. Leipzig, 1854, 4to. 
This is reproduced in Mas Latrie's Tresor de Chronologie, &c., pp. 549-622. 
2. Geschichte der Tilrken mit besonderer Berilcksichtigung des 
vermeintlichen Anrechts derselben auf den Besitz von Griechenland. 
Leipzig, 1899, 8vo. 

A book full of inaccuracies and misleading statements : altogether 
unworthy of the author of the Tabellen. 

Wuttke, Heinrich. Editor of German trans, of P. J. Safarik. 
Wylie, H. History of England under Henry IV. London, 1884-98. 
4 vols. 12mo. 

Xenopol, A. D. Histoire des Boumains. Paris, 1896. 2 vols, 
la. 8vo. This is a translation, revised and abridged by trie author 
himself, of Istoria Rominilor din Dacia traiana. Jassy, 1888-93. 
6 vols. 8vo. 

Yahia, Nasreddin. See Ibn Bibi. 
Yale, H. English trans, of Marco Polo. 

Zagorsky, Vladimir. Frangois Backi et la renaissance scientifigue 
et politique de la Croatie. Paris, 1909, 8vo. 

pp. 178-81 contain expose of Bosno-Serbo-Croatian relations at time of 
Ottoman conquest. 

Zenker, J. Th. Bibliotheca Orientalis. Leipzig, 1848-61. 2- vols. 
4to. Vol. i contains : Arabic, Persian, and Turkish books from 
invention of printing to 1840 ; vol. ii, a supplement of preceding 
up to 1860, and books on Christian Orient. 

Compiled in haphazard fashion : very incomplete : most important 
works are omitted : in giving translations Seadeddin is confused with Ali. 

Zinkeisen, Johann Wilhelm. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs 
in Europa. Gotha, 1840-63. 7 vols. 8vo. In Allgemeine Staaten- 
geschichte, I, 15 Werke. Vol. i up to 1453. 
Jorga's recent work is 37 in the same series. 

Zollikofer, Lucas. German trans, of Pedro Mexia. 

Zotenberg, H. French trans, of Jean of Nikiou. 



366 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



ANONYMOUS 

Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani (1315-1402). In Miklositch 

and Miiller, Acta et diplomata, vol. i. 
Anciennes Clironiques de Savoye. Cols. 1-382 in Monumenta 

Historiae Patriae : Scriptores, vol. i. 

Contemporary account of Amadeo's expedition to the Levant. 

Chronik aus Kaiser Sigmunds Zeit {1126-1434). Edited by Th. 

von Kern, in Die ChroniJcen der deutschen Stadte, Niirnberg, i. 344- 

414. Leipzig, 1862, 8vo. 
La Clironique du due Loys de Bourbon. Ed. by P. P. Chazaud, 

Paris, 1876, 8vo. 

Clironique de Moree. Edited for Soc. Hist. France by Jean de 
Longnon. Paris, 1911, 8vo. 

See also Rodd, Sir Rennell, Schmitt, John, and Morel-Fatio, A. 

Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis. Edited by Bellaguet, in Coll. 
des Doc. inedits sur l'hist. de France, XVII, tome ii. 504. Paris, 
1839-52. 6 vols. 4to. 

Nicopolis expedition, ii. 425-30, 483-532. 

Chronique des quatre premiers Valois. (1327-93.) Edited by S. Luce. 

Paris, 1861, 8vo. 
Cronica Dolfina. Bibl. Marc, Venice, MS. ital., class 7, no. 794. 
Derbend Name. English trans, with Turkish text, by Mirza A. 

Kazem bey. St. Petersburg, 1851, 4to. 
The Dominican Friar's Account of Timur. See Moranville, Henri, 

and Silvestre de Sacy, A. I. 
'ETTipwriKa (Epirotica). Historia Epiri a Michaele Nepote Duce con- 

scripta. Six fragments, forming pp. 207-79, in Historia et Politica 

Patriarchica Constantinopoleos. (In Corpus Script. Byz.) Bonn, 

1849, 8vo. 

La Genealogie du Grand-Turc (Lyon ed.). See Gycaud. 

Lime des faicts du bon messire Jean le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut. 
Bibl. Nat., fonds fr., no. 11432. Th. Godefroy edited and pub- 
lished this MS., Paris, 1620, 4to. Modern editions : Collection 
Petitot, VI and VII ; Michaud et Poujoulat, II ; and Buchon, 
Choix de chroniques (Pantheon litteraire), III. Paris, 1853. 

Memoirs of Timur. Supposed to be an autobiography in Djagatai 
Turkish, MS. of which was discovered in the Yemen. 

1. Persian trans, by Abu Halib Hussein. The text was edited 
by Professor White, and publ. by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1783, with a trans, into English by Major Davy. A second English 
trans, was made by Charles Stewart, under title Mulfuzat timur y 
or autobiographical memoirs of the Moghul emp. Timur. London, 
1830, 4to. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



367 



2. French trans, from Persian by L. Langles, under title 
Instituts politiques et militaires de Tamerldn, ecrit par lui-meme. 
Paris, 1787, 8vo. 

Mira-ari tarihh Osmani. (Ottoman history.) Constantinople, 1876, 
8to. 

Monumenta Pisana. In Muratori, xv. 973-1088. 

Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis par un serviteur de Gui de Blois. 
The two MSS. in the Library of the Due d'Arenbourg and the 
Ashburnham collection are published by Kervyn de Lettenhove, 
in his edition of Froissart, xv. 439-508 ; xvi. 413-43. 

Series Imperatorum Turcicorum. In Foglietta, de Originibus. 

Tractatus de ritu et moribus Turcarum. Cologne, c. 1488 ; Witten- 
berg, with preface by Martin Luther, 1530 ; German trans, by 
Sebastian Franck, without place, 1530 ; augmented edition of 
Franck' s trans., Berlin, 1590. The same work under title Tractatus 
de ritu, moribus et multiplicatione nequitiae Turcarum, Paris, 
1514, 8vo. 

By a Christian slave under Murad EL Rambaud, Hist, gen., iii. 867, 
cites an edition of Paris, 1509, 4to, which he attributes to Bicoldus. But 
I do not find this name in other editions. 

SEEBIAN CHRONICLES 

Chronicle of the Abbey Tronosha. Chronicle of Pek, quoted by 
Mijatovitch. 

BYZANTINE HISTORIANS 

1. Historiae byzantinae scriptores. Louvre ed. Paris, 1645- 
1711. 38 vols. fol. Venice, 1727-33. 23 vols. 

2. Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae. Ed. by Niebuhx. 
Bonn, 1828-78. 49 vols. 8vo. 

3. Patrologia Graeca. Ed.byMigne. Paris, 1857-66, 161 vols 4to. 
The writers who deal with the 14th cent, are : 

1. Pachvmeres (1258-1308). Bonn, 1835. 2 vols. 8vo. Rome, 
1660. 

2. Nicephorus Gregoras (1204-1351). Bonn. 1855. Paris, 1702, 
2 vols. 

3. Johannes VI Cantacuzenos (1320-57). Bonn, 1828-32. 3 
vols. 8vo. Paris, 1645. Migne. ciii-civ. 

4. Manuel I Palaeologos (1388-1407). Migne, clvi. 82-582. 

5. Chalcocondylas, Laonicus (1298-1462). Bonn, 1843. Paris, 
1650. Migne, vol. clix. 

6. Ducas, Johannes (1341-1462). Bonn, 1834. Migne, clvii. 
750-1166. Paris, 1649. Chronicon Breve^ — added to Ducas. 

7. Phrantzes, George (1259-1477). Bonn. 1838. Migne, vol. 
clvi. Vienna, 1796. 

8. Panaretos, Michail (1204-1386). For Trebizond. See editions 
under his card. 

9. Historia Epirotica. Bonn, 1849. (In vol. xxiii.) 



368 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



VENETIAN AECHIVES 

Original MS. collections referred to in my book : 

I. Commemoriali. A transcription of miscellaneous acts, bulls, 
&c, 1295-1787. 33 vols. la. fol. Vols, i-ix, 1295-1405. i, 1295-8. 
ii, 1309-16. iii, 1317-26. iv, 1325-43. v, 1342-52. vi, 1353-8. 
vii, 1358-62. viii, 1362-76. viii (2), 1376-97. ix, 1395-1405. 
The Commemoriali have been edited by Kiccardo Predelli. See 
also Thomas. 

II. Misti (Deliberationes mixtae). ' Continentes res terrestres 
et maritimas.' 1293-1440. First 14 volumes (1293-1331) were 
burned in 1574 or 1577, but indices have been preserved in the 
Rubricarii. 60 vols. fol. xv-xxxii, 1332-67 ; xxxiii-xli, 1368-88 ; 
xlii-xlix, 1389-1413. Rubricarii. Indices of the Misti. 4 vols, 
i, 1293-1368 (32 registers) ; ii, 1368-89 (9 registers) ; iii, 1389- 
1413 (9 registers). 

III. Secreti (Deliberationes secretae). For foreign affairs. 1345- 
1401. Numbered by letters. 19 vols., A to S, of which only 
four remain. A and B, 1345-50 ; R (now called E), March 
1388-97 ; and L, May 1373-Feb. 1376. One feels deeply the loss 
of these records, especially of S, which went from April 1397 to 
Feb. 1400. 

IV. Patti. 7 registers of treaties from 883 to 1496. 

V. Liber Albus. Treaties, privileges, &c, with the Levant 
(principally for commerce) up to 1348. 

VI. Libri Secretorum Consilii Rogatorum, commonly called 
' Cons. Rog. '. A continuation of the Secreti from April 10, 1401, 
to Feb. 26, 1476. These volumes bear Arabic numerals, not 
letters. There are 27 registers, of which no. 1 contains the Ana- 
tolian campaign of Timur and the downfall of Bayezid. 

In the classified bibliography, the collections in which documents from 
Venetian records have been published are grouped. 



INDEX 



Adalia, 158, 296, 297-8. 

Adana, 74, 282, 296, 298-9. 

Adrianople, 39, 91, 100, 103, 112, 
114, 121, 123, 125-6, 171-87, 207, 
231-2, 261 ; unique place of, in 
Ottoman history, 139. 

Afion Kara Hissar, 11, 290. 

Aidin, 65, 86, 158, 185-6, 191, 228, 

283, 286, 291 ; Ottoman absorp- 
tion of, 185, 259, 274,287. 

Akbara, 69, 284. 

Akridur, 284, 288-9. 

Ak Serai, 16, 162, 187, 189, 237, 

284, 300. 

Ak Sheiir, 154, 187, 260, 284-5, 
Ak Tchai, battle of, 188-90. 
Alaia, 285, 289. 

Albania, Ottoman invasions of, 147, 
159-60, 170, 183, 206, 243. 

Albanian nobility, conversion of, 
to Islam, 76. 

Albanians, value of, in Ottoman 
army, 159. 

Alaeddin Kai Kobad, composition 
of army of, 16-17 ; connexion 
with Osmanlis, 20-2, 264, 266, 
269 ; fortifies Sivas, 246. 

— of Karamania, 165-7, 187-90, 
288 ; sons of, set free by Timur 
after Angora, 257. 

— pasha (brother of Orkhan), 70-2. 
Alexander of Bulgaria, 103, 138-9, 

170. 

Ali pasha (grand vizier of Bayezid), 

171-2, 199-200, 234. 
Altoluogo, 286. 

Amadeo of Savoy, crusade of, 128, 
130 ; proselytizing zeal of, aids 
conquests of Murad, 141-2 ; 
intervenes to make peace be- 
tween Venice and Genoa, 155 ; 
hostility to Theodore Palaeologos, 
228. 

Amassia, 250, 300. 
Anatoli Hissar, 234. 
Anatolia (see Asia Minor). 
Angora, 16, 68, 155, 162, 188, 191, 
250, 259, 264, 285-6, 288 ; battle 



of, 251-5, 262 ; capture of, by 

Osmanlis, 68, 156. 
Anna of Savoy, 91-4, 129. 
Argos, population of, deported to 

Anatolia, 230. 
Armenia, Little, kingdom of (see 

Cilicia). 

Armenians, bravery and massacre 
of, at Sivas, 248. 

Asia Minor, railways in, 11-12 ; new 
ethnic elements in, 14-15 ; ob- 
scure geographical names in, 32 ; 
exodus of Greeks to coast of, 35 ; 
Catalans in, 36-8, 123, 301 ; im- 
portance of Aegaean islands for 
control of, 43 ; not conquered by 
early Osmanlis, 68-9, 300-2 ; 
Black Death in, 96 ; Crusaders' 
road through, 162 ; Bayezid 
nominal master of greater part of, 
191 ; Timur invades, 257-60 ; 
Mongol invasions of, 270-3, 300 ; 
Turkish emirates in, 277-301. 

Athens, Osmanlis in, 231. 

Attika, Ottoman invasions of, 147, 
186, 205. 

Ayasoluk, 185, 283, 286, 295. 



Bagdad, 244, 249, 269. 
Balikesri, 66, 69, 286, 291, 294. 
Balkan Christians prefer Ottoman 

rule to that of Catholics, 133, 194. 

240. 

— peninsula, distance between cities 
of, 162 ; Moslem immigration into, 
1 96, 230-91 ; Venetian fear of Hun- 
garian hegemony in, 207 ; Ottoman 
activities cease in, 243. 

Balsa of Albania, 159. 

Baphaeon, battle of, 34, 45. 

Bayezid, assassinates Yakub upon 
his accession, 180; marries daugh- 
ter of Lazar, 183 ; conquers 
Anatolian emirates, 184-91, 274; 
invests Smyrna, 185 ; completes 
conquest of Bulgaria, 195 ; re- 
ceives privileges in Constanti- 

a 



370 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



nople, 199 ; propitiated by Vene- 
tians and Genoese, 204-5, 207 ; 
continues subjugation of Albania 
and Greece, 230, 243; defeats 
crusaders at Nicopolis, 216-24 ; 
invades the Morea, 228-32 ; 
settles Anatolian Turks in Balkan 
peninsula, and pushes siege of 
Constantinople after Nicopolis, 
230-4 ; extends conquests to 
valley of the Euphrates, and 
comes into contact with Timur, 
244; defies Timur, 246 ; defeated 
by Timur at Angora, 251-5 ; 
taken prisoner and humiliated, 
253-6 ; dies at Ak Sheir, 256 ; 
arrogance of, 181-2, 209, 227, 
246, 249 ; origin of nickname 
Yildirim, 188 ; contemporary 
western conception of, 208 ; 
change of character after success, 
225, 235, 249, 257 ; claims to 
greatness as a statesman, 235 ; 
humble origin of, 245, 267 ; 
wrong tactics at Angora, 251-2 ; 
discussion of cage story, 255-6 ; 
durability of conquests of, 262. 

Bayezid, sons of, confusion of 
western writers concerning iden- 
tity of, 246, 252 ; fate of, after 
Angora, 255 ; fight for succession, 
259. 

Belgrad, 162; 

Bigha, Catalan colony of, 123, 294, 
301. 

Biledjik, 11, 12, 22, 33. 
Black Death, 95-6, 115. 
— Sheep, dynasty of, 245. 
Bogomile heresy, 93. 
Boli, 286, 292. 
Borlu, 286. 

Bosnia, Ottoman invasions of, 147, 
184,191. {See also Tvrtko.) 

Bosnian nobility, conversion to 
Islam, 75. 

Bosphorus, 32, 45, 59, 233-4, 237, 
260-1. 

Boucicaut, crusade of, 128, 236-9 ; 
in Nicopolis campaign, 212-23 ; 
tries to raise ransom at Constan- 
tinople, 226 ; crusaders left be- 
hind by, save Constantinople. 242. 

Brusa, 12, 13, 22, 32, 45, 46, 54, 84, 
122, 125, 152, 185, 188, 198, 225, 
257, 275-6, 286-7 ; captured by 



the Osmanlis, 46-8 ; place in 

Ottoman history, 125. 
Buda, John Palaeologos at, 130 ; 

Nicopolis crusaders at, 211. 
Bulair, 101, 111. 

Bulgaria, incorporated in Ottoman 
Empire, 195. 

Bulgarians, early propagation of 
Islam among, 26 ; refuse to aid 
Byzantines against Osmanlis, 103 ; 
first conflict with Osmanlis in 
Thrace, 111-14; make John 
Palaeologus prisoner, and are at- 
tacked by Savoyard crusaders, 
129-30; struggle against Osmanlis 
in Thrace, 139-40 ; resist Hunga- 
rian attempts to convert them to 
Catholic faith, 141 ; lose Sofia, 
161 ; Ottoman invasion and con- 
quest, 171-3, 194-5 ; aid Osman- 
lis in Karamanian campaign, 
188 ; oppressed by Greek patri- 
archate, 195-6. 

Bunar Hissar, 112, 139. 

Burgas, 129, 142. 

Burhaneddin of Caesarea, 190, 287, 
297. 

Byzantine architecture, influence of, 
upon Ottoman, 275-6. 

— emperor, glamour of title in 
Western Europe, 241. 

Byzantines, civil dynastic strife 
among, 35, 47-9, 57-61, 91-4, 
98-105, 149-54, 197-200, 237-9, 
259 ; first contact with Osmanlis, 
34 ; receive aid from Catalans, 
37-40 ; seek aid of Genoese and 
Serbians, against Turks, 41 ; men- 
aced again by western schemes 
of conquest, 42 ; lose Bithynia to 
Osmanlis, 45-9 ; defeated by 
Osmanlis at Pelecanon, 59-61 ; 
weakness of opposition of, to 
Orkhan, 106 ; abasement of, 
before Murad, 122 ; fail to co- 
operate with other Balkan Chris- 
tians against Osmanlis, 123, 139 ; 
make treaty with Genoese, 162 ; 
reduced to city state of Con- 
stantinople, 232-4, 242-3 ; aided 
by Boucicaut' s crusade, 236-9, 
242 ; fail to take advantage of 
defeat of Bayezid by Timur, and 
help Ottoman armies in retreat 
to Europe, 261. 



INDEX 



371 



Caesarea, 16, 190, 248, 272, 284, 

287, 300. 
Callixtus, patriarch, 101-3, 144. 
Cantacuzenos, Helen, 94. 

— Irene, 91, 94, 103. 

— , John, wounded by Turks, 
48 ; at battle of Pelecanon, 
60 ; prevents marriage alliance 
between Orkhan and Dushan, 
90 ; usurps imperial purple, 91 ; 
marries daughter to Orkhan, 93 ; 
forces widow of Andronicus III 
to recognize him as co-emperor, 
and marries daughter to John 
Palaeologus, 93-4 ; asks aid of 
Orkhan against Dushan, 98 ; 
dynastic war with John Palaeo- 
logus, in which Osmanlis help him, 
99-102 ; forced to abdicate, and 
becomes monk, 103 ; character of, 
104-5 ; responsibility for intro- 
ducing Osmanlis into Europe, 
92-5, 97-100, 102-3, 105-10; 
grand- daughter of, in harem of 
Bayezid, 230. 

— , Matthew, turns against father, 
98 ; Patriarch Callixtus refuses 
to consecrate as co- emperor, 
101-2 ; forced by John Palaeo- 
logus to abdicate, 103. 

— , Theodora, wife of Orkhan, 
93^, 98, 107. 

Catalans, aid Byzantines in Asia 
Minor, 37-8 ; form state at 
Gallipoli, 39 ; go to Thessaly, 40 ; 
sack Chios, 43 ; mercenaries of 
Cantacuzenos, 103 ; remnants of, 
at Bigha, 123, 301. 

Cattaro, 134. 

Charles IV (Holy Roman Em- 
peror), 138. 

— of Durazzo, 192. 

— VI of France, rejoices over 
death of Murad, 178; opposes 
Bayezid, 202, 208-9, 233; in- 
sanity of, 202, 209, 242 ; receives 
Manuel Palaeologus, 241 ; Timur 
proposes to share world with, 249 ; 
misinformed about origin and 
power of Osmanlis, 208-9, 274. 

— Thopia, lord of Durazzo, 159. 
Chios, 43, 163, 186, 205. 
Chivalry, last effort of, in crusade 

against Bayezid, 211-14, 217-20, 
222-4, 225-8. 



Christians in Ottoman Empire, civil 

status of, 77-8. 
Cilicia, 13, 271, 282, 293, 298-9, 

300. 

Constantine, Bulgarian prince of 
Kustendil, 140, 143, 173. 

Constantinople, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 
24, 36, 41, 79, 91, 100, 121, 125, 
148-9, 162, 196-200, 205-7, 232-4, 
235-9, 241-3, 259-60. 

Corfu, Venetians alarmed about 
safety of, 243. 

Croia, 160. 

Crusaders, road of, to Jerusalem, 
162. 

Crusades, end of, 13, 14, 203 ; per- 
version of, in 14th century, 143. 

— , Nicopolis the last, 203. 

Cypriotes, join league againstMurad, 
163 ; fighting Genoese, 239 ; re- 
lations with Rhodes and Ana- 
tolian emirates, 285, 290, 295, 
297, 299-300. 

Damascus, 240, 250, 279, 287. 
Dardanelles, 22, 128, 261, 291, 293 ; 

' question ' of, 152, 203, 237. 
Demotika, 48, 57, 90, 91, 99, 100, 

105, 112, 114, 121, 125, 150. 
Despina, daughter of Lazar, marries 

Bayezid, 183 ; disgraced by 

Timur, 256. 
Djagatai, 244. 

Djenghiz Khan, 13, 16, 26, 41, 53, 

74, 243-4, 256, 264, 270. 
Dobrotich, 140, 170. 
Drama, 146, 158, 161. 
Durazzo, 159, 162, 201-2, 206. 
Dushan, Stephen, 86-90, 94, 98-9, 

143, 201. 



Edebali, Sheik, 23-4, 27. 
Egherdir, 284, 288. 
Elbassan, 159. 

Emir, confused by contemporary 
western writers with Murad, 
213 ; transcribed into ' admiral 
163. 

Enos, 114, 123. 

Ephesus, 258-9, 283. 

Epiros, Ottoman invasion of, 159. 

Ertogrul, father of Osman, 20-2, 
28, 263-4, 267. 

Erzerum, 20, 266, 270, 288, 300. 



A 



372 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Erzindjian, 20, 246, 248, 259, 266, 

270, 272, 288, 293, 300. 
Eski Baba, 112. 

— Sheir, 11, 12, 22, 32, 290. 
Evrenos, general of Murad, 112, 143, 

146. 

— , general of Osman, 48, 76. 

— of Yanitza, 171, 228, 230. 

Famagusta, 239, 298. 
Flor, Roger de, 37-9, 43. 
Fratricide, Ottoman legal sanction 
of, 180-1. 

Gallipoli, 39, 41, 100-3, 111, 129, 
221. 

Genoese, aid Michael IX, 41 ; sup- 
posed to have instigated Turkish 
attack on Rhodes, 44 ; help 
Osmanlis, 97-8, 100, 107, 165; 
fight with Venetians for Tenedos, 
152-5 ; make treaty with Byzan- 
tines in 1386, 162 ; make treaty 
with Osmanlis in 1385, and join 
league against them in 1386, 163 ; 
fail to aid Nicopolis crusade, 207 ; 
under protection of France, 236 ; 
encourage Timur to attack Baye- 
zid, 249 ; help Ottoman army to 
cross to Europe after Angora, 
261 ; wars with Venetians, 96-7, 
152-5, 262 ; at Kafifa. 294. 

Ghazan Khan, 26, 36-7. 

Grand vizier, origin of office, 71. 

Greece, conquests of Osmanlis in, 
171, 186, 228-30, 232. 

Gul Hissar, 69, 288-9. 

Gumuldjina, 112. 

Guzel Hissar, 283, 286. 

Hadji Ilbeki, 123-4. 
Halicarnassus, 288, 300. 
Hamid, 86, 157, 165-6, 187, 284-5, 
289. 

Hedwig of Hungary, becomes Queen 
of Poland, 192. 

Henry IV of England, not at Nico- 
polis, 214 ; turns from crusades to 
efforts for English crown, 233 ; 
receives Manuel Palaeologus, 241 ; 
wants to help to save Constanti- 
nople, 242 ; tries to convert Timur 
to Christianity, 259. 

Hungarians, first conflict with 
Osmanlis, 122-4 ; aid of, solicited 



by John Palaeologus, 128-30 ; 
urged by Gregory XI to fight 
Osmanlis, 136-7 ; attack Bulga- 
rians, and are driven back, 141 ; 
attack Venice, 154 ; border nobles 
co-operate with Serbians at Kos- 
sova, 170. 

Hungary, first Ottoman raid into, 
183-4 ; first battle of Osmanlis on 
soil of, 191 ; separation of crown 
of, from Poland, 192 ; interest of, 
in checking progress of Osmanlis, 
203-4 ; hegemony of, in Balkans 
feared by Venice, 207 ; Ottoman 
invasion of, after Nicopolis, 224. 

Hunyadi, 194. 

Ibn Batutah, 69, 277-80. 
Ishtiman, 142, 160-2. 
Islamic state, theocratic conception 
of, 72-3. 

— teaching, concrete results of, 75. 
Ispahan, 259. 

Istip, 158, 160-2. 
Italians, city ideal of, 14. 

Jagello of Lithuania, converted and 
becomes Ladislas of Poland, 192. 
Janina, 159. 

Janissaries, institution of, 80, 117— 
21 ; number of, in early Ottoman 
history, 118-19, 253 ; role of, in 
early history not important, 119- 
20, 173. 

Jean de Nevers, 210, 212, 218, 223, 

225-8. 
Jeanne d'Arc, 106, 209. 
Jews, cruelty of Tartars to, at 

Brusa, 267. 

Kaffa, 165, 264, 291. 
Kaouia, Ottoman absorption of, 
69. 

Karamania, 165-7, 187-90, 259, 274, 

285,289-90,300-2. * 
Karamanlis, power of, in fifteenth 

century, 190, 290, 301-2. 
Kara Khalil Tchenderli, 112. 

— Yuluk, 190. 

— Yussuf, 244-5. 

Karasi, 66, 69, 257, 286, 291, 294. 
Kastemuni, 191, 259, 291-2, 297. 
Kastriota, George, 170. 
Kavalla, 146, 161. 
Keraites, 14. 



INDEX 



37*3 



Keredek, Ottoman absorption of, 
69. 

Kermasti, 68, 292. 

Kermian, 156, 166, 188, 271, 274, 

284, 285, 292-3. 
Khaireddin, 146, 159. 
Kharesmians, 17. 

Kharesm, distinct from Khorassan, 
19. 

Kharput, 190, 244. 

Khorassan, 19, 25, 244, 264. 

KirkKilisse, 112, 139. 

Kir Sheiir, 250. 

Koese, Michail, 52, 76. 

Konia, 6, 11, 13, 16, 166-7, 187, 189, 

260, 270-2, 274, 284, 290-300. 
Kossova, battle of, 174-8, 203-4 ; 

regarded as victory by Bosnians, 

Italians and French, 178. 
Kustendil, 140, 143, 173. 
Kutayia, 12, 22, 34, 156-7, 166-7, 

188, 257-8, 284, 292. 

Lalashahin, 111, 114, 123-4, 126, 

142-3. 
Laodicea, 287. 

Lazar, election of, 148 ; tributary 
to Murad, 149 ; increases tribute 
after fall of Nish, 162 ; sends 
contingent to Murad for Ana- 
tolian campaign, 166 ; dies at 
Kossova, 177. 

Lemnos, 269. 

Louis of Hungary, defeated by 
Osmanlis, 124 ; attacks Bul- 
garians, 141 ; prejudices Chris- 
tians of Balkans against Catholic 
faith by attempts of forcible con- 
version, 141, 194 ; ignored by 
Tvrtko of Bosnia, 168-9 ; death, 
and contest over succession of, 
192. 

Lule Burgas, 112. 

Macedonia, Ottoman conquest of, 
145-9, 158-9. 

Macedonians, uncertainty of, re- 
garding nationality, 144. 

Maeander River, caution concerning 
identity of, 294. 

Magnesia, 258. 

Malkhatun, wife of Osman, 23-4, 
27, 275. 

Mamelukes, in Asia Minor, 282, 293, 
300-1. 



Marash, 279, 293. 

Maritza, battle of, 122-4, 144. 

Marko, 52, 76. 

Marmora, Ottoman absorption of, 
69. 

Marriage, reason for abandonment 

of, by Ottoman sultans, 183, 256. 
Mary of Hungary, marries Sigis- 

mund, 193. 
Matthew, patriarch, 243. 
Megalopolis, battle of, 230. 
Menteshe, 158, 185-6, 191, 259, 274, 

283, 287-8, 289, 294, 297, 300 ; 

emir of, invades Rhodes, 43-4. 
Messembria, 139. 

Mezieres, Philippe de, agitation of, 
for crusade, 160, 203. 

Michael Asan, conflict with Byzan- 
tines, 59 ; repudiates Serbian 
marriage alliance, 87. 

Midia, 139. 

Mikhalitch, conquered by Osmanlis, 
68 ; Nicopolis prisoners at, 225, 
294 ; Timur's army reaches, 257 ; 
emirate of, 294. 

Miletus, 294, 295. 

Mircea of Wallachia, promises to 
co-operate with Lazar against 
Osmanlis, 170 ; defeated by 
Osmanlis, and helps Bayezid 
against Hungarians, 192 ; ne- 
gotiates with Bayezid to desert 
crusaders, 214 ; withdraws from 
Nicopolis during battle, 221 ; 
defeats invading Ottoman army, 
224. 

Modon, 230, 240, 243. 

Mohammed I, becomes undisputed 
Ottoman sultan, 262 ; building 
activity of, 275-6 ; Karamanians 
not dependent upon, 301. 

— II (the Conqueror), legisla- 
tion of, 72-3, 195; desire of, to 
connect origin of family with 
Byzantine imperial family, 265. 

— Sultan, grandson of Timur, 
251-2. 

Monastir, 158-9, 195. 

Mongols, invasion of Asia Minor, 13, 
16, 17, 36-7, 300 ; attempts of 
Christian missionaries to convert, 
14, 26 ; connexion with Byzan- 
tines, 36-7, 41, 65 ; exposure of 
women symbol of conquest 
among, 256. 



374 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Morea, 170-1, 228-32, 240, 243. 
Mughla, 294, 295. 

Murad, first European conquests, 
111-15 ; creates corps of janis- 
saries, 117-20 ; decides to build 
Ottoman empire in Balkan penin- 
sula, and makes Adrianople his 
capital, 125 ; extension of con- 
quests in Bulgaria, 138-43 ; 159- 
61 ; conquers Macedonia, 145-9, 
158-9 ; extends sovereignty in 
Asia Minor, 155-8, 274 ; treaties 
with Ragusa, Venice, and Genoa, 
126-7, 163-4 ; first conflict with 
Karamania, 165-7 ; reaches 
Danube by further conquests in 
Bulgaria, 172 ; destroys Serbian 
independence, and is killed, in 
battle of Kossova, 175-7 ; method 
of assimilating Balkan Christians, 
115-21; policy in empire- building, 
125 ; organization of conquered 
territories, 147-9 ; policy in 
Byzantine dynastic quarrels, 149- 
55 ; anxious not to alarm Venice, 
160 ; kindness to non-comba- 
tants, 167; policy towards Serbian 
league, 171 ; character of, 178-9 ; 
confused with Bayezid by western 
travellers and writers, 208-13 ; 
contemporary western conception 
of, 208. 

Musalla, highest mountain in Balkan 

peninsula, 143. 
Mytilene, 163, 205. 



Nagy Olosz, battle of, 191. 

Nauplia, 230. 

Nazlu, 284, 289, 295. 

Nicaea, 12, 13, 32, 45-6, 54, 84, 111, 
185, 257, 275 ; captured by the 
Osmanlis, 56-7, 61-3 ; emirate 
of, 295. 

Nicomedia, 11, 12, 13, 32, 45-6, 54, 
84, 111, 185 ; captured by the 
Osmanlis, 63-4. 

Nicopolis, 172-3, 193-4, 196 ; cru- 
sade and battle of, 203, 206, 
208-24 ; identification of, 215 ; 
significance of battle of, 262 ; 
ransom of prisoners taken at, 
225-8. 

Nilufer, wife of Orkhan, 25, 62. 
Nish, 158, 161-2, 183-4. 



Okhrida, 159. 

Orkhan, first battles of, 46 ; adds 
Nicaea and Nicomedia to his 
emirate, 56-7, 61-4 ; defeats 
Byzantines at Pelecanon, 60-1 ; 
completes conquest of Bithynia, 
64 ; invades and annexes por- 
tions of neighbouring emirates, 
66-8, 291-2, 294; invited by 
Cantacuzenos to aid him against 
Anna, and receives Cantacu- 
zenos' s daughter as bride, 92-4 ; 
invited again by Cantacuzenos 
into Europe to aid him against 
John Palaeologus, 98-9 ; first 
conquests in Europe, 100-6 ; has 
Byzantines at his mercy, 107-8 ; 
Ottoman historians unsatisfactory 
in accounts of reign of, 65 ; con- 
temporary statements as to power 
of, 69-70 ; legislation of, 70-3 ; 
policy of towards Christians, 75- 
80 ; organization of army of, 
81-4 ; death of, and estimate of 
his character, 109 ; extent of 
emirate of, 301-2. 

Orsova, 215. 

Orthodox Christians, animosity 
against Catholics and unwilling- 
ness for reunion of Churches, 128, 
132-4, 141, 194. 

— Church, loses hold on Levan- 
tine Christians, 49 ; oppresses 
Bulgarians, 195-6. 

Orthography, oriental, 5-6. 

Osman, birth of, 22 ; conversion, 
marriage, and dream of, 23-9 ; 
principality of, in 1300, 32 ; first 
battle with Byzantines, 34 ; con- 
quests of, from Byzantines, 45-9 ; 
legends concerning power and 
character of, 50-2, 263-76 ; re- 
incarnation of early khalifs, 52 ; i 
elected as chief of tribe, 55 ; 
army of, 81 ; parentage of, 263-5, 
267 ; relation of with Anatolian 
Turkish emirs, 17, 44-5, 273-4, 
300-2 ; error of attributing coin- 
age to, 51. 

Osmandjik, 265, 291. 

Osmanli, connotation of this word, 
29, 50, 78, 80-1. 

Osmanlis, originate on border of 
Bithynia, 19, 25, 28, 30-2 ; com- 
plete conquest of Bithynia, 62-4, 



INDEX 



375 



80; become a distinct race, 78-81; 
first invasion of Europe, 100 ; 
advance into Thrace, 101 ; con- 
quer Thrace, 121-6, 149 ; con- 
quer Bulgaria, 139, 143, 149, 160- 
1, 171-3, 193-6 ; conquer Mace- 
donia, 144, 149, 158-9, 183; 
conquer Servia, 161-2, 173-8, 
182 ; conquer Thessaly, 147, 
228-30, 232 ; invade Albania, 
147, 159-60, 183, 206, 243 ; in- 
vade Attika, 147, 186, 205; 
invade Bosnia, 147, 184 ; invade 
Hungary, 183-^, 191, 224 ; invade 
Wallachia, 192, 224 ; invade the 
Morea, 171, 228-30, 232 ; con- 
quests of, in Greece, 171, 186, 
228-30, 232 ; absorb Anatolian 
Turkish emirates, 66-9, 155-8, 
185-7, 190-1, 274 ; invade Kara- 
mania, 165-7, 187-90, 290 ; be- 
siege Constantinople, 198-9, 232- 
4, 236 ; naval raids of, 186, 205 ; 
first cross the Danube, 191-2 ; 
first cross the Vardar, 147 ; con- 
temporary western misconception 
of their character, 216-17, 247 ; 
composite blood of, 115-17, 126 ; 
character of, 74-5 ; distinct from 
other Anatolian Turks, 19, 28, 31, 
78-9, 115, 126, 217, 228, 283; 
tolerance of, 74, 81, 115, 179 ; 
rule of, preferred by Balkan 
, Christians to that of Catholics, 
133, 141, 194-5 ; not raiders, 
but colonists, 149, 186; not feared 
by Europe until they appeared 
in Thrace, 111. 
Ottoman architecture, Byzantine 
influence in, 275-6. 

— army, organization of, 81-4 ; 
Christian elements in, 166, 173, 
184, 187-8, 217, 252. 

— ceremonial of holding ambassa- 
dors' arms in audience with 
Sultan, 178. 

— historians, unsatisfactory ac- 
counts of reign of Orkhan, 
65. 

— history, lacks early sources, 17, 
265. 

— legislation, beginning of, 71-3. 

— navy, beginning of, 186 ; weak- 
ness in reign of Bayezid, 205-6, 
234, 237-8. 



Palaeologos, Andronicus II, looks 
to Mongols and Catalans for aid 
against Turks, 35-7 ; bestows 
title of Caesar on Roger de Flor, 
39 ; menaced by Mongols, Venice, 
and French princes, 41-2 ; civil 
strife with grandson, 48, 57-9 ; 
refuses to co-operate in crusade 
planned by Marino Sanudo, 49 ; 
seeks aid of papacy against Turks, 
85. 

— , Andronicus III, set upon by 
Turks on wedding journey, 48 ; 
captures Salonika, 58 ; deposes 
grandfather, 59 ; defeated by 
Osmanlis at Pelecanon, and aban- 
dons Nicaea, 59-61 ; invites aid 
of Anatolian emirs in siege of 
Phocaea, 65-6, 86 ; makes over- 
tures to John XXII, 85 ; marries 
sister to Czar Michael of Bulgaria, 
87 ; on death-bed entrusts em- 
press and son and heir to care of 
Cantacuzenos, 91 ; assassinates 
brother, 181. 

— , Andronicus IV, charged with 
suggesting to Bulgarians that 
they keep his father prisoner, 
128 ; rebels against father, and 
is imprisoned, 149-51 ; escapes, 
imprisons father and brothers, 
and gives Tenedos to Genoese, 
153 ; treaty with Genoese, 163. 

— , John V (I), under guardianship 
of Cantacuzenos, 91 ; forced to 
marry daughter of Cantacuzenos, 
and to accept father-in-law as 
co-emperor, 94 ; exiled by Canta- 
cuzenos to Tenedos, 99 ; returns 
from exile, and forces John and 
Matthew Cantacuzenos to abdi- 
cate, 103 ; at the mercy of Ork- 
han, 106-8 ; unpopularity of, 
with Byzantines, 115; treaties of, 
with Murad, 122, 128, 136 ; fails 
to send aid to Balkan crusaders 
at Maritza, 122 ; tries to get aid 
from Venetians against Osmanlis, 
128 ; goes to Buda to seek aid 
from Louis of Hungary, and is 
made prisoner by Bulgarians, 
128-9; release secured by Amadeo 
of Savoy, and promises to submit 
to Roman Church, 129-30 ; visits 
Rome, and becomes Catholic, 



376 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



134-5 ; last desperate appeal to 
Pope, 137 ; war with Alexander 
of Bulgaria, 139 ; passes over 
Andronicus, and raises Manuel to 
imperial purple, 149 ; blinds son 
Andronicus at Murad' s command, 
150 ; refuses to receive fugitive 
Manuel at Constantinople for fear 
of Murad, 152 ; gives Tenedos to 
Venetians, 153 ; aids Osmanlis to 
conquer Philadelphia, last By- 
zantine possession in Asia, 154, 
197 ; treaty with Genoese, 152-3 ; 
ignominious death of, 198. 

Palaeologus, John VII (II), rebels 
against grandfather and uncle, 
197 ; co-operates with Osmanlis 
against Manuel, 199-200, 237-8, 
243 ; becomes co-emperor with 
Manuel, 238-9 ; banished by 
Manuel to Lemnos, 259. 

■ — , Manuel II (I), ransoms father 
from Venetian merchants, 135 ; 
serves in Ottoman army, 136, 149, 
154, 187, 197 ; made co-emperor 
by father, 149 ; fails in con- 
spiracy to drive Osmanlis from 
Serres, and has to seek pardon 
of Murad at Brusa, 151-2, 231 ; 
gives Bayezid privileges in Con- 
stantinople, 199 ; fails to enlist 
support of Pope and Western 
princes, 200, 206, 233, 239; 
marries son to Russian princess, 
232 ; receives aid from Boucicaut, 
236-9 ; accepts John VII as co- 
emperor, 238 ; unsuccessful visit 
to Europe, 240-3 ; expels Os- 
manlis from Constantinople, and 
offers to become vassal of Timur, 
259 ; appeals to Rome and 
Venice for aid against Timur, 
260. 

— , Michael IX, unsuccessfully 
opposes Turks in Anatolia, 35 ; 
at Adrianople, 39 ; flees before 
Turks of Halil, 40. 

■ — , Theodore, serves in Ottoman 
army, 149 ; imprisoned by An- 
dronicus IV, 153 ; summoned, as 
ruler of the Morea, to do hom- 
age to Bayezid at Serres, 171, 
200, 229 ; invites Osmanlis to 
enter the Morea to aid him 
against Frankish lords, 228 ; 



defeated by Osmanlis at Megalo- 
polis, 230 ; tries to dissuade 
Manuel from trip to western 
Europe, 240. 

Palatchia, 286, 294-5. 

Papacy, and Eastern crusades, 41, 
85 ; invited to intervene to save 
Constantinople from Osmanlis, 
95 ; tries to raise crusades against 
Osmanlis, 122, 129, 132, 136-8, 
141, 153, 201-2, 235-6, 241 ; 
consistently denounces traffic of 
Italian republics with Moslems, 
154. (See also under Popes.) 

Pasha, origin of this title, 71-2. 

Pergama, 284, 286, 291, 294. 

Petrarch, hatred of schismatics, 133. 

Philadelphia, 13, 34, 105, 154, 296, 
299. 

Philippe d'Artois, 212, 217-18, 223, 
225. 

— de Bourgogne, 202, 209-10, 212, 
218, 226, 236, 242. 

— le Bel, plans to retake Con- 
stantinople, 41-2 ; aids in con- 
quest of Rhodes, 44. 

Philippopolis, 114, 122, 139, 161-2, 
231. 

Phocaea, Byzantines and Anatolian 
emirs besiege, 66, 283, 296 ; John 
Palaeologus attacks at command 
of Orkhan, 107-8 ; not dependent 
upon Osmanlis, 299. 

Plochnik, battle of, 169. 

Popes : 

Gregory X, 164. 
Boniface VIII, 164. 
Clement V, 41-2, 44. 
John XXII, 85. 
Clement VI, 95. 

Urban V, 122, 129-32, 134-6, 141, 
164. 

Gregory XI, 136-8, 153, 164. 

Urban VI, 201. 

Boniface XI, 201-2, 235, 262. 

Benedict XIII, 202, 235-6, 241. 
Popova Shapkah, 143. 
Prilep, 158. 
Princes' Islands, 35. 
Pristina, 92, 144. 

Ragusa, first Christian state to 
make tributary treaty with Os- 
manlis, 127. 

Raia, meaning of the word, 77. 



INDEX 



377 



Rhodes, 43-4, 186, 205 ; grand 
master of, at Nicopolis, 219, 221 ; 
chevaliers of (see Saint John, 
Knights of). 

Rhodope Mountains, 140, 143, 147. 

Rilo, monastery of, 195. 

Riva, 237. 

Rodosto, 65, 101. 

Rumeli Hissar, 234. 

Rustchuk, 172. 

Saint John, Knights of, conquer 
Rhodes, 43 ; resist Turks, 44, 
283 ; capture Smyrna, 85, 283 ; 
conspire with Pope to seize the 
Morea, 240; lose Smyrna to Timur, 
258 ; relations with Cyprus and 
Anatolian emirates, 285-6, 295, 
297, 299-300. 

— Sophia, mosque of, 60, 93, 94, 
102, 154,233. 

Salona, duchy of, conquered by 

Bayezid, 229-30. 
Salonika, 40, 58, 65, 79, 92. 98, 100, 

121, 145, 181, 231. 
Samakov, battle of, 142-3, 160. 
Samarkand, 244, 251, 256, 260. 
Samsun, 191, 196, 291. 
Sangarius, 11, 12, 32, 38, 45, 302. 
Sarukhan, 65, 86, 158, 185-6, 191, 

228, 259, 283, 291, 295-6. 
Savoy, origin of armies of, 44. (See 

also Amadeo and Anna. ) 
Savra, battle of, 159. 
Scutari (in Albania), 160. 
Scutari (on the Bosphorus), 60, 64, 

94, 108, 234. 
Seljuk architecture, influence upon 

Ottoman, 275-6. 
Seljuks, invasions of Asia Minor, 

15-16 ; changes of religion, 26. 

— of Rum, contest Asia Minor 
with Byzantines, 13 ; relations 
with Osmanlis, 20-2, 32, 268- 
76 ; subject to Mongols, 270-2 ; 
end of dynasty, 297. 

Serbian Church, autocephalous, 
144-5. 

— empire of Stephen Dushan, 
86-90. 

Serbians, illusions of, concerning 
their fourteenth-century empire, 
86, 90, 175, 201 ; first enter 
Macedonia to help Byzantines 
against Turks, 41 ; aid Androni- 



cus II against his grandson, 58 ; 
conflict with Orthodox Church, 
89-90, 144-5; refuse to aid 
Byzantines against Osmanlis, 
102 ; defeated by Osmanlis at 
Maritza, 122-4 ; anarchy among 
chieftains of, in Macedonia, 144 ; 
defeated by Osmanlis at Cer- 
nomen, and lose Macedonia, 145- 
8 ; become subject to Osmanlis, 
160-2 ; help Murad inKaramanian 
campaign, and are punished for 
looting, 167 ; form league against 
Murad, and are defeated at 
Kossova, 168-78 ; treachery of 
their nobles, 173 ; cast fortunes 
definitely with Osmanlis, 182-3 ; 
aid Bayezid in Karamanian cam- 
paign, 188 ; last of Dushan' s 
following disappear in Mace- 
donia, 201 ; fidelity of, to Bayezid 
at Mcopolis, 220 ; fight in Otto- 
man army at Angora, 252. 
Serres, 58, 144, 147, 152, 158, 161, 
200, 229. 

Shah-Rokh, son of Timur, 255, 258. 
Shehabeddin, 69, 277-80. 
Shuman, 172. 

Sigismund, first invasion of Bul- 
garia, 188, 193-5 ; becomes king 
of Hungary, and sends threat to 
Bayezid, 193 ; tries to get sup- 
port of Italian republics against 
Bayezid, 205-7 ; leads Nicopolis 
crusade, 210-24 ; boastfulness of, 
before Mcopolis, 216 ; flees from 
battle-field, 220-1 ; character of, 
193,222. 

Silistria, 196. 

Silivria, 237. 

Sinope, 191, 291-2, 296, 297. 
Sis, 282. 

Sisman, John, 128, 140-3, 170, 

172-3, 194-6. 
Sivas, 190, 270, 272, 274, 287, 297, 

300 ; destruction of, by Timur, 

243, 245-8. 
Slavery, Greek abhorrence of, 116 ; 

connivance of Italian republics in, 

165. 

Smyrna, 11, 79, 85, 185, 258-60, 

270, 283, 286, 299-300. 
Sofia, 142, 158, 160-2, 172, 231. 
Soleiman pasha, son of Orkhan, 

100-1, 105, 108, 111. 



378 



THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 



Soleiman Shah, grandfather of 
Osman, 20, 266. 

— tchelebi, son of Bavezid, 195, 
245-8, 252-3, 257-61. 

South Slavs, character of, 170. 

Sozopolis, 129, 142. 

Stanibul, origin of name, 199. 

Stephen Lazarevitch, kral of Serbia, 
vassal and brother-in-law of 
Bayezid, 182-3 ; rights for Os- 
manlis at Nicopolis, 220, and at 
Angora, 253. 

Stracimir, 140-1. 

Sugut, 12, 22, 25, 33, 63, 115, 285. 

Taharten, emir of Erzindjian, 246. 

Tarsus, 24, 216. 298. 

Taurus Mountains, 24, 125, 187, 289, 

298, 300-2. 
Tchataldja, 115. 
Tchorlu, 105, 112, 162. 
Tekke, emirate of, 158, 165-6, 186- 

7, 285, 289, 297-8. 
Tenedos, importance of, to control 

Dardanelles, 152 ; struggle of 

Venice and Genoa for, 152-5 ; 

John VII Palaeologus banished 

to, 236. 

Thessaly, Ottoman conquest of, 

147, 228-30. 
Thingizlu, 69. 

Thomas, despot of Janina, 159. 

Timur, origin of name, and con- 
quests of, 244 ; charges against 
Bayezid, 190, 245-6; destroys 
Sivas, 247-8 ; makes overtures to 
Occidental princes, 249 ; invades 
Asia Minor, and crushes Bayezid 
at Angora, 250-4 ; degrades 
Bayezid and Despina, 255-6 ; 
pushes to Aegaean Sea, and cap- 
tures Smyrna, 257-60 ; death of, 
260 ; infirmity of, 244 ; lacked 
constructive policy in conquests, 
257, 260-1 ; restores Anatolian 
emirs deposed by Bayezid, 257, 
259, 283, 288, 290, 292-3, 294. 

Timurtash, 142, 158, 166, 187, 188- 
9, 254. 

Tirnovo, 140, 142, 172, 194-6. 
Tokat, 190, 250, 287, 298. 
Trebizond, 13, 162, 270, 280, 288, 

291, 293, 297, 299. 
Tughra, origin of, 127. 
Turin, treaty of, 155. 



Turk, connotation of word in Otto- 
man Empire, 78-81, 228 ; lacks 
family ties and family name, 267. 

Turkey, connotation of word in 
fourteenth century, 107. 

Turkish chieftainship elective rather 
than hereditary, 54, 276. 

— raids in Aegaean Sea, Macedonia 
and Thrace, 36-40, 65, 84, 185-6, 
261, 283. 

— emirates of Asia Minor stronger 
than Osinanlis, 30, 274, 290, 301-2. 

— refugees from Thrace in 1912. 16. 

— women not veiled in fourteenth 
century, 157. 

Turks, character of Anatolian, 15. 
Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia, 168-70, 178, 
183-4, 201. 

Ulubad, 68, 298. 
Uskub, 88, 174, 183. 

Valona, 159. 
Varna, 129, 172. 

Venetians, interfere in Byzantine 
dynastic quarrels, 35 ; invited by 
Clement V to co-operate in re- 
conquest of Byzantine Empire, 
42 ; menaced in Aegaean by 
Turks, 84 ; relations with Ste- 
phen Dushan, 88-90 ; wars with 
Genoese, 96-7, 152-5, 262 ; urged 
by fellow countrymen to oppose 
Orkhan, 107 ; fail to protect 
Byzantines against Murad, 128 ; 
detain John Palaeologus because 
of debts, 135 ; refuse to contribute 
seriously to crusade against Os- 
manlis, 137 ; struggle with Genoa 
for Tenedos, 152-5 ; sapped by 
prosperity, 163 ; make com- 
mercial treaty with Murad, 164 ; 
opposition to Hungarians, 169 ; 
indifference to Murad' s conquests, 
170 ; refuse to buy Lemnos from 
Byzantines, 200 ; fail to aid in 
Nicopolis crusade, 203-7 ; in 
Athens and Salonika, 230-1 ; 
prefer to curry favour with 
Bayezid rather than defend Con- 
stantinople, 233 ; reception of 
Manuel Palaeologus and their 
pacifist policy, 240 ; alarm over 
appearance of Osmanlis on Adri- 
atic, 243 ; help Ottoman army to 



INDEX 



379 



cross to Europe after Angora, 
261 ; at Palatchia, 294-5. 

Visconti, Giovanni Galeazzo, 131, 
210, 236, 240. 

Viza, 139. 

Vukasin, 145-6, 159, 173. 

Wallachia, Ottoman invasions of, 
192, 224. 

Wallachians, aid Bulgarians against 
Hungarians, 141 ; aid Osmanlis 
against Hungarians, 192 ; worth 
of, as soldiers, 192 ; aid Osmanlis 
in Bulgaria, 193 ; withdraw dur- 



ing battle of Nicopolis, 221 ; suc- 
cessfully resist Ottoman invasion 
after Nicopolis, 225. 

Wenceslaus, 210, 235. 

Western Europe, inability to under- 
stand Eastern Europe, 132-3. 

White Sheep, dynasty of, 190, 245. 

Widin, 140, 141, 142, 196, 215. 

Yakub, killed by brother Bayezid 

after Kossova, 180. 
Yakub, general of Bayezid, 230. 
Yamboli, 140, 142. 
Yeni Shelr, 28, 32, 34, 258, 275. 



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